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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the main obstacles to political development in the Kurdistan region 
(KR) in the period 1992-2014. It is an interdisciplinary study of recent history, culture, 
economics, politics and regional relations with a focus on political outcomes. Data from 
documentary sources is supported by semi-structured interviews with political stakeholders. 
The first part reviews the current historical, geographic, economic and social situation in the 
KR. The analysis is informed by theories of political development and the dependency 
school. The second part concentrates on the socio-political organisation of the KR, the 
performance of government and parliament, the role of the political parties and tribes. The 
third part evaluates the external relationships between the KR and the neighbouring 
countries, namely Iran and Turkey, and their impacts, positive or negative on political 
development.  
The aim of the study is to explain the interaction between all these aspects in the process of 
political development. Modern political institutions are considered as a tool for development, 
manifested in general elections in a multiparty system. However, the finding of this thesis is 
that the political institutions in the KR themselves obstruct the process of political 
development. The main political parties have a strongly centralised hierarchical structure 
without devolution of power or rotation of leaders. The parties cooperate with chieftains and 
tribes to stay in power. A further finding is that the level of political development in the KR 
corresponds to its relationships with neighbouring countries and the stability or instability of 
the region. The existence of Kurdish populations in the neighbouring countries and the 
standing of the KR as a non-state entity has had a negative impact on the ability of the 
Kurdistan regional government to follow an independent policy for development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Thesis Is Dedicated  
To  
My wife Parishan. 
To 
Zhia, my little son, who left us one week after he was born in October 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
Acknowlegments 
 
Let me begin with a word of thanks to my wife, for her endless support and love. Thank you 
to my parents.  
I heartily thank my supervisor Professor Howard Davis for his insightful support and 
professional advice, which contributed to the successful completion of the study as well as 
my personal and professional development.  
I also wish to express my appreciation to my friends notably: Dr. Murad Hakeem, Dr. Izaddin 
Rasool, Nykola Lee, Sadettin Taşçi, Sartip Khalis, Sherwan Hashm, Zana Dizayee, Kovan 
Brifki, Wrya Majid, Dldar Sedqi, Aras Abdulkarim, Hardy Mahmood and Muhhamad 
Waladbagi. 
I wish to use this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to this study’s participants 
who shared their time, knowledge, experience, and cooperation with this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. i 
Acknowlegments ................................................................................................................. iii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ iv 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... viii 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... ix 
Declaration and Consent ..................................................................................................... x 
Preface .................................................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter One: Identifying the Kurdistan Region .............................................................. 4 
Geography and History ...................................................................................................... 4 
Demography ..................................................................................................................... 10 
Economy .......................................................................................................................... 13 
Society ............................................................................................................................. 22 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 26 
Chapter Two: Literature, Concepts and Theories ......................................................... 28 
Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 28 
Key Concepts and Theories ............................................................................................. 35 
Formulating the Problem ................................................................................................. 47 
Chapter Three: The Concept and Definitions of Political Development ...................... 50 
The Political Development School .................................................................................. 51 
Elaboration and Critique .................................................................................................. 53 
The Dependency School .................................................................................................. 62 
Critiques of the Dependency School ............................................................................... 69 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 73 
Chapter Four: Design and Methodology of the Study ................................................... 76 
Research Design and Strategy ......................................................................................... 77 
Research Practice and Fieldwork ..................................................................................... 80 
Fieldwork Problems ......................................................................................................... 83 
Chapter Five: Foundations of Government and Parliament (1992-2005).................... 86 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 86 
Establishing Government and Institutions ....................................................................... 88 
The Role of Parliament .................................................................................................... 96 
v 
 
Consequences of Division for Political Development ..................................................... 99 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 104 
Chapter Six: The Policy Shift Towards Unification and the Rise of Opposition ...... 106 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 106 
Government Structure: Broad Unity and Creation of Trust (2006-2009)...................... 106 
Parliamentary Structure 2005-2009 ............................................................................... 111 
Towards the Rebuilding of Institutions: Government Structure (2009-2014) ............... 113 
The Third Term of Parliament: Rising Political Opposition ......................................... 117 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter Seven: Structure and Function of the Political Parties ................................. 124 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 124 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): Background .................................................. 125 
The KDP’s Congresses and the Issue of the Leadership ............................................... 127 
The KDP After the Uprising .......................................................................................... 130 
The Formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) ........................................... 137 
The PUK’s Structure and Congresses ............................................................................ 139 
The Leadership Issue in the PUK .................................................................................. 144 
The Gorran Movement (GM)......................................................................................... 146 
The Gorran Movement and Society ............................................................................... 148 
The Islamic Parties and Society: Background ............................................................... 153 
The Islamic Union (IU) .................................................................................................. 155 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 159 
Chapter Eight: Social Fabric, Tribe and Politics ......................................................... 161 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 161 
Background to Tribalism in Iraq .................................................................................... 163 
Social Fabric in the Kurdistan Region ........................................................................... 170 
Connection Between Tribes and Political Parties .......................................................... 176 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 184 
Chapter Nine: Fragile Entity, the Impact of Regional Intervention on Political 
Development ..................................................................................................................... 185 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 185 
Turkey: 1992-2003, Conflict and Cooperation .............................................................. 186 
Turkey: 2004-2014: From Conflict to Economic and Political Cooperation ................ 190 
Iran: 1992-2003: Making Problems for the Status Quo ................................................. 199 
Iran: 2004-2014: A Factor of Continuous Instability .................................................... 202 
vi 
 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 206 
Chapter Ten: Conclusion ................................................................................................ 208 
Critique of Political Development Theories .................................................................. 208 
Analysis and discussion ................................................................................................. 213 
Internal Factors: The Problematic Nature of the Political Parties ................................. 215 
Internal Factors: The Tribal Base Obstacle ................................................................... 220 
External Factors ............................................................................................................. 223 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. 231 
References......................................................................................................................... 250 
 
  
vii 
 
List of Figures 
Chapter One 
Figure 1.1: Division of the KR by the 36th Parallel ............................................................... 7 
Figure 1.2: Kurdistan Regional Territory and Disputed Areas ............................................. 8 
Figure 1.3: Dominant Parties in the Kurdistan Region (1996-2003) .................................... 9 
Figure 1.4: Labour Force Status of the Kurdistan Region ................................................... 16 
Figure 1.5: Corruption in Governmental Apparatuses ........................................................ 22 
Chapter Six 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of Parties’ Seats in the KR Parliament in the Third Term .......... 117 
Figure 6.2: Responses to the Question of Monitoring Government by Parliament .......... 118 
Chapter Seven 
Figure 7.1: KDP’s Organisational Structure...................................................................... 132 
Figure 7.2: The PUK’s Organisational Structure .............................................................. 142 
Figure 7.3: The GM’s Organisational Structure ................................................................ 151 
Figure 7.4: The IU’s Structure ........................................................................................... 158 
Chapter Eight 
Figure 8.1: Iraqi Ethno-Religious Groups and Major Iraqi Tribes Map ........................... 162 
Figure 8.2: The Structure of a Tribe .................................................................................. 174 
Chapter Nine 
Figure 9.1: Country Rankings for Turkey’s Exports ......................................................... 196 
  
viii 
 
List of Tables                                                        
Chapter One                                                                                                                  
Table 1.1: UN-Habitat (displaced people in the KR) .......................................................... 11 
Table 1.2: Size of the KR Population .................................................................................. 11 
Table 1.3: Food Coupons in the KR .................................................................................... 12 
Table 1.4: The Kurdistan Region’s Villages (reconstructed following the uprising 1991 up 
to 2002) ................................................................................................................................ 13 
Table 1.5: The Kurdistan Region’s Allocated Budget by Trillion Dinar (parliament and 
judiciary council spending excluded) (1200 Dinar= US$1) ................................................ 19 
Table 1.6: Poverty Rate as a Percentage of the Total Population of the KR ....................... 20 
Chapter Three 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Political Development and Dependency Theories. ................... 72 
Chapter Five 
Table 5.1: The Kurdistan Region’s Parliaments and Cabinets ............................................ 87 
Table 5. 2: Results of Parliamentary Elections (1992) ........................................................ 89 
Chapter Seven 
Table 7.1: Parallel Roles in the Political Bureau and Government ................................... 134 
 
 
 
 
   
ix 
 
Abbreviations 
EU: European Union 
GM: Gorran Movement 
GNP: Gross National Product 
HCDP: Human Capacity Development Programme 
ID: Iraqi Dinar 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IMK: Islamic Movement of Kurdistan  
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Sham 
IU: Islamic Union 
KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party 
KDPD: Kurdistan People’s Democratic Party 
KDP-I: Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran 
KFM: Kurdish Freedom Movement 
KR: Kurdistan Region 
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government  
KRSO: Kurdistan Region Survey Organisation  
OFFP: Oil for Food Programme 
PASOK: Kurdistan Socialist Party 
PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party 
PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
UN: United Nations 
USA: United State of America  
USCR: United States Committee for Refugees 
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WB: World Bank  
x 
 
Declaration and Consent 
Details of the Work 
I hereby agree to deposit the following item in the digital repository maintained by Bangor 
University and/or in any other repository authorized for use by Bangor University. 
Author Name: ……………………………………………………………… 
Title: ………………………………………………………………………… 
Supervisor/Department: ............................................................................... 
Funding body (if any): .................................................................................... 
Qualification/Degree obtained: …………………………………………… 
This item is a product of my own research endeavours and is covered by the agreement below 
in which the item is referred to as “the Work”.  It is identical in content to that deposited in 
the Library, subject to point 4 below. 
Non-exclusive Rights 
Rights granted to the digital repository through this agreement are entirely non-exclusive.  I 
am free to publish the Work in its present version or future versions elsewhere. 
I agree that Bangor University may electronically store, copy or translate the Work to any 
approved medium or format for the purpose of future preservation and accessibility.  Bangor 
University is not under any obligation to reproduce or display the Work in the same formats 
or resolutions in which it was originally deposited. 
Bangor University Digital Repository 
I understand that work deposited in the digital repository will be accessible to a wide variety 
of people and institutions, including automated agents and search engines via the World 
Wide Web. 
I understand that once the Work is deposited, the item and its metadata may be incorporated 
into public access catalogues or services, national databases of electronic theses and 
dissertations such as the British Library’s EThOS or any service provided by the National 
Library of Wales. 
xi 
 
I understand that the Work may be made available via the National Library of Wales Online 
Electronic Theses Service under the declared terms and conditions of use 
(http://www.llgc.org.uk/index.php?id=4676). I agree that as part of this service the National 
Library of Wales may electronically store, copy or convert the Work to any approved 
medium or format for the purpose of future preservation and accessibility.  The National 
Library of Wales is not under any obligation to reproduce or display the Work in the same 
formats or resolutions in which it was originally deposited. 
 
Statement 1: 
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being 
concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree unless as agreed by the University for 
approved dual awards. 
Signed ………………………………………….. (candidate) 
Date …………………………………………….. 
Statement 2: 
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.  Where 
correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked 
in a footnote(s). 
All other sources are acknowledged by footnotes and/or a bibliography. 
Signed …………………………………………. (candidate) 
Date ……………………………………………. 
Statement 3: 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying, for inter-
library loan and for electronic storage (subject to any constraints as defined in statement 4), 
and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. 
Signed …………………………………………. (candidate) 
Date ……………………………………………. 
xii 
 
NB: Candidates on whose behalf a bar on access has been approved by the Academic 
Registry should use the following version of Statement 3: 
Statement 3 (bar): 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying, for inter-
library loans and for electronic storage (subject to any constraints as defined in statement 4), 
after expiry of a bar on access. 
Signed …………………………………………… (candidate) 
Date ………………………………………………       
                                                                                   
Statement 4: 
Choose one of the following options  
a)      I agree to deposit an electronic copy of my thesis (the Work) in the Bangor 
University (BU) Institutional Digital Repository, the British Library ETHOS 
system, and/or in any other repository authorized for use by Bangor University 
and where necessary have gained the required permissions for the use of third 
party material. 
 
b)      I agree to deposit an electronic copy of my thesis (the Work) in the Bangor 
University (BU) Institutional Digital Repository, the British Library ETHOS 
system, and/or in any other repository authorized for use by Bangor University 
when the approved bar on access has been lifted. 
 
c)      I agree to submit my thesis (the Work) electronically via Bangor University’s 
e-submission system, however I opt-out of the electronic deposit to the 
Bangor University (BU) Institutional Digital Repository, the British Library 
ETHOS system, and/or in any other repository authorized for use by Bangor 
University, due to lack of permissions for use of third party material. 
 
Options B should only be used if a bar on access has been approved by the University. 
 
 
xiii 
 
In addition to the above I also agree to the following: 
1. That I am the author or have the authority of the author(s) to make this agreement and do 
hereby give Bangor University the right to make available the Work in the way described 
above. 
2. That the electronic copy of the Work deposited in the digital repository and covered by 
this agreement, is identical in content to the paper copy of the Work deposited in the Bangor 
University Library, subject to point 4 below. 
3. That I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the Work is original and, to the best 
of my knowledge, does not breach any laws – including those relating to defamation, libel 
and copyright. 
4. That I have, in instances where the intellectual property of other authors or copyright 
holders is included in the Work, and where appropriate, gained explicit permission for the 
inclusion of that material in the Work, and in the electronic form of the Work as accessed 
through the open access digital repository, or that I have identified and removed that material 
for which adequate and appropriate permission has not been obtained and which will be 
inaccessible via the digital repository. 
5. That Bangor University does not hold any obligation to take legal action on behalf of the 
Depositor, or other rights holders, in the event of a breach of intellectual property rights, or 
any other right, in the material deposited. 
6. That I will indemnify and keep indemnified Bangor University and the National Library 
of Wales from and against any loss, liability, claim or damage, including without limitation 
any related legal fees and court costs (on a full indemnity bases), related to any breach by 
myself of any term of this agreement. 
 
Signature: …………………………                       Date: ………………………… 
1 
 
Preface 
A variety of issues influence political development in the Kurdistan region (KR), sometimes 
called the Iraqi Kurdistan region or the North of Iraq. Internally, the region lives within a 
complex socio-political situation, where political parties co-exist with deadly rivals, have 
their own armed forces, are divided administratively, relate to tribal organisations and where 
there is both unity and disunity between political elites. Externally, the geographical location 
and neighbouring governments’ policies often influence the stability, instability and level of 
political development in the KR. The legal status of the region is even more controversial. 
From 1992 to 2005, the KR had autonomy under the umbrella of international support and 
United Nations (UN) resolutions. In the decade which followed from 2005, it has had federal 
status in the framework of the Iraqi constitution. In 2014, with ISIS controlling the majority 
of the Sunni part of Iraq, the president of the KR explicitly demanded an independent state.   
This timespan is necessary to understand the context and pathways of political change. The 
puzzle is that, while a federal system normally consists of several regions, Iraq has only one 
federal region. Despite this, the KR has been able to behave somewhat like an independent 
state, especially in the oil and military sectors. On the other hand, the region continues to 
face difficulties in defining its authority and boundaries within the status quo. In response to 
this complex situation, this thesis aims to describe and analyse a variety of aspects of its 
formal structure (executive and legislative apparatuses), informal aspects of political life (the 
tribal fabric) as well as neighbouring states' relationships with the Kurdistan regional 
government (KRG) and its political parties. To understand this complexity, the resources of 
more than one theory, a range of data and a mixed methodology need to be utilized to be 
able to provide a comprehensive view of political development in the KR.  
This thesis is a study of the Iraqi Kurdistan region from 1992 to 2014. It is written from the 
perspective of theories of political development and informed by political theory, 
international relations and theories of political culture. The thesis is divided into ten chapters, 
which together support the argument that in the KR there is an inconsistency between two 
types of structure. On the one hand, there is a multi-party system, with a parliament and 
political competition which mainly corresponds to western democratic ideas. On the other 
hand, these bodies are dominated by political parties based on Marxist-Leninist structures 
even if this is not explicitly acknowledged; and behaviour which is shaped by a mixture of 
Sharia and western secular laws. In fact, there is a problematic relationship between the 
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existence of the apparatuses of democracy and the practice of these apparatuses in everyday 
life and policy. 
Chapter One focuses on the characteristics of the KR and investigates its historical origins, 
its controversial geographic location, demography, economic sector and social features to 
highlight those subjects that have an impact on the process of political development in the 
KR in the current situation.  
Chapter Two, on the state of knowledge, key concepts and theories, reviews the available 
research literature on the subject of political development in the KR. Concepts from state 
and institution theory, political elite theory and geopolitical theory are used to frame key 
questions and to explore the main challenges of political development in the KR, including 
the problematic de facto status of the KR and foreign influences upon its development.  
Chapter Three, on the concept and definition of political development, presents the key ideas 
in political development thinking. The chapter provides an overview of political 
development theories, both from the political development tradition itself, as well as the 
more critical ideas of the dependency school.  
Chapter Four, on the design and methodology of the study, reviews the theoretical context, 
methodology, methods and type of data collection. The study uses both qualitative and 
quantitative data and it is a single case study that compares the periods of government from 
1992 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2014. 
Chapters Five and Six explore the formal government administrations of the KR 
chronologically, and their role in political development, both negative and positive. Chapter 
Five on the foundations of government and parliament (1992-2005), examines the building 
of governmental and parliamentary apparatuses as a step towards institutionalization. This 
success, however, led to the division of the government into the administrations of Erbil and 
Slemani which amounts to deinstitutionalisation and regression in political development. 
The next chapter, on the policy shift towards unification and the rise of opposition (2006-
2014), examines the second experiment in political life in the form of the united cabinet and 
explores the reality of unification on the ground, both in the period when opposition was 
absent (the fifth cabinet) and when opposition emerged (the sixth and seventh cabinets).  
Chapter Seven, on the structure and function of the political parties, addresses the role of the 
political parties. It is a continuation of the previous chapters. The programmes, structures 
and perspectives of the main political parties of the KR are assessed and analysed. The issue 
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of their leadership is also considered. The long-established political parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP since 1946) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK since 1976) 
receive more attention than others. The influential Islamic parties emerged after the uprising 
in 1992 and the Gorran (Change) Movement was not established until 2009. 
Chapter Eight, on the social fabric, tribes and politics, investigates the impact of tribes on 
political parties and vice versa and the consequences of these relationships for the process 
of political development. It explains why political parties and the government sometimes 
reinforce and sometimes marginalise the role of tribes.  
Chapter Nine deals with the impact of foreign intervention and political development in the 
KR, especially in terms of the relationships between the neighbouring countries of Turkey 
and Iran and the Kurdistan region’s political parties and government. Turkey has the greatest 
impact on the region, compared with other regional states. The reason is that, historically, 
the KR was part of the Ottoman Empire; it is the recognized outlet for the KR to connect 
with Europe economically; and the majority of the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) 
headquarters and safe havens exist within the KR’s border areas with Turkey. Finally, the 
Turkish government still maintains military bases inside the KR.  However, this does not 
mean that other states are unimportant, only that Iran and Turkey have the most direct role 
in the stability or instability and development or undevelopment of the KR.  
Chapter Ten, conclusion, explains the contribution to knowledge made by the research, 
highlights the weaknesses of theories of political development and explains how in the KR, 
the democratic political institutions created after 1992 were broadened and supported by 
western countries, but have continued to behave in a way that remains a barrier to further 
political development. 
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Chapter One: Identifying the Kurdistan Region 
The aims of this chapter are: to lay the foundations for the following chapters, to describe 
the physical and natural resources of the KR which shape the material context for political 
development, to provide some historical context in order to explain the distribution of the 
economic and social resources of the KR according to existing quantitative and qualitative 
data, and finally to contribute to a better understanding of obstacles to political development 
in the KR.  
A political entity contains certain characteristics which contribute directly to the nature of 
political development in the entity. They include: 1. Geographical location – with its various 
features (landlocked or sea access, fertile and non-fertile land, climate, natural or imposed 
boundaries) and history 2. Demography 3. Economy (agricultural, industrialized or non-
industrialized economy, individual income, the rate of unemployment and the distribution 
of wealth) 4. Social characteristics (especially education). The combination of these 
elements plays a crucial role in the political development process of any society. They are 
considered in turn. 
Geography and History 
Some of the fundamental elements in the developmental process are geographical: the 
physical characteristics of a territory, the relationship between earth and its people, between 
people themselves and with others (O’Shea, 2006). The geographical location of a territory 
is often linked to recognition of its boundaries by foreign entities1. The territoriality and the 
sovereignty of an entity not only defines the state authority, but also includes the 
communication function of boundaries with other states. This identification can be 
considered as a part of the institutionalisation of the entity and ways to “distinguish between 
us and them, inside and outside, domestic and foreign” (Newman and Paasi, 1998:187-195; 
Minghi, 1963; Paasi, 1997; O’Shea, 2006).  
According to Pye (1963) more communication inside a society leads to more development. 
Based on this claim, communication with the outside world should have a similar role. 
However, this communication function will differ from one geographical location to another. 
For instance, in the European Union (EU), communication across borders has become open 
                                                 
1 Many Kurds believe that they are victims of their geography and that this geography plays a crucial role in 
their destiny. This type of thinking can impact on the ability of a nation to choose its trajectory of development, 
leading to negative consequences for Kurdish society and its policies.   
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and fluid. In contrast, the boundaries of many countries, in the Middle East for example, 
indicate that the political role of geographical boundaries is more than just the physical 
borders that separate countries.  
Geographical boundaries represent a dynamic relationship between place and society, people 
and their symbols (Murphy, 1990). This does not mean that geography is an agent, but refers 
to the political imagination that geography is able to play through political ideology. This 
dynamic, for example, has been a key consideration in the conflict between the KRG, its 
political parties and the central Iraqi government, which is an ongoing process, but without 
armed conflict since 1992.  
The KR is a landlocked location and the surrounding countries all have problems with the 
Kurdish question. This feature has negative consequences for its relationships with the 
external world, especially in terms of economic development. Such a landlocked location 
creates difficulties in connecting with the global marketplace, which serves to build the 
infrastructure of a society (Hill et al, 2012). As the KR does not have access to sea routes, 
its economic development can be threatened by pressure from other governments in the 
region. The political aspects of geography will be considered further in Chapter 2.  
Historically, Kurdistan means ‘the land of Kurds’ (Kelly, 2010; Culcasi, 2006; Yildiz, 2004). 
It has frequently been controlled by others. In the seventh century, when Arabs diffused 
Islam and dominated Kurdistan, they used the word Kurd for the inhabitants of the Zagros 
Mountains, which are located in Iran and the present-day KR. In the twelfth century, the 
Turkish Seljuk prince Saandjar built up a province named Kurdistan which is now located 
in Iran. The term then became used in the sixteenth century for all those areas that had a 
majority of Kurds located in them (Yildiz, 2004:7; McDowell, 2007:6).  
The impact of this complex geography on politics in the KR can be traced back to when 
Greater Kurdistan was divided between the Safavid and Ottoman Empires in 1639. Later, 
the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 divided Greater Kurdistan between Russia, France and 
Britain. Due to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the latter power refused to be 
part of this agreement. When the Ottoman Empire no longer featured on the world map after 
World War I, Syria was under French mandate and Iraq was under British mandate. The 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 divided Greater Kurdistan between Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. 
Southern Kurdistan (the KR) became part of Iraq (Ismail, 1991; Dahlman, 2002; O’Leary 
and Salih, 2005; Culcasi, 2006; Gunter, 2009).  
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Iraqi Kurdistan, after the granting of autonomy in 1970, was divided again into two parts, 
one of them being the current KR and the other (with a Kurdish majority population) being 
run by the Iraqi government, referred to in Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution as the so 
called ‘disputed areas’. Again, in the 1990s, the autonomous part (three Northern provinces) 
was divided geographically, administratively and politically by internal war into two parts, 
with some further sub-divided areas, as discussed in the following paragraphs. These ‘Hard 
Divisions’, as will be seen, continued to have serious repercussions for the social fabric of 
society and created socio-political cleavages between the segmented parts that can be 
described as ‘Soft Divisions’.  
With this compartmentalization, the occupier states began to transform the demographic 
features of the areas with majority Kurdish populations, either by changing the Kurdish 
names of cities and locations or by removing Kurds and replacing them with other ethnic 
groups to create a non-Kurdish dominant ethnic group in each of these countries. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, this process reached its peak after the Ba’ath regime seized power in 1963, with 
apartheid policies and the Anfal campaigns and chemical bombings in 1988, forced 
settlements and the Arabization of Kurdish territory. These deeds ultimately led to the deaths 
of around 200,000 people and destroyed more than 4000 villages or more than 80% of rural 
settlements (Kelly, 2010; Dahlman, 2002; O’Shea, 2006; Natali, 2010; (Yesiltas, 2014:50).  
In its transformation attempts, the Ba’ath regime used politically charged terms to motivate 
the Iraqi Arab population such as changing the name of Kirkuk to Ta’amim (which in Arabic 
means nationalization) or the Anfal campaign, which refers to a Sura or a chapter of the 
Quran, which announces war against atheists and takes their property as spoils, or instead of 
using the term ‘Kurdistan’, calling it Shimalona Al-habib which means ‘our lovely North’. 
Furthermore, the majority of investment aimed at developing the country was designated 
either for the Arab part of Iraq or for military forces to be used against neighbouring 
countries or against Iraqi ethnic groups and religious creeds (Ismael and Ismael, 2005). 
According to Karami (1997:206) and Natali (2010) 12% of the total Iraqi budget was 
invested in the KR. The outcome of this policy was a lack of infrastructure in the region. 
Even today, household water supplies, sewerage systems, sufficient electrical power and 
advanced agricultural tools are lacking in the KR.  
The landmark political events in the Iraqi state since 1921, such as the 1958 revolution, the 
1968 coup, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990 attack on Kuwait have all led to negotiations 
with Kurds about the solution to the Kirkuk province problem or demarcation of the 
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boundaries of the KR (Hiltermann, 2008). The demands frequently reiterated by the Kurds, 
in 1919 by Sharif Pasha and Sheikh Mahmoud, in 1944 by the Hiwa party, in 1961 by the 
Eiylol (September) revolution, in the negotiations of 1970, the new revolution in 1975, the 
1991 negotiations, in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, Article 58, 2004) and 
finally in the Iraqi constitution in 2005 (Article 140) have consistently aimed to integrate the 
disputed areas into the KR.  
Disagreement between Kurds and the central government over the definition of boundaries 
was a factor in the failure of the autonomy agreement on 11 March 1970 (March Manifesto, 
Beyannamey yazdei Azar). This disagreement was replaced by an accord between Iran and 
Iraq in 1975, and was named the Algeria Agreement and spelled the demise of the Kurdish 
autonomous claim that included all majority Kurdish population areas. Even the 36th  parallel 
that was drawn in 1991 by the international community to protect the Kurds, divided Iraqi 
Kurdistan by a straight line (see Figure 1.1). All of these external interventions, up to now, 
have doubled the challenges in the process of establishing a self-ruling entity and have 
shaped the endless struggle between the KR and successive Iraqi governments. 
Figure 1.1: Division of the KR by the 36th Parallel  
 
Source: KRG Website (2013): http://old.krg.org/reference/images/IKR09.jpg   
After the uprising in 1991, Kurdistan political parties controlled the provinces of Erbil, 
Duhok and Slemani and established their authority. The territory of Iraqi Kurdistan consists 
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of 18.5% of Iraq’s total land. Until 2014, 51.4% was under the control of the Baghdad 
government and the rest was governed by the KRG (Yosif, 2012) (see Figure 1.2). In 2009 
the KR parliament approved the draft constitution which in Article (2:1) states that  
Kurdistan-Iraq is a geographical and historical entity made up of the Duhok province 
in its present administrative boundaries, as well as the provinces of Kirkuk, Slemani, 
and Erbil Provinces, as well as the districts of Akra, Shiekhan, Sinjar, Telkeif, 
Karakush, and the sub-districts of Zummar, Basheka, Aski Kalak of the Nineveh 
province and the districts of Khanakeen, Mandili of the Diyala province according to 
their administrative boundaries before 1968 (KRG, 2009).  
Identifying the boundaries of the KR in this way provoked a reaction from regional states 
(Kelly, 2010), which led to the suspension of the referendum on the KR draft constitution.  
Figure 1.2: Kurdistan Regional Territory and Disputed Areas 
 
Source: Crisis Group Middle East Report No 88, (8 July 2009) ‘Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Tiger 
Line’. The green line has been adjusted to add more detail and the towns of Chamchamal, Khanaqin and Kifri 
have been added.  
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In 2014 with the ISIS invasion, Kirkuk province and the majority of the disputed areas came 
under the control of the KRG and their destiny still remains uncertain. These areas could be 
incorporated into the KR peacefully or there could be another conflict between the KRG and 
the Iraqi government, depending on future events in the context of the KR, Iraq and the wider 
region. On the other hand, the resistance of the KRG to the ISIS invasion created more 
international respect and support for the KR and raised the level of its demand for federalism 
to an independent state. 
While the KR is made up of the provinces of Duhok, Slemani and Erbil, these areas have 
been segregated between different political parties since 1996. Geographically, they are 
divided between the KDP, the PUK (and the Islamic factions until 2003). Each of them 
manages the areas they control according to their own laws (see Figure 1.3).  
Figure 1.3: Dominant Parties in the Kurdistan Region (1996-2003) 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook, cited in Martin van Bruinessen (2005) ‘Iraq: Kurdish challenges’. 
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In addition, some Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish frontier areas have until the present time been 
controlled by the PKK. For this reason, in studying the geography and history of the KR it 
is important to consider how it has been segmented both internally and externally. 
Geographical and geopolitical divisions have contributed to permanent instability and great 
difficulty for strategic plans or development. 
Demography 
Measurement of the KR’s population in Iraq has always been subject to constant revision for 
reasons which are more political than technical2. Khalil Mohammad (2013), the head of the 
statistics board of the KR stated that the Iraqi and Kurdistan political parties do not wish to 
have accurate population statistics because the exact rate of each religious and ethnic group 
will be clear and this would conflict with the political parties’ interests (cited in Tahir, 
2013:8).  
Through the forced resettlement process (in Arabic Mojemia’at and in Kurdish Komelga 
Zore Mlékan), the Iraqi regime before 1991 forcibly removed 150,000-200,000 Kurds into 
the Arab parts of Iraq and the majority of them were killed by the regime. The regime also, 
displaced approximately 800,000 people inside the KR and more than 200,000 Kurds 
migrated to Iran (Dahlman; 2002:289; Yildiz, 2004:25-26; Kelly, 2010:718; Romano, 2005). 
The estimated number of victims of these processes differs from one source to another. 
However, they account for thousands of victims. Table 1.1 shows the figures from the UN-
Habitat report of 2000, that out of 3,515,921 (the population based on the use of Food 
Coupons3) in the KR, 805,505 or 22.91% of inhabitants had been displaced. 
                                                 
2 The population census is a political issue. In the Ba’ath period the regime tried to limit the recording of the 
Kurdish population by excluding them from the census and the Kurds declined to participate for fear of 
conscription. Many of them joined the Kurdish movement and lost their Iraqi ID. After 2003, the central 
government and the KRG agreed to solve the problem of disputed areas and the KR’s budget by holding a 
census. They agreed to allocate 17% of the total Iraqi budget to the KR until the census was held. To decide 
the future of the disputed areas either as part of central government or part of the KR needed a process of 
normalization and census and finally referendum which should have been completed in 2007. The central 
government’s fear of losing these areas led to delay. The problem is not technical but political. Since 2005, 
many different elections have been held in Iraq without technical problems, but the government continues to 
announce that they have technical problems in conducting a census.  
3 The Food Coupon is the food ration that Iraqi citizens have had since 1996 according to the Oil For Food 
Programme (OFFP) and since that time the Food Coupon has been used as the data for measuring the population 
of Iraq. However, the problem with this method is that because citizens benefit from the Coupon, families often 
do not delete the names of dead persons. According to the Kurdistan Region Survey Organisation KRSO 
(2014:9) 98.6% of all households in the KR use Food Coupons.  
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Table 1.1: UN-Habitat (displaced people in the KR) 
Expelled in the 70s and 80s              372,347 
Victims of the 1988 Anfal campaign 222,839  
Victims of ethnic cleansing                   58,706  
Victims of the in-fighting 77,004 
Returnees from Iran                                40,145 
Refugees from Iran                                   491 
Refugees from Turkey                              2,552 
Victims of conflicts with the PKK                   15,335 
Others     16,086 
Total     805,505 
Source: ‘The Internally Displaced People of Iraq’, (UN-Habitat cited in Fawcett and Tanner, 2002:16).  
According to the reports of the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) and Human 
Rights Watch, the population displaced by the Arabization process was between 100,000 
and 120,000. The PUK announced that the number of displacements in its zone of influence 
was 59,699 while the KDP’s number was 58,000 (Fawcett and Tanner, 2002: 16-17).  
Concerning the total population, based on pre-statistics from the Ministry of Planning 
(2013:2-3) in the KR, the population is more than five million. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the 
KR’s population growth from 2009-12. 
Table 1.2: Size of the KR Population 
Governorate Population  Estimated population 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Erbil 1,717,284 1,820,120 1,929,114 2,044,635 
Slemani 1,803,792 1,855,265 1,908,207 1,962,660 
Dohuk 1,177,714 1,234,499 1,294,022 1,356,415 
Total (KR) 4,698,790 4,909,884 5,130,461 5,360,948 
Source: Ministry of Planning (2013): ‘Population Statement’, 
http://www.mop.gov.krd/resources/MoP%20Files/PDF%20Files/Population_Statememt.pdf (Pre- statistic 
refers to the process of the numbering of houses and the numbers of each family as a first step toward a final 
census in the KR). 
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The statistics in this table include: 1. Those who live in the KR and whose Food Coupon is 
related to the KR.  2. Those who live in the KR but whose Food Coupon is related to the 
central government. 3. Residents of the disputed areas that are controlled by the KRG. 4. 
This number does not include the Shingal district which has a resident population of 400,000.  
Table 1.3: Food Coupons in the KR 
Governorate 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Erbil 1,428,677 1,462,650 1,517,762 1,582,053 
Slemani 1,635,193 1,670,457 1,709,678 1,760,076 
Dohuk 961,880 1,005,190 1,038,744 1,087,413 
Total (KR) 4,025,750 4,138,297 4,266,184 4,429,542 
The size of the population does not accord with an exact census. It is the process of pre-census (numbering and 
inventory) that was done in 2009 and 2010 by the KRG’s Board of Regional Statistics under the supervision 
of the UN. Source: Ministry of Planning (2013:2-3): ‘Population Statement’, 
http://www.mop.gov.krd/resources/MoP%20Files/PDF%20Files/Population_Statememt.pdf  
In addition, the number of refugees that have emigrated from Syria since the events of 2011 
and inside Iraq following the ISIS invasion reached 1,400,000 or one third of the total KR 
population (UNI, 2014).  
Undoubtedly, the growth of the population and the development process have influenced 
each other, especially through their link to government capacity and available resources. 
Any plan for development will benefit from a steady population growth rate. However, due 
to the abnormally rapid increase in the KR, population demands can exceed the 
governmental capacity to meet these demands. For instance, at the start of the school year in 
2014, many schools where displaced families had settled did not open and electricity 
shortages doubled in frequency.  
Concerning population distribution, 77.8% of residents live in the governorate centres, and 
the remaining 22.2% live in districts, sub-districts and rural areas (Ministry of Planning, 
2011:5). The numbers of residents in urban areas is at odds with the economic features of 
the KR, which is a primary agricultural and non-industrial region. The growth of urban areas 
and population is not a response to the growth of economic activities or more employment 
opportunities. Rather, it is a result of the Ba’ath policy of the destruction of villages 
especially up to 1991 (see Table 1.4).  
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Table 1.4: The Kurdistan Region’s Villages (reconstructed following the uprising 1991 up 
to 2002) 
Governorate Number of 
villages 
Destroyed 
villages 
Reconstructed 
villages 
Remaining 
villages to 
reconstruct 
Erbil 1,497 1,205 800 405 
Dohuk 1,123 809 470 339 
Slemani 2,035 1,992 1,350 642 
Total  4,655 4,006 2,620 1,386 
Source: KRG Website (2013): http://old.krg.org/about/ministries/reconstruction/index.asp 
In the 1970s around 80% of the KR population lived in villages (Berwari, 2013:134). By 
1991 this proportion had reversed, with nearly 80% living in urban areas. The Slemani 
province has 83.2% of urban residents, while the Dohuk province has 27.5% of urban 
residents (KRSO, 2014:7). Even after the rebuilding of the rural areas by the KRG, their 
settlers suffered from a lack of services, which again resulted in the evacuation of these areas 
(Kurdistan Review, 2014). Consequently, the extension of urban regions has not 
automatically lead to economic transformations, such as the emergence of a middle class.  
Economy 
Economic development as a part of the development process requires a combination of 
political stability, governmental economic activity and private sector activity in a 
competitive atmosphere. The Iraqi state relies mainly on oil extraction and nearly 99% of its 
exports and 95% of its revenue comes from the oil sector (UNI, 2013:1). Successive coups 
in the first and the second decades of the Republican era, a powerful centralization of the 
economy and the declarations of war against the Kurds, Iran and Kuwait damaged the 
economic sector and led to the greatest portion of Iraq’s income being devoted to military 
expenditure. According to Ismael and Ismael (2005:612) Iraq's public expenditure on 
military services as a percentage of GNP in 1960, 1987 and 1990 was 7.3%, 30.2% and 
27.4% respectively.  
The outcome was the stagnation of the economy and war debts reaching around US$100 
billion. Rebuilding the destroyed country required inputs of double this amount (Anderson 
and Stansfield, 2004:84; Al-Khafaji, 1988). The Kuwait invasion provoked an international 
embargo on Iraq. The uninterrupted process of the militarization of society to keep the 
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regime in power further ruined human capacity and the pursuit of an ethnic policy doubled 
the challenges of the rebuilding process. Added to this picture, is the damage caused by 
sectarianism in Baghdad after 2003, which continued up to the rise of ISIS in 2014 and 
resulted in an increase in military expenditure.  
The KR is rich in natural resources. The land and the climate have the ability to produce 
variety of vegetables and fruits. Agricultural land represents about 42.5% of the total area of 
the KR, of which 87.6% is rain fed (37.2% of the region) and 12.4% is irrigated (5.3% of 
the region’s land) (Ministry of Planning, 2011:1; Gafor, 2005). During the 1980s, the KR 
contributed 25-30% to all of the food production in Iraq (WFP, 2001:4).  
However, before the uprising, due to the destruction of villages by the Ba’ath regime, and 
after the uprising as a result of the Oil for Food Programme (OFFP) and the internal war, the 
shrinkage of local markets and an increase in the rate of employment by political parties, 
this sector was almost completely destroyed. Now Iraq imports the majority of its goods 
from abroad. For example, importing wheat from Australia involves Iraq spending half of 
its total price on transportation, despite the fact that it can be produced in the KR (Natali, 
2010). The USAID report (2008:5-14) stated that in 2007 the KR imported 65% of its total 
food consumption. Yet the region produces 50% of Iraq’s wheat, 40% of its barley, 98% of 
its tobacco, 30% of Iraq’s cotton, and 50% of its fruit.  
Economic activity in the agricultural sector has continued to decline. In 2003, around 35% 
of the KR’s population engaged in agriculture as the main source of their income. By 2012, 
this rate had reduced to 9% of the total population. Total governmental investment in this 
sector was US$ 677 million from the KR’s total budget between 2006-2013, of which 48% 
was for growing crops and 52% for animal farming (Kurdistan Review, 2014: 156-157). In 
2014, 6.63% of the total forcework was active in this sector (Ministry of Planning, 2014:39). 
In addition, there is a shortage in providing agricultural services, which reduces the farmers’ 
motivation. The government has created a state of dependency, through its reliance on the 
import of essential goods, leading to political dependency.   
There are reasons for the backwardness of agriculture. Firstly, the Ba’ath regime policy 
destroyed the agricultural infrastructure, subsidized essential goods, used petrodollars and 
spent the income of the state on military service. In an interview, Muhamad Ra’auf4 the 
agricultural minister in the fifth cabinet, pointed out that the Ba’ath regime tried to make the 
                                                 
4 Interview with Muhamad Ra’auf. 
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KR an agricultural backyard for other parts of Iraq, but it built the strategic warehouse for 
agricultural products outside the KR or in the Arab part of Iraq. This meant that the 
government prevented the accumulation of capital in the KR, by controlling or destroying 
the infrastructure of the region, which was mainly agricultural.  
Secondly, after the uprising in 1991, foreign aid5 agencies did not target the rebuilding of 
the infrastructure, but sought an opportunity to find markets in which to sell their products. 
The majority of the basic goods came from abroad at cheaper prices than those for domestic 
goods (McDowell, 2007). Thirdly, the backwardness of agriculture relates to the rivalry 
between political parties to increase their cadres and pay themselves salaries even in the rural 
areas (often without any duties, which in Kurdish is called the Bin Diwar, meaning the 
person who lies in the shade of the wall and gains a salary). The budget came from 13% of 
the Iraqi total budget that was allocated to the KR. Fourthly, after 2003, around 17% of the 
total Iraqi budget coming from the oil sector was allocated to the KR, which strengthened 
the government-parties’ capacity to ‘employ’ people. It destroyed the agricultural sector 
because of the transformation of the workforce from the agricultural sector to the 
government-parties’ sectors6. Finally, contaminated land and landmines have harmed the 
agrarian sector. After the internal war, some farmers obtained livestock from foreign 
agencies, but many livestock died from disease and a lack of medicines or from landmines.  
Concerning the workforce, as Figure 1.4 shows in 2012, the economically active workforce 
(15-64 age range) constituted 38.4% of KR residents which is a low rate. Among men 65.7% 
and 12.2% women were in the labour force (Ministry of Planning, 2014:26-7). The 
unemployment rate in 2012 was 7.4%, down from 17.9% in 2009 (Ministry of Planning, 
                                                 
5 The aid programme improved to some extent the local economy and the recovery from poverty and 
malnutrition. However, it spread corruption and inequality in society due to the control of the distribution of 
the food and its trade by local figures such as Aghas, Sheikhs and entrepreneurs who had connections with 
political parties. Also, it helped to reinforce the PUK and the KDP due to the UN agencies, which dealt with 
them directly (Leezenberg, 2005; Natali, 2007; Natali, 2010). 
6 After 2005, the government followed the policy of rebuilding the agricultural sector by funding farmers for a 
certain period after which the farmers had to repay the loaned amount. However, this policy did not succeed, 
due to the import of agricultural commodities, lack of governmental support for domestic production and the 
high value of the Iraqi Dinar (ID) currency after 2003, compared to the currencies of neighbouring governments 
that facilitated agricultural trade between the region and these governments. For instance, in 2013, the 
governmental wheat price in Iran was 720 Toman per kilo (nearly 23 US cents at the time). Iraqi smugglers 
bought wheat from Iranian farmers at 1200 Toman which benefitted both, but it impacted negatively on the 
agricultural sector of Iraq as a whole (News (2013) BBC Persian, 10 May). Meanwhile, the governmental price 
of high quality wheat in the KR in the same period was 792 Iraqi Dinar or US 66 cents (News (2013) Rudaw, 
03 June). 
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2011:1). Another report from this ministry, “Strategic Planning for Developing the Kurdistan 
Region for the Years 2012–2016”, announced a strategy to reduce the unemployment rate to 
4% in 2016 (Ministry of Planning, 2012). However, this plan needs a stable political situation 
that cannot be guaranteed in the KR, because of frequent changes in Iraqi domestic and 
regional political conditions. The best example was the cutting of the KR’s budget in 2014, 
the inroads of ISIS, the influx of refugees into the KR and the halving of the oil price since 
2015. All of these factors have had an impact upon the increase in unemployment, which 
has forced many young people to seek a better life in Europe. 
Figure 1.4: Labour Force Status of the Kurdistan Region 
Source: Ministry of Planning (2014:26) ‘Capacity Building at the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Organization 
Through Data Collection’. (Note: the total population in this figure is different from total in tables 1.2 and 1.3, 
although they all come the Ministry of Planning). 
The other sectors of economic activity, particularly since 2005, are the oil sector and 
housing. The alteration from a de facto unit to a federal one in 2005, strengthened the 
region’s capacity to invest in the oil sector. Oil extraction by international companies 
formally brought the KR into an international economic network. From 2007 to 2013, total 
investment in the oil and gas sector was US$15-20 billion. This can be compared with 
investment in the agricultural sector (US$677 million from 2006-2013) (Kurdistan Review, 
2014:91). The challenge is that the KR, as Leezenberg (2005:633) has stated, has become a 
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“rentier state”7 more than a productive one, through its reliance on the petrodollar rather than 
investment in renewable resources and human capacity. 
In 2009, for the first time and formally, the KRG extracted oil using a Norwegian company 
(DNO Company). Until 2013, more than forty companies from nineteen different countries 
including Total, Exxon Mobil and Chevron entered the KR to invest in the oil and gas sector 
(Iraq-Business News, 2013). The problem in studying the oil industry in the KR is the 
disparity between official documents on oil revenue and the Parliament Oil and Gas 
Commission which make it difficult to access accurate statistics. Opposition parties in the 
sixth, seventh and eighth cabinets challenged the lack of transparency in oil revenues. 
Unusually, the oil sector does not have its own ministry building. The question is: can 
political and economic development be improved while this sector suffers from a lack of 
transparency and a fragile market as happened in 2014 and 2015? 
According to the Resource Governance Index (RGI, 2013), a website that investigates the 
quality of the management of natural resources (oil, gas and the mineral sectors), in 2013 
within the group of 58 countries that produce 85% of the world’s total petroleum, Iraq ranked 
29th. It is classified as a weak country that has failed in its management of this sector in terms 
of accountability and transparency. The concealment of information by interested elites and 
the institutional weakness in the surveillance of this sector leads to a lack of transparency. 
Oil revenues can be used as a political economic lever to control society, which weakens the 
process of institutionalisation and allows elites to dominate society.  
Further, the ability of the KR to compete in regional and world oil markets is limited. Other 
main actors in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran and Kuwait dominate the 
                                                 
7 Although the KR is not a state, the concept ‘rentier state’ is relevant to understanding the relationship between 
governance and the economic system. In this thesis the term refers to the political economy of the KR and is 
used to show how the elites in power in the period before 2003 as well as after, have benefitted from a non-
productive economy which relies on oil revenue. As Beblawi (1987:384) stated, there is no pure rentier 
economy; any country has other sources of income to some extent. But as this thesis explains, oil is the major 
source of income in the KR. Many other countries in the Middle East also rely on income from oil. However, 
because oil extraction in the KR is in its early stages and because of the fall in the oil price in 2014, it is difficult 
to compare the KR with other states in the region. The main similarity is that the political elites have a tendency 
to rely on oil to strengthen their power through the direct allocation of oil revenue to public services instead of 
via an efficient tax system. As Ross (2001) argues, the states which are rich in oil resources are more likely to 
be dictatorships, while Luciani (1994) similarly argues that rentierism obstructs the development of civil 
society. This thesis does not argue that the rentier economy is the only obstacle to political development in the 
KR. Socio-political factors are equally important, alongside the type of economy. For further information about 
the rentier state see: Anderson (1987), Brynen (1992), Chaudry (1997), Luciani (1988, 1990, 1994, 1995) and 
Ross (2001). 
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market and have more ability to extract oil. There are also other powerful economic and 
political actors such as Turkey. For the KR, the best solution in this situation is to improve 
other economic sectors, that can be relied upon in both crisis and non-crisis periods.  
After oil, the main investment sector is the housing sector. As well as making the oil sector 
a main source of revenue, the government promoted housing projects that turned land into a 
source of income. The relative political stability in the KR compared to other parts of Iraq 
fuelled a boom in the housing sector. The total investment in this sector from 2006-2012 was 
US$13.7 billion (Kurdistan Review, 2014:120-121). This sector also suffers from 
corruption. The Reform Commission, Lejney Çaksazi, that was launched by the president of 
the KR in 2011 reported that, after one year a total of 174 corruption cases were investigated, 
involving 95 officials from the KRG. The corruption was in various sectors of the 
government, including the “health sector, the allocation of public property to businesses, 
governmental employment opportunities, administration and government bureaucracy, the 
tendering of public projects, budget transparency, investment policies, public housing 
projects, agricultural lands, market monopolies, and fuel and domestic energy” (KRP, 2012). 
Citizens complain about the monopoly of this sector by officials and the high price of houses. 
The housing shortage in rural areas means that 37% of rural residents suffer from 
homelessness (Ministry of Planning, 2011).  
The fourth source of incme is the tourism sector. Erbil the capital city of the KR was chosen 
as the Arab world capital for tourism in 2014. Investment in this sector began in 2007, and 
the total investment from this date until 2013 was US$3 billion, and the revenue in 2012 was 
US$650 million (Kurdistan Review, 2014:187). According to investment law in 2006, 
construction and tourism investment projects are free from tax, which again can lead to 
injustice in the distribution of income (Kurdistan Parliament, Law No 4, 2006). However, 
the ISIS occupation has had a negative impact on activity in this sector. 
For a better understanding of economic sectors, it is important to review other sources of 
income from the KR to complete the overall picture. 
After the establishment of the KRG in 1992, the main source of income was foreign aid. In 
1993, Turkey paid US$13.5 million to the KRG to obtain its backing in pursuit of the PKK 
(Chorev, 2007:4). To achieve a ceasefire between the KDP and the PUK, the US in 1996 
paid these parties US$11 million and in the same year the KDP opened the Haji Omran trade 
gate with Iran that earned $US100,000 daily (McDowell, 2007:389). Nearly two-thirds of 
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international aid for Iraq between 1992 and 1996 was allocated to the KR. Furthermore, 
during that period the government started trading with neighbouring countries. Trade 
revenue with the Turkish government reached almost US$750 million annually, and 85% of 
this trade was for the Erbil (KDP) administration. From 1992 to 2003, the Erbil 
administration gained $US1.5-2.5 billion from the renting of land and factories. During the 
same period, the British government, through its international development programme, and 
the UN in its budget for Iraq, allocated 78% and 65% to the KR and 22% and 35% for the 
rest of Iraq respectively (Natali, 2010:30, 31, 44, 58).  
Next, a portion came from the selling of oil by the Iraqi government (OFFP) after 1996. 
From the budget of the OFFP, 13% was allocated to the KR’s three provinces and 59% to 
another fifteen Iraqi provinces. The UN dealt directly with the Erbil and Slemani 
administrations without the mediation of the Iraqi government (OFF, 2003). The portion of 
13% was divided between Slemani at 43%, Erbil at 34% and the Dohuk province at 23%. In 
other words, 57% for the KDP zone and 43% for the PUK zone (from this 13% portion in 
six years the KRG received only 51% and the remaining 49% was kept in a French bank). 
In 2004-2005, the region received $US1.5 billion from this money (Leezenberg, 2005:639; 
Natali, 2007:1116-1120; Natali, 2010:54). In this finance map it is necessary to note that the 
population of the KR’s three provinces contains around one-fifth of the total Iraqi 
population. After 2005, nearly 95% of the KR budget came from 17% of the total Iraqi 
budget . All of these revenues and foreign aid helped the KR “to survive, but not to thrive” 
(Chorev, 2007:5). 
Table 1.5: The Kurdistan Region’s Allocated Budget by Trillion Dinar (parliament and 
judiciary council spending excluded) (1200 Dinar= US$1) 
Budget per year Amount (trillion) Investment budget Operational budget 
2007 7,847,660 2,285,556 5,518,287 
2008 7,628,783 2,879,079 4,674,842 
2009 8,857,263 2,303,338 6,553,925 
2010 11,432,176 3,543,074 7,889,102 
2011 13,950,670 3,852,000 ---------------- 
2012 15,245,797 3,678,437 10,624,518 
2013 16,942,749 5,333,791 11,507,171 
Source: collected from Kurdistan Region Parliament website 
(http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/Default.aspx?page=byyear&c=LDD-Yasa).  
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As Table 1.5 shows, the budget of the KR increased, but not because of a booming 
productive economy in its various sectors. According to the parliament Budget Law for 
2013, the region faces a deficit of 1,684,900 trillion ID (Kurdistan Parliament, Law No 1, 
2013). The deficit has caused banks to fail, delayed salaries, suspended housing mortgages 
and marriage loans. It reflects insufficient economic planning in the KRG and over-
emphasises oil revenues. At the beginning of 2016, the budgets for 2014 and 2015 has not 
approved because of financial crisis. Furthermore, the KRG in 2016, cut off the salary of its 
employment from 15% to 75% (KRG, 2016).  
Besides this, it is important to mention the role of the Kurds in the diaspora, especially in 
the 1990s. As the value of the Iraqi currency declined relative to foreign currencies, diaspora 
Kurds transferred money (Dollars and Euros) to their families. This process had two benefits: 
firstly, it reduced the burden on the government to provide for citizens’ livelihood; secondly, 
it helped the region’s economy by bringing foreign currency into the KR alongside the Iraqi 
Swiss Dinar which is recognized as an international currency of Iraq used solely in the KR. 
Other parts of Iraq used the copied Dinar (currency issued by the Baghdad government), 
which is only used inside Iraq. However, with all these revenues the living conditions for 
many people remain difficult. Table 1.6 shows the rate of poverty in the KR. 
Table 1.6: Poverty Rate as a Percentage of the Total Population of the KR 
Provinces  Governorate 
centre 
Other urban places Rural areas 
Erbil  0.9 3.5 10.1 
Slemani 0.5 3.8 7.8 
Dohuk 3.6 5.9 20.5 
Source: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (2011:24) ‘Confronting Poverty 
in Iraq’.  
According to this data the average rate of poverty in the KR is different from one place to 
another and between rural and urban areas7. Further, according to a report published by the 
                                                 
7 The poverty in this table, according to the IBRD (2011:10-14), is measured by 1) “an empirical indicator to 
measure living standards which is referred to as per capita expenditure; 2) a threshold value (poverty line) that 
distinguishes the poor from the non-poor via a cost-of-basic-needs method. 3, a set of indices that describe 
poverty in the population such as levels of expenditure on consumption (food, housing, services, education), 
per capita income, and the calories that each person needs daily. Iraqi households with a monthly per capita 
expenditure of less than 76,896 ID are categorised as poor and more than this amount is categorised as “non-
poor”.  
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World Bank (2015:3) the poverty rate in the KR “increased from 3.5 percent in 2012 up to 
8.1 percent in 2014’’. After 2003, the number of rich people (millionaires and billionaires) 
increased. The majority of this rich stratum is composed of those who run communications, 
oil, building and construction, cigarette and alcohol companies, as well as major traders in 
construction, food and medicines. In other words, those who have either political influence 
or political power (Karim, 2015). 
Overall, in the KR the political position has overlapped with economic status in a negative 
relationship which contrasts with the political development idea (See Chapter 3), which 
claims that economic development will lead to political development. Obviously the KR has 
partly developed in the construction sector, oil extraction, foreign trade and international 
relationships have also been established, but they have not contributed directly to political 
development. The control of the economic system has reinforced the political status quo.   
Often, political officials use their positions to deliver economic outcomes or vice versa. 
Economic inequality correlates with political inequality, which means the economically 
powerful person has more political influence. Huge companies are registered in the name of 
a person close to officials to cover the official’s corruption (Abdulla, 2013). This situation 
can be considered as the result of the absence of political competition over a long period of 
time and the absence of accountability that is related to political inequality, both of which 
generate regressive results for political development (Acemoglu et al, 2008:181).  
Economic progress as a process is more than just economic growth. It includes both growth 
and change which focuses on the qualitative aspects of change in production, attitudes, 
behaviours and improvement of institutional performance (Meier, 1995). The infrastructure 
of the KR is incompatible with what is actually essential for the country. For example, many 
luxury cars exist without having insurance or standard roads or enough petrol (often drivers 
have to wait hours for a tank of petrol or its price is double that of other parts of Iraq). The 
number of hotels has increased, while the region suffers from a lack of hospitals (Rubin, 
2012).  
All of these phenomena are rooted in corruption. As Benavot (1996) argued, corruption and 
inequality in the distribution of capital and goods leads to the formation of a nondemocratic 
system with underdevelopment in the country. The figure below illustrates the level of 
corruption according to public opinion. 
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Figure 1.5: Corruption in Governmental Apparatuses 
Q: ‘In your opinion how high is the level of corruption in the government institutions?’ 
 
Source: Tojinewe Centre (2011) ‘Current political issues of the KR’, Kurdistan Intellectual Foundation. 
As the figure shows, participants in this survey overwhelmingly agree that corruption in 
governmental organisations is at a high level.  
In short, in the KR up to 2014, the economic sector boomed quantitatively but in terms of 
qualitative measures, it still suffers from monopolization and a non-productive economy, 
inadequate fiscal policy, and inequality in the distribution of national wealth.  
Society 
The social profile includes religion, ethnicity, language and education issues. Issues of class 
and gender are also relevant (see Chapter 7 and 8). The religion of the majority of KR citizens 
is the Sunni creed of Islam. Other religious groups such Christian, Jewish, Yezidi, Mandai, 
Sabian, Zoroastrian and Kakai exist and practice their religious rituals. In all these religions, 
converting to another religion is either forbidden or very difficult and the converter may face 
death. Secularization of society is at a low level and Islamic clerics have a powerful role in 
society. The sixth Article of the draft constitution states that Islam is a source of legislation. 
Ethnically, the region consists of various ethnic groups of Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs, 
Assyrians and Armenians. This variety is mirrored in the diversity of languages. According 
to law, each minority has the right to be educated in its mother tongue and in Article 14 of 
the draft constitution, Turkmen and Assyrian are considered as official languages in the areas 
where they constitute the majority. Furthermore, this ethnicity is reflected in parliament in 
Too high, 61%
High, 29%
Low, 6%
Very 
low, 
2%
I don't know, 2%
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which Turkmens have five seats, Chaldeans and Assyrians have five together and Armenians 
one seat, which represents a quota with portfolios in the cabinet.  
The Kurdish language itself is divided into the Hawramani, Surani and Badinani dialects. 
The Surani dialect is official in the Suranian and Hawramanian areas and Badini in the 
Badinan area..Dialect variation is a normal phenomenon in any society, but its exploitation 
creates political problems. The diversity often leads to people not understanding each other. 
Political parties and their mass media in striving to gain peoples votes, play a negative role 
in deepening this language gap, by focusing on diversity and local dialects more than the 
formation of an official common language8. 
Another issue of social profile is education. In principle, education has a positive effect on 
development in parallel with other elements. According to some points of view, compared 
with other aspects such as urbanization, its impact is even more obvious9 (Meyer and 
Rubinson, 1975). Scholars have made connections between political development, 
democracy and education and have argued that the rate of education (especially higher 
education) leads to increased institutionalisation of the political system. An educated person 
has more information about politics, more motivation to participate in politics and behaves 
in a way that supports democratic values (Benavot, 1996; Patil, 2012; Lipset, 1959; Lerner, 
1958). However, Acemoglu et al (2005) argue that education by itself does not lead to 
democracy and political development.  
To achieve political development through education, the type of education system and its 
basis (democratic secular education, teachers, textbooks, technology, adequate buildings and 
other educational facilities) together with family and social education, play a pivotal role. In 
the KR, tuition is free. Through the self-administration period, the number of students 
increased, but in terms of quality, this sector suffers fundamentally from a poor ratio of 
teachers to students, classrooms with more than 35-40 students, a lack of adequate textbooks 
and inadequate buildings. Most school textbooks are published abroad. Often, students use 
second hand books from previous years, while new books are sold on the black market. 
                                                 
8 Many words have political implications. For example, for the word ‘woman’ the KDP uses Afrat and the PUK 
uses Jin and the IU uses the term of Xwişk.  For the word ‘student’, the KDP uses Qutabi and the PUK uses 
Xwendkar. Even in official documents such as in Education Ministry forms, both words are written with the 
same meaning. 
9 This claim comes in contrast to Lerner (1958) who argues that urbanization leads to an increase in the 
educational level and then more modernization. The rise of ISIS challenged this idea fundamentally. However, 
both of them emphasise the importance of education in development (see also Winham, 1970). 
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There is the problem of the lack of a standard language in education. In universities the 
majority of students can speak only one of the Kurdish dialects. A system of booklets 
prepared by tutors is the norm, due to the lack of main references in the Kurdish language. 
According to the Minister of Education, this sector accounts for 24% of governmental 
employment (Kurdistan Review, 2014:167-171). 
According to KRSO (2014:7-8), the rate of participation in elementary school is 91.5%, in 
secondary school it is 59.8% and in preparatory school it is 36.9%. The total number of those 
who can read and write from the age of 10 and above is 67.8%. The main reason for leaving 
school is to participate in gaining a livelihood for the family (20.4%). Additionally, 7.2% 
cannot attend school because of a lack of schools in their area. However, the growth of the 
education system and participation in schools has not eliminated illiteracy. At the 
governorate level it stands at 13.6%, increases to 16.3% in the district and sub-district areas 
and rises to 25.4% in the rural areas (Ministry of Planning, 2011:118). The education system 
in the KR suffers from some fundamental problems: the frequently changing education 
system and its methods; the influence of religion; and its domination by political parties.  
Regarding religious education, Islamic studies begin in primary school based on the textbook 
of Islamic Education entitled Perwerdey Islami. Entering the upper year requires a pass in 
the religious module. In the first years of schooling the students’ ability to read and write is 
limited, and they are compelled to learn and memorize religious texts. Such lessons continue 
until entry into university. 
Concerning higher education, the participation rate increased from 4.9% in 2003 to 14.7% 
in 2009 with no increase in the number of teachers. The teacher-student ratio dropped from 
1:12 in 2004 to 1:19 in 2009 (Ministry of Planning (2011:3). The number of universities 
increased from 3 universities in 2003 to 18 public and 11 private universities in 2013 
(Kurdistan Review, 2014:173). 
However, after 1992, the opening of new universities mirrored the political rivalry between 
the PUK and the KDP. For example, the PUK in 1992 reopened Slemani University which 
had been closed by the Ba’ath regime. This happened at a time when the government did not 
pay the salaries of Salahaddin University staff for four months because of a lack of finance 
(Ala’Aldeen, 2013). As a response to the PUK, the KDP founded the University of Dohuk 
in the same year. In 2006, the University of Kurdistan in Erbil (British-Kurdish University) 
was opened by Nechirvan Barzani from the KDP. In 2007, the American University was 
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opened in Slemani by Barhan Salih from the PUK. The University of Chamchemal in the 
PUK Zone and Suran University in the KDP Zone are in the same situation. 
 The political parties’ domination of the educational centres, has weakened their scientific 
value. Not only in the universities, but even in the secondary schools, political parties hold 
elections to elect party representatives. Instead of emphasising improvements in the 
education system, national integration and spread of a spirit of tolerance, this process instils 
students with the concept of loyalty towards a party. The role of schools as a tool of 
socialization in the framework of the nation has changed to become a tool for introducing 
students to parties’ ideas10. What happens in the real world is different from what is taught 
in textbooks. For example, the students read The Nationhood (Niştımany), civic education, 
social education and human rights textbooks in a curriculum that is focused on human rights, 
tolerance, democratic principles and the history of the Kurdish fight for freedom, but in 
actual society, the concepts of the party are dominant, together with tribal values, and 
conflict.  
The influence of parties extends to the employment of those who support them (See Chapter 
7 and 8). In the universities often the spirit of partisanship dominates scientific discussion 
and shrinks the scope of critiques. Instructors are divided between political parties. The 
University Instructors’ Unions have power to influence employment procedures and 
university policies. Often instructors who want to be employed in the university sector have 
to go through these unions that belongs to political parties. The Student Unions in 
universities belong to the dominant political parties, often recording the students’ name and 
their political affiliations. By the end of the fifth cabinet this phenomenon had reduced but 
it still continues.  
The sixth cabinet began a reform of the higher education system under the name of the 
Human Capacity Development Programme (HCDP), and sent a number of students abroad. 
                                                 
10 Various Student Unions play a role in pursuing the party programme in schools and universities and often 
operate as a data collection wing for parties. If students wish to find a better occupation or university 
accommodation, it is advantageous for them to fill in their forms and accept the membership of political parties. 
Often these unions have the names of all students and their affiliations. Branches have monthly meetings with 
their members in schools, universities or their union buildings (dominant parties have formal offices in schools 
and universities) and discuss party issues. Generally, members pay a monthly subscription. Some of the 
political parties have become rich and do not charge such subscriptions. Further, university staff and school 
teachers have their own political party unions. In my employment as an instructor in the university, one of the 
political party unions supported me and without its support it was difficult to be employed. Having a sponsor 
or a mediator that knows a key official is equally important in employment. These unions are even able to find 
places for candidates for postgraduate studies.  
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Up to 2015 around 3,200 students out of 4,350 in the framework of this programme started 
their studies (Hawlati, 2015).  
The role that families play in the socialization of teenagers and children’s processes must 
also be taken into account. It may even have a greater influence than official education. The 
KR is a deeply politicized society. It is very rare that political debates do not happen between 
family members or relatives on political issues. Hence, the younger generation will be 
familiar with political affiliations and often all family members are followers or supporters 
of one party.  
The party domination of everyday life extends to the media. The overwhelming majority of 
media organizations based in the region belong to political parties. New social media such 
as Facebook play an important role in daily socio-political debates. The PMs of the fourth 
term have utilized Facebook to display the corrupt documents of previous cabinets on their 
pages and then to circulate them in the press. In short, all of these ideological influences 
undermine the role of education and instead make it a tool for political regulation, adapting 
citizens to the party-ization of society11.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped various dimensions of the KR: geographic, historical, 
demographic, economic, religious and educational, and their relevance to the process of 
political development. Although the Ba’ath regime deprived the KR of possibilities for 
development, the creation of the KR as a self-administrative regime after 1992 gave it the 
authority to manage its various natural resources. However, possessing natural resources is 
not enough to develop a country. How to manage them in favour of development requires 
an effective government.  
Different sources of economic activity and sources of income such as petrodollars, border 
crossings, airports, tourism and other governmental revenues constitute the KR’s revenues. 
The major sector of the economy in the KR is non-productive. Trade is mainly with Turkey 
and Iran which is again a shaky income source because of its relationship with political 
                                                 
11 In my interviews all participants agreed that the media belongs to the political parties, and they contributed 
to the disintegration of society more than integration, because of they reflect the idea of their parties which are 
in sharp competition with each other.  
 In Kurdish the term for ‘party-izing’ is ‘Be Hizbi Kirdin’, which means that a political party controls all 
aspects of society. It is not the same as the party-state term applied to the Soviet Union, because in the KR 
there is more than one political party. It has more negative than positive connotations. 
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interests that can impact on the economic relationship (see Chapter 9). This means that the 
durability of this type of economic growth is under question in the absence of an economic 
diversification policy and a degree of self-sufficiency, especially in the agricultural sector.   
Generally, between 2005 and 2013, individual incomes increased in the region, but the 
inequality of distribution of wealth, market price fluctuations and the reason for this increase 
have to be considered. The slogan of “Kurdistan is the next Dubai” that has been promoted 
by some officials since the fifth cabinet illustrates the trajectory of development in the KR.  
To understand political development of the KR, there needs to be a review of ideas from the 
literature on political development. The next chapter focuses on the literature, concepts and 
theories related to political development in the KR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Chapter Two: Literature, Concepts and Theories 
The Kurdistan Region was attached to the state of Iraq in 1926, five years after the 
foundation of Iraq as a state in 1921, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
and the redrawing of boundaries by the powerful and victorious states. Their aim was to 
form zones of influence and to keep a balance among different local ethnic groups and states 
to serve their political and economic interests. These factors combined to bind the KR to 
Iraq and create a country with negative features of government collapse, coups and 
successive devastating wars against its citizens and neighbours, as subsequent history shows.  
The Kurds in Iraq, since the establishment of this state have fought, politically and militarily, 
to obtain their political rights. This endless conflict and tension has been the context for 
development in the KR and indeed in Iraq as a whole. This situation has not just prevented 
forward movement, it has also put development in reverse; especially during the Ba’ath 
regime from 1963 and more specifically when Saddam Hussein held power from 1979 to 
2003 (albeit for Kurdistan until 1991). After the Kurdish uprising, Rapereen, in 1991 the 
circumstances changed dramatically due to the establishment of the Kurds’ self-autonomy 
within the Iraqi state.  
This period of promise was not without turbulence in its political life, which is reflected in 
socioeconomic aspects. At the beginning of the uprising, the KR’s political parties which 
were previously forbidden from exercising political activities, obtained the authority to 
establish political institutions in the framework of a democratic system by passing an 
electoral law and holding parliamentary and presidential elections. However, democracy 
faced challenges, due to the unfamiliarity of political parties with democratic principles. This 
turbulence makes it necessary to focus on political development in this region and to know 
what the impediments that confront this process are. 
Literature Review 
The following review is based on books, theses and articles on the subject of political 
development in the KR in the English language. Most of the scholarly publications on Iraqi 
Kurdistan (after 1992 called the Kurdistan region as well) have been written by historians 
and orientalists who have drawn attention to the social structure of Kurdistan, Kurdish 
Freedom Movements (KFM) and the kind of political relationship between its political 
parties and central government. The contribution of authors such as Bois (1966), Meho and 
Maglaughlin (1968), Kreyenbroek and Sperl (1992) Gunter (1993, 1996, 2009) and 
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McDowall, (2007) are important sources for the history of the KR and Greater Kurdistan as 
well. This corpus, which is mainly descriptive, reflects the social life and economic activity 
of the KR, at a time when it was mostly based on subsistence agriculture and small scale 
production of handicrafts for local markets or, as they explain, the relationship between 
Kurds and central governments and their political movements. However, they were either 
written before or at the outset of the uprising or do not give full consideration to aspects of 
political development in the KR. The following pages present and summarise the main 
academic contributions in a chronological order1. It is necessary to mention that one 
characteristic of literature on the KR, is that it tends to be uncritical of other works and there 
is little interaction between the sources. One reason could be the recent rise of the KR as a 
political entity and the underdevelopment of its economic, political, educational, 
communication and social aspects. Some studies on the KR focus on specific themes such 
as human rights, ethnicity, political parties, tribes and Kurdish political movements. 
There are relatively few writings about political development in the KR. One is Identity, 
Nationalism and the State System: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan by Sophia Isabella Wanche 
(2002). This research discusses Kurdish national identity in the framework of tribe, 
language, class and religion and its impact on the Kurdish nationalist movement before 1991 
and the political development of this movement. It also considers the relationship between 
the Kurds and neighbouring states. The main focus of this thesis is national identity, the 
nationalist movements in Iraqi Kurdistan and the impact of international and regional policy 
on these movements. However, with the establishment of the KRG in 1992 and the 
declaration of the federal system, recognized in the Iraqi constitution in 2005 (Article. 117, 
No 1), the nationalist movements acquired government status. Since this thesis was written 
socio-political changes have affected the KR’s national identity and its political 
development. What is more, development through a political movement is different from 
                                                 
1 There is a wide literature on the Kurdish nationalism in Greater Kurdistan, which it is goes beyond the purpose 
of this thesis. The majority of studies focused on issues of language, history, ethnicity and culture. However, 
through the thesis, imlicitly the reader can understand the elements on nation building and nationalism 
sentiment in the KR. See: Phillips, D, L. (2015) The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East: London: 
Transaction Publishers Bengio, O. (2014) Kurdish Awakening: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland: 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014 Romano, D. (2006) The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, 
Mobilization and Identity, UK: Cambridge University Press. Olson, R, W (1996) The Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, USA. University Press of Kentucky, 31 
Oct 1996 Aziz, M, A. (2011) The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
London: Tauris Academic Studies. Abbas, V. (2003) Essays on the Origions of Kurdish Nationalism, USA: 
Mazda Publishers. 
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political development in the framework of governmental institutions. These institutions 
change the definition of identity of both the movement and nation within the new context.   
Stansfield's study Iraqi Kurdistan Political Development and Emergent Democracy (2003) 
was the first to investigate political development in the framework of political parties, their 
impact on governmental structure and policymaking from 1992-2001. The hypothesis of the 
book is that  
The current divided political and administrative system is a direct manifestation of the 
historical development and characteristics of the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan 
(Stansfield, 2003:5).  
The book attempted to investigate the structure of political parties and the political party 
system in the KR in the 1990s by using major documents and elite interviews, available to 
the author because he had worked as an adviser for both the Erbil and Slemani governments 
at that time. Critics have noted and as the author himself acknowledges the difficulty of 
avoiding the politically charged atmosphere. The book focuses on the official structure of 
the KRG(s), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the 
manner of making decisions inside these two political parties. The relationships of the KR 
with other countries, the social fabric, and its role in the political development in the KR 
also receive attention. Stansfield’s contribution to the knowledge still relevant.   
However, after 2003, the regime in Baghdad changed, and the abovementioned parties 
established a united cabinet. The relationship between them changed from disunity to a kind 
of political consensus. Then, between 2009 and 2014, a powerful opposition rose up, which 
gained one-third of parliamentary seats. The study of political development in the KR 
required further review and updating. 
Yildiz, in his book The Kurds in Iraq, the Past, Present and Future (2004), provides an 
overview of the chronology of the Kurdish Freedom Movement (KFM) and relationships 
between the central government and Iraqi Kurdistan. The main object of the book is 
humanitarian aid to the KR after 1991. In this framework, the author tried to investigate 
Kurdish human rights in the context of international law. However, in the twentieth century 
besides international law, the economy, the world political order and geopolitics played a 
crucial role in determining the future of a nation.  
O’Leary’s study entitled The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (O’Leary et al, 2005), focuses on 
the KR through its history, the national freedom movement, political parties and the KRG. 
The book is set in the KR in the framework of international policy following the downfall 
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of the Ba’ath regime. It then highlights the constitutional aspects of building Iraq after 2003. 
The main goal is to show the political events that have occurred in Iraq since 1921 to suggest 
that a federal system is the best solution for the future of Iraq. By implication, the reader can 
understand why the KR did not develop in the last century. However, the development of 
internal affairs since the publication of the book in 2005, needs more focus. This thesis 
responds to this challenge. 
Olson’s book ‘The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-
Iraq since the Iraqi War (2005)’, revolves around the regional and international political 
equations and their impact on the KR. It analyses the Kurdish issue, mainly from the collapse 
of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 to the establishment of the Iraqi government in 2005. It assumes 
that Iraq, the Kurds, Turkey and the USA are the main players. However, Iran needs to be 
included in this list. The study presents the struggle between capitalists and nationalists in 
the KR on how to achieve the national goal. Olson argues that the Kurds seek their 
independence either through national orientations or economic orientations. According to 
Pranger (2006) the main point of the book is that Turkey has a great impact on the KR and 
the future of the KR is unpredictable, because when Kurdish leaders make decisions, they 
consider external rather than internal factors. 
The Kurds, Nationalism and Politics edited by Jabar and Dawod (2006) with the cooperation 
of a number of international contributors discusses the ethnic problem of the Kurds in the 
Middle East, with a focus on Iraq. It contains studies of the Kurds’ nationality, ethnicity, 
language and religion and concludes that all of them are politicized. In this context it searches 
for a solution to the Kurdish issue in the framework of federalism. It shows that Kurds have 
a different identity from surrounding identities (Persians, Turks and Arabs) and they try to 
preserve this identity from assimilation within other identities. The main themes are 
historical and the role of internal actors, especially political parties and elites, is neglected 
and does not target the KRG and parliament’s performance. 
The report published by the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (2008) 
entitled A Fact Finding Mission in Kurdistan, Iraq: Gaps in the Human Rights Infrastructure 
(Yildiz et al, 2008), attempts to investigate human rights policy and related organisations in 
the KR and in parts of Greater Kurdistan (Iran, Turkey and Syria). The report focuses on 
progress in and obstructions to human rights after the Kurdish uprising in 1991. It concludes 
that some aspects of human rights had improved and noted that the failure was not due to a 
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lack of sufficient legislative provision, but the result of unimplemented human rights 
provisions. 
Chapman, in Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (2009), studied military 
organisations in the KR, their development after the uprising in 1991 and the American 
invention in Iraq in 2003. The author argues that despite a single government, two different 
types of army organization exist in the KR under the supervision of two separate 
administrations, one in Erbil and another in Slemani, each commanded by a political party. 
This phenomenon plays a negative role in political development due to the possibility of 
military intervention in politics, as happened in the period from 1994 to 1996.   
The book authored by Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State, Development and Dependency in 
Post-Gulf War Iraq (2010), focuses on international aid to the KR through NGOs, 
international organisations such as the UN or the Oil For Food Programme (OFFP). It 
highlights how aid programmes reinforced the two administrations via their dealings with 
the dominant political parties and how political parties distributed aid via local figures and 
chieftains to protect these parties -a relationship that led to the growth of patron-clientist 
relationships and the spread of corruption. Furthermore, the book argues that aid did not 
result in infrastructure development, but led to the control of construction activities by the 
dominant political parties. These activities became a source of income for them to employ 
citizens in various political parties’ offices and in government administration. However, the 
book only focuses on one of the obstacles to political development in the KR. 
Another source in the framework of political science and international relations is the thesis 
written by Yaniv Voller From rebellion to de facto statehood: international and 
transnational sources of the transformation of the Kurdish national liberation movement in 
Iraq into the Kurdistan regional government (2012). It focuses on the de facto status of the 
KRG and it attempts to obtain international legitimacy as a step towards state-building, 
beginning with the KFM in 1958 until the establishment of a de facto region. The author 
argues that national liberation movements result in the creation of a de facto region because 
of dramatic changes in the domestic and international setting. This transformation has an 
important impact on the identity, politics, strategy and the development of such movements. 
The thesis argues that 
By constantly interacting with the international community in an effort to legitimise its 
existence and actions, the de facto state puts itself under further scrutiny and allows more 
transnational actors to take part in the process of state-building (p, 2). 
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The important conclusion of Voller’s research is that for de facto regions to gain legitimacy 
and international support, they are more likely to promote democracy and development by 
the liberalization of their political systems. In other words, leaders of unrecognized regions 
are more prepared to build democratic institutions through interaction with the international 
community. However, what happens in the external setting is often not reflected in internal 
affairs. As will be shown, the establishment of democratic institutions in the KR has not 
necessarily brought about political development and a democratic system. The Voller thesis 
explains that de facto regions are often small in terms of population and geography, however, 
they punch above their weight in international politics and play an important role in regional 
political stability or instability. The author acknowledges that his main focus is on 
legitimacy, not the development of de facto status. 
Ofra Bengio’s book The Kurds of Iraq, Building a State Within a State (2012), is another 
source that reviews the relationships between the Kurdish political movement and the Ba’ath 
party, the relationship between the KRG and its political parties with external powers, and 
the war between Iran and Iraq and its impact on the Kurdish question. It is essentially a 
historical approach to the Kurdish issue.   
The book Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria, edited by Romano and Gurses (2014) assumed Kurds to be both an opportunity 
and an obstacle facing democratization in the Middle East. Relating to the KR, Chapter 2: 
Iraq, Arab Nationalism, and Obstacles to Democratic Transitions by Ozum Yesiltas, 
reviewed the relationship between Kurds and the Iraqi government in a historical context. 
The Author believes that the Arab nationalist policy pursued by the central government was 
the main obstacle to democratizing Iraq, which destroyed Iraqi Kurdistan and undermined 
the government capacity. The review did not target the current socio-political organizations 
of the KR. Chapter 7, by Nicole F. Watts, Democracy and Self-Determination in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, focused on the democratization process in the KR in the period 
2003-2014. The author argues that the NGOs, political opposition and independent mass 
media as signs to democratization exist in the KR. The chapter was mainly focused on the 
political activities in Slemani and not the whole of the KR, which is a weakness point of the 
study. The NGOs that the author mentioned are mostly seeking public services and not 
political rights. As well, as this thesis’ arguments and interviews reasserted that the KR 
suffers from a lack of independent mass media, NGOs and domination of political parties on 
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all sectors of society. The current so called, mass media, political parties and NGOs of the 
KR consist partly of obstacles to political development in the KR. 
Chapter 13, Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas, by Orfa Bengio, 
targeted the relationship between Turkey and Iraq. The author claims that after 1991’s attack 
by the American-led coalition on Iraq, it made the KR a new neighbour to Turkey. The 2003 
changing regime in Bagdad, Shi’a and Sunni division, allowed the Shia domination of the 
government to force the Turkish government to improve its relationships with the KRG.  
This means that the relationship of Turkey with the KRG, has not been established on the 
good will of Turkey, but is the result of regional circumstances. The author argues that both 
the KR and the rest of Iraq are quasi-states. Relating to the KR, she believes that especially 
after 2003 the KR is in the process of nation building. The signals of this process according 
to the author are: self-government, the parliament, the flag and the army. However, as this 
thesis implicitly shows political parties utilize nationalist sentiments to challenge external 
threats onto their interests.    
Through the chapters related to the KR, it obvious that the high price of oil and relative 
stability before the rise of ISIS dominated the type of authors’ thinking regarding the KR. 
Taucher et al The Kurds: History, Religion, Language, Politics (2015), as the title suggests, 
focuses on Greater Kurdistan and a wide range of issues. One chapter is historically focused 
on the political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan and the rivalry between political parties and 
between tribes in order to achieve their narrow interests and how through these rivalries, the 
neighbouring countries were able to use Kurdish parties and clans against each other or 
against a neighbouring country. The author argues that even with the establishment of the 
KRG under the protection of the western powers which provided a safe haven, the Kurdish 
political parties were unable to develop a proper political system due to deep rivalry between 
themselves. This point of view underlines the problem that the current political parties in the 
                                                 
 Jackson (1990:21) referred to quasi-states for independent ex-colonial states, which suffer from sufficient 
institutional capacity to runs its internal and external affairs. He defined quasi-states as “they disclose limited 
empirical statehood: their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with 
independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and 
organized power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare. The concrete benefits which have 
historically justified the undeniable burdens of sovereign statehood are often limited to fairly narrow elites and 
not yet extended to the citizenry at large whose lives may be scarcely improved by independence or even 
adversely affected by it” (see: Jackson, R, H. (1990), Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and 
the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
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KR represent in terms of political development. The author notes that the unification of the 
government after 2003 was the result of changes brought about from the outside rather than 
the political will of the elites. However, the unification did bring stability to the region 
compared to other parts of Iraq. 
Each of above-mentioned studies illuminates an aspect of the socio-political and economic 
life in a descriptive or historical framework or by focusing on the key events that have 
occurred in the political life of the KR. These contributions to knowledge though valuable, 
leave some gaps and unresolved issues. There is a need to move beyond the existing 
knowledge, towards a better level of conceptualisation and theorization of what has occurred 
on the ground. It is difficult to understand the entire process of political development without 
tying together these various aspects in a scholarly theoretical approach. The following 
section considers some of the theoretical and conceptual tools which can help to shape a 
more complete understanding.  
Key Concepts and Theories 
The KR is in a complicated situation, which needs to be recognized in any analysis. It is a 
stateless country but it is also a state within a state. This paradoxical status was born from 
its geopolitical location, weakness of central government and international political factors 
including support mainly from western countries. Political development must be considered 
a complex and multidimensional process, spanning place and time, individuals and society. 
To understand the multiple aspects in the context of the KR, the resources of more than one 
theory are required. 
Kurdistan as a region has exercised semi-independence since 1991 when Kurdish people 
rose up against the central government of Iraq which led it to withdraw its apparatuses from 
the KR. The action provided an opportunity for the latter to build its own institutions 
(Bengio, 2005). Subsequently, the creation of a no-fly zone or safe haven by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 688 in 1991 and Operation Provide Comfort, helped the KR to manage 
its domestic and foreign affairs. In 1992, parliamentary elections to form the executive and 
legislature authorities were held by various political parties. The aftermath was 
parliamentary rule and a coalition government by cadres of the two most powerful parties 
namely, the KDP and the PUK. As a result, the term Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
appeared in the political literature. Later, in 1996 the UN 986 resolution, Oil For Food 
Programme (OFFP) gave economic assistance to the KR. 
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If the situation of the KR is discussed in terms of the state aside from the concept of 
sovereignty, the KR should be recognized as an independent state because it exercises 
authority, issues laws, manages governmental apparatuses, has controlled the majority of 
income resources since 1992, regulates tax and has its own military forces. Hence, the 
question can be posed whether the KR is recognized as a de facto region or an independent 
state or a federal state, or whether it is a new form of political entity under an international 
umbrella, which in public international law is called "governance without the state" (Rudolf, 
2009:2). 
It is important to investigate the meaning of these concepts to obtain comprehensive 
knowledge of the KR. According to the de facto situation, it could be defined as an  
Organised political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of 
indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to 
provide government services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over 
which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time. The de facto state 
views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full 
constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign 
state. It is, however, unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore 
remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society (Pegg in Voller, 2012:59).  
However, the concept ‘illegitimate’ in this definition needs to be questioned. The 
establishment of the KR is based on UN resolutions and international support, so, it does 
have legitimacy.  
Another definition refers to an entity which in practice has “at least some effective […] 
authority over a territory within a state” (Schoiswohl in Essen, 2012:2). This level of 
effective authority is accompanied by a certain level of political and organizational capacity. 
The concept of a de facto regime has been defined by International Humanitarian Law and 
International Criminal Law and it is used to describe an international actor in the political 
arena possessing International Legal Personality and recognition, even if implicit, by other 
governments (Essen, 2012). Based on this, the region is a de facto entity with both political 
and legal responsibility at the local and international level. The KR operated in this way from 
1992 to 2005 when the new Iraqi constitution was approved. 
According to the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (December 26, 
1933), the state in international law should possess the following characteristics: (A) a 
permanent population; (B) a defined territory; (C) a government; and (D) the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. The KR has the first three characteristics. The fourth 
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one actually refers to the sovereignty of the state and it is a normative concept (Beitz, 1991) 
more than an empirical one. There are states in the world that have the capacity but cannot 
enter into relations with some other states, for instance, Israel with some Arab countries.  
After 2005, the ability of the KR to establish relationships with other countries became 
enhanced by virtue of its official federal status and then with the invasion of ISIS in 2014 
this ability increased. In addition, it is important to note that after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, politics at the international level has incorporated the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, which implies the end of the state’s absolute sovereignty (Beitz, 1991). Other 
intervention occurred but not under justification of humanitarian intervention. This is in 
contrast to the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, which states in 
Article eight that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another”.  Humanitarian intervention by international organizations or "supra-state bodies" 
(Kingsbury, 2007:58) such as NATO and the UN has and break down the concept of absolute 
sovereignty (Held, 1991). The collapse of absolute sovereignty was positive for the KR. This 
occurred in Iraq in 1991 with Operation Provide Comfort.  
Concerning internal and external sovereignty (Beitz, 1991), the KR has internal sovereignty 
and to some degree, external sovereignty. In terms of internal sovereignty, it exercises 
authority over its citizens and executes laws issued by the KR parliament (as well as, some 
Iraqi civil laws). External sovereignty is a more controversial subject because from 1992 to 
2003, the KR was protected by the international community. Later, the Iraqi constitution 
(2005: Article, 117, No 1) came to define Iraq as a federal state and acknowledged the 
official governmental structure of the KR. Article 141, which states that all contracts 
concluded by the KRG since 1992, are valid. This means that the KRG has the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states or organizations and act as a quasi-state (Natali, 2007).  
As mentioned, some scholars (e.g. Essen, 2012) refer to de facto status as being a situation 
of an entity exercising authority on a territory within a state. This definition does not target 
sovereignty as a key issue, but the exercise of power in the context of governmental 
institutions. Parallel to this understanding of the KR’s status, it is useful to apply Fukuyama's 
(2004:22) interpretation. He does not refer to sovereignty, instead he makes a distinction 
between two concepts: the scope of the state activities or those actions and the aims that a 
government tries to achieve, and the strength of the state's power or the capacity of the state 
to make and execute plans, perform legislation, function transparently and have institutional 
capacity. Both strength and scope, here, refer to the government more than the state.  
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Roxborough (1979:118) defined the state as "a structured and interlocking set of 
institutions". In these definitions there are interconnections and a merging of state and 
government. The question of sovereignty is not settled yet and the KR does not fit perfectly 
into the context of state theory that developed around the nation-state idea. Moreover, these 
debates on the state and its sovereignty contrast with the common belief in the KR that the 
problem of development is its location (no access to an international sea) and its stateless 
situation. Watts (2014:147) borrowed from King (2001:525) the concept of ‘state-like entity’ 
to describe the political situation of the KR with its exercise of internal but not external 
sovereinty. Natali (2007) used the concept of quasi-state to describe the KR situation. 
However, as this thesis will explain, the KRG exercises a degree of external sovereinty as 
well, and especially since ISIS emerged in 2014. From this perspective, it is more practical, 
in discussing political development in the KR, to give priority to the government and 
political institutions’ performance rather than giving priority to the state. 
However, it is important to know how these institutions accomplish their responsibilities. 
The type of institution (complex or basic, professional or non-professional and run by whom) 
and its performance has a direct impact upon political development. Hence, in the study of 
the KR, a further theory needs to be considered, namely institutional theory.  
In this thesis the term ‘institutions’ is used in the context of democratic institutionalisation, 
when the transfer of power and elite changes happen frequently through public and 
competitive elections in both government and a political party’s leadership. A specific 
question is why, after the formation of the government in 1992, with an elected parliament 
and the existence of political organizations, the KR fell into internal war from 1994 to 1996 
which led to instability, deinstitutionalisation and a breakdown in social order (Jepperson, 
1991). One factor contributing to the conflict was that political organizations had not become 
institutionalized. As North (1993:12) states “Institutions are the rules of the game and 
organizations are the player”. Knight (1992) uses similar terms 
Institutions are features of society and government which involve both formal and informal 
structures (Peters, 1999). The institutions of the state must continue in their functions 
regardless of political and personnel changes (Kingsbury, 2007). Roxborough (1979), in 
analysing the state’s performance in what he described as Third World countries, argues that 
it is necessary to consider which social classes control the institutions and the mechanisms 
of decision making. In the KR, for instance, the political apparatuses are controlled by a 
circle of political elites, the majority of whom have remained in power for decades.  
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For this reason, investigation of the performance of the KR’s institutions is necessary. 
Indeed, as this thesis is a political study and "the roots of political science are in the study of 
institutions" (Peters, 1999:1), so institutionalisation is indispensable for stability and 
development (Martinussen, 1997; Huntington, 2006). This study aims to avoid internal 
disputes between different varieties of institutionalism and draws on the general framework 
of institutionalism theory, especially political institutionalism. Its main focus is on the state 
apparatuses and the interaction between them. This does not mean that the study avoids 
applying other approaches of institutionalization. As Hall and Taylor (1996) have observed, 
the schools of institutionalism are closely related.  
The degree of political development in a society can be measured by different political 
activities in the framework of political institutions (Huntington, 2006). Institutions by 
definition have some essential features. According to Peters (1999:18-19) political 
institutions: 
1. Are recognized as a structural characteristic of society and polity (This structure 
could be formal or informal); 
2. Have some degree of stability; 
3. Influence individuals' behaviour; and 
4. Members of an institution have some degree of shared values. 
Respect for an institution “lies in the moral authority it exercises over the individual” 
(Parsons, 1990:326). Institutions for Parsons imply a set of norms that interact together. For 
institutions to endure, they need to be legitimized and people accept them (Calhoun et al, 
2002). If “institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour” (Scott, 1995:33), what are these 
norms? How can this cognition be identified in the KR if the means–ends concept that 
Parsons has referred to is applied? Parsons explained the role of institutions in the integration 
of the social system and noted the importance of institutional control over individuals' 
actions as well as the importance of social stability in the institutional framework. Failure to 
perform this function leads to the division of society.  
The same view of the fundamental role of institutions is found in Huntington's studies on 
political development and institutionalization. He refers to Institutionalisation as a "process 
                                                 
 Peters (1999) refers to six different approaches in the new institutionalism and poses the question: does it 
enrich political science? He argues that we can gather all of them under one umbrella. 
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by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington, 2006:12). 
Moreover, he considers that the level of institutionalisation can be measured by adaptability, 
complexity, autonomy and coherence in organizations and procedures. Subsequently, by 
institutionalization, the polity will be impersonal and the rules will apply independently of 
personal ties.  
Political institutions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. In the 
period before 2003, various political institutions were established in the KR, including 
parliament, governmental organs and political party organizations, but development was 
prevented by military conflict between the political parties. Therefore, one aim of this thesis 
is to investigate this unrealised potential and explore the other factors that shape the political 
sphere in the KR and find out what is going on behind political institutions that has a negative 
impact on their role. The deficiency of institutions in the KR is visible in its present form 
because they are dominated by political elites. In fact, institutionalisation and the political 
elites’ behaviours impact upon each other. Therefore, it is necessary to spotlight the political 
elites and their power in the KR. The KR, as a new political entity with a tribal base (see 
Chapter 8) and tendency for non-democratic rule, needs a theory of political elites. Theories 
of political elites will be used in this thesis to help reveal impediments to the political 
development of the KR.  
Elite theory has been applied to nation-states or independent states, but this does not mean 
it cannot be utilized to study a non-state entity, especially if that entity possesses modern 
political organizations. Political elites and political institutions have a close relationship. 
Institutions limit the elites’ behaviour and in return, the elites’ behaviour impacts upon the 
institution’s formation and performance. What is important is that the unity, cooperation and 
disunity among elites is reflected in the type of political system, constitution, institutions and 
economic activity (Higley and Lengyel, 2000).  
Burton and Higley (1987:296) defined elites as: “People who are able, through their 
positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes individually, 
regularly, and seriously”. Mosca explains that “in all societies… two classes of people 
appear: a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (cited in Parry, 1969:36). Pareto also 
divides social classes into the ruling class and ruled class. The ruling class directly or 
indirectly participates in political authority, which means that they form political elites (cited 
in Parry, 1969).  
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However, this thesis utilizes a concept of political elite which does not depend on a 
sociological concept of class struggle or the ruling class. The justification for this is that the 
literature on the ruling class is dated and does not properly apply to the current political and 
economic situation of the KR. Furthermore, as described in this thesis the majority of 
economic activities are controlled by political parties and political elites. Bottomore (1993:7) 
used the concept of “political elite” or “governing elite”, which it is more suitable for 
studying the relationship between the political elite and political development in the KR. 
Bottomore used political elite to distinguish the concept from political class used by Mosca, 
which includes all groups that exercise political power and influence and fight for leadership. 
The political elites or governing elites which directly exercise power are smaller in size and 
number than the political class. Hence, the political elites as he pointed out are “members of 
the government and the high administration, military leaders …politically influential 
families and leaders of powerful economic enterprise” (p:7). 
In the case of the KR it is possible to illustrate this with the example of a military commander 
being owner of a big company and at the same time, being a member of a political bureau of 
a party and also a member of an influential family. It is a problem that the literature on 
political development itself is related to the democratic system more than others. The lack 
of change in political leadership underlines the need to apply a new political elite approach 
in order to understand the socio-political structure of the KR.  
Baylis (1998), in his study of the relationship between elites and institutions in Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1989, explains that in these countries a complex 
interdependence can be seen between new political elites and new political institutions. 
Elites established the new institutions and the latter created a suitable setting for the elites’ 
actions. Baylis argues that it is important to distinguish between the ways in which elites 
change and superficial institutional change.  
The situation of the KR after the uprising in 1991 was a political and administrative vacuum. 
To fill the vacuum, the political elites decided to hold parliamentary elections and form 
political institutions to maintain social order and political stability. However, disagreement 
among the political elites led to the collapse of the political institutions within two years of 
their creation: “the façade of elite consensus on the rules of the political game and the 
mission of political institutions promptly collapsed” (Tokes, 2000:74). 
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Concepts such as elite, stability, institutions, unity and disunity among political elites are all 
closely connected. Higley et al (1998), and Higley and Lengyel (2000) highlight the 
connection between stability, the nature of the political system and the unity of elites. They 
claim that, in consolidated democracies, elites have a strong unity and a wide differentiation. 
Authoritarian regimes have neither. Totalitarian regimes have strong unity but a narrow 
differentiation. Finally, unconsolidated democracies live in a state of flux and may 
experience a short period of authoritarian features which means extensive differentiations, 
but fragile unity. However, it is difficult to place the KR in a single one of these situations. 
Elite disunity occurs when political elites cannot trust each other and an atmosphere of fear 
governs different factions. This fear arises from a belief that if a person or a group obtains 
political authority, others will lose everything. In these circumstances, transfers of authority 
often occur through violent conflict and outside the institutional framework (Dogan and 
Higley, 1998; Higley et al, 1998; Higley and Lengyel 2000; Higley and Burton, 1989). On 
the other hand, the implication of consensus, as Higley and Burton (1989) show, is that elites 
must accept political outcomes even when they are not in their favour. This consensus is a 
foundation for democratic institutionalisation and the rule of competition (Burton and 
Higley, 1987; Burton and Higley, 1998). 
The same phenomenon could be seen in the KR, after the first parliamentary elections in 
1992. The PUK and the KDP divided the parliamentary seats and ministerial portfolios fifty-
fifty (with five seats allocated to the Christians). However, political elite unity failed with 
the outbreak of internecine warfare in 1994 up until the Washington Agreement in 1998 
between the two parties. This agreement led to a period of political calm, but without the 
unification of the two separated administrations. After the downfall of the Ba’ath regime in 
2003, both political parties found common ground until the establishment of the united 
cabinet in 2006.  
The fifth and the eighth cabinets expanded to include various political parties with an equal 
number of posts for both the PUK and the KDP (see Chapter 5 and 6). Additionally, in 2007, 
both parties signed a Strategic Agreement (see Appendix 1) to participate with a single list 
in both the KR provincial and Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Strategic Agreement 
governs all types of relationships between these two parties. The same accommodation is 
reflected in relationships between the political parties of the KR and the Iraqi government. 
The region’s political parties created the Kurdistan Alliance Bloc in the Iraqi parliament 
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(2005-2009) to co-ordinate their policies towards the Baghdad government. These policies 
were enabled by a consensus among the political elites. 
Etzioni-Halevy (1998) argued that for a democratic system to be established and 
consolidated it is crucial that political elites have relative autonomy. This autonomy can exist 
in a system that consists of a variety of civil political parties, NGOs and transparent funding 
sources. It is harder to apply it in a newly formed region where political elites have other 
roles, such as head of a clan and military commander. Furthermore, if the political parties 
and the government are a source of livelihood for citizens, the equation will be even more 
complex (this issue will be discussed in the following chapters).  
Higley and Burton (1989) also discuss the role of the economic sector and its political 
negative impact on consensus and stability. Finally, both Eisenstadt, (1973a:89) and 
Huntington (2006) argue that to achieve political development, political elites need to be 
modernized. 
In this thesis, the terms “political elites” and “political leaders” or “leadership”, are used 
interchangeably. The top party elites and government officers of the KR are considered to 
be political elites. In the KR, there are tendencies towards non-democratic rule, which also 
impacts negatively on the process of institutionalisation (This claim will be substantiated 
throughout this research). This is linked the history of the political parties that was based on 
Marxist-Leninist principles and the non-devolution of power at both levels of political party 
and governmental authority as well as parties having armed forces (see Chapter 7). The non-
democratic base of political elites in the KR is a combination of their being party-based, 
family-based, and religion-based and being backed by armed forces. Sometimes a leader 
combines all of these three bases, which gives him additional strength. Although, there was 
a growth of opposition for a period of time (2009-2014), it was very limited. This division 
between parties means that, a portion of the population is sufficient to re-elect the same 
political elites for a long period of time. 
As mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, Voller (2012) argues that there is a 
tendency in de facto entities to build democratic institutions in co-operation with the 
international community. In the KR, while there are democratic intuitions, they are under 
the influence of political parties. Each party and its leaders, has a tendency towards non-
democratic rule within the party or in government and they try to limit the capacity of 
opposing parties as much as possible. However, their ability is limited because they want to 
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show the outside world a democratic façade. This formal democratic competition is 
inconsistent with the actual political activity and the tendency of political elites. The term 
“non-democratic” is used here to describe to the tendency for there to be non-rotation of 
power. Even when elections have been held on the level of political parties or government, 
the same leaders stay in power for more than two terms and people follow rulers to gain 
economic and fiscal privileges. 
In the light of these considerations, this thesis will explore the relationship between elites 
and political development in the KR. Specifically, it will address the following issues: (A) 
the need for  political elites to abandon separate armed forces and nationalize the army; (B) 
the diversity of elites and their participation in the regulation of the institutional framework 
(parliament and government); (C) the role of the tribal base that continues to give political 
parties authority, but has a regressive impact on the process of political development.  
To return to an issue raised in Chapter 1, geography has its impact on the mind of people 
and political elites in the KR. The idea of being victimized by geography is mainstream in 
the KR; the idea that geography prevents the people from having their own independent 
state. However, it is important to notice that this determinist view of geography can be 
exaggerated by political elites and have a negative impact on political development. For this 
reason, it is important to include a brief review of geopolitics and geopolitical theory and its 
impact on the KR’s policy, especially with neighbouring countries. 
The geographical location of the KR, in its sensitive location in the Middle East, influences 
political decisions at both international and regional levels3. To understand this geopolitical 
position and its influence on political development, it is useful to mention the Kurdish 
proverb “we have no friends but the mountains” (Dahlman, 2002:273). 
Geopolitics revolves round the idea of “how the world is or should be organized” and this 
idea related to the “activity of government and foreign policy” (Painter and Jeffrey, 
2009:198-207). In geopolitics, geographical features, physical location, space, natural and 
human resources combine with a state and politics to shape the importance of a geographical 
area. According to Dahlman (2009:89-90), the main question in geopolitics is “how does 
geography affect politics?” or “how, exactly, geography matters to world affairs?” He 
                                                 
3 Region is a geographic area which is "unified culturally, unified at first economically and later by consensus 
of thought, education, recreation etc, which distinguishes it from other areas" (Young in Minshull, 2009:18). 
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defines geopolitics as “the study of the relationship between geographical features and 
international politics” (p. 97).  
In brief, the term refers to the understanding of “how politics, especially international 
politics, and geography are related” (Flint, 2102:17).  
Geopolitics has played a vital role in political development in the KR. With the declaration 
of Iraq as an independent state in 1921 and the incorporation of the KR into this state, firstly, 
the concept of nation-state building as a form of political development was not in favour 
with either Iraq or the KR. The series of wars that occurred between the Kurdistan political 
movements and the Iraqi governments from 1921 to 1991; the type of relationship between 
both sides from 2003 to 2013 which led to the KR’s annual budget being cut off in 2014; 
and the Iraqi regime’s treatment of different ethno-religious groups are all evidence of this. 
The Sykes-Picot treaty of 1916 was followed by the treaty of Sevres in 1920. In part III, 
Articles 62, 63 and 64, under the heading Section III Kurdistan, it is stated that the Kurdish 
people could have their autonomy or independent state if they have the ability to run their 
own affairs. As it did not serve the powerful states' interests at the time, this treaty was 
replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne in which Kurdistan is officially divided among 
Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. The 1975 Algeria Agreement between Iraq and Iran on the 
Kurdish issue, also indicates the importance of Kurdistan’s geopolitics in shaping the politics 
of the neighbouring states.  
Even in the war on Iraq in 2003, Iraq’s neighbours (Iran, Turkey and Syria) who did not have 
a good political relationship with the Iraqi government, opposed the attack on Iraq, the main 
reason being the threat of the Kurdish issue. However, politics is changeable and this can be 
seen in the difference in political rhetoric among the KRG, Iran and Turkish governments 
after the change of regime in Iraq in 2003, and more specifically between Turkey and the 
KDP or Iran and the PUK (see Chapter 9).  
Kennedy (2004), in an article for The Guardian, wrote “in a world that seems full of 
contending ideas and aspirations, perhaps none is more puzzling than the tension between 
democracy and realpolitik”. The author explained how geographical location has an impact 
on politics. This claim should be applied to the geographical position of the KR, surrounded 
by countries that have Kurdish residents and assumes that any development in the KR will 
have a negative effect on political stability if their Kurdish inhabitants make the same 
demands. Kaplan (2009:98-103) argued that 
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The map determined nearly everything, leaving little room for human agency…. The 
geographically illogical states in the Fertile Crescent (the Fertile Crescent, wedged 
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Iranian plateau), none is more so than Iraq…. The 
mountains that separate Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq, and the division of the 
Mesopotamian plain between Sunnis in the centre and Shiites in the south, may prove 
more pivotal to Iraq’s stability than the yearning after the ideal of democracy.  
Mackinder (1904:422) famously related the state’s power and its development to 
geographical location and declared “man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure 
controls”. However, this deterministic view about geography, reduces the ability of humans 
and the political system to shape its future. Yet this deterministic view is common among 
intellectual and ordinary people in the KR and has given a good rationale to the political elite 
to justify their type of governance. The Kurdish proverbs of ‘we are surrounded by enemies’ 
and ‘we are the victim of our geography’ are evidence of this type of thinking. Geographical 
location has some power to shape economic development, such as having access to an 
international sea; and to frame relationships with neighbouring countries, but it does not 
have power to determine whether the type of political system is to be democratic or non-
democratic, secular or non-secular. This determinist view reduces the ability of a nation to 
fashion its future.  
Culcasi (2006) in a study of the impact of Kurdistan’s geography on international political 
relationships describes how its geography has negatively impacted upon Kurdistan and how 
neighbouring states have stood against most of the Kurds' demands. Culcasi refers to 
Chomsky's (2002) argument about the KR before the collapse of the Ba’ath regime that even 
if the USA were to accept the establishment of a federal region for Iraqi Kurdistan, it would 
be opposed by the Turkish government. The government of Iran certainly takes the same 
position and both governments may intervene in KR to control any potential instability, 
which may occur inside their boundaries (Moberly, 1992). The geopolitical location of the 
KR and its impact on the relationships with its neighbouring countries is addressed in 
Chapter 9. 
The situation has not been static. After 2003 especially the KR obtained more opportunities, 
politically, legally and economically, to move towards development. It did not mean that 
barriers were removed. But the type of relationship with neighbouring countries and 
especially with Turkey, shifted markedly to establish a better relationship. This new 
relationship helped to overcome some of the disadvantages of geography in the political and 
economic relationships between countries. In addition, in 2014 with the inroads by ISIS to 
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parts of the KR, the international community provided military and economic support for 
resistance and the KR became a ‘political traffic arena’ in which the level of visits by foreign 
officials increased to bolster the stability of the region. In early 2015, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the UK’s parliament published a long report about the KR, asking the 
government to expand its relationships with the KR and even to prepare itself for the 
possibility of an independent Kurdish state (House of Commons, 2015). 
Formulating the Problem 
In the political development of the KR, certain events have occurred which have left their 
footprint on the development trajectory. These events include: firstly, the United Nations 
Security Council’s resolution (660) about economic sanctions on Iraq in 1990 that were 
designed to limit world trade with Iraq. The sanctions had an impact on Iraq's development 
in two ways; on the one hand, they hindered economic progress and the rebuilding of the 
infrastructure of the country that was devastated by Iraq’s wars against its neighbours, 
namely Iran and Kuwait. Subsequently, the KR as a part of Iraq could not avoid being 
involved. On the other hand, the living conditions of the people of the KR were improved 
by the introduction of the OFFP in 1996. The negative consequences were the devastation 
of the agricultural sector due to the import of everyday items from abroad (during the Ba’ath 
period this sector had already been destroyed, but it was never rebuilt after 1992). Due to the 
PUK and the KDP employing people in administrative organizations, military and party 
offices, the number of government employees rose markedly without any growth in the 
productive sectors. Politically, foreign aid helped to establish a relationship between the 
KRG as a non-state actor and foreign governments. However, the dependency of the KR on 
the Iraqi government shifted to dependency on foreign countries and the region suffered 
from both an internal and an external embargo (Stansfield, 2003; Natali, 2007; Natali, 2010). 
Secondly, the internal conflict between the PUK and the KDP (1994-1996) led to a 
geographical and political division of the KR. This war forced those people who supported 
one of the two parties to abandon their homes, land and towns and move to areas controlled 
by the relevant party. This process even separated family members. Many ordinary people 
and party members went missing during the internal war, which created a deeply politicized 
society. The social unions, educational centres and even religious organizations became 
divided along political party lines.  
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Thirdly, the geographical division also had implications for economic activities. Two key 
parties, the KDP and the PUK, controlled nearly all the important economic activities in the 
areas under their control. This phenomenon led to the spread of extensive corruption. The 
budget allocated to the KR by the Iraqi government was divided between the two parties. 
The problem is that fiscal data are not clearly and transparently published by the KRG (Nore 
and Ghani, 2009).   
Fourthly, with the weakening of the Iraqi central government after 1992 and the interference 
of neighbouring states in the KR issues (via one of the two main parties) the region's situation 
became more complicated. This can be clearly observed during the period of internal conflict 
in the KR, when it became the stage for a balance of power among regional states on the one 
hand, as well as a zone to exclude anything that would have a negative impact on their 
interests, on the other.  
This period, finally, coincided with the emergence of a variety of Islamic groups; and for a 
time some areas of the region have been totally controlled by them. Their stated aim is to 
apply Islamic law or Al-Sharia which prohibits all kinds of music and arts, prevents the 
schooling of females and punishes offenders by extreme religious means. Military conflict 
occurred between the PUK and some of these groups and between the KDP and others such 
as Ansar Al-Islam (the partisan of Islam). During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US 
attacked the Islamic groups that they had identified as terrorist groups (Nore and Ghani, 
2009; Leezenberg, 2005). 
These events, besides encouraging the PUK and the KDP to seek tribal support, left their 
mark on the development process and type of socio-political culture (see Chapter 8). 
However, this does not mean a complete absence of progress in the KR. For example, 
holding parliamentary elections, one year after the uprising, can be considered as a first step 
towards pluralism. Moreover, after 2005, the two administrations founded a united 
government. A powerful opposition appeared in the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
Furthermore, regarding the development of human rights, Amnesty International (2013) 
reported that respect for human rights was in a more favourable position than with other 
parts of Iraq.  
What is more important after the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in 2003, and the creation of 
a new constitution for Iraq, was that it became an opportunity for the KR to invest more in 
the economic sector. According to the Iraqi constitution (2005), which recognized the KR 
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as a federal entity (Article 117), it has power to run its internal affairs (Article 120). The 
KRG in coordination with the Baghdad government formulates oil and gas strategic policies 
(Article 112). Both governments in coordination manage the KR’s customs’ revenues 
(Article, 114).  More importantly, according to Article 115 “All powers not stipulated in the 
exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region”. Article 141, states that all legislation that 
has been enacted in the KR since 1992 remains in force. Despite all the difficulties between 
the KRG and Baghdad government, these Articles have empowered the KR to provide a road 
map for its future development (Shakir, 2014).  
In short, in the study of political development in the KR there are variety of concepts that 
must be considered such as the institutionalisation process, regional and international 
political equations, its geographical location and the history of the foundation of the Iraqi 
state. The aforementioned theories are generally applied to independent state entities, but 
this does not mean that they cannot be applied to a non-state entity. The next chapter reviews 
some ideas on political development and dependency as a context for understanding the 
process of political development in the KR. 
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Chapter Three: The Concept and Definitions of Political Development 
Scholars refer to the history of human development either by classifying societies under the 
binary labels of traditional and modern, community and society, mechanical and organic, 
developed and underdeveloped societies, or by studying them historically through 
evolutionary perspectives.  To some extent each society or nation has developed. However, 
the degree of this development differs from one to another. This chapter presents an 
overview of two different schools of thought on political development, to know their 
perspective towards political development and their weaknesses and strengths. The aim is to 
introduce development issues and connect them with political development in the KR in 
preparation for detailed and more comprehensive coverage of each subject in the following 
chapters. The thesis focuses mainly on the political dimension of political development 
rather than, for example, political culture, political psychology or economic development. 
Politics is derived from the Greek term of Politikos, which means “appertaining to the city, 
the citizen and citizenship” (Price, 1975:19). Like other social concepts there is no single 
definition. In the sphere of public life there are various applications of the concept of politics 
(Morgenthau, 2012:96). Identifying politics in developing societies where both formal and 
informal structures contribute to shaping policy and making decisions is particularly difficult 
(Burnell and Randall, 2005).  
Politics in a democratic system can be defined as an “activity through which people make, 
preserve and amend the general rules under which they live” (Heywood, 1997:4). Political 
subjects in the broad sense should be defined as “activities surrounding the process and 
institutions of government” (Burnell and Randall, 2005:3).  
The concept of politics in this thesis refers to the various political and mutual interactions of 
governmental apparatuses with domestic formal and informal political power and their 
relationship with external political players. The purpose of this broad definition of politics 
is to find out how it serves a political development process in society. If development in its 
simplest form is progress that occurs within and between different aspects of a society, then 
politics is the method of managing and regulating these aspects.   
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The Political Development School 
The concept of development gained currency in the late eighteenth century with the 
emergence of capitalism. It replaced terms such as progress, evolution and growth, which 
were borrowed from natural science (Larrain, 1989; Mothoghy, 2005). “The term 
‘development’ implies movement or growth over time along some specified set of 
dimensions from one state of these dimensions to another” (Willner, 1964:471). After the 
Second World War, modernization theories emerged in the context of the rise of the USA as 
a hegemonic power, the growth of communism and capitalism as rival ideologies and the 
appearance of new nation-states as a result of decolonization policies (Tipps, 1973; Berger, 
2003). Political development was explicitly utilized in the 1960s to refer to the political 
modernization of newly emerged states (Kingsbury, 2007).  
These circumstances and particularly the fear of competition from communism drove the 
USA to monitor new countries through policies of modernization. Political development 
theories built on modernization theories in response to the shortcomings of the latter. Both 
modernization and development theories have certain similarities in their conceptual 
characteristics. For example, both make use of concepts such as traditional norms, a 
transformation period, and they distinguish between the modernized and the undeveloped, 
developing and developed societies. In addition, both concepts attempt to display and 
propose a set of practical goals and programmes (Nwzary, 2007). 
Economically, development means a growth in economic capacity. Socially, it refers to the 
distribution of income and social services on an equal base, and culturally it means building 
a national identity (Portes, 1976:56). Development in the broadest sense means a better life 
for all people or improvement in the essential and basic needs of life such as, clean water, 
shelter, food, sanitation and education. It originates from economic, social and cultural 
processes, which enhance an individual’s capacity to manage their life (Peet and Hartwick, 
2009; So, 1990).  
It is crucial to understand that, for political development to occur, the polity needs to develop 
procedures that allow political authorities to legislate. For Huntington (1965:386 and 393), 
political development is the “institutionalisation of political organizations and procedures”. 
This definition is ambiguous as institutionalisation can lead to the establishment of either a 
democratic or a non-democratic system. However, it is obvious that political development 
needs political will as a prerequisite. 
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Nye (1967) believes that a single definition of political development cannot cover all aspects, 
especially if it concerns a dynamic and durable process. Lucian Pye (1965:5-11), in his 
influential theoretical study ‘The Concept of Political Development’, identified ten 
dimensions. 
1. The political prerequisite for economic development. 
2. The politics typical of industrial societies. 
3. Political modernization.  
4. The operations of a nation-state. 
5. Administrative and legal development.  
6. Mass mobilization and participation. 
7. Building of democracy.  
8. Stability and orderly change. 
9. Mobilization and power.  
10. One aspect of a multidimensional process of social change. 
Nye (1967:418-419) also refers to the difficulty of defining of the concept “since it has an 
evaluative as well as a descriptive content”, which is derived from scholars’ different 
opinions and each one is focused on self-interested criteria in a specific place and time. He 
defined political development (or decay) as “growth (or decline) in the capacity of a society's 
governmental structures and processes to maintain their legitimacy over time”. 
Winham (1970:810) stated that political development means “the development of 
democratic political institutions and processes”. While Coleman (1971:74) defined it in 
functionalist terms as “a continuous interaction among the process of structural 
differentiation, the imperative of equality, and the integrative, responsive, and adaptive 
capacity of a political system”.  
Later the definition of political development broadened to embrace additional aspects. 
Przeworski et al (2000:1) defined it as a “multifaceted process of structural transformation, 
not only economic, that becomes manifest in the growth of income, productivity, 
consumption, investment, education and life expectancy, and employment -all that makes 
for a better life”. 
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If all the above-mentioned aspects of political development are combined, they show that 
political development corresponds to both micro and macro changes in society. At the micro 
level the concept deals with the individual level (individual capacity and participation), and 
at the macro level it deals with the variety of institutions1 in society and their degree of 
modernisation (Chilton, 2005). For this reason, to understand the process of political 
development it is difficult to rely on any definition of this process which mainly targets a 
single aspect (e.g. economic, social or cultural). As Pye (1963:16) pointed out “no single 
scale can be used for measuring the degree of political development”. Political development 
includes multiple dimensions and various aspects of society. It is a dynamic process which 
reproduces itself to adapt to new challenges according to changing features of society. 
Relying on this claim and following the discussion of the multi-dimensionality of this 
process, our definition is illustrated at the end of this chapter.  
Elaboration and Critique 
Studies of modernisation mostly emphasised the economy as the key to modernise other 
aspects of society. Lerner (1958:60), for example, pointed out the sequences of 
modernisation as urbanisation, literacy, exposure to mass media and participation 
(economically and politically), which all correlate with improvements in the economic 
situation of individuals. For Lipset (1959:75), the sequence of modernisation was wealth, 
industrialisation, urbanisation and education. The early studies of political development in 
the 1960s broadened these ideas and argued that politics and culture also contribute to 
political development.  
Cutright (1963:255), linked political development to institutional capacity, and noted that a 
developed country should have “more complex and specialized national political institutions 
than a less politically developed nation”. He believed that the level of political development 
could be measured by comparing the degrees of development in political institutions 
between nations. Almond and Verba (1963), Pye (1965) and Huntington (2006), all referred 
to the importance of participation in political development, its impact on political stability 
or instability, government efficiency and legitimacy2.  
                                                 
 1 The concept of institutions is related to governmental structures—legislatures, executives, agencies, and 
courts (Arnold and Hero, 2005). These formal institutions authoritatively shape and execute policies that 
identify society's benefits and interests.  
2 The concept of legitimacy, from the Latin Legitimare, refers to transformation of power into authority. The 
term is different from legality which does not guarantee that the government respects its citizens or citizens 
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A number of authors have engaged with the problem that political development is complex 
and multi-dimensional. Packenham (1964:109-117), advocates a five-fold approach to 
political development as follows: 
1. The legal-formal approach deals with the constitution, laws, elections and separation of 
powers. This approach is normative and it is not necessarily useful for understanding what 
is happening in reality. 
2. The economic approach focuses on government capacity, economic development and the 
ability to supply demands. This approach was popular among modernisation theorists who 
saw economic growth as a pathway to democracy. However, measures such as increase in 
per capita income cannot be accurately measured. In addition, many rich countries still have 
a non-democratic political system. Instead, Jackman (1973), referred to democratic political 
development and connected it to economic progress and the establishment of political 
organizations democratically.  
3. The administrative approach emphasises the bureaucratic capacity of institutions to create 
stability and order. Focusing on governmental outputs. This approach highlights system 
rationality instead of tradition, nepotism, personality cults and charisma or ascriptive criteria. 
4. The social system approach focuses on the mass participation of different groups in 
society. It recognises the participation of different socio-political groups in political 
activities and the rotation of power. However, as Huntington (1984) points out, where there 
is insufficient institutionalisation, participation may lead to instability; or as in case of KR, 
leads to party domination on society. 
5. The political culture approach studies psychological concepts. According to Packenham 
“the psychological mechanisms at work occur on at least two levels: (i) the level of attitudes 
or sets of expectations about political roles held by members of the polity, and (2) the level 
of personality”. 
In addition to these five approaches, Packenham added the geographical approach to refer 
to the influence of geographical location on political development. The same view is 
reiterated by Escobar (1995:9), on the role of geography in development. He pointed out that 
                                                 
accept to obey the government (see Heywood, 1997:193). Legitimacy “involves the capacity of a political 
system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper 
ones for the society” and as an evaluative concept has close relations with the effectiveness and diffusion of 
"secular political culture" in society (see Lipset, 1959:86-89 and Lipset 1960:77). 
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“geographical imagination has shaped the meaning of development for more than four 
decades”. This point is relevant to the KR, which is surrounded by countries that have 
different political interests and sometimes the region becomes an arena for the settlement of 
political conflicts (see Chapter 9). However, it is important to avoid exaggeration in the role 
of geography and neglect the other factors in political development.   
Each approach that Packenham identifies, taken together, they highlight the fact that political 
development is a multi-dimensional process which includes government, society and 
individuals. These different approaches cannot be separated but can be broadened to include 
the external foreign relationships of a country and their impact on political development. 
Consistent with the functionalist view of the social system a defect in one aspect will have a 
negative impact on the whole process.  
Scholars such as Almond and Verba (1963), and Pye and Verba (1965), focused on the 
normative dimension of political development but also recognised multi-dimensionality, in 
terms of three dimensions linked to cultural aspects. The first is the change from a passive 
population to a contributory or participatory citizenry. This process has to be grounded in 
equality and acceptance of universal laws. The second is growth in the government's 
capacity3 to run social affairs, control social conflict and supply general demands. The third 
is structural differentiation, functional specialization and more integration in society through 
participation in institutions. Implicitly, universal law refers to western liberal law, political 
and Human Rights. Thus, individuals have duties and rights and the government is being 
recognized as a legitimate authority. The result is, society and authority can monitor 
themselves. 
Olsen (1968), broadened these ideas and instead of ‘approach’ used the term ‘dimension’, 
which he divided into values (political development) and material aspects (modernisation). 
Olsen pointed out that “national socio-economic and political development are both 
conceived of as multi-dimensional processes, consisting of several empirically interrelated 
but analytically distinct dimensions” (p:702). He identified five dimensions of political 
development which he then sub-divided. The characteristics of a democratic society in this 
view are: the separation of executive and legislative functions; civic control of the 
                                                 
3 A state has many sources of capacity, which are different from one state to another. Capacity basically refers 
to the state’s ability to extract various resources to enforce its status at both internal and international levels. 
The government as an agent of the state, exercises the function of extraction. Thus the concept refers to the 
performance ability of the government. Knowing the degree of political capacity is a necessity for the state, to 
make plans, strategies, decisions and respond to internal and external demands (see: Feng, 2006). 
56 
 
legislature; the existence of a stable multi-political party system; diversification of power 
among governmental apparatuses; and finally, citizens’ influence on governmental 
institutions through free expression and associations. 
Emphasising industrialization, Olson added five further socioeconomic dimensions, which 
were again sub-divided into categories borrowed from modernisation theories, namely 
“Industrialization, urbanisation, transportation, communication and education” (p:703). 
Olsen’s elaborated Packenham’s approach and concluded that all the dimensions and sub-
dimensions are interrelated and cannot be separated if political development is to be 
achieved. 
In this new trend the political procedures have priority and come above economic factors. 
This reversal was the result of the limitations of previous studies that each emphasised one 
dimension of development, as well as lessons from the experience of what was going on in 
the political transformation of developing countries.  
Another controversial subject in studies of political development is the role of the military. 
In the early 1960s, the idea of supporting the military as a modernising organisation spread. 
The basic reason was that this sector was “recruited from a comparatively modern, rational, 
and cohesive middle class” (Bienen, 1971:11). Theorists such as Pye (1961), criticized 
institutionalisation as a failed approach that was introduced to underdeveloped countries 
from outside by those unfamiliar with native culture. He referred to the military as nation 
builders and as an apparatus of development. Lovell and Kim (1967) identified the military 
as a mechanism of modernisation through its activities in political socialisation and political 
communication within society and abroad. Marion and Levy (1971) referred to the army as 
a tool for stability and modernisation. 
Some authors were critical of these claims. Huntington (1965), for example, claimed that the 
military may lead to modernisation but not to stability, institutionalisation and political 
development4. He suggested that “Instead of relying on the military, American policy should 
be directed to the creation within modernizing countries of at least one strong non- 
communist political party” (p:429). Many newly emerging countries in the twentieth 
century, for a certain period of time, were ruled by military elites who were mostly supported 
                                                 
4 Huntington (1965), distinguished between modernization and political development. As Bienen (1971) 
mentioned, in his view political development means institutionalisation and the stability of institutions. 
Mobilization, participation and economic growth for Huntington was a part of modernization and not political 
development.  
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by foreign countries. Countries such as Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and Egypt became militarized 
states.  
The military approach opened the way for military intervention in political issues. It 
increased the risk of armed conflict with neighbouring countries as well as internal war if 
any political dissent should arise between the army and others. Both development and 
dependency schools neglected the role of war (internal and external) in underdeveloped 
societies and their negative impact on development. Many of these countries were stuck in 
a permanent war for more than a generation and faced long term economic and political 
exclusion that often provoked civil war. Understanding the origins of war among and within 
underdeveloped societies may lead to a better understanding of the origins of political 
underdevelopment. 
With coups d'état and the rise of military regimes in various developing countries, 
development theorists such as Huntington (2006) argued for the necessity of stable 
institutionalized government regardless of the type of government. Huntington in the first 
page of his book Political Order in Changing Societies, states that 
The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of 
government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and 
dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics 
embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, 
and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist 
totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of 
effective rather than debile political systems (2006:1).  
Before Huntington, Apter (1965) observed that modernisation may lead to instability. 
Following this idea, Huntington prioritized institutionalisation before mobilisation and 
participation, fearing that economic growth which was conducive to fast mobilisation and 
participation would destabilize the order of society (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch, 2009). As 
a result of this view of the dangers of instability and the risks of participation leading to 
social conflicts, studies of political development focused on the crises or problems that might 
occur in this process. 
Binder (1971) argued that in the process of political development the state may face crises 
of identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution and penetration. If the state traverses these 
crises successfully, the goals of development will be achieved. According to him, the ability 
of the state is evident in how these crises are resolved. Political development “refers to the 
change in the type and style of politics” (1971:66). The goal of political development is to 
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handle these crises and establish a sustainable institutionalized government to serve both 
individuals and society. 
Combining the ideas of Almond and Verba (1963), Pye and Verba (1965) and Nye (1967), 
Coleman (1971) argued that political development is the capacity of the political system to 
institutionalize a new form of organizational integration, dissolve conflicts in society, and 
shape new forms of participation and equality in the distribution of resources. Consequently, 
if a political system satisfies these demands, it can overcome the problems of national 
identity and power legitimacy. According to Verba (1971), capacity can be evaluated as the 
ability of governmental organizations to make decisions and implement them. Furthermore, 
institutionalisation processes are differentiated between political institutions and economic 
apparatuses. This distinction leads to the separation of power-holders from economic 
activities which, in turn, limits the rulers' power (Glaeser et al, 2004).  
The majority of theorists devote attention to the role of institutions. However, other studies 
also refer to elites, and their unity or disunity and their impact on political development, as 
a key element in determining government capacity and stability. They focus on the effective 
bureaucratic system and its role in the management of public services with the elaboration 
of nongovernmental organizations. Next, public support is important in identifying the 
degree of government capacity. Government capacity in the application of its programmes 
and responding to public demands, leads to stability in the country (Nelson, 1984; Crone, 
1988). An effective bureaucratic system as Weber (1968) describes is related to the rational-
legal political system, and consequently, it obtains the citizens’ support. For this reason, in 
one party or an authoritarian system it is difficult to measure the level of public support. 
Jones and Olken (2005), investigated the important rule of leaders of developing countries 
in growth or non-growth and policy making. Also, Glaeser et al (2004:271), argued that 
“human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions”.  
In addition to institutionalisation and the role of elites, Almond and Powell (1966), later 
included secular culture in the process of political development and observed that 
development is a reaction of the political system to changes that occur in both internal and 
external settings; especially, nation-state building, political participation5 and the re-
                                                 
5 Political participation refers to the engagement of citizens in political activities such as voting, campaigns, 
making financial contributions, contacting public officials, attending protests and demonstrations, and being 
involved formally or informally in politics. Participation has a close relationship to the improvement of socio-
economic aspects of life such as an increase in per capita income, education and urbanization (see: Nie et al, 
1969; Brady, et al, 1995; Dalton, 2008). There is a revolution as a kind of political participation. However, the 
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distribution of national wealth. The measures of this process are “structural differentiation, 
subsystem autonomy, and cultural secularization” (reiterated in Huntington, 1971:300). 
Structural differentiation6 indicates the division of functions between subunits. This 
differentiation, in turn, leads to autonomy of the subsystem and complexity of the 
organization (Rueschemeyer, 1977; Dewar and Hage, 1978). An important implication is 
that in the process of state building, other national-ethnic entities will not be victimized in 
this process.  
The concept of secularisation, according to Almond and Powell (1966), Chaves (1994), and 
Verweij et al (1997) refers to the reduction of religious intervention in the individual’s life 
and social and economic activities. As Jabar and Dawod (2006:281) have argued, 
“secularization and the creation of the nation-state go hand in hand as indispensable, 
integrated components, asserting new loyalties and a novel socio-economic and political 
organization, that stand over and above other forms of allegiance and political association”.  
The above-mentioned discussion on political development shows that the theory is not static 
and it develops new ideas around institutions, elite, bureaucratic systems, public support and 
secularisation. Moreover, between the early 1970s and 1990s certain events and new 
measurements affected the trajectory of political development studies. The goal of fast 
modernisation and the process of rapid exploitation of natural resources led to a fear of 
devastation of natural resources without a solution to the problems of economic inequality, 
poverty, health and providing shelter. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a new concept of 
sustainable development emerged, to give a new priority to these aspects of development, 
the protection of the environment and human beings alongside the previous concerns.   
Various reports such as the Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (1972) in Stockholm; The World Conservation Strategy, Living Resources 
Conservation for Sustainable Development (1980), and Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987), known as the Brundtland 
Commission, was the first report by the UN to consider the human and environmental as 
                                                 
political development theories as originally formed in western capitalist societies, focused on political 
participation through democratic institutions and neglected revolution as a kind of political participation. A 
revolution as a tool to change the capitalism into socialism or communism has been put forward in dependency 
theories.  
6 Differentiation refers to the separation of institutions and social functions from each other, with a semi-
autonomous framework of the institutionalized system; and the degree of differentiation refers to the division 
of labour (see: Eisenstad, 1964). Furthermore, differentiation means, division and the specialization of roles 
and institutions which are related to modernized societies (see: Coleman, 1971). 
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well as economic issues in development, which implicitly refers to responsible government. 
Sustainable development studies concluded that for development to occur it must include 
dimensions of economic development, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability 
and that the dimension of responsible politics is an essential concomitant (SDSN, 2015:4).  
At the end of the Cold War, the concept of good governance was used by the World Bank to 
refer to the crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1989 and after that by authors as a tool for 
democratization. The Worldwide Governance Indicators, were based on six dimensions of 
good governance from 215 economies in the period from 1996 to 2013, namely voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Weiss, 2000; Santiso, 2001; 
Doornbos, 2010; WGI, 2013). 
From the mid-1970s, some countries had made the transition into a democratic system in 
what Huntington (1991) called ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’. This emerging theme coincided 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the publication of Fukuyama’s book The End of 
History and the Last Man (1992), and the use of the Human Development Index as another 
measure of development in the 1990s that mainly focused on individual experiences of life 
expectancy, education and per capita income to evaluate the capacity of government. All of 
these events impacted on the stance of some researchers towards the subject of political 
development and led to a stronger focus on democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for 
example, treat the terms democratisation and political development as synonymous.   
As a result, scholars and international organisations argued that development is not a goal in 
itself, but a tool to achieve desirable goals and the centre of these goals is the human being 
(Kingsbury, 2007:16; UNDP, 1990). However, in reality it is different from the moral 
aspects of the tenet. As history often shows, the pure notion of development is often 
corrupted by ideologies, leading to regressive outcomes. For example, the World Bank and 
its apparatuses fund developmental programmes in financially and economically weak 
countries, according to conditions laid down by the bank, especially policies for the 
liberalization and privatization of the economic sector (Bradshaw and Huang, 1991; Hills, 
1994).  
Welzel et al (2003:341-342), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) linked a number of variables in 
political development according to three trajectories and entitled them ‘the theory of human 
development’. The first, socioeconomic trajectory, included technological innovation, 
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productivity growth, improving health and life expectancy, increasing incomes, raising 
levels of education, growing access to information and increasing social complexity. The 
second is the trajectory of value change, which refers to the extension of the market, trade 
and social mobilization7. The third is the shifting of political institutions towards democracy.  
According to Welzel et al (2003), three criteria are required to achieve political development. 
However, external relationships and rivalry between global political powers also have to be 
taken into account.  
Studies of political development have expanded to include more aspects of development and 
have enlarged their theoretical base. It makes it difficult to combine all of these aspects in 
one theory. Pieterse (2010:92) has pointed out that these new aspects which might be titled 
“alternative development” have enriched the theory, but at the same time have fragmented 
it.  
In summary, it is important to show how different elements of development can interact. The 
time has passed when researchers made universal assumptions, reduced the problems of 
underdeveloped countries to economic factors, and focused on economic growth as a priority 
strategy. Today, the important role of socio-cultural features in each society cannot be 
ignored. In developmental studies there is a new focus on noneconomic aspects, single 
countries, and their relation to the global system, research into social, cultural and gender 
differentiations, and explanations of the obstacles to development in each society (Portes, 
1976; Martinussen, 1997). 
The new premise of political development theories is diversity. The idea of ‘multiple 
modernities’ is now standard wisdom for development and it has made the notion of political 
development more pragmatic. It is open to the objection that external economic and political 
relationships remain fundamental and responsible for creating underdevelopment. As a 
reaction, dependency theories emerged, which have argued for external factors as the key to 
keeping underdeveloped societies undeveloped.  
                                                 
7 Marshall defined mobilization as “the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of 
individuals to an active participant in public life”. (see: Scott and Marshall, 2012). Scholars such as Huntington 
(2006) and Cameron (1974) regard political parties as the main tools in political mobilization. 
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The Dependency School 
Political development theories emphasize internal factors as the main obstacles to 
development. Partly in response to development theories came the dependency approach, 
which focused mainly on the role of external factors and their impact on underdevelopment. 
The connection between political development and economic growth in dependency theories 
is more complex than in political development theories. The latter describe development as 
stages marked by variety of indicators, while the dependency school refers to a kind of 
system that does not evolve through such stages. This school influenced Third World 
countries from the early 1960s to the 1980s, especially those in Latin America. There are 
various theories of dependency, which mainly emerged from a combination of Marxism and 
structural thinking through the formation of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) in 1949 (Larrain, 1989; Love, 1990). ‘Structuralism’, here, means that 
underdevelopment can be understood in terms of the historical structure of the international 
economic system (Smith, 1979). This section reviews some important points in this school 
of thought. 
In the dependency view, development means economic growth and the discussion mainly 
focuses on economic relationships without engaging closely with politics itself. The political 
expression of the dependency school is socialism which occurs via revolution (Angotti, 
1981). As Leys (1977:95-96) has noted, the dependency school is “economistic in a sense 
that social classes, the state, politics, ideology figure in it very noticeably as derivative of 
economic forces, and often get very little attention at all”. To understand underdevelopment, 
it tries to analyse cross-state economic relationships and “offers a general interpretation of 
current situation”. The economy is fundamental for other aspects. 
Raul Prebisch (1963), the director of the ECLA, pointed out that the mechanisms of 
economic growth in industrialised societies do not contribute to the development of poorer 
societies. The problem is that the underdeveloped countries export raw materials to 
developed countries at a cheap price and import manufactured goods at a higher price. 
Consequently, international trade and exchange are based on an unequal relationship which 
favours capitalist developed states. This inequality in exchange leads to inequality in 
economic development. According to the ECLA, the solution was import substitution, for 
countries to manufacture their own goods (Ferraro, 2008; Larrain, 1989:13-16). 
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The focal points of this critical school are international political economy, economic 
surplus8, and the unequal relationship between industrialized capitalist developed countries 
and underdeveloped societies. In other words, the “relationship between the social, 
economic, and political structures of the dependent countries and the international capitalist 
system” (Cardoso, 1977:12; Ahiakpor, 1985; Frank, 1969).  
Frank (1969), as a pioneer of this school, addressed the history of underdevelopment and 
argued that to understand the factors of underdevelopment, it is important to identify the 
history of each underdeveloped country and its relation with the outside world. According 
to Frank, external factors especially economic ones constitute a key element in 
underdevelopment. However, such an interpretation overestimates the power of economy 
and the power of industrialized societies to determine the fate of underdeveloped societies, 
and in contrast, underestimates the power of a nation and the role of national factors in 
development or underdevelopment. The result is generalisation and at the same time 
oversimplification of a complex issue of political development and underdevelopment of a 
society (Smith, 1979). 
Santos (1970:231-232) also emphasised the economy, defining dependency as “a situation 
in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion 
of another economy to which the former is subjected”. Santos distinguished three periods of 
dependency. First, colonial dependence, in which colonizing countries dominated trade, 
colonial land and human labour. Second, financial-industrial dependence at the end of the 
nineteenth century, a period when monopoly finance in the metropolises was invested in the 
production of raw materials and the agricultural sector in the peripheries to reinforce 
metropolitan development. The third is the post-war period when international corporations 
invested in the industrial-technological sector of underdeveloped countries and became a 
consumption market for the former. 
However, in the present world system, many aspects are different. The monopoly of finance 
is no longer under the domination of the western capitalist states. Other powerful financial 
centres have emerged outside the capitalist zone, such as the Gulf States. Many financial 
crises have occurred in the capitalist states such as the Euro-zone financial crisis. Further, 
                                                 
8 Baran and Sweezy (1966:9) defined economic surplus as “the difference between what a society produces 
and the costs of producing it. The size of the surplus is an index of productivity and wealth; of how much 
freedom a society has to accomplish whatever goals it may set for itself”. 
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not just capitalist developed countries, but other countries can invest in both developed and 
underdeveloped countries.  
Michaely (1981:317), has linked dependency to the “vulnerability” of the state economy, 
which means the extent to which the economic sector of a country depends on imports of 
goods and services. Economic vulnerability correlates with political subordination. 
However, there are countries such as Iran that are economically weak, but maintain their 
political independence and play an important role in the regional political equations that 
contrast with the policy of Western industrialised and developed countries. This country 
according to the Index of Economic Freedom (2015) was the most closed economically and 
ranked 171 out of a total of 178 countries.  
Hills (1994), has argued that the policy of dependency was pursued after the 1980s by the 
USA in alliance with the UK and countries within the international membership of the World 
Bank (WB), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This policy was applied through strategies of 
liberalization, privatization of economy and free trade designed to prevent single nation-
states from opposing the hegemony of the USA. The best strategy to implement this policy 
is direct foreign investment that forces recipient countries to minimize trade regulation in 
favour of its companies. The policy that Hills calls “micropolitics in the international 
system” turns the concept of dependency into interdependency (Hills, 1994:172). It benefits 
those countries that dominated the international economic markets via economic bodies that 
may be considered as driven by political ideology rather than unbiased mechanisms.  
To achieve their plans, in the 1980s, the WB and the IMF imposed Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) on developing countries to make them adjust their economic 
foundations to conform to neo-liberal principles as a condition for being able to take out 
loans. The policies were designed to reduce state intervention in the economic sector and 
encourage more privatization, free trade, lower tariffs on imports and reduce subsidies to 
public services in these countries. They imposed heavy conditions on the poor and 
developing countries (Bradshaw and Huang, 1991; WHO, 2013).  
According to the Human Development Report (2002), 29 out of 50 African countries spent 
more on debt than on their health sector. The WHO’s (2013) report entitled ‘Debt’ stated  
At present 41 countries are identified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), thirty-
three in Africa, four in Latin America, three in Asia and one in the Middle East…. The 
total debt of all developing countries in 1995 amounted to 41 per cent of their total gross 
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national product (GNP), whereas the total net aid received was a mere 0.9 per cent of their 
total GNP (WHO, 2013a).  
Loans intended to develop these countries exacerbated the situation and enhanced 
dependency. How underdeveloped countries can benefit from these loans and adapt to a new 
environment is therefore a political issue. Harvey (2005:6), writing about the role of the USA 
in the creation of dependency in Iraq after 2003 argued that the USA  
promulgated four orders that included ‘the full privatization of public enterprises, full 
ownership rights by foreign ﬁrms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign proﬁts… 
the opening of Iraq’s banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies 
and the elimination of nearly all trade barriers’. The orders were to apply to all areas of 
the economy, including public services, the media, manufacturing, services, 
transportation, ﬁnance, and construction. Only oil was exempt (presumably because of its 
special status as revenue producer to pay for the war and its geopolitical signiﬁcance). 
This policy was implemented in a country that had a long history of nationalization, where 
the majority of the population were government employees, and where subsistence goods 
and public services were subsidized.  
Samir Amin (1997:4-5), argued that in the present world system, dependency continues 
under the title of globalization. He lists five different ways in which it occurs: 
1. Technological monopoly. 
2. Financial control of worldwide financial markets. 
3. Monopolistic access to the planet’s natural resources. 
4. Media and communication monopolies. 
5.  Monopolies over weapons of mass destruction. 
Amin addressed economic, technological and military aspects of development without 
mentioning the role of politics itself in underdeveloped countries. It means that politics is 
either neglected or is given a subsidiary position to other aspects. These aspects can be 
monopolized by non-state actors, but politics is mainly directed by the state to regulate other 
socio-economic aspects and foreign relationships. Amin himself suggests globalized 
capitalist hegemony should be replaced by the formation of a global political system under 
a world parliament based on socialist principles. This means that politics cannot exist in 
isolation. Although Amin criticizes the global system, he proposes a global system.  
In contrast to Amin’s view, Sullivan and Nadgrodkiewicz (2008) argue that the best solution 
for the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East and North Africa is to develop 
privatisation, foreign investment and reform of the governments of these states to make them 
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more democratic. They believe that the economy failed in these states because of the lack of 
political reform alongside economic reform, the low level of women’s employment and rapid 
population growth. For these countries to develop, they argue, there has to be link between 
a democratic system and the market economy.  
While the role of politics and its capacity to develop and change with the environment is 
important, the capacity of each country’s leaders in development is important as well. The 
dependency school argues that dependent status is historical and rooted Europe’s domination 
of other countries since the fifteenth century. This domination has continued through the 
political elites of underdeveloped countries who trained in the dominant countries. The 
interests of these elites often coincide with the interests of the developed societies; a 
relationship which produces the status of dependency (Ferraro, 2008).  
Dependency theories implicitly recognize the role of internal factors (So, 1990) even if this 
claim applies only to certain countries, especially during the Cold War. However, not all 
political elites are trained or have mutual interests with western developed societies. The 
elite role has to be studied separately in each underdeveloped country and in relation to other 
factors such as free mass media and economic and political competition. Internal policies 
compound the effect of external factors. Overall, abstract interpretation of 
underdevelopment and attributing it to just one external or internal factor may detract from 
understanding what actually occurs in reality.  
The dependency school divided the world society between the centre and periphery, 
metropolis and satellites. According to this school, to develop, dependent states should base 
their efforts on the self-reliance model (trade between themselves), and find their own paths 
to development by replacing imports with internal production (Tony, 1986; Larrain, 1989; 
So, 1990:104-105). This is a static view which does not consider the skills and capacity of 
each nation. Empirically, there is considerable divergence between the economic political 
poles in the global economy. Therefore, the important question is “the necessity of 
identifying the specific economic, political and cultural linkage of centres and peripheries” 
(Preston, 1996:194). This suggestion, according to the dependency school, follows from the 
close ties between underdeveloped countries’ elites with western capitalist states (Chilcote, 
1978; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986; Preston, 1996; Kay and Gwynne, 2000;). 
Moreover, it implies a unilinear direction for development; aiming for socialism not 
capitalism.  
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The policy of self-reliance to promote economic development in the Latin American 
countries can be seen in this summary from Bradford Burns: 
The elite proudly regarded the new railroads, steamships, telegraph lines, and 
renovated ports as ample physical evidence of the progressive course on which their 
nations had embarked. In their satisfaction, they seemed oblivious to another aspect of 
modernization: that those very steamships, railroads, and ports tied them and their 
nations ever more tightly to a handful of industrialized nations in Western Europe and 
North America…. They failed to take note of the significance that many of their 
railroads did not link the principal cities of their nations but rather ran from plantations 
or mines directly to the ports, subordinating the goal of national unification to the 
demands of the industrial nations for agricultural products and minerals. As foreign 
investment rose, the voices of foreign investors and bankers spoke with greater 
authority in making economic decisions for the host countries. Local economic options 
diminished. In short, modernization magnified Latin America's dependency (cited in 
Smith, 1979:275). 
The progress that Bradford Burns refers to is quantitative progress without reference to 
qualitative progress in politics. 
In a related debate, the experience of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
highlights the multi-centrality of economic power and orientations, which do not necessarily 
conform to be a western capitalist model. Another example is the Asian Tigers’ countries 
which developed in recent decades as a result of the crucial role played by national 
developmentalist governments that controlled industrialization policies. In fact, the 
globalisation of the economy can co-exist with a wide range of political types from socialist 
and democratic to non-democratic. This diversity means different criteria are required to 
understand their development. Political diversity exists in a world in which states are more 
integrated, dependent and interdependent. Each state to some extent depends on other states 
and none can exist as an isolated entity; especially in the current technologically developed 
world where many issues and phenomena become worldwide. 
Another important theme in dependency theory is the relationship between dependency and 
foreign aid. Michaely (1981), connected dependency to foreign aid and foreign investment 
that leads to the destruction of the recipient country’s economy. Michaely explains that 
foreign aid can provide an atmosphere of public consumption without any productive 
activity that leads to a decrease in the value of the domestic currency. In Chase-Dunn’s 
(1975) view, direct investment penetrates directly into the economy and creates a direct 
dependency, but aid programmes operate indirectly to create an indirect dependency.  
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Natali (2010), in a study of foreign aid in the KR, claims that such aid has created a 
dependency situation in the region and ruined the infrastructural sector. This has occurred at 
a time when the region has both the natural and human capacity to invest in the 
reconstruction of the country. However, in the KR’s case, as is argued in this thesis, the role 
of internal political elites has to be considered as a conduit for corruption and misuse of aid. 
This is not to say that foreign aid is worthless, but rather, that aid should serve political 
development. For donors, stability is more valuable than democratic political development. 
In response, Gershman and Allen (2006) have argued that aid should be in the framework of 
“democracy assistance”. 
Moyo (2009), has reservations about foreign investment in developing countries and argues 
that apart from humanitarian and emergency aid or donations via charities going directly to 
people and some institutions, the problem of foreign aid is hidden in government-to-
government aid or international organisations’ aid given to governments in developing 
countries. This type of aid is misused by corrupt political elites who fail to respond to the 
needs of society. The alternative is not to cease foreign aid and investment, but to adopt new 
ways of directing aid and investment to serve the whole of society. It follows that internal 
politics and administrations are important.  
To sum up, the dependency school provides a useful framework concerning the role of 
international economic policy and representative bodies such as the WB, the IMF and the 
relationship between developed and undeveloped states. However, it is crucial for a better 
understanding of the situation of underdevelopment to connect these external factors to what 
is occurring in the real context of each society. Internal factors such as the role of politics 
itself, inequalities in the distribution of national wealth, resources and services, the level of 
democratic institutionalisation, its social structures, the engagement of political elites in 
corruption and the level of internal skills and abilities, all have to be considered9. For 
example, Sen (1996) linked underdevelopment (famine, minority rights, natural disasters, 
and demographic change) to lack of free mass media, absence of political opposition and 
lack of individual choice.  
It can be seen from the above discussion that external factors (the economic and political 
role that foreign states play) and internal factors (social, cultural and elite politics) both affect 
                                                 
9 For this reason, new dependency studies also refer to the role of internal political elites. However, like the 
old version of dependency theories they give priority to external factors. In this new perspective, the state in 
underdeveloped countries serves as an agent for local and international capital (So, 1990: 164-165). 
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the level of political development in any society; both “internal and external structural 
components are connected” (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986:502).  
Critiques of the Dependency School 
As with any theory in the socio-political and economic sciences, the dependency school has 
faced criticisms. The first target is the methodological problem of how many capitalist 
centres and peripheries exist in the world’s economic system and the relationship between 
the centres themselves and peripheries. This methodological question relates to the structural 
studies that dependency theories are based on. Each state-nation has its specific interests that 
may come into conflict with others10 (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977:404).  
A second criticism is that, by focusing on economic relationships in the international context, 
it disregards the role of culture in politics and development. Culture, in this school, is 
considered to be a subordinate factor in development (Kapoor, 2002). Whereas culture is 
significant in shaping individual attitudes (of both citizens and political elites) and the 
diffusion of democratic values. 
Kay and Gwynne (2000), Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986), and Akbari (1984), argue that 
dependency theorists present a rational analysis and powerful evidence of underdevelopment 
but downplay the role of internal political systems. As Walt (1998) maintains, an 
overemphasis on external economic factors has led to a rigid approach. A capitalist economy 
actually leaves room for manoeuvre and covers various and varied responses to challenging 
circumstances.  
An overemphasis on the role of the external factors has created a notion of “the people 
without history” in dependent countries (Wolf, 1982 in Kearney, 1995:551). Focusing on the 
historical evolution of capitalist development leads to neglect of the domestic components 
of non-capitalist societies or, as Kapoor (2002:654) stated, “using Europe as a universal 
model”. The view that the world has been ruled by capitalist states is a holistic framework 
                                                 
10 This problem led Wallerstein (1974) to revise the centre- periphery world system to make it more flexible 
by dividing it into core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states. Wallerstein stated that without the semi-
periphery it is difficult to understand the structural differentiation and relationship between the core and the 
periphery. The semi-periphery is the bridge between them. Each state in this new design can move towards a 
higher position and become an industrialized capitalist state. This claim contrasts with the dependency claim 
that the movement is towards socialism. 
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which implies that. For countries to develop, the world economic system needs to change 
fundamentally. It amounts to a type of utopianism (Angotti, 1981). 
The new theorists of dependency in the 1970s and 1980s reassessed the relationship between 
dependency and development which was mutually exclusive in classical studies of 
dependency including more internal factors. For example, Cardoso (1973) was a pioneer in 
new studies of dependency who used the concept of “associated dependent development” as 
a bridge between dependency and modernisation theories to recognize the growth of active 
international corporation between various countries (cited in So, 1990:140). However, like 
classical studies, economic analysis remains the foundation and foreign domination is held 
responsible for dependency, but indirectly, through domestic elites and capital investment 
that flows into underdeveloped countries through multinational corporations. 
A further critique highlights the challenge to the dependency school which comes from 
fundamental changes in the global political economy, namely the end of the Cold War, the 
emergence of new supra national powers such as the European Union (EU) and new 
powerful economies. Preston (1996:344-345), Kay and Gwynne (2000:56), have argued that 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world order moved into a tripolar instead of bipolar 
system. In this system, the USA and Japan, the developed East Asian countries and the EU 
have an important role.  
The dependency school has also had to confront the issue of globalization. Globalization is 
an attractive term which serves the aims of liberals and liberalization, and it is linked to the 
rapid growth in international trade (Kay and Gwynne, 2000). As Kearney (1995:549) stated, 
globalization relationships transformed the two-dimensional division of the world (centre-
periphery) into multiple-dimensions. Regardless of whether globalization is understood in 
negative or positive terms, many problems have become global issues that call for more 
cooperation between states. Many economic organizations have been established and various 
developing countries such as China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are members; for example, 
the G20 foundation. The globalization concept, even in comparison with modernization 
theories, points to the positive role of local cultures in the development process.  
Another point is about trade. As the history of trade shows, trade relationships support 
internal development. This contrasts with the stance of dependency theory which insists on 
isolation from capitalist states. Active engagement with the world economy should 
contribute to development goals (Walt, 1998). As European Union history illustrates, free 
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market policies were the cornerstone of this union which transformed interrelationship to 
integration. East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) countries is 
another example. By establishing relationships with developed capitalist countries they 
became powerful industrialized countries without being dependent or peripheral. They 
developed with the support of powerful central governments that provided political stability 
and suitable conditions for foreign investment. These examples and factors, highlight a 
significant topic. In contrast to the views of development theory and globalization, state 
intervention can play a crucial and positive role if it prioritizes development instead of 
building a military state.  
Dependency theory neglects the regional context of development which may have more 
impact than the world context. If underdeveloped countries are considered in regional terms, 
they share many characteristics. For instance, the majority of the Middle Eastern countries 
have the same religion, undemocratic regimes, mixed traditional and modern economies and 
cultures, large populations, a mainly tribal base and extended family structures. Power is 
monopolized by authoritarian elites and a rotation of power often occurs by military coup or 
revolution. States such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Yemen have aimed to build a 
powerful and integrated state, through militarization of society and the repression of 
opposition and ethnic groups.  
The largest countries in the Middle East are engaged in strong rivalry with each other rather 
than co-operation, which has impacted upon the stability and instability of each country. The 
same description of regional characteristics could be applied to the Latin American, the 
northern African and Caucasian countries. It even applies to the developed countries in 
regions such as western Europe, eastern Europe and east Asia, that have very similar cultures 
and features. Hence, the regional context plays an important role in development.  
In a nutshell, undoubtedly, the dependency school is justified in referring to external factors 
as playing a negative role in underdevelopment, but the role of internal factors should not be 
neglected. The following figure is designed to show the key similarities and contrasts 
between the two theoretical traditions, before moving on to the general conclusion.  
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Political Development and Dependency Theories. 
Similarities                  Differences  
 Political Development Dependency 
The focus for both schools is 
development of the Third 
World 
Ahistorical: domestic factors 
are responsible for 
underdevelopment 
Historical emphasis on 
colonialism and post-
colonialism in 
underdeveloped societies 
Both schools make general 
assumptions about 
underdevelopment (global 
analysis) 
Originated from the West 
and especially the USA 
Originated in underdeveloped 
countries 
Both schools divide the 
world into a bipolar system 
Capitalist orientation. 
Support for international free 
trade 
Socialist orientation. 
Emphasis on trade between 
socialist states 
The unit of analysis is the 
nation-state 
Lack of historical 
explanation 
Historical experience such as 
colonialism 
Teleological perspective Based on evolutionary 
perspective (functionalist) 
The result of failure of ECLA 
programme (revolutionary 
perspective) 
Both agree that modern 
economy is led by the 
Western economic powers 
Nation-states can develop 
 
Development is impossible 
because of the domination of 
capitalism 
 Micro-analysis. Focuses on 
individuals, their behaviour, 
values and beliefs 
Macro-analysis, focuses on 
economic production, 
international trade and 
relationship between 
underdeveloped and 
developed countries 
 Culture shapes behaviour Economy shapes behaviour 
 Institutional and cultural 
standpoint 
Structural and economic 
standpoint 
 Reflexive theory with 
globalist tendency 
Rigid theory with regionalist 
tendency 
 To develop a society must 
change from the inside 
To develop, the outside 
conditions must be changed 
(global economic system) 
Source: Preston (1996:194-195); So, (1990: 96-109); Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986:508-511); Kapoor 
(2002). 
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Conclusion 
To prepare the conceptual foundations for what follows, this chapter has reviewed the 
political development and dependency literatures, highlighted areas of consensus and 
specified the key concepts which are required for further exploration. 
The two major schools attempt to explain the problems of underdevelopment and its origins 
in different ways and with different recommendations. Both of them try to address issues of 
underdevelopment through universal generalization. This level of generalization can be 
considered as a point of weakness. A more adequate theory needs to combine both internal 
elements and external ones with regards to the inside components of society to make a 
positive contribution to change.  
The role of government-political elites, also, in the early stages of development is crucial. 
As discussed in this chapter and as experiences have shown, a government-political elite that 
respects the democratic rules and orients development is a necessary characteristic for 
political development.  Despite this, it is not desirable that government should undertake all 
responsibility for development. The government's duty is to regulate the economic sector 
and not to control it. The role of society, NGOs and economic organizations must also be 
considered. If all revenue sources are monopolized by government, the social capacity and 
government capacity will be imbalanced and the private sector will not grow sufficiently. 
Certainly, the economic sector has an important role in political development but it is not 
the only factor. There are many examples of states that have developed economically but 
failed under authoritarian regimes. For instance, at various times in the twentieth century, 
German, Italy, Spain and Russia were economically developed but were non-democratic 
states. Though the economy is important in political development, politics is the essential 
factor; the reason being, that politics draws the map of economic progress and maintains the 
stability of society.  
Based on the different views and critiques of political development that have been reviewed 
in this chapter, the political development can be defined as a process which is (1) dynamic, 
nonlinear but still coherent, interlocking and constructive; (2) leads to the strengthening of 
the political, economic, social and cultural components of civil society, together with (3) 
positive outcomes in terms of the contribution of both government and society to the political 
process, which (4) increase the government’s capacity through democratic 
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institutionalization, (5) requires political will between different political groups, and (6) 
leads to greater integration with international processes. 
These elements reflect the multi-dimensionality of the development process. Political 
development is a constructive, interlocking process which is not built on one sector that has 
priority over others. It requires comprehensive development and the participation of 
individuals and institutions. The functional differentiation of types of organizations should 
not mean separation, but rather a connection between various aspects which contribute to 
the coherency of this process. This requires a dynamic but planned and flexible agenda 
capable of changing in time and place, open to different pathways according to the 
differences between societies and how they choose to develop politically. Political 
development is a nonlinear process which means that there is no common point of origin or 
necessary trajectory. As Eisenstadt (1973) argued, the road to development differs from one 
society to another according to human capacity and available resources in a country.  
Multi-dimensional development paves the way for the second point concerning the growth 
of civil society, when cultural, economic and political sectors are differentiated and mutually 
interdependent (not subordinated to centralized authorities). This context of civil society 
includes different political movements, ethnic groups and different social classes with 
various micro-cultures. They need to be combined in such a way that different groups have 
a mutual consensus about the importance of living together under accepted legal and 
democratic constitutional authority that gives access for all of them to gain political positions 
according to their merit. This criteria, as Hajarian (1993) pointed out, should be achieved by 
planting the citizenship concept among citizens and treating them equally. 
Differentiation and complexity in the economy, seen for example in the division of labour 
and the growth of the middle class, is linked to other aspects. Individuals and corporations 
engage in economic activities which lead to the rise of economic interest groups and 
eventually the growing autonomy of the economy and society from the state. In politics, as 
Huntington (2006) maintains, development leads to more complexity of political 
organizations and the government capacity to respond to the political demands of different 
groups. Development in this domain requires not only the formation of real representative 
bodies, pressure groups, different political parties, the separation of powers and regulatory 
bodies; but extends to all societal realms through support for the rise of civil society 
organizations and democratic institutionalization. It is important that the general framework 
of political interaction is identified by society and political groups, to minimize political 
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instability. This framework indicates the level of political will or the stance of political elites 
towards democratic institutionalization.  
Finally, in political development, integration with international processes is important. 
Modernization, political development and dependency studies were all elaborated at a time 
when the world was divided ideologically between the West and the East, which left its 
impact on the type of relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries. The 
latter became the field for ideological struggle between the two poles of the system at the 
time. In the current world system, which provides more flexibility for state alliances, the role 
of the international dimension cannot be ignored; it exists alongside the internal role of 
underdeveloped states.  
This practical complexity of political development means that the theoretical 
conceptualization of this process is bound to differ from what happens in reality. This means 
the operationalization dimension of political development at any time may be undermined 
by political factors such as internal war, elite conflict, and lack of natural resources or 
demands that may overload the system capacity. Further, group interests or narrow 
affiliations of local leaders can threaten development.  
In short, applying a synthesis of development and dependency schools to study political 
development is helpful as a context to show how political parties, participation, legitimacy, 
institutionalisation, political culture and the type of foreign relationship all play a part in 
political development. Just as political development theories were given an impetus by the 
emerging new countries after the Second World War, so, in the 1990s and early twenty first 
century, the many new government and movements emerging in the Middle East since the 
Arab Spring have given a new impetus to the political development debate. Debates on 
development have broadened to not just include political development but living conditions, 
the supply of human rights and protection of environment all of which depend on politics.  
The next chapter moves from this general discussion to the programme of research and the 
manner of collecting data for the investigation of the obstacles to political development in 
the KR. 
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Chapter Four: Design and Methodology of the Study 
The KR suffers from inadequate and poor research on the subject of political development. 
This study aims to rectify this and undertakes a wide-ranging investigation of the obstacles 
facing political development in the KR. The need for this research comes firstly from the 
fact that so far scholars have not made a critical investigation of the political development 
process in the KR. The majority of studies are focused on international relationships, 
ethnicity, nationalism and political parties. Secondly, as a region with de facto status within 
the Iraqi federal system it has a special place in the Middle East. Thirdly, there is a need for 
research to analyse the informal as well as the formal political institutions of the KR and 
their impact on political development.  
As the previous chapters have shown, the study of political development in the KR needs to 
take account of multiple variables including: the historical context, geographical location, 
the domestic socio-political fabric, fluctuations in the balance of power between Kurdistan’s 
political parties, the role of political elites and regional and international political relations.  
This study focuses on political development from 1992 to 2014. The reason is that the first 
KRG was established in 1992, through public elections and it administered its domestic 
issues free from the Baghdad government. The year 2014 was the end of the seventh cabinet, 
which gives an opportunity to assess its performance. Important changes occurred after that 
period, both internally and externally, but it is difficult to address them because of the rapid 
change in the nature of the events and their impact upon political development. However, 
where necessary, these new events are briefly discussed.  
The de facto recognition of the KR in 1991 and then the establishment of the KRG in 1992, 
provided a historical opportunity for the Kurds and paved the way for Kurdish political 
parties to create a self-administrative entity in the northern part of Iraq. In the self-
administrative period, the region faced challenges which originated in the ambition of 
political elites to seize authority alone and exclude others, which led to military conflict 
among political parties. This conflict impacted upon political development and it still plays 
an important role in ongoing events. In addition, change inside the circle of top leaders in 
the KR is rare. This can be seen in the long intervals between the political parties’ congresses 
as well as the continuities in leadership.  
The research and literature described in the previous chapters leads to the following 
questions: 
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- To what extent have the democratic political institutions (electoral government, 
parliament and political parties) helped to promote political development in the KR? 
- What impact do political parties (the level of internal openness and their relationships 
with the governments in the region) have on the political development process in the 
KR? 
- What is the type of relationship between political parties and   governmental 
institutions in the KR?   
- What are the relationships between society, culture, political parties and government 
and how do they relate to political development?  
- In the geopolitical context, what roles do regional states play in the political 
development of the KR? 
Each of these questions comes back to the political parties, which represent a unifying theme 
in this study. Hence, this thesis will provide evidence for the key proposition that  
Political development in the Kurdistan region corresponds directly to the level of internal 
openness of the political parties and their relationships with the governments in the 
region.  
This theme emerged from the previous chapters on the KR’s background and the theories of 
political development. However, the theme extends beyond the framework of political 
development and in some respects it is a challenge to existing approaches. This is the reason 
why this thesis has a focus on the role of political parties in the KR and their interaction with 
other political, economic and social aspects that constitute obstacles to the process of 
political development.  
Research Design and Strategy 
In this thesis, there are elements of political science, sociology, economic, international 
relationships and history; political development cannot be captured in one single discipline. 
As Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009) pointed out, political development is a mixed 
subject. For this reason, this thesis focuses on political consequences as they are understood 
in each discipline. It utilizes political science and political sociology together with a 
subsidiary framework of international relations from the last fifty years. For example, the 
early research by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research 
Council (CCPSSR) studied modernisation and political development in relation to education 
(Coleman, 1965), communication (Lerner, 1958; Pye, 1963), bureaucracy (LaPalombara, 
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1963), political culture (Pye and Verba, 1965) and political parties (LaPalombara and 
Weiner, 1966). The crises and sequences of the political development process in relation to 
differentiation, equality, identity, participation, legitimacy of government and its capacity to 
distract and penetrate has been studied by Binder et al (1971). Other theorists such as 
Huntington (2006) studied political development in the framework of political science 
through the institutionalisation of policy and participation. The majority of these studies 
utilized the methods of comparison between countries, case studies and mainly qualitative 
research. These methods were in the tradition of structural explanations and were broadly 
objectivist. This thesis has some similarities, it is not comparative to another case study but 
it has different phases; and it is more historical and interpretive and the interviews were held 
in order to interpret and explain phenomena and not just collect information. In addition, this 
thesis takes into account regional relationships. 
The dependency school studied underdevelopment and development in the framework of the 
economic relationship between states. However, new trends in international relationships 
recognise that the state is no longer the only actor in the international arena and refer to non-
state actors, namely international organisations, as partners or even counter-partners of states 
(Higgott et al, 2000; Kappen, 2003). The dependency school has a strong theoretical base 
and is mainly quantitative with a focus on the economy; while this thesis mainly focuses on 
the political aspects of political development and their impact upon other aspects.  
The sources of data on the KR are fragmented, which makes accessing them difficult, 
especially information that relates to the income and revenues of the KR. Typically, the data 
published by the Ministry of Planning (its statistic branches) and Ministry of Oil do not 
correspond to the data published by political parties, which participate in the same cabinet. 
There is a lack of transparency and credibility in the government data. In 2015, according to 
Corruption Perception Index, of 167 countries, Iraq ranked 161 as one of the most corrupt 
countries (Transparency International, 2015). It also has to be taken into account that the 
unification of the government was in 2005, which means that the ministries that operate 
throughout the country have only been established recently including the ministry of 
planning, which is in charge of statistics (the issue of unification is discussed in the following 
chapters). For this reason, the data collected from various sources is interpreted according to 
the authorities that published them (official and semi-official government and political 
parties, and other sources such as books and organisations’ websites).  
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The research design includes interviews (described below), that are designed to supplement, 
corroborate and develop the above-mentioned data sources and theoretical perspectives. For 
this reason, there is no separate chapter to analysis the interview data; the interviews are 
integrated with other sources of information and commentary. In terms of design, the 
research can be understood as a case study which focuses on political development in the 
KR. Stake (1995) defines a case study as an approach  
In which the researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process or 
one or more individuals…, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of 
data collection procedures over a sustained period of time (cited in Creswell, 2003:15).  
The present case study is a "single case study" which, as Yin (2009:46-47) notes, represents 
a critical test of a significant theory and represents a unique case. In a single case study, the 
researcher observes and analyses a phenomenon that has not been analysed; it is a 
longitudinal case to study how certain conditions have changed over time.  
The KR as explained earlier, altered from a de facto autonomous status into a recognized 
federal entity in 2005. Hence, it is necessary to address the changes that have occurred in 
this significant political period. This study is, therefore, a comparative study, comparing the 
progress that occurred in different phases at the level of the governmental apparatuses, 
political parties and societal changes. This method is used to analyse differences and 
similarities between two or more subjects of the study in different periods.  
The study is designed to address "what" type questions (Blaikie, 2010:61). To achieve this 
aim, it utilizes multiple sources of information such as archival investigation, interviews and 
documents. It uses both qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative data is used when it 
is essential in the study of a population, the annual budgets of government and political 
parties, voting behaviour and so on. These materials are used to compare, check and, where 
possible, triangulate evidence which refers to the same event, facts or interpretations (Yin, 
2012; Creswell, 2003). 
However, the main emphasis in the analysis is interpretive. In contrast to positivism it looks 
for culturally derived and historically situated interoperations of the social life-world 
(Crotty, 1998:67), and allows the researcher to “filter(s) the data through a personal lens” 
(Creswell, 2003:183). Qualitative researchers focus on the meaning of particular texts, 
actions or social relations. For example, the investigator may use evidence from individuals 
(narrative, phenomenology), institutional processes, activities and events (case studies) or 
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culture by scrutinizing the behaviour of individuals or groups (ethnography) (Creswell, 
2003).  
As the majority of this research is qualitative, the study uses a number of data sources and 
types of inquiry to explore the various aspects of political development. It moves from the 
more particular (specific socio-political aspects of society and its apparatuses) to the more 
general (political development in the KR), utilizing an inductive strategy to answer the 
specified questions. An inductive strategy should help to limit over-generalization from what 
can be observed in the KR. Hence, the results apply mainly to this region. 
Merriam (1988) argued that “there is no standard format for reporting case study research” 
(cited in Creswell, 1998:188). Following this argument, an epistemology is employed, which 
acknowledges the relationship between the subjects of the research and the researcher, in the 
reality of Kurdistan society. The reason for adopting this standpoint is that the researcher is 
an insider to the case study setting (indeed, the town where he lives, is where the key KDP 
cadres and officials live). The researcher plays a reflexive role in the study (Creswell, 2003). 
He is engaged in issues of political development in the KR, contributing to on-line websites 
and journals as well as conducting research interviews. The reliability of qualitative research 
benefits from minimizing the distance between the researcher and the subject (Creswell, 
1998). Insider knowledge is also valuable when analysing and interpreting available data. 
However, the research also, benefits from the distance gained by studying abroad and being 
challenged by western sociological assumptions about political development. These 
positions of being an insider and being at a distance, have helped to strengthen the 
researcher’s understanding of issues of political development in the KR.   
Research Practice and Fieldwork 
To fulfill the purpose of this study, the researcher employed a number of methods in data 
collection, utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The main library sources were 
books, academic journals and official documents (from political parties, government, 
parliament and the presidency). The relative lack of previous research made it essential to 
use Internet websites, mass media, some available dissertations and other current 
information sources. This included actively following relevant ongoing events through 
various TV channels in order to assess elite and mass opinion about ongoing events. As the 
majority of the mass media are dominated by political parties, the researcher tried as much 
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as possible to check each source of data with other governmental, non-governmental and 
political party sources to ensure the reliability of the data.  
The researcher used resources in the English, Kurdish, Arabic and Persian languages. The 
titles of non-English books and journals, are given in the list of references in both English 
and the original language. The Persian sources contain details of both Persian and English 
calendars. The titles of Kurdish websites’ subjects are written in Latin Kurdish making them 
more accessible for non-Kurdish readers as Latin Kurdish is widely used in the KR and 
Greater Kurdistan. It is necessary to mention that, in the provinces of the KR, spelling 
formats differ, for example Erbil (Arbil, Irbil and in Kurdish Hewler), Dohuk (Duhok, 
Dihuk) and Sulaimani (Slemani, Suleimaniah, Sulaymaniyah). This thesis adopts the 
following form: Erbil, Slemani and Dohuk. 
The interviews were used to explore the major impediments that face the process of political 
development in the KR. The interviews were with officials, MPs, cadres (government and 
political parties) and heads of some larger tribes. They were semi-structured using a limited 
number of open-ended questions in order to gain in depth responses.  
The next source is observation, which was made possible by the researcher spending nearly 
four months in the field. Direct observation is recognized as having a role in data collection 
and analysis. Utilizing both secondary and primary (interview and observation) sources of 
data, significantly enhances the reliability of the data. Besides the interviews, the researcher 
had informal conversations with members of the public, to learn their point of view about 
subjects related to the study.  They included taxi drivers, a person in a coffee shop, as well 
as conversations with colleagues of the university. The purpose was to collect data from 
various sources, not only officials or textbooks, but from ordinary citizens. I recorded their 
views in my field notebook. However, the data is unsystematic and is not quoted directly, it 
is only treated as a source of background knowledge.   
The field work was carried out in three provinces of the KR, namely Erbil, Dohuk and 
Slemani. However, the main focus was on Erbil, on the grounds that it is the capital city and 
officials and where cadres of various political parties are concentrated. All interviews were 
immediately transferred to my laptop, recorder, USB and a hard drive to avoid any damage 
or loss of data. During my fieldwork period in the KR from mid-March to Mid-June 2014, 
seventeen participants were interviewed by way of face to face and open-ended interviews, 
six participants responded via E-mail and one provided written answers. The participants 
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were from various occupations and different governmental and political officials such as 
Ministers, top political parties’ cadres, Members of Parliament and chieftains (see Appendix 
7). Each participant had their own specific questions. However, sometimes the participant 
had more than one duty at the same time or previously, which led to an extended list of 
questions. One example, was an interviewee who had been a member of the political bureau 
and an MP and Minister at different periods.  
The participants were selected from the main political parties. I decided to interview 25 
participants, who were most influential and accessible; five participants from each political 
party (elected and non-elected to keep a balance) and five chieftains across the region. I 
prepared a list of those I selected to interview. I eliminated the first figures of each political 
party because access to them was difficult. I followed a pragmatic way in selecting the 
interviewees. Further, I regarded the target of five per party to be sufficient to obtain a range 
of opinion and avoid repetition by doing more interviews. However, carrying out field work 
on the ground did not follow exactly the same patterns as I had planned because of the events 
that are explained in the next section. 
After gaining approval from the Bangor University Research Ethics Committee for Social 
Science (see Appendix 5), the interview letters, questions, consent forms and participant 
forms were all translated into the Kurdish Language (see Appendices 8, 9 and 10). All 
interviews were done via the Kurdish language. However, there was an opportunity for 
interviewees to respond either in English or Kurdish (both Kurdish dialects). Only one e-
mail interview was conducted in English. Before starting the interview, the consent form and 
participant form were prepared for each participant, who was requested to read and sign (if 
they agreed). According to the interview ethical framework, some ethical recommendations 
were not met during interviewing. Sometimes, the interviewees did not even read the 
participant information and basically told me ‘do what is best for you’. Verbally, I informed 
them that they were free to not respond to any question that they did not want to answer. 
Before starting the interview, I introduced myself and the topic of my study. Additionally, I 
showed the participants the Support Letter that was provided by my supervisor (see 
Appendix 6).   
Carrying out interviews in the KR is a difficult task. Face to face interviews had to be 
arranged by a personal mediator or broker, or via mobile phone to make an appointment. 
The brokers were friends or relatives who knew someone who had a connection with the 
interviewee. Some of them (mostly interviews by correspondence) were contacted via 
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Facebook to arrange a meeting. However, they preferred to send their questions via 
Facebook. Many of them ignored me and did not send back the answers. In addition, many 
who were approached directly by phone rejected my appeal for an interview, giving reasons 
of lack of time. (Around 40% of the total number that I contacted rejected the interview 
directly or indirectly). Some of them just said ‘not today’, ‘tomorrow’ and finally did not 
respond to my phone calls. For this reason, the broker was the best option.  
In fact, the researcher was treated differently according to how he was perceived. Having a 
good car was important in doing interviews, especially with chieftains and some cadres of 
political parties. Further, signing the participant form was the most difficult part of the 
interview. In the Parliament Member Syndicate, where I had asked many people to take part 
in interviews, a significant number refused to take part after reading and being asked to sign 
the consent form even though they were free to sign or not.  I realised the Kurdish cultural 
context was totally different to following scientific procedures compared to the European 
context. Many of the potential participants thought it was a form of insult, because they were 
in powerful positions and signing the consent form put them in the rank of ordinary people. 
I faced the same problem when I did the field work for my MA between 2006 and 2007. 
Fieldwork Problems 
Other problems were encountered, besides those mentioned above. Firstly, the time 
coincided with various events which created logistical difficulties, although it was a dynamic 
period politically. The whole of April 2014, was the month of election campaigns for the 
Iraqi parliament and the KR provincial elections. The cadres of political parties were 
engaged in campaigns, which affected the interview process. However, during this month, I 
travelled to all three provinces of the KR and a number of cities to observe the elections 
process. I could observe the types of rivalry between political parties and talk with people 
about the process of the campaigns.  
In May, I continued my interviews. To carry out the interviews, it was necessary to travel 
from province to province, which was sometimes pointless, because the interviewee was 
engaged with other duties. In June 2014, ISIS attacked Mosul province, causing a shortage 
of vehicle fuel in the KR. Vehicles had to wait in queues for nearly 24 hours or more for 
rationed fuel (30 litres for two days). The fuel price on the black market increased six fold 
and the transport system became totally jammed. For instance, during doing one of my 
interviews, to come back from Amedi to my base city Pirmam I waited three days for a car, 
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because the allocated fuel was not enough for both directions and no car was ready to take 
me. Finally, I called my family to buy fuel on the black market to pick me up. July was the 
fasting month, Ramadan, which affected the interview process, because the majority of 
people were fasting and there were electricity shortages and temperatures were very high.  
Some interviews were done in a cafeteria. For the interviews with chieftains, there was no 
private place. The interview was held in the chieftain’s palace, (called Kuçık or Diwexan in 
Kurdish), in which many servants, bodyguards and guests of the chieftain were presented 
and nearly all were smoking. During questions the chieftain, Akha, looked at the audience 
as if to secure approval for his speech. For one interview with a chieftain, he changed the 
appointment three times and each time I was ready at his palace. The interviews with 
chieftains were held at night.   
The same occurred during an interview with some MPs in the Parliamentary Syndicate, 
where the interview took place, in a non-private room which had a TV which was turned on.  
The majority of participants interrupted the interviews to answer their mobile phones. 
Sometimes, a few participants reacted strongly when I asked questions such as ‘What are the 
privileges of being a member of a party compared with an ordinary person who is not a 
member of a party?’ or the question ‘A lot of the national budget is allocated to the 
parliamentary members. They have many privileges, such as receiving vehicles, houses, 
body guards and high salaries and pensions. Do you consider this as a kind of corruption?’  
Finally, as mentioned, the interview data is not used to form a separate chapter, but serves 
as additional and supplementary data to the theme of the thesis. The responses sometimes 
are paraphrased and sometimes direct quotations are used. The participants allowed me to 
use their real names and functional titles. The interviewees’ responses therefore can be 
considered as both the policy of their political parties and as private opinions. They contain 
both types of data, the official political party view as well as commentary, which can be 
considered more individual. Chapter Nine (on neighbouring governments’ policy) contains 
less interview material because of the lack of response from officials who are in charge of 
this issue.     
To provide further support for the theme of this thesis and the data of interviews, unpublished 
questionnaire data is used from a report of the Tojinewe Centre: Kurdistan Intellectual 
Foundation entitled Current Political Issues of the Kurdistan Region. The survey was 
conducted by written questionnaires between 23 January and 5 February 2011. There were 
85 
 
1,320 participants from the cities of Slemani (451), Erbil (564) and Dohuk (186) of which 
1,201 responses were counted.  
I accessed the whole data of the survey, thanks to a personal relationship with the director 
of the centre and because, at the time of the survey I was an editor of the Tojinewe Journal. 
The centre is related to the Media and Culture Institution of the KDP, and conducted the 
survey for the KDP, but independently and by professionals in relevant subjects, especially 
sociologists. The questions were designed by the centre itself. The surveys were not 
published, but because of the lapse of time, the director of the centre allowed me to publish 
the data which is relevant to this research. The data, design and methods described here 
prepare the ground for the next chapter, which examines the performance of the parliament 
and government in the KR. 
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Chapter Five: Foundations of Government and Parliament (1992-2005) 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on parliament and government and their performance 
throughout the phases of the KRG to understand their structural form, their capacity to 
influence society and the kind of relationship that exists between these two main bodies. It 
will help to provide an understanding of the current level of, and obstacles to, political 
development in the KR.  
The approach is to review the different governmental cabinets and parliamentary terms, 
using description and analysis based on published sources, research interviews and some 
quantitative data. The events and performance of political apparatuses are often closely 
associated and interlocked, so there are some overlaps between the sections in this chapter.  
As the table below shows, from 1992 to 2014, seven different cabinets with different 
durations were formed in the KR. They held power either alone or by coalition between 
different political parties. This and the next chapter focus on these different cabinets and 
their achievements to underline the sequence of political development in different periods. 
From the third cabinet until the fifth cabinet, two separate administrations were established 
in Erbil and Slemani; for this reason, the terms cabinet and administration are both used. 
This chapter discusses the cabinets from 1992 to 2005, and the rest will be in the next 
chapter.  
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Table 5.1: The Kurdistan Region’s Parliaments and Cabinets 
Parliament 
Term 
The cabinet  Duration Ruling Party Prime Minster 
The first term 
(1992-2005)  
The first cabinet 1992 to 1993 PUK, coalition with 
KDP 
Fuad Masum 
The first term The second cabinet 1993 to 1995 PUK, coalition with 
KDP 
Kosrat Rasul 
The first term The third cabinet 
(administration)  
1996 to 1999 KDP (in Erbil) Rozh Nuri Shawis 
(Deputy of 
Nechirvan Barzani). 
--------- The third cabinet  1996 to 2001 PUK (in Slemani) Kosrat Rasul 
The first term The fourth cabinet  1999 to 2006 KDP (in Erbil) Nechirvan Barzani 
Transitional 
period (2002-
2005) 
The fourth cabinet  2001 to 2006. PUK (in Slemani)  Barham Salih. 
(From 2005 Omar 
Fatah) 
 The second 
term (2005-
2009) 
The fifth cabinet 2006 to 2009 KDP, coalition with 
PUK and other parties 
Nechirvan Barzani. 
The third term 
(2009-2014) 
The sixth cabinet 2009 to 2011 PUK coalition with 
KDP 
Barham Salih 
The third term 
(209-2014) 
The seventh 
cabinet 
2011-2014 The KDP coalition with 
the PUK 
Nechirvan Barzani. 
 
The fourth 
term (2014-
…) 
The eighth cabinet 2014-… A broad based cabinet Nechirvan Barzani 
Sources: Government website (2014) http://cabinet.gov.krd/; Mirkhan, Z, H. (2011) ‘The Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region’, Goftogu, 58, pp. 11-22, [Online], available at: 
http://www.noormags.com/view/fa/articlepage/927442?sta=%d8%a7%d9%82%d9%84%db%8c%d9%85%2
0%da%a9%d8%b1%d8%af%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%a7%d9%86%20%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82  
(Accessed: 22 July 2013). [In Persian calendar (1390)] and Author’s own. Note: From 2002 to 2005, it was 
the transitional period, which was the period when international negotiation started on changing the region in 
Baghdad, which united the policy of the KDP and the PUK and established parliamentary general elections in 
2005 (See: Ala’Aldeen, 2013).  
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Establishing Government and Institutions 
The origins of the KRG go back to the Kurdistan Front that was founded in 1988 as a unified 
reaction of the political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan to the Ba’ath regime’s actions against the 
Kurds. The Front consisted of eight political parties namely the KDP, the PUK, the Kurdistan 
People’s Democratic Party (KDPD), the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PASOK), the Kurdistan 
Branch of the Iraqi Communist Party, the Assyrian Democratic Movement and the Kurdistan 
Toilers’ Party (Yildiz, 2004, Chapman, 2009, Khalil, 2008). After the uprising in 1991, this 
Front became the body that took up the legitimate political leadership of Kurdistan society.  
With the establishment of the Safe Haven by the international community in the North of 
Iraq, refugees from neighbouring countries returned. The Safe Haven zone caused the central 
government to withdraw its governmental organizations from the KR. This allowed the 
Kurdistan Front to control the KR. However, each party tried to control its own areas of 
influence by forming separate relationships with regional states and authorising their military 
commanders to act as a legal authority in the areas under their control. The rivalry between 
political parties and chaotic economic circumstances created a culture of theft, killing for 
food or money, the sale of governmental and public assets to neighbouring countries by local 
commanders, and widespread corruption. In other words, political instability and social 
disorder prevailed (Gunter, 1993a; Karami, 1997; McDowell, 2007).  
A minimum level of standard of living and stability are crucial for political development. In 
the above-mentioned situation, providing daily subsistence for citizens and achieving 
stability and social order for the exercise of authority should be the main goal. To solve the 
challenge of disorder, the Kurdistan Front invited fifteen internal experts who represented 
various political parties to form a committee and compose a law for parliamentary elections 
to shape the legislative and executive authorities.  
The outcome of discussions between the committee’s members from 23 September 1991 to 
28 January 1992 was Law No.1 (Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly Law) and Law No.2 
(the Law of Presidential Elections), which stated that parliament has the authority to pass 
laws from its position as the highest body in the region (Aziz, 2000; Parliament website, 
2013a). Through these laws, the general democratic framework of political activity, the 
rights and duties of authority and the relationship between legislative and executive powers 
were set out. The two laws were the first step towards the consolidation of the political 
institutions in the KR.  
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To implement these laws, on 19 May 1992, thirteen political parties competed for 105 
parliamentary seats. The KDP and the PUK’s coalition list both gained a similar proportion 
of votes. After division of the threshold of other parties between the KDP and the PUK, the 
KDP gained 50.22% of total votes and the PUK 49.78%. As a result, aside from the Christian 
quota (the right to five seats regardless of the vote), from seven Kurdish lists, only the KDP 
and the PUK entered into parliament. The rest failed to pass the 7% threshold (see Table 
5.2). Turkmens did not participate. 
Table 5. 2: Results of Parliamentary Elections (1992) 
Political Party Gained Votes Proportion  
KDP 437,889 45.50% 
PUK and Toiler party 423,833 43.61% 
Islamic list 49,108 5.50% 
Yekgrtin (the Union) 24,882 2.56% 
Democratic Union of 
Kurdistan and Independents 
21,123 2.17% 
Kurdistan Democratic 
People’s Party 
9,903 1.02% 
The Independent Democrats 501 0.05% 
Total  971,953 100% 
Source: Parliament Website (2013) ‘Session Minutes, First Term 1992’, [online], available at:         
http://www.perleman.org/default.aspx?page=sitecontents&c=Parliament-History1992 
Commenting on the first public elections in 1992 McDowell (2007:380) writes 
Like many elections elsewhere, the campaign was essentially a personality contest. It was 
about loyalty to leaders rather than matters of ideology…. The overwhelming majority 
voted according to their sense of personal loyalty.  
This situation, as will be seen the following chapters, still continues. In the presidential 
elections Masoud Barzani, head of the KDP, gained 44.6% and Jalal Talabani, head of the 
PUK, obtained 44.3% of the total votes. The close result of both elections, the ambition to 
capture power and the loser’s fear of being excluded from power by the winner, caused the 
PUK to reject the results with accusations of fraud in the elections (Khalil, 2008). In fact, 
90 
 
both sides believe that they gained the majority of votes and accused the other side of fraud 
in the elections1. According to one interviewee  
To resolve this problem and to form the government, ministries’ portfolios were divided 
between the PUK and the KDP by a fifty-fifty ratio; appointments were allocated equally 
and if a minister belonged to the KDP, the deputy had to be from the PUK and vice versa. 
Any decisions had to be made by both the Minister and his Deputy2.  
This outcome did not emerge from the goodwill of political elites. It was the result of 
mediation by foreign actors, especially Frence, to create a unified cabinet. The ‘solution’ 
paved the way for the future decomposition of government and society. It was decided to 
hold the presidential elections again because no candidate had gained the majority of votes. 
However, while both leaders stayed out of governmental political institutions, they continued 
to supervise them. Any decisions required their approval and they became the main reference 
for decision making (Ala’Aldeen, 2013; Natali, 2010; Chapman, 2009; Leezenberg, 2005; 
Gunter, 1993). 
The election results clearly showed that society was divided equally between the PUK and 
the KDP. Consequently, with the lack of experience of political democratic life among both 
parties and voters, any decision made by one political party would tend to include or exclude 
nearly half of society. The political cleavage and distrust between parties affected the process 
of political development.  
The first alliance cabinet was formed on 4th
 
July 1992 by the Prime Minister from the PUK 
(Fuad Masum who became the president of Iraq in 2014), with his Deputy from the KDP, 
fifteen other Ministers and their Deputies from both parties and the participation of one 
Christian Minister. The important achievement of this cabinet was to fill the power vacuum 
by establishing new institutions with indigenous cadres that possessed legitimacy in running 
society and executing orders. The declared aims of the first cabinet (Aziz, 2000:106-107; 
Khalil, 2008:73) were to: 
1. Provide freedom of speech, belief, religion, nation3, journalists and syndicates. 
2. Apply the law and support judicial independence. 
                                                 
1 Participants in interview according to their political bias counted their party as a winner in those elections. 
2 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader, a Minister in the first cabinet on 10 June 2014. He mentioned that if 
he allowed any privilege for his bodyguards, his deputy did the same. “[Laughingly and seriously], if I drink a 
cup of tea, my Deputy drinks a cup of tea”.  
3 The term ‘freedom of nation’ is an ambiguous term because it does not refer to what it means by the ‘freedom 
of nation’. Whether it is independence or federalism is not clear.   
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Theoretically, this agenda shows that despite the crudity and lack of democratic experience, 
the elites at the time tried to initiate democratic procedures, which could be considered as a 
first step towards political development. The decision to run the country as a democratic 
system calls for some investigation of why political parties at the time tried to follow this 
policy. The answer lies in several features of the KR politics at the time:  
1. The existence of various Kurdish parties before 1990 with two major competing parties 
(the PUK and the KDP).  
2. The establishment of the Kurdistan Front, which can be considered as a step towards the 
aggregation of different interests, providing revolutionary legitimacy. 
3. Parties in the Kurdistan Front through their history had fought against a dictatorial regime, 
so it was unacceptable at the time to follow the same approach to self-rule. In addition, the 
formation of the Front which included various political parties was a democratic pathway in 
itself. On the international level, the period of establishment of the KRG coincided with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and a wave of democratisation which possibly influenced the 
KR’s political parties. 
4. As Voller (2012) argues, the leaders of de facto entities seeking to gain international 
support are generally willing to build democratic institutions and liberalize the political 
system. However, this point will be accepted only up to the point where each party’s interests 
are no longer threatened by their rivals. Voller’s argument is pertinent to the KR, where this 
principle operated until the parties’ interests were secured.    
In the first phase of the establishment of government and parliament, the division of offices 
between the PUK and the KDP was by mutual agreement. Prior to the first cabinet the 
struggle was outside the government, but the even split of elected representatives brought it 
into the governmental sphere. The struggle became endemic to government and obstructed 
its capacity. However, because the financial capacity of the government was weak, 
corruption was limited. Nonetheless, the first cabinet in its short period in office succeeded 
in organizing all the KR’s cross border incomes. Further, the Prime Minister concentrated 
on governing instead of ‘party-izing’4.  
The growing competition between the political parties obstructed the performance of the 
government and the internal rivalry to take control inside the PUK itself (see Chapter 7), 
                                                 
4 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
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caused the collapse of the first cabinet on 17th
 
March 1993 (Gunter, 1993; Chapman, 2009). 
Another reason, as the prime minister of the first cabinet explained, was the non-participation 
of the president of the KDP and the Secretary General of the PUK in either parliament or 
government. As he mentioned  
If the two leaders of PUK and KDP enter parliament, we will be rescued from 
considerable trouble. Every decision now needs a party decision. If the leaders join the 
government there will not be this uncertainty (quoted in McDowell, 2007:385).  
The short life of this cabinet neither allowed it to execute its agenda, nor helped it to promote 
economic growth. Until the second cabinet was formed, the offices of the different political 
parties were a substitute for government.  
To fill the vacuum of power the second cabinet was formed, again by the PUK, on 25th April 
1993. It was headed by a Prime Minister with a military background from the most extreme 
faction of the PUK opposed to the KDP at that time (Ala’Aldeen, 2013). The new prime 
minister used “government funds to promote his own enterprises” (Stansfield, 2003:151). 
According to a minister of the first cabinet  
The new prime minister worked 100% on partisanship and not on how to govern, and 
worked to weaken the KDP. As a result, both parliament and government became 
party-ized5.  
The PUK’s change of Prime Minister and the majority of his ministers, without the 
acceptable involvement of the KDP, strengthened the latter’s distrust, caused increasing 
strife, elevated party interests over national interests and controlled trade points by political 
parties without returning the revenues to government coffers. This period coincided with the 
commencement of armed conflict between various political parties- the PUK and the KDP, 
the PUK and the IMK, the KDP and PASOK (Khalil, 2008).  
Conflicts mirrored the depth of antagonism between political parties, their will to exclude 
others and were a sign of the unwillingness of the political elites to establish democratic 
institutions. In addition, due to the nonexistence of opposition in the parliament as a result 
of the fifty-fifty rule, and the increase of loyalty to each party’s ideology, discord grew in 
ministries between ministers and their deputies. These events led to a sharp polarization and 
the ‘party-ization’ of society.  
                                                 
5 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
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To understand the factors in the failure of the first and the second cabinets, it is important to 
look at the historical hostility between the KDP and the PUK and how it was reflected in the 
governmental process. At the beginning of the establishment of the KDP, two factions, 
communist and nationalist were involved in a deep struggle (see Chapter 7). According to 
one interviewee, after the establishment of the PUK by the communist wing of the KDP in 
1975, the struggle between both parties erupted into armed conflicts. At this period, the 
leaders of political parties imported the revolutionary culture from outside, especially from 
certain Arabic countries that had imposed revolution by the gun. Hence, both sides used arms 
against each other. Eventually, according to the leadership base of each party, the PUK 
emerged to dominate areas of Slemani, Kirkuk and some parts of Erbil, the mostly Soranian 
area; and the KDP emerged in areas of Duhok, Mosul and some parts of Erbil, the mostly 
Badinan area6.  
The same interviewee continued to explained at length, when the activities of a party were 
prohibited, their popularity gradually decreased. After the uprising, this balance which in 
Kurdish language came to be called ‘mountain balance’ (until the uprising the major 
activities of both parties were in the mountainous areas) transferred into the cities, which led 
to the outbreak of war in Erbil. Eventually, two administrations were built, coinciding with 
a narrowing of privileges. The members of each party were enabled to gain privileges such 
as employment, trade and investment in their zone. In such a situation, a businessman for 
example, has a simple choice in terms of party allegiance and business interests. Because of 
the geographical and administrative division, financial capital cannot be mobile. A PUK 
supporter would be prevented from investing in the KDP zone and vice versa. As a result, 
investors remained in their areas and supported the dominant party there7.  
The polarization of society by and in favour of political parties opened the way for them to 
control the entire apparatus of economics, politics, culture and education. In addition, as 
(Weiner, 1965), mentioned the polarization undermined societal integration, which is 
recognized as a crucial aspect in the process of political development.  
It is important to mention to the logic of force in the mentality of the PUK and the KDP. A 
top leader of the PUK explained that:  
If a party in the KR were to achieve first place in the elections, the runner up would not 
gain power for a long period of time. In the KR the power of logic and law does not apply, 
                                                 
6 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
7 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
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only the logic of power. For this reason, if the other party does not have the military 
strength to counter problems, and maintain its popular base, it faces problems8.  
The logic of this statement reflects the fragility of institutions in the region, the role of militia 
and elites in political development and more importantly the permanence of the dual 
administration system, with political parties on the one hand and the government on the 
other. 
Hence, one of defects of the coalition government was the non-unification of the army, 
Peshmerga, under a legitimate centre accepted by all parties. In my interviews, in response 
to the question ‘the army belongs to whom’? the participants replied that the army belongs 
to the KDP and the PUK. Without announcing one’s loyalty to one of the main parties it is 
difficult to enter the military sector. However, in the 2013 and 2014 elections, various 
political parties gained votes within the military. At the same time, the military organization 
is often in parallel with tribal trends (see Chapter 8). What is more, during the field work 
observation, I found out that some army units are limited to specific areas which do not allow 
citizens from other areas to join. The result of such a military structure is that instead of 
becoming a national army it has accelerated the division of the region and the society. This 
role of the military is maintained by the political leaders who are or who have been army 
commanders. According to one interviewee “up to now the military force participates in 
electoral fraud, in war and destroying election centres”10. 
This negative role of the army, alongside the sort of political thinking of each party that 
counts itself as a legitimate body with the right to rule society, is a powerful reason for the 
collapse of the first and the second governments and the outbreak of the internal war. As 
Almond and Powell (1969:10) argued “in all societies the role of formal governmental 
institutions is shaped and limited by informal groups, political attitudes, and a multitude of 
interpersonal relations”.  
                                                 
8 Interview with Sa’adi Ahmad Pira. 
 The logic of force still dominates the parties’ mentality after more than two decades of governing. The most 
obvious example is the parliamentary election campaigns of 2014, in which events such as burning cars and 
shops and wounding occurred between supporters of various political parties and in different cities. One 
military commander of the PUK announced that even if other parties gained 100% of the vote, the PUK would 
not allow them to take power in Slemani and threatened to resort to arms as previously if necessary (Source: 
Awene, M, A. (2013) ‘The Deputy of the Internal Minister Announced that the Security Forces Are Free to 
Vote for Any Political Party’, 27 August, [online], available at: 
http://www.awene.com/article/2013/08/27/25052 (Accessed: 27 August 2013). [In Kurdish: Birîkarî Wezaretî 
Nawxoy hêzekanman serpişk kirduwe deng be kê deden Biden]. 
10 Interview with Sa’adi Ahmad Pira. 
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The aftermath of these events was political instability in the region which prevented political 
development. The double embargo on the KR and increasing poverty and unemployment in 
society fuelled this conflict. In the mid-1990s the unemployment rate reached 70-80%. 
Males participated in the civil war to obtain essential subsistence for their families 
(Stansﬁeld, 2003:53; Leezenberg, 2005). This high level of poverty and unemployment 
occurred at the time when in the first cabinet the government unspent budget was 13.5 
million Iraqi Swiss Dinar plus US$3.5 million and in the second cabinet it was 4.5 billion 
Iraqi Swiss Dinar that mainly came from border crossings (Ala’Aldeen, 2013:64-72). In one 
interview, a member of the first cabinet pointed out that the first cabinet succeeded in 
collecting more than US$10 million11.  
In that period the distribution of wealth was to a small circle around the top leaders of each 
party and they in turn would be responsible for allocations to lower levels of the hierarchy. 
According to one interviewee, 
Before allocating the budget for the public sector, the PUK and the KDP decided on their 
own shares, and then the factions inside each party would redistribute the allocated 
portion12.  
The imbalance between society (poverty and unemployment) and the wishes of elites to 
control all effective positions of power created an unintegrated socio-political society in 
favour of single party rule, freezing political development through an attempt to homogenise 
both society and authority by narrowing the circle of political activities. To achieve this goal, 
powerful organisations of different kinds of media were established to mobilize in favour of 
one party or the other13.    
In addition, the KRG was obstructed by its geographical landlocked character, its being 
surrounded by unfriendly governments and by the intervention of regional powers in the 
KR’s issues (see Chapter 9). As the former secretary of state of the USA, Henry Kissinger 
(1999) observed the KR must trade with “forbidding geography, ambivalent motives on the 
part of neighbouring countries, and incompatible motivations within the Kurdish community 
itself” (cited in Gunter, 2008a:237).  
                                                 
11 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
12 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
13 In my interviews, which referred to the role of mass media in the KR, participants expressed the view that 
the mass media belongs to the political parties. Even those called independent media have a bias or loyalty to 
a given party. 
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In brief, the strong message of the first and the second cabinets was that elections alone are 
not a sufficient factor to propel institutions on a trajectory towards political development. 
Even if these institutions are supported by law, there is a tendency for them to break down, 
especially if a militia mentality rules the government. In the KR, the citizens’ economic 
situation and the tendency to take absolute power to the exclusion of others, destroyed 
progress towards political development.  
The Role of Parliament 
The first parliament was formed on 4 June 1992 according to Law No 1:51 and its term was 
three years. However, due to a deep struggle between the KDP and the PUK from 3 May 
1994 until 27 June 1994 the parliament, whose president belonged to the KDP, was 
surrounded by the PUK’s armed forces, which meant, in practice the authority of this body 
as a legislative one to monitor the government’s actions came to an end (Khalil, 2008). 
Article 6 of Law No. 1 states that the army cannot enter the precinct of parliament.  
This action highlighted the type of thinking of political elites, who instead of solving points 
of disagreement through democratic procedures preferred to resort to the logic of force. The 
second cabinet collapsed on 24th
 
October 1994 and internal war broke out, which meant the 
collapse of the parliament as well (Parliament website, 2013; Chapman, 2009). As a reaction 
to the war, 59 parliamentary members were stuck in the parliament building for 101 days 
and issued a manifesto against internal war (Jambaz and Pirdawd, 2008:5).   
The term of parliament extended from 1992 until June 2005. From 1996 to 2002, the 
parliament was dominated by the KDP alone, which extended its duration four times without 
elections. In this period the KDP filled its seats according to the results of the 1992 
parliamentary elections (and not according to the fifty-fifty agreement), winning 51 seats, 
which together with five seats of the Christians resulted in a majority of seats (56 out of a 
total of 105), allowing them to change the laws in their own favour (Stansfield, 2003). This 
practice could be considered as a civilian coup, whereby a political party, alongside another 
party, remains in power via the legitimacy of parliament and without using guns and without 
holding public elections. In 2002, again and without elections the parliament re-formed in 
coalition with the PUK according to an agreement between them, the so-called transitional 
period (2002-2005). As power was divided politically, it was reflected geographically. The 
first session of parliament in the transitional period was held in Erbil, the area dominated by 
the KDP and the second one was held in Slemani, the area dominated by the PUK.  
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A leader of the KDP mentioned that the main reason for taking up the legislative authority 
instead of the executive one by the KDP was the non-existence of previous experience in 
running governmental apparatuses. It is also accounted for by the influence of a kind of 
western idea amongst the top cadres of this party, who lived abroad before the uprising and 
believed that the authority of parliament comes above government power, because the 
parliament votes to appoint and depose the head of cabinet14.  
It is important to note that the period of the fifty-fifty agreement conflicts with the law of 
establishment of parliament which refers to a duration of three years. Mutual agreement was 
reached that each party would run the parliament for two years and the next government for 
the next two years, and vice versa (Parliament Website, 2013). This political division of all 
ranks and positions facilitated the deinstitutionalisation of the legislative structure. Instead 
of a separation of powers, in practice both parliament and the executive authority were 
mixed. It resulted in the vulnerability of the parliament structure to party influence and 
barriers to parliament’s responsibility for pursuing government accountability.  
The mean reasons for this relate to the question of the party allegiance of the president of 
the parliament and which party should fill the presidency. Despite the parliamentary 
elections, the distribution of offices of both parliament and government forms one political 
package. This means that neither parliament nor government represent the people. They 
firstly represent parties and then citizens15.  
The parliament, which originally consisted of 105 members, expanded to reach 169 members 
due to frequent changes among the elderly and following the death of members. New 
members were appointed by the political bureaus of parties. Also, the total number of women 
in this round was only nine, which reflects the general lack of women’s participation in 
public life (Jambaz and Pirdawd, 2008).  
It is important to mention that the threshold of 7% to qualify for a seat according to Article 
36:3 of the elections law was another obstacle to political participation and development in 
the KR. The region was on the verge of institutionalisation of political arrangments that 
would allow different parties to practice their programmes. However, through law some 
                                                 
14 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
15 In my interviews, participants pointed out that MPs firstly represent their parties and then the people. It is 
usual that an MP represents both their party and the people. However, the problem in the KR is that 
representation is more in favour of political parties’ interests than peoples. Thereby, the term ‘representing 
party and then people’ indicates a negative phenomenon.  
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political parties were excluded from entering into parliament. For example, the IMK did not 
enter into parliament, even though it gained 49,108 or 5.5% of the votes and according to 
the law every 30,000 votes was equal to one seat (Kurdistan National Assembly-Iraq, no 
date).  
This party lost their votes in favour of the winning parties. This happened at a time when the 
IMK was a member of the Kurdistan Front and like other parties possessed a militiary force. 
Horowitz (1993) argues that the failure of democracy in many societies is due to power 
conflicts between civilian or military elites, non-readiness of the sociocultural setting to 
accept democratic principles and weak institutional formation. This was the situation in the 
KR, especially considering the history of these parties, which were forbidden by the Ba’ath 
regime. Their inherent form of political activity was clandestine or partisan actions against 
central government.   
In short, it is difficult to say that the foundations of the political structures in the KR 
encourage the development of civic norms among political elites to create a stable situation 
or even to prevent the outbreak of internal war. The sum of all these factors was the 
geographical division of authority in the KR.   
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Consequences of Division for Political Development   
In this period of two administrations (1996-2005, which in practice started in 1994), the 
social perspective of the polarization of society was deepened by the political parties via 
their different branches and organizations. The period coincided with physical ‘cleansing’ 
(killing, coercion and mutilation) and the use of the parties’ armed forces to suppress 
opponents’ views. Legitimate bodies such as the courts became biased towards a dominant 
party and social problems were solved mainly through party organizations, tribal chieftains 
and according to traditional norms. The power of the chieftains was increased by distributing 
wealth among those supporting the dominant party16. The KDP, because of its social 
structure which includes different strata and because of its religious background, was more 
successful in gaining the support of chieftains17 (see Chapter 8). 
The policy of cleansing extended from top to bottom, or from authority to society. As 
Horowitz (1993:18) argued, “in divided societies, there is a tendency to conflate inclusion 
in the government with inclusion in the community and exclusion from government with 
exclusion from the community”. The result was a decrease in the ability of the government 
to penetrate different aspects of society (one of canonical function towards political 
development) and, conversely, the increasing ability of dominant parties to enter the various 
social spheres. To secure the status quo, the security and militia activities that were 
associated with every political party became enlarged.  
In the economic sphere, the double sanctions on the KR, the civil war (in Kurdish, internal 
war) and then division of administrations, inflated prices. The PUK zone faced an extra 
embargo from the KDP through its control of the border crossing of Ibrahim Khalil 
(Khabour), the main trade gate with Turkey. Irregular salary payments, electricity cuts, the 
increasing price of goods and a lack of enough income to subsist led to the spread of daily 
conflict between citizens. Powerful figures in parties and tribes engaged in market 
speculation. Recruitment to the military services of each of the dominant parties increased 
as they offered better salaries and privileges such as plots of land to own property. Thus, 
military positions became more popular than other services (Ala’Aldeen, 2013). 
Even recruitment to and retirement from the army was not based on age. According to one 
interviewee, the military became a tool for maintaining the economic and political interests 
                                                 
16 Interview with Salahaddin Babaker, Haydar Esmail Abdullah, Mohamad Haji and Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
17 Interview with Mohamad Haji and Saro Qadir. 
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of each party18. Up to now, the majority of families have a member or members in the 
military or security services. Another interviewee pointed out, recruitment and employment 
in the military, police and public services all required a support letter, Tezkyeh, issued by 
various parties’ offices19. As the economy, the market, institutions, governmental offices and 
the military are monopolized by each party in its respective area, becoming a member of a 
party is the only or the best option for citizens to gain privileges.   
An important impact of the two administrations was the brake on the growth of the free 
economic sector due to the instability of the region. Both the economic and political spheres 
were controlled by parties20 which also used their communication organs and mass media to 
control social interaction and culture. Concepts such as human rights were insignificant 
relative to the main problem of citizens, which was simply to gain a livelihood. This state of 
affairs gave the opportunity for a party to practice its power regardless of human rights 
considerations. 
As mentioned, after the civil war,21 the KDP founded a new cabinet in Erbil in 1996 with 
the participation of some smaller parties: the Kurdistan branch of the Iraqi Communist Party; 
the Assyrian Movement; the Independent Workers Party of Kurdistan; and the Islamic 
Union. The cabinet had fifteen Ministers and five extra Ministers without portfolio, called 
Regional Ministers, to satisfy the small parties or minorities, to enhance legitimacy. The 
influential areas of the cabinet were in the Erbil and Duhok provinces or the Yellow Zone 
(indicated by the yellow colour of the KDP’s flag). It worked as a separate government from 
the Slemani government formed by the PUK. The period of two administrations was a good 
opportunity for many small political parties in both the Erbil and Slemani Zones. In both 
administrations the majority of ministers and provincial governors were the KDP or the PUK 
                                                 
18 Interview with Sa’adi Ahmad Pira. In all my interviews, the participants agreed that the army is a political 
and not a national one. One of the participants even used the term “Kurdistan parties’ army” instead of national 
army. 
19 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. In this interview, he pointed out that for employment, in the police 
sector for instance, the employee needs to have the party’s support letter. The head of police is appointed by 
the party, hence, the party offices and head of police, cooperate in employing people in this sector. 
20 There was a consensus among my fieldwork participants as well as ordinary people and small businessmen 
I spoke to that the economy and market are monopolized by political parties and only marginal room remained 
those outside party circles. 
21 The PUK and the KDP entered into an intense conflict to remove each other from the political arena and 
govern society alone. However, the balance of power between them on the one hand, and neighbouring 
countries’ interests on the other, prevented the achievement of this aim by either party. At the beginning of the 
war, the PUK controlled the capital city and then the KDP through the support of the Iraqi Army controlled all 
cities of the KR and the PUK fled into Iran’s boundary areas. This triumph of the KDP was a direct signal to 
threaten regional stability according to whether the KDP alone controlled the KR, it may become a source of 
threat for these countries. As a result, the PUK with support mainly from Iran through intense fighting returned 
to Slemani province.  
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political bureau’s members. Ministers of each administration discussed weekly the 
government issues in the political bureau and then in the cabinets (Stansfield, 2003). 
In the PUK zone another problem inside the government was the strengthening of local 
loyalties between the top cadres from Erbil and Slemani. The struggle between its various 
factions led to the supremacy of the Erbilian members in the PUK cabinet. This 
phenomenon, also reflected multi-centrality in making decisions. This problem forced the 
PUK to form a new administration (or the fourth cabinet in Slemani) in 2001 with Barham 
Salih as Prime Minister –who is originally from Slemani. He tried to run a government 
independent from party interventions. However, his attempts did not succeed (Ala’Aldeen, 
2013). The PUK domination of the government and personalisation of authority in favour of 
the General Secretary’s family and a small group of his supporters led to massive discontent 
inside the party’s base. Some cadres of the political bureau petitioned the General Secretary 
to set up reform inside the party, and threatened to separate if he did not (Mustafa, 2013).  
In contrast, this factionalism is less prominent in the organisations and in the governance of 
the KDP. This is evidenced in the greater stability of this party compared with the PUK. 
However, the top leaders of both parties tried to capture or ‘family-ize’ their authority22. 
Khalil (2009) studied the PUK and the KDP with an economic eye and characterised them 
as economic patrons who act in favour of leaders’ families on both sides. The same claim 
was reiterated by an interviewee that the leaders’ family of both parties receive a portion of 
the economy and national budget23. Bengio (2003) stated that in function these parties are 
closer to militias than political parties. The same claim was implied by the president of the 
KDP at the threshold of unification of both administrations when he stated that the KDP and 
the PUK “should turn into two civil parties and melt within one government” (Gunter, 
2008:50). 
Concerning the parliament, its power was paralysed and became a wing of the executive 
branch. A joint parliament formally operated until 1994. By the establishment of the third 
cabinet (also in Kurdish called an administration or government) in Erbil, the KDP had 
                                                 
22 For example, by establishment of the third cabinet in 1996 in the Yellow Zone, Nechirvan Barzani became 
Deputy Prime Minister and then from 1999 up to now, except for two years, he has remained as head of the 
government. Mohamad Mulla Qader, a cadre of the KDP pointed out that Nechirvan Barzani became a Prime 
Minister, because he is a grandson of Mostafa Barzani and son of Edris Barzani, and son-in-law of the KDP’s 
head. Without these credentials others find it difficult to run for this post. Even inside the party, close relatives 
hold the key offices. It is also widely recognized among ordinary people. 
23 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
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reformed parliament with some smaller groups without PUK membership and its laws 
applied only in the Yellow Zone. In the Slemani government, the PUK chose Jalal Talabani 
as president of the Green Zone (the colour of the PUK’s flag) to supervise the cabinet acts 
and implement parliament duties. Moreover, the duties of the parliament were transferred 
into the PUK’s political bureau (Lawrence, 2008:64; Ala’Aldeen, 2013; Stansfield, 2003).  
The chief aim of each side was to preserve the status quo of its dominant area which made 
it extremely difficult to discuss development. Some small parties had Ministers in both 
administrations. The reason for this was that the dominant parties were attempting to show 
to the outside world that the cabinet was democratic and was made up of multiple parties. 
Some of these parties were formed by the same dominant parties to give them legitimacy 
(Khalil, 2009). The Islamic Union was a party that emerged at this time and had activities in 
both zones24. 
Furthermore, the two administration periods from 1996 to 2005 coincided with the 
emergence of a different phenomenon that challenged the rebuilding of the future of the KR. 
Different Turkmen parties were created and were supported either by Turkey (such as the 
Turkmen Front) or by the KDP25 or the PUK to keep the balance of power. Various extremist 
Islamic groups especially Ansar Al-Islam that introduced Al-Qaida to the KR were activated 
and different small party groupings emerged. The proliferation of numerous political groups 
led to the phenomenon that it is very rare to find a street in the cities of the region without 
various political parties’ offices. Many of them are just a routine party office to support a 
dominant party and gain economic privileges. People often refer to them as ‘political shops’, 
Dokani Siasi. 
Apart from these two formal administrations, two other informal semi-administrations were 
formed. One was founded by the PKK in the Choman border areas with Iran and then 
extended throughout the border line of the KR, which led to further outbreaks of fighting in 
the region between this party and the KDP in 1996-98. To this day, the PKK has some bases 
in the KR. Another semi-administration was shaped by an Islamic group, Ansar Al-Islam in 
                                                 
24 Interview with Bayan Ahmad (Barwary) and Salahaddin Babaker.  
25 In the KR people often believe that the minority seats of parliament belong to the KDP. One reason is that 
the majority of them are habitants of the Yellow Zone. Further, during my fieldwork I had an informal 
conversation with some Peshmerga of the KDP in Erbil and Dohuk. They reported that in the parliamentary 
elections in 2013, the KDP commanded some battalions in Erbil to vote for a Turkmen party and in Dohuk for 
a Christian party. However, in Dohuk the party faced problems because of the religious culture, where some 
Peshmerga refused to vote for a Christian party. This reflects the dominance of religious beliefs in the society.  
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2000, operating in the Halabjah border area with Iran. This led to armed conflict between it 
and the PUK from 2001 and ended with an attack by the USA on this group in 2003 (Muir, 
2002). Absence of negotiation, coercion and the logic of power were the prevailing features 
of the KR at the time. 
In 1998, the KDP and the PUK signed the Washington Agreement that ended the military 
conflict and brought about political stability without unifying the two administrations. 
However, the new upheavals that happened such as planning for the overthrow of the Ba’ath 
regime and holding opposition conferences regarding the future of Iraq after the Ba’ath, 
forced the two parties to seek convergence. After eight years of division, on 4th November 
2002, with the participation of Danielle Mitterrand, the head of the PUK, the KDP and the 
parliamentary lists, the Kurdistan parliament held its first session. In that session and 
according to the Washington Agreement, the parliament was formed according to the 
election results in 1992; 51 seats for the KDP and 49 for the PUK (Nuraldini, 2003).  
Though geographically and politically the KR was divided horizontally between the KDP 
and the PUK, this division was reproduced in the vertical division of society between the 
rich and poor classes. The negative impact of the latter was and continues to be more 
profound than the former division. Authority can eventually be unified through the 
establishment of united organisations as happened in the KR, but to close the societal gap 
between its various strata requires more time and more capital. For example, while the PUK 
and the KDP formed a united cabinet in 2006, the features of a divided society remained 
almost unchanged from two administrations period (Mustafa, 2013). According to one 
interviewee, the political party itself became a tool in the creation of injustice between social 
classes and strata26.  
A good summary of this argument in this chapter is a statement by another interviewee who 
explained at length 
Political parties are designed to peacefully represent the differences and diversities 
present in society. However, parties active in the Kurdistan Region have played a 
negative role in this respect. Due to the absence of a regular peaceful and democratic 
handover of power, differences and enmities have taken roots in the region. Hence, in 
contrast to long-established western democracies where other parties are considered 
as rivals, in the Kurdistan Region other parties are mainly viewed as enemies. In such 
a system, parties attempt to thrive through intensifying the existent differences in 
society and party leaders work hard to turn their members into a loyal, ignorant, and 
                                                 
26 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
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ideologically motivated force. There is no attempt to educate the party members in 
accordance with the modern norms of fair competition, mutual respect, cooperation 
and peaceful coexistence. On the contrary, the focus is on the differences and further 
polarisation of society for greedy party interests through the utilisation of the existent 
differences. For instance, instead of working to enhance national solidarity, political 
parties are reinforcing the local, linguistic and tribal affiliations to keep the party 
members loyal and guarantee the party’s survival or dominance27.       
The segmentation of society through these different political parties with different 
programmes, without a national agenda, facing each other as enemies, created a society 
divided by religions, parties and local identities. Certain party activities may be considered 
to have created active citizens, but the problem is that the narrow influence of these parties 
usually comes before more inclusive features such as national interest.  
In a nutshell, up to 2005 the political developmental process met with ups and downs. The 
two administrations ruled a divided society but opened the way for the PUK and the KDP to 
practice power and become more familiar with governance procedures. However, the 
regressive impact of this kind of politics continued into the next united cabinet. The existence 
of various political parties in the KR does not mean political development actually occurred. 
In the KR in the 1990s, the political parties instead of building or accelerating the process of 
political development obstructed it. This claim is discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters.    
Conclusion 
In the KR the governing process and political institutions (legislative and executive 
branches) were interlocked and difficult to separate. The KRG has been divided politically 
between the PUK and the KDP, a division which reflects the socioeconomic division within 
society. The division of the KR and between different armed parties that attempted to 
preserve the party rather than serve the “nation”, indicates to an unstable co-existence as 
well as inadequate political will to develop society. In such a situation, the party comes above 
or is equal to society and only its members are considered as citizens.  
Where citizens’ loyalty is synonymous with their membership of a party, the consequence is 
that the party’s ideology will count as the government’s plan, its armed forces as a national 
army, its party’s leaders as national leaders and its unions as the civil society organizations. 
In the KR, separate administrations were more beneficial for political leaders (Stansfield, 
                                                 
27 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
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2003). In the first decade of the parties participation in rule, it was difficult to separate party 
and government. As LaPalombara and Weiner (1966:415) pointed out “where the party and 
government are indistinguishable, there tends to be no buffer between the formulation of 
public policy and its application”. 
Regarding international intervention, the 688 UN Resolution to establish a safe haven in 
1991 and the Washington Agreement in 1998, can be considered as evidence of the positive 
role that the international community played in the political development of the KR, 
designed to bring about stability. What can be extracted from these events is that the 
unification of the government was achieved through external factors. To sum up, political 
development in the first period of the establishment of the KRG (1992-2005) failed in the 
hands of the political elites and political parties. 
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Chapter Six: The Policy Shift Towards Unification and the Rise of Opposition  
(2006-2014) 
Introduction 
The KR has experienced development to some extent. Following the collapse of the Ba’ath 
regime in 2003 and up to 2014 the standard of living improved and economic activities grew. 
In political terms, opposition parties were allowed to develop. However, the contribution of 
the rotation of power to political development is open to question. In economic terms, as 
discussed in Chapter One, the KR has become a rentier state. Oil revenue supports political 
power by allowing government to fund itself independently without tax revenues.  
After more than two decades of governing, the KR’s leaders still resort to the concept of 
Hıkumety Sawa (toddler government) to justify their inefficiency. It should also be 
remembered that the constitution of the KR remains in draft form. This chapter follows from 
the previous chapter and describes the successive cabinets and parliaments from 2005/6 to 
2014. There is a greater emphasis on the government due to its greater influence as a political 
body compared with the parliament. The chapter aims to illustrate that despite the shift 
towards the unification of government and parliament and the emergence of opposition 
groups, political development is still affected by the legacy of the two administrations.  
Government Structure: Broad Unity and Creation of Trust (2006-2009) 
The united cabinet (the fifth cabinet) established in May 2006 was the outcome of factors 
such as the Washington Agreement in 1998, the formation of a new political atmosphere in 
Iraq after 2003, which led to the emergence of new political powers and the appearance of 
new economic interests. External factors forced leaders to combine their political will in the 
frame of a coalition government. The cabinet was formed on the basis of the parliamentary 
elections in January 2005 or more than one year after the elections were held. The reason for 
the delay was the disagreement between the PUK and the KDP about the division of power 
in both Baghdad and the KR.  
The fifty-fifty rule was repeated in the fifth cabinet with some participation from other 
parties. To get the consent of the majority of political parties, the number of ministries and 
ministers was increased to 42. Some did not have a portfolio or office and were called 
Minister for the Region without having the right to vote in the cabinet but they had the same 
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privileges and financial rights and pension. Further, General Managers of ministries were 
divided between the political parties (KRG, 2006; Chapman, 2009).  
This broad based cabinet headed by the KDP followed an agreement with the PUK to 
alternate the head of government every two years. To divide power and form the cabinet in 
both Baghdad and the KRG, both the KDP and the PUK signed the Strategic Agreement and 
Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement in 2006 (see Appendix 1). An 
interviewee from the KDP pointed out that  
The Strategic Agreement was a ‘Tactical Agreement’. It was a factor to continue two 
administrations. Both the PUK and the KDP still have their own budget. By a whistle 
the government will collapse. It was signed in order for Massoud Barzani to become 
the President of the KR and Jalal Talabani to become the President of Iraq. Offices, as 
well, were divided equally between them. The government was a formality and each 
party dominated its own area1.   
The key problem that the cabinet faced, as its Prime Minister reiterated, was the lack of trust 
between different political parties in the government. Each party tried to promote its own 
interests. The distrust between elites was reflected in the societal organizations which grew 
alongside parties’ interests as centres to collect public support. When the concept of 
responsibility towards society is restricted to responsibility for the party, the efficiency of 
the government declines. The outcome is a decrease in trust within society as a whole and 
the cabinet2.  
The lack of opposition in parliament, as well as rivalry within the PUK, allowed the KDP to 
increase its interference in the government. Factionalism within the PUK, its engagement in 
Baghdad political issues more than those of the KR, the location of government in Erbil 
(which caused the Slemani governing organs to be dismantled), all led to the PUK’s 
Ministers becoming guests rather than partners in running government (Ala’Aldeen, 2013). 
Parties such as the Islamic Union (IU) had followed a dual strategy as both partners in 
government and as opposition to gain the benefits of governing on the one hand, and to avoid 
the accusation of being a partner in corruption on the other.  
                                                 
1 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
2 In an interview with Muhamad Ra’auf a minister in the fifth cabinet who was from the Islamic Union party, 
he pointed out that throughout his time of office as a minister, except for an operational budget, no budget was 
allocated to his ministry despite this ministry offering many projects to the cabinet. Even if the cabinet agreed 
on a project, because the majority of the parliament were the PUK and the KDP, they obstructed any discussion 
of it. They thought a party that the minister belonged to could use it as a trophy in elections. Hence, the project 
would be carried out through the personal links with ministers and officials of each party. 
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In 2008, according to the Unification Agreement, it was the PUK’s turn to form a new 
cabinet, but the internal struggle between factions left power with the KDP. This opportunity 
weakened the former and opened the door to a future split (Knight, 2009). Consequently, the 
KDP ruled the cabinet for the next two years. In addition, according to the previous pact, the 
presidential position was allocated to the KDP. Thereby, both executive branches were 
controlled by the KDP or more precisely by the Barzani family, helping it to increase its 
economic and fiscal monopoly (Katzman, 2009).  
The most important feature of this cabinet which can be considered as a challenge to the 
political development process was that the majority of political parties participated in one 
list in the parliamentary elections in 2005. The Kurdistan National Democratic List gained 
89.55% or 104 seats from the total of 111 seats (Kurdistan National Assembly-Iraq, no date: 
21). This means there was no opposition in parliament to challenge the government. In other 
words, all parties agreed on a common agenda to run the government. The challenge to 
political development is that it is difficult to aggregate the programmes of all these different 
parties into a single coherent agenda.  
 Throughout the fifth cabinet the Ministries of Finance, the Interior, Justice and the 
Peshmerga did not become unified (Gunter, 2008; Khalil, 2009). According to Article 5: d 
of the Unification Agreement, all ministries of the government had to be unified within one 
year (see Appendix 1). The non-unification of these focal ministries meant that there was a 
deep distrust between both sides; and society was ruled by monopolizing the finance, 
military and legal sectors in favour of political parties. In the following cabinets, in which 
these ministries were formally unified, the two administrations continued de facto. For 
example, despite the formation of some unified army units, the majority of Peshmerga 
salaries are paid by political parties and the biggest battalions (70 and 80 battalions) are 
under the control of the PUK and the KDP respectively.  
Further, in the two administrative periods, two different systems of civil servants’ salary 
applied in the Yellow (KDP) and Green Zones (PUK) respectively. Civil service salaries in 
the Yellow administration were higher than in the latter. This difference created another 
challenge to the unification of the Finance Ministry. In addition to this, some cities 
geographically belonged to the Erbil province but were administered by the Slemani 
government (PUK) and applied their law. Some cities in both administrations experienced 
the same situation.  
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The same points were reiterated by further interviewees who pointed out that the parties’ 
organs exerted a powerful influence on the ministries. Until the end of the seventh cabinet 
all previous cabinets were just formally unified. The police and intelligence sectors of both 
political parties were separated from each other. The ministers of each party only had 
relations with their zone of influence and his/her deputy had power in the other zone and 
vice versa. Formally they were a single cabinet but in reality each minister represented their 
own zone3. 
According to some interviewees, the factors which play a role in recruitment to party and 
government office include: the level and background of loyalty to a party, the history of 
family and social rank such as being the offspring of a Sheikh or Agha, wealth, support for 
the party in the time of revolution, as well as competition between party members, and finally 
the women’s quota4.   
In such circumstances any steps towards political development face challenges due to the 
spread of negative phenomena within government. They affect the commitment of 
individuals and represent obstacles to reform or progress. According to a Minister of the fifth 
cabinet:  
In this country there is nothing in the name of the governing system and efficient 
government. Any project that is constructed, is not constructed by a national 
government, but accomplished on the base of personal influence5.  
Consequently, the concepts of accountability, responsibility and the interpellation of 
officials are difficult to achieve. According to another interviewee, unification of the two 
administrations occurred at the top level of political parties’ leaders, but did not penetrate to 
the majority of their base, organs and offices6. Non-transparency and corruption spread, 
which was the main factor that encouraged the rise of opposition parties7.  
With all of these defects, however, from the fifth cabinet the military conflict between the 
PUK and the KDP was transformed into partial political co-operation. The society focused 
more on living conditions and well-being. The check-points of each party between their 
                                                 
3 Interview with Mohamad Haji. 
4 Interview with Saro Qadir and Adnan Osman. The majority of those interviewed were in broad agreement 
with the above-mentioned factors. In addition, the elections law and bylaw of political parties guaranteed the 
women’s quota.   
5 Interview with Muhamad Ra’auf.  
6 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
7 Interview with Muhamad Ra’auf. 
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previous zones have continued to exist up to now, but the sphere of social freedom increased. 
For example, in 2006, demonstrations were held in various cities such as Halabjah, 
Chamchamal and Slemani (the main area of the PUK), to demand more public services and 
the eradication of corruption (Gunter, 2008). This phenomenon had rarely occurred in the 
past. The fifth cabinet even established a Ministry for Human Rights, although it was 
abolished in the following cabinet. Through the unification of the cabinet, the attention of 
the political system was focused on boosting economic activities. 
Concerning the presidency, Massoud Barzani was confirmed as president of the KR in an 
agreement on 1 December 2004. The problem of defining the KR president’s powers delayed 
the inauguration of parliamentary sessions for more than five months after the parliamentary 
elections were held8 (Mustafa, 2013:4). As a result of this agreement, presidential authority 
was added to the executive branch and was considered to be the highest executive power in 
the KR with the ultimate right to approve or reject parliamentary legislation or return laws 
to the parliament for more discussion (KR draft constitution, 2009).  
In 2005, the presidential law (Law Number 1) was approved by parliament including Article 
2 and 3, which states that the president will be elected by citizens for four years, and for not 
more than two terms. In contradiction with this, Article 17 states that for the first term the 
president will be chosen by parliament. The contradiction shows the elite’s political will 
plays a determining role in the institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation of the system and 
the law is composed in favour of their interests.   
According to this law, a presidential candidate will be president of the KR if he gains the 
majority of votes (51%) but to depose him 75% of the parliament votes are needed. This 
reflects the tendency towards semi-personalization of authority and the supremacy of top 
elites over institutions. For example, the president of the region through his eleven years’ 
presidency period was never questioned by parliament.  
                                                 
8 Parliamentary elections were held on 1 January 2005 and the parliament was formed on 4 June 2005. On 8 
June 2005 the parliament passed the presidential law. The passing of this law just four days after the formation 
of the parliament shows that the law was prepared before the formation of parliament; implying that the 
political parties dominated the legislative bodies. Nwshirwan Mustafa (2013), the second figure of the PUK at 
time and now the General Coordinator of the GM in his diary stated that the KDP drafted the presidential law 
and the delaying of the formation of parliament was related to the rejection of this law by the PUK political 
bureau. However, eventually it was accepted by the General Secretary of the PUK alone without political 
bureau consultation. 
111 
 
Parliamentary Structure 2005-2009 
Parliamentary elections were held in January 2005. The total number of seats increased from 
105 to 111 to include Turkmen (five seats) and Armenian (one seat) quotas. Eleven seats 
were allocated as quotas to different ethnic and religious minorities. Thirteen political lists 
participated in the election campaigns and three lists entered parliament which were the 
Kurdistan National Democratic List9, Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Toilers list 
(Katzman, 2009; Mirkhan, 2011; Ala’Aldeen 2013).  
The ratio of women to men was 29 to 82. It means that women had a higher level of 
representation than in the previous term. This participation was guaranteed by law through 
international pressure. However, it represents the gradual removal of an obstacle to women’s 
participation in political activities. Concerning the education level, 70 out of 111 members 
of parliament, had a university degree and higher certification. Others were below university 
level; some only had an elementary school degree. Compared with the previous term the 
educational level of members had improved (Jambaz, 2007). 
In this term the parliament approved some important laws such as the Investment Law in 
200610, the law that the KRG wished to apply to the KR as a trade pathway for the whole of 
Iraq (Gunter, 2008). Other examples include the Anti-Terror Law of 2006 and the 
Hydrocarbons (Oil and Gas) Law of 2007 and approval of the draft constitution in the 
extended period of parliament in 2009. The referendum on it has not been held to date, owing 
to resistance from the opposition to the draft and intervention from neighbouring countries.  
According to interviewees, the main problem of the parliament in the period 2005-2009 was 
its structure, which was dominated by political parties without independent members. 
Members were those who either had a close relationship with elite leaders or those who could 
                                                 
9 The Kurdistan National Democratic List consisted of the PUK and the KDP and the IU, the Kurdistan 
communist party, Turkmen parties, the Kurdistan Social Democratic party, Christian parties, the Kurdistan 
National Union Democratic party and Farmers Party) that gained 104 seats (40 seats gained by the KDP, the 
PUK had 38 seats, the IU 9 seats and others for minorities and some small parties). 
10 According to this law an investor can acquire a plot of land by symbolic rent or for free or long term lease 
investment. Projects are exempted from tax and customs for ten years, starting from the first day of their actual 
production; and all imported equipment according to this law is tax exempt. Consequently, the law itself 
became a part of the creation of inequality. An observer, by looking at construction projects and their prices, 
can easily find out the depth of inequality created by government itself via the law of Investment. By this law, 
an owner of a project can use the wealth gained from this project to build another project, again without paying 
tax. 
 Personal communication with the members of the constitution committee. 
112 
 
easily get the tribal or religious votes. Hence, the parliament became the parties’ parliament 
and not a citizens’ representative body12.  
Further, interviewees agreed that another factor in this inefficiency of parliament was that 
political parties did not send in top leaders to the parliament. They do not consider parliament 
to be an institution on a par with or above executive power. Often, only the parliament 
Presidential Assembly (the president, vice president and secretary) were members of the 
political bureau. The Assembly members are chosen out of parliament and by an agreement 
between political parties. To gain votes, parties nominate top cadres to election lists, but 
after that they return to their party posts. For example, the MPs cannot impeach or bring 
ministers or the president to account. There is no political will to make parliament strong13.      
The elections were held by a closed party list system which means that all candidates were 
nominated by the political parties. As interviewees pointed out, the voters vote for the entire 
party list. The candidates often have no role in gaining votes, only the party14. As an MP of 
the second term explained  
Because the MPs are nominated by parties and according to a closed list, hence, they are 
subordinate to the parties’ plan and programme and have to work to execute the parties’ 
programme. Although the MP is a people’s representative, the party is the point of 
reference15.  
This phenomenon did not only make parliament inefficient as a legislative institution, but it 
also allowed the executive branch and parties to dominate parliament (Asasard et al, 2009). 
The electoral law (Law No 47, Article 10, 2004) does not allow individuals to nominate 
themselves as candidates. Even the opposition parties which arose in the third term did not 
change this law.  
Evidence of parliamentary surveillance of government can be found in the questions that 
were asked by parliamentary members during the second term (2005-2009). Sixty-two 
questions were addressed to nineteen ministers and the total responses from all ministers 
                                                 
12 Interviews with Nahla Mohammad Sa’adulah, Ihsan Abdullah, Karim Bahri Bradost, Zana Rostai and 
Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
13 MPs of different parties are in general agreement about this issue. Regarding parties’ agreement outside of 
parliament, they agreed that this process had become the reality of the political process in the KR. Without 
agreement it is difficult to elect the Presidential Assembly of parliament. The best example is the fourth term 
of parliamentary elections. For six months the parliament did not hold sessions because of disagreement 
between political parties on the division of parliamentary and cabinet posts. 
14 Interview with Amina Zikri, Zana Rostai, Bayan Ahmad, Layla Amir, and Zakia Sayd Salih. 
15 Interview with Ihsan Abdullah. In fact, the majority of MPs expressed the same view. 
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numbered 27. The number of questions in 2008 and 2009 was 51, which coincided with the 
beginning of the rise of the Gorran Movement (GM) that was supported by some of the PUK 
MPs who subsequently became members of this movement (Jambaz, 2009:6).  
To sum up, it can be argued that, in the second term, parliament’s performance was under 
the supervision of the political parties with negative consequences. The role of members was 
vague: did they represent a specific area or the whole of the KR? Did they represent the 
party’s programme, or what was their priority? According to the closed list, the KR counted 
for a single constituency. This happened again in the third term of parliamentary elections, 
when each MP was a representative of the whole of the KR. These arrangements killed the 
spirit of competition and undermined the relationship of parliament to the general public. 
The result was a political system which was an obstacle to more open and flexible 
participation.   
Towards the Rebuilding of Institutions: Government Structure (2009-2014) 
The Minister of Higher Education in the sixth cabinet, Ala’Aldeen (2013:117) described this 
cabinet as “one step forward, two steps back”. Throughout the sixth cabinet strong 
competition emerged between the government and new opposition groups. At the same time, 
the rivalry within the cabinet between the KDP and the PUK continued, especially through 
the weakening of the PUK by the Gorran Movement, which broke off from it.  
Following the principle of shared positions, the sixth cabinet was formed by a Prime Minister 
from the PUK and the Deputy of the KDP for two years and vice versa in alliance with some 
other parties and minorities. It meant that this government reproduced the characteristics of 
the previous governments. However, the presence of the opposition altered the balance of 
power between the parties. To some extent opposition increased public political awareness 
especially through the election campaigns, which focused on government performance in 
previous cabinets and the role of elites in wasting national wealth and corruption.  
In response to social pressure and the growth of strong opposition, as a first step towards the 
establishment of a technocratic cabinet, the number of ministries was reduced to nineteen 
with five other officials that had ministerial rank. However, the programme was extremely 
ambitious for such a short period. It included renovation and reconstruction, transparency 
and reform, unifying institutions, regulation of public spending, participation of youth and 
women in political life and many other aspects that related to the relationship of the KRG 
with the outside world (KRG, 2009b). 
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Furthermore, the government declared that it would attempt to cut off the intervention of 
political parties in governmental affairs, re-regulate parties’ activities and their funding. It 
did not succeed. The only policy to have been implemented so far is the regulation of parties’ 
budgets, in the eighth cabinet, by which time the opposition had been incorporated into the 
government. According to a survey that was held during the sixth cabinet, the majority of 
participants (85%) were of the opinion that there is too much intervention by political parties 
in governmental affairs (Tojinewe Centre, 2011).  
This cabinet did attempt reform and some important decisions were made. The Prime 
Minister decided to cut ministers’ salaries by 10% and return the savings to the government 
budget as a step towards the reduction of inequality in the distribution of wealth. Another 
important decision was the return of public buildings such as schools to the government. 
However, because the majority of them were seized by political parties or had been sold by 
the PUK and the KDP, this reform has yet to succeed16.  
The higher education system saw a reform in the project of the Human Capacity 
Development Programme (HCDP) designed to send students abroad. The policy was 
welcomed by the intellectual strata of society as providing an almost equal opportunity for 
all postgraduate students. Moreover, the employment of university deans partly changed 
from employment via political parties to apparent competition by curriculum vitae. The main 
area of implementation of the abovementioned resolutions was the PUK zone. According to 
one interviewee,  
The innovation capacity of government was obstructed by latent rivalry within the united 
cabinet. A general framework of common interests was absent. Obstructions were also 
generated by other participants in governmental circles; the parties in government did not 
recognize that governing is a shared responsibility. The cabinet was the same as in the 
period of the two administrations. The KDP’s ministers were real ministers with authority 
and power in Erbil and Dohuk; while the PUK’s were ministers of Slemani17.   
Throughout this cabinet, protests and turbulence occurred in different parts of the region. 
Demonstrators were from various strata of society and were higher education students in 
                                                 
16 Up to August 2013 from thousands of dunums of land and 300 buildings occupied by officials and political 
parties, only 10 buildings had been returned to the government and the majority of them were returned by the 
PUK because it was itself the head of government (source: NRT (2013) ‘After two years still the decision to 
return public property has not been executed’, 21 August, [online], aAvailable at:  
http://nrttv.com/dreje.aspx?jimare=33309 (Accessed: 21 August 2013). , [In Kurdish] Paş Dû Sal Le Derçunî 
Ta Esta Biryarî Gerandinewey Mulk û Malî Giştî Cêbecê Nekrawe]. 
17 Interview with Muhamad Ra’auf. Other participants expressed the same view. 
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particular. Three opposition parties, the Gorran Movement (GM), the Islamic Union (IU) 
and the Islamic League (IL), led the protests. The main base of protest was the Green Zone 
and particularly Slemani city but turbulence occurred in the Yellow Zone. In 2011, in the 
Badinan area, some people attacked bars, massage shops and hotels and the KDP accused 
the IU of inciting its followers to burn these places. In reaction, the IU’s headquarters were 
set alight and this party accused the KDP. The Gorran Headquarters in the cities of Erbil and 
Soran were also burned. In addition, the new NRT (Nalia Radio and TV) was burned down 
in Slemani just a few days after its first broadcasts.  
These tensions reflect the deep antagonism between political parties and their inability to 
solve disputes. Growing opposition groups, rejecting and accusing each other were the 
dominant features of this period. Beside this, internal rivalry between the PUK and the KDP 
on the one hand, and within the PUK itself on the other, caused a paralysis of the fundamental 
reform programme. The multi-polarity of power beyond the elected authority challenged the 
capacity of government. The problem was that all of these power centres were both a part of 
the political system and in opposition to it. For example, the opposition groups participated 
in parliament and occasionally protested against the legitimacy of it.  
Simultaneously, the Arab Spring to some extent influenced KR society. To exploit these 
events, the opposition and especially the GM at the beginning of 2011 published a manifesto 
that was entitled the Opposition Package ‘Pakêcekanî opozîsyon’. It requested the 
dissolution of the government and its replacement by a new technocrat cabinet with the 
ability to fight corruption (Gorran, 2012). Thereafter, protests broke out to challenge the 
government.  
When the period of the sixth cabinet ended after two years, on 4 April 2012, the seventh 
cabinet was formed by the Prime Minister from the KDP, and his Deputy from the PUK. 
Like the previous cabinet, the new one consisted of 19 ministries and five other offices with 
the same rank as minister. Some ministers remained in office for more than three cabinets 
(even remained in office in the eighth cabinet). For example, the Minister of the Interior has 
held this position from 2001 up to now and he is a member of the KDP political bureau 
(KRG, 2009a). The Minister of Oil and Gas has held this position continuously since the 
fifth cabinet. The cabinet received the confidence vote of parliament without elections and 
without the participation of opposition groups in a confidence debate.  
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Many citizens and small political parties believe that the aim of unification of the 
government is not to serve society, but to serve the interests of the KDP and the PUK. They 
use their power in parliament via their representatives to enact any resolution that favours 
them. According to an MP of the third term, the political process and decision-making are 
accomplished outside parliament and then are brought back to parliament because the 
parties’ leaders are outside parliament18. Another MP agreed and explained that the duty of 
parliament is just to approve legitimation19.  Khalil (2009:24) argues that the united cabinet 
was a result of a Unification Agreement between the KDP and the PUK, which can be 
considered as a guarantee to establish a democratic system in the region, but its mechanisms 
narrowed the political space to the extent of making it impossible to achieve this goal in the 
near future.  
While the cabinet is the executive power, since 2005 the president of the region has been 
considered to be the highest executive authority in the KR. As in the previous term, the 
president belonged to the KDP and his Deputy was designated by the PUK. In contrast to 
the previous term, throughout the sixth cabinet, the president executed duties individually 
and without having a deputy until 2012, when he chose Kosrat Rasol from the PUK as his 
deputy (Halbijardin, 2012). The president has often been accused of reflecting the interests 
of his party more than national interests, performing as a president of a party, not of a whole 
region. In a questionnaire, 21% of participants gave the response that the president acts as 
the president of the region, while 44% considered him to be president of the KDP. In Slemani 
city only 10% of participants responded that the president of the KR behaves like a president 
of the region. Even in Dohuk, which is considered to be the base of the KDP, fewer than 
35% of participants considered that the president acts like a president of the KR (Tojinewe 
Centre, 2011).  
In short, the type of formation of the sixth and seventh cabinets indicates that the government 
did not have a strategic plan towards political development. The rotation of power originates 
from the relative balance of power between the PUK and the KDP (shown in the 50:50 
division of offices which has lasted since 1992) and both parties’ failure to accept being out 
of power. The general public accepts this situation as a reality. There is no formal evidence 
but there is a scepticism among people about the possibility of change because even the 
                                                 
18 Interview with Omer Nuraldini.  
19 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
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growth of the opposition did not bring about change and it was re-absorbed into the dual 
structure of power. 
The Third Term of Parliament: Rising Political Opposition 
The parliamentary elections in 2009, like previous elections, were held according to the 
closed list system20; with strong competition, especially following the emergence of the 
Gorran ‘Change Movement’, which was supported mainly by educated strata in various 
parts of the country, particularly in Slemani province. The figure below demonstrates each 
list’s seats in the third term of parliament. 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of Parties’ Seats in the KR Parliament in the Third Term 
Source: KRG website (2014): http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=319&p=229 
The third term of parliament saw some changes. The minimum age of parliament candidates 
was lowered from 30 to 25 years, to give more opportunity to younger people to participate 
in political affairs. In addition, the quota rate for women increased to 30% of the total number 
of parliamentary seats according to Electoral Law No 2, Article 4 in 2009 (KRG, 2013). The 
rise in the women’s quota was a response to the Iraqi constitution, Article 49:4 of which 
states that the rate of women’s participation in parliament should not be less than 25%. 
                                                 
20 During my interviews, which coincided with the KR’s provincial and Iraqi parliament elections in April 
2014, I witnessed many candidates using their tribal title as a way to gain votes from their tribes. This type of 
nomination is an index to the structure of representative bodies and manner of mass mobilization by political 
parties to acquire votes regardless of the consequences of such nominations. 
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Regarding the age of representatives, while it allowed younger people to participate in 
political life, it was nevertheless an obstacle to the development of skills because, according 
to the law, an MP retires after finishing their parliamentary term. This means that a 25-year-
old MP can retire at the age of 29 with a high pension or 80% of total salary per month. Even 
if the member dies his/her inheritor will receive the pension (Law No 12, 2008). The 
retirement law applies to all MPs, which means a portion of the national budget has to be 
allocated to them and to ministers.  
Another main change was that strong opposition groups arrived to express different voices. 
Theoretically, this can be considered as a step towards more democratization of political 
authority. However, the question remains: how far has parliament succeeded in monitoring 
government performance? The figure below shows the public response to this question in a 
survey. 
Figure 6.2: Responses to the Question of Monitoring Government by Parliament 
Q: Do you think the parliament has power to monitor government performance? 
Source: Tojinewe Centre (2011) ‘Current political Issues of the KR’, Kurdistan Intellectual Foundation. 
As figure shows, 62% of respondents to the questionnaire believed that the parliament had 
not succeeded properly in monitoring government and 20% believed that it had not 
succeeded at all. A further important question is whether the parliament lists in the third term 
became more independent from their parties’ interventions or not? The following section 
attempts to find the answer to this question.  
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In the parliamentary elections of 2009, the GM gained 25 seats, a result which neither the 
Movement’s leaders nor the political investigators anticipated. However, like other parties, 
the head of this movement just participated in the elections and after that withdrew from 
parliament. Owing to the closed list system, all the MPs were subject to their parties’ 
programme21. According to one interviewee, in the KR’s political culture, MPs have to 
submit to party discipline and the party’s framework. Any disagreement is seen as a kind of 
rebellion against the party, not simply a difference of opinion22.  
On the other hand, the emergence of a new strong opposition in a short period of time can 
be considered as a direct stimulus for the governing political parties to review their past 
record in exercising power. Instead of reviewing their performance, the KDP and specially 
the PUK started cutting the salaries of many of those who voted for the GM, particularly in 
the army and security services. Consequently, the term ‘Cut off Livelihood’ (Nan Braw) 
became widely used. This response reveals political parties’ lack of respect for the rights of 
citizens to decide their political tendency and to express their opinion in elections. It shows 
the unreadiness of elites to understand the aspirations of the new generation. Although 
parties formed the parliament according to the logic of democracy, they are incapable of 
playing the democratic game and democratic procedures have not taken root. 
Emerging opposition caused the parliament, in contrast to previous terms, to become more 
active. The opposition group interrogated the sixth cabinet’s Prime Minister. In April 2013, 
the Gorran parliamentary list called MPs to put questions to the seventh cabinet’s Prime 
Minister, who refused on the grounds that he was busy (Gorran, 2013). Throughout the third 
term, from 2009 to 2013, parliament asked 418 questions to government and the government 
responded to 285 questions (Parliament Press Statement, 2013).  Compared to the previous 
term, the number of questions in the third term increased significantly.  
In 2011 and 2013, events occurred that require more scrutiny to explain the performance of 
the parliament in the third term. In early 2011, demonstrations occurred in the KR and lasted 
for more than two months. The organisers announced that they were supporting the Egyptian 
protest against the Mubarak regime. The direction then changed and demonstrators attacked 
                                                 
21 Nearly all of the interviewed MPs from different terms and various lists agreed that the MPs follow their 
party’s commands especially on political issues. As Amina Zikri pointed out, “the priority is for the party and 
its programme, because people trusted the party and then, within the party, they voted for me”.  
22 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
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the KDP headquarters in Slemani, which caused deaths and injuries on both sides23. 
Subsequently, opposition groups headed the demonstrations and it absolutely became a 
political issue (Watts, 2014).  
The demonstrators demanded the reform of government performance and equality in the 
distribution of wealth. The demonstrators and opposition parties demanded the overthrow of 
the whole political apparatus, including parliament and government. The demonstrations 
were brought to an end by cutting the opposition parties’ funding for a few months to compel 
them to withdraw support for the demonstrations.  
An MP of the third term pointed out that  
There was no parliamentary opposition. Because, instead of making parliament as a 
platform, the opposition required to resolve it. The opposition left parliament and 
exercised its activity on the streets [meaning making disorder]24.  
The main outcome of the protests were the reforms announced by the president of the region 
in the Nawroz ceremony 2011. Some points were: monitoring the fiscal system that 
embodied huge corruption25; all political parties and mass media must disclose their financial 
resources; political parties should not allow themselves to be influenced by relations with 
foreign governments; the government must determine the earliest date for provincial 
elections; activating the public prosecutor; and the companies that monopolised the economy 
must be shared with citizens and a portion of their stock be given to them (Barzani speech, 
2011).  
To legislate these reforms, Law No 2 was approved by parliament in March 2011. Articles 
referred to the separation between the political party and government, the dissolution of 
                                                 
23 Due to the attack being in the PUK zone, the KDP accused the police and Asayish (another branch of the 
police services but more powerful) that they were unable to protect the KDP’s buildings. Hence, army services 
(Zeravani) under the control of the KDP from Erbil were sent to Slemani without the permission of the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence (Peshmerga). The action caused a strong reaction from both the PUK, 
opposition groups and other organizations that compelled these forces to remain on the outskirts of the city. In 
fact, the army was moved by the KDP’s leaders. Two years after this event, in July 2013 Barham Salih revealed 
that the army moved without his permission (Awene (2013) ‘Dr. Barham Salih Between Problems and Security 
Forces’, 31 July, [online], available at: http://www.awene.com/article/2013/07/31/24257 (Accessed: 27 August 
2013). [In Kurdish: Dr. Barham Salih Le Nêwan Cule Pêkirdin û Westandinî Hêzekanî Zêrevanî Le 17 Şubat]. 
24 Interview with Omer Nuraldini.  
25 Many of these points remained as ink on paper. In August 2014, on social networks, mass media and 
webpages of MPs, lists of corrupt activities were released that contained the names of 100,000 retirees from 
different political parties. The overwhelming majority of them belonged to the KDP (more than 60%) and the 
rest to other political parties. The lists were about the illegal retirement of party cadres with a high salary paid 
by government.  
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parties’ armed forces and the formation of a national army, the re-rewriting of the draft 
constitution and the preservation of the courts’ independence. To be an enacted law it needs 
to be published in an official parliament newspaper. Up to now it has not been published as 
an enacted law.  
Certainly, if any law is to be implemented it needs the backing of parliament, government 
and citizens. In the KR, political parties have controlled both government and parliament, so 
legislation must first of all serve the political parties. One interviewee mentioned that 
“because there are no institutions, we cannot separate government and political parties; the 
relationships between them are intertwined”26. The non-implementation of the new law led 
the opposition to announce another reform manifesto in early 2012. It focused on reform in 
the political system, independence of the military, independence of the courts, eradication 
of corruption, reform of the education system, curtailment of parties’ interference in 
government and the establishment of a government capable of implementing the reform 
process (Gorran, 2012). This led to renewed negotiations inside and outside parliament.  
Besides the demonstrations, another important event was the extension of the presidential 
term of office. In April 2013, the PUK and the KDP met opposition parties and proposed to 
extend the presidential term. The suggestion was rejected by the opposition (Gorran, 2013a). 
The dominant parties realized that according to the presidential law in 2005, even with the 
agreement of opposition groups, they could not nominate the president for the third term nor 
extend his term (Law No 18 and 19, 2013).  
On 30 June 2013, the PUK and the KDP list in parliament passed the law to extend the 
parliamentary term for two months and the presidential term for another two years (until 
21/9/2015)27. In the absence of a constitution, the dominant parties utilized the opportunity 
to interpret laws in their own favour. Frequent changes to the law in favour of the governing 
parties has been the norm through the period of parliament and government in the KR. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the first term of parliament was extended by parliament 
itself (the KDP) until 2002 and then by agreement between the KDP and the PUK until 2005 
(The same phenomenon applies to the provincial assemblies).  
                                                 
26 Interview with Muhamad Ra’auf. 
27 In interviews with MPs from the KDP and the PUK. They pointed out that the resolution to extend 
presidential terms came from the political bureau of each party; because the resolution was political, the MPs 
of each party were obliged to support it. 
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By this resolution, the president became the legitimate authority backed by parliament. 
However, opposition groups interpreted this as a bloodless coup that took place to prevent 
the rotation of power. In the Kurdish language they used the term parliamentary coup or 
white coup ‘Kwdetai Sıpy’. Many publications used the expression the ‘extended period 
president’ or the ‘illegal president’. Consequently, parliament as a vehicle for democratic 
institutionalisation acted as an instrument of deinstitutionalization. The extended term 
profoundly affected party-ization by provoking various social strata to stand against each 
other. Even opposition lists announced that they would consider the presidency and the 
parliament as illegitimate bodies (Sbeiy, 2013). However, by participating in the eighth 
cabinet, for a while, the opposition groups ignored this issue.  
In response to the extension of the presidency, opposition groups decided to withdraw from 
parliament by ending the legal term of parliament on 20 August 2013. However, they 
remained because of their political bureaus’ decision. This is because the political bureau is 
the ultimate stage in decision making, not members of parliament28. One interviewee pointed 
out that in the KR, for change to occur, it has to be guaranteed by governmental institutions 
and not by party organization. Furthermore, economic power has to be separated from 
political parties that have monopolized the market29. 
To sum up, growing opposition in parliament raised hopes for a move away from “managed 
democracy” (Knights, 2009) to a more liberal democratic system. However, in the KR, the 
negative role of the majority in the parliament and the role of political bureaus paralysed this 
hope. The closed ‘collective’ list, office in the Presidential Assembly as a political rank30, 
and the coalition between the PUK and the KDP, all restricted parliamentary performance. 
The experience of the third term shows that political parties play a dual role in political 
development: they exploit pre-modern aspects of organisation which help them to remain in 
power; and they have a modern structure (multi-party system) co-existing with party-ilized 
government and society. 
                                                 
28 In my interviews with MPs, the majority of them stated that in political issues the MPs do not have a role. 
Instead, the political bureau of each party or the head of the party makes the final decision.  
29 Interview with Haydar Esmail Abdullah. 
30 All of my MP participants agreed that whoever will occupy the posts of the Presidential Assembly of 
parliament is a political subject more than a legislative duty. By agreement between the political bureaus, the 
posts of Presidential Assembly are divided between the parties. Without distribution of these posts, the cabinet 
of the government cannot be formed. 
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Conclusion 
The type of power sharing is a problem for political development. If at the beginning of the 
1990s, the fifty-fifty split was the best choice for running the government, its continuation 
led to the non-rotation of power. Although the Unification and Strategic Agreements 
between the PUK and the KDP brought about relative stability for society and political 
activities, it did not eliminate the crucial obstacles to the democratic institutionalisation of 
societal organizations and political development. As one interviewee observed, as a result of 
the difficulty in rotating power, the political parties agreed the eighth cabinet to be a broad-
based cabinet the same as the fifth cabinet to avoid political, economic and social 
instability31.  
The process of institutionalisation towards political development, even since the unification 
of cabinets, is weak. The type of relationship between a political party and citizen has 
affected the concept of participation. The purpose of political participation is not to criticise 
the governing party because of its performance, but rather to support one party against 
another regardless of its efficiency in the achievement of public interests. In spite of the 
emergence and growth of the Gorran Movement this tendency continues. This Movement 
was reabsorbed into the political process. It shows how the political system allows some 
dissent but can easily supress it. Above all, it shows the weakness of parliament. 
The absence of a constitution created another challenge. The relationship between political 
organisations and the type of separation of powers is regulated by ordinary laws enacted by 
parliament. Concerning the presidency, the president has more authority and rights than 
responsibilities, especially in terms of security and the military (Kelly, 2010).  
In summary, even the government or political parties who are successful in creating socio-
political organizations will have difficulty considering them as democratic institutions that 
serve the entire society. This chapter, with the previous one, reviewed the political structure 
of parliament and government, and by explaining their performance tried to show their 
capacity for political development. It is obvious in the KR’s political system the 
abovementioned bodies were born from political parties. Hence, it is necessary to study the 
type of political parties in the region as a complementary element of this study to know how 
their structures contribute to or create obstacles to political development.  
                                                 
31 Interview with Salahaddin Babaker. 
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Chapter Seven: Structure and Function of the Political Parties 
Introduction 
The existence of more than two political parties in the KR does not mean that it is a mature 
democratic system; especially when the parties have their own armed forces and control the 
economic sector. This chapter attempts to show the extent to which political parties in the 
KR have either facilitated the process of political development or acted as an obstacle to it. 
Political parties in the KR originated as freedom movement and, up to 1991, the key 
activities of the Kurdish parties were armed struggles in remote areas against the central 
government. Weapons became one of the main features of Kurdistan politics influencing 
party thinking and creating a militia-commander style of leadership which has guaranteed 
their survival (Miran, 2010). Even carrying a weapon is part of the socio-political culture. 
Originally, they adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and type of mass organisation in a 
society with a low level of education (for example, the first University in the KR opened in 
Slemani in 1968). This characteristic feature helped parties to achieve mass mobilization, 
obedience to the party’s programme and loyalty to the party’s leaders. Mass mobilization 
and the extended influence of political party organs remain a dominant feature in Kurdish 
politics.  
The chapter will discuss the structure of political parties in the KR, the process of leadership, 
their decision making, their functions and their relationship to society. This approach helps 
to identify the experiences of change within the political parties and how they have adapted 
to the environment of upheaval in different periods. It requires a brief historical review of 
the emergence of the political parties in the KR beginning with the KDP. The chapter then 
focuses on the PUK, the GM and the IU. These are the main players in the political arena. 
However, in spite of their different ideologies, it is useful to note that many of the parties’ 
branches in society have similar functions and play similar roles. For example, a women’s 
union exists in each party with different titles, but they each mobilize the female population 
around the party’s programme.  
To understand the essential functions of political parties in the KR and their penetration into 
society, it will be necessary to focus on their function more than their structural form. 
However, to define their role, it is necessary to focus on their structure as well. This approach 
corresponds with the elite and institutional theories that were discussed in the second 
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chapter. To attain this objective, a brief historical narrative of the establishment of each party 
is needed to identify their common features. 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): Background 
In the 1930’s, many Kurds joined the newly-founded Iraqi Communist Party. In the 1940s 
some other small parties were established in Iraqi Kurdistan such as Hiwa (Hope) and Shorsh 
(Revolution). They also followed the Marxist approach. When the KDP was formed, they 
merged into one (Gunter, 1993). The KDP is the oldest modern Kurdish party in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and it was the first to organize and institutionalize political activity by combining 
politicians, the army and tribal chieftains (Akyol, 2010). The majority of political parties 
that were established later had top leaders who were members of the KDP.  
The Republic of Kurdistan was established in Mahabad-Iran in 1945, supported by the 
USSR, involving Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The formation of the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party-Iran (KDP-I) enhanced national sentiment within Iraq’s Kurds and led to the formation 
of the KDP-Iraq in 1946. This party tried to combine the different rural and urban strata of 
society.  
The powerful rural and tribal figure of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who before the formation 
of the KDP was in Slemani, was chosen to lead the party.  Hamza 'Abdallah, an educated 
urban figure who became the Secretary General and two landlords, Sheikh Latif Barzinji, 
the son of Sheikh Mahmmmud Barzinji, who led the revolt against Britain after the first 
world war, and Ziyad Aghai Kwyi, a famous feudal-nationalist Agha, were chosen as Vice 
Presidents. They were chosen by Mullah Mustafa Barzani for their influence on local areas. 
Even in the foundation of the Revolution Leadership Council, Encwmeni Serkrdaieti Şoriş, 
some of the chieftains became members of this council (Stansfield, 2003; McDowell, 2007; 
Berwari, 2013).  
It is important to note the religious significance of the choice of Sheikh Latif Barzinji, who 
belonged to the Qaderi religious order (a branch in Islam), while Mustafa Barzani was of the 
rival Naqhshebandi order. Another important religious order in Iraqi Kurdistan is the 
Talabani order. Jalal Talabani another influential member of the KDP’s political bureau, 
belongs to this order, who later became the Secretary General of the PUK. By constituting 
the revolutionary leadership in this way, Mustafa Barzani neutralized the threat of religious 
and geographical division. Even many Christian and other religious groups joined the KDP. 
Later, as Bruinessen (1992) notes, with the increasing tension in the late 1950s, between 
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farmers and some Sheiks and Aghas, on issues of farming land, water for irrigation and the 
division of crops in some parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, the popularity of the KDP increased 
because of its support to farmers. 
As society was predominantly agricultural, to choose one Deputy from the farmers’ strata 
and another from the national revolutionary strata can be considered an intelligent decision. 
Chieftains and landowners became engaged more in politics via a modern and broad based 
party. The exile of Mustafa Barzani to the USSR as a result of the collapse of the Kurdistan 
Republic in Iran in 1946, allowed the urbanite figures to take the reins of leadership. On the 
return of Mustafa Barzani after the change of regime in Iraq from monarchy to republic in 
1958, he again became the KDP’s leader alongside Ibrahim Ahmad, the Marxist General 
Secretary (Yesiltas, 2014). During the period of absence of Mustafa Barzani the Marxist-
Leninist ideology dominated the party1. 
However, this caused inter-party factionalization, reflecting the hostility between the 
‘leadership’ or tribal-traditional wing and the General Secretary’s Marxist-urban ‘political 
bureau’ wing. Support for the policy of land reform by the political bureau wing weakened 
the traditional power of the chieftains, aggravating this dispute between the party’s tribal 
and Marxist wings (Qhader, 2007; Gunter, 1996; Anderson and Stansfield, 2004).  
In the 1960s, when conflict grew between the two wings of the KDP, the political bureau 
wing (Marxist wing), based on the small urban middle class, tried to lead Kurdistan society, 
despite the fact that it was an agricultural society. This was the reason why the majority of 
Kurdistan society was with the leadership wing2. The separation of the political bureau and 
the formation of the PUK in 1975 provoked armed clashes between the PUK and the KDP 
in the following decades (80s, and 90s). The conflict led each of them to seek support from 
one of the regional states and with the central government against each another.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
2 Interview with Abdilselam Berwari. 
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The KDP’s Congresses and the Issue of the Leadership  
Throughout its existence, the KDP has held thirteen congresses at different intervals. 
According to the internal regulations of the KDP, the party must hold a congress once every 
four years. However, it has been very rare for this party to hold its congresses on time. The 
first important phase in the political life of the party was in 1959 or the fourth congress, 
when Mustafa Barzani the leader of the party returned from exile. The party was being run 
by the political bureau members who followed a pro Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was 
alien and ill- adapted to society (Al-Khorsan, 2001). 
According to one interviewee,  
The return of Mustafa Barzani saw increasing conflict between the two wings, which 
finally led to the separation of the political bureau’s members and the strengthening of 
the Barzani family’s hold on the leadership. Until the beginning of the 1970s, the Barzani 
family were not members of the party. Then, two of his sons joined and gradually their 
numbers increased. Eventually, in the thirteenth congress more family members entered 
the party. Features of dictatorship grew at the expense of democracy and individualism3.  
At the beginning of the formation of the KDP, the choice of Mustafa Barzani as leader could 
be justified firstly in terms of the fighting history and religious background of this family in 
resisting Ottoman and Baghdad authority since the early twentieth century, which attracted 
many tribes to support the leadership of this family. Second, the exile of Mustafa Barzani to 
Slemani helped to attract support from the educated and other tribes. This meant that, in 
addition to his own tribal support, he gained followers from both the Badinan and the 
Soranian areas. Additionally, one of his wives was from Slemani. The third reason was his 
personality as a Peshmerga leader. The final reason was his participation in the building of 
the Kurdistan Republic in Iran. All of these points helped to confirm him as a charismatic 
personality in the eyes of the majority of society and in the national movement of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Ultimately, the struggle between tribal attitudes and Marxist-Leninist attitudes 
inside the party ended in the triumph of the former over the latter (Stansfield, 2003). 
The second phase of Mustafa Barzani leadership lasted until his death after eight successive 
congresses. He was succeeded from the ninth congress in 1979 by his son, Masoud Barzani, 
who continues to lead the party. At the thirteenth congress in 2010, Nechirvan Barzani, his 
nephew and son-in-law, was elected as vice-president of the party without competition and 
without secret ballot (KDP, 2013). According to a top cadre of this party, the KDP is a 
                                                 
3 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader.  
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national party with religious pluralism. For this reason, except for the period of absence of 
Mustafa Barzani (1946-1959), no political ideology had a chance to grow. The family 
embodies its religious and political history; and it owns the tribal militia. In fact, it is a 
family-run party4.  
With the collapse of the Kurdistan revolution following the Algeria agreement between Iran 
and Iraq in 1974, and the separation of the political bureau and formation of the PUK, the 
KDP formed a provisional leadership. In the ninth congress in 1979, dissent between the 
Masoud Barzani wing and Sami Abdulrahman (a member of the provisional leadership), 
resulted in the latter being ousted and Edris Barzani (the brother of Masoud) becoming a 
member of the political bureau, who at the same time was supervisor of both the armed 
forces (Peshmerga) and the Public Relations Office of the party. In the tenth congress in 
1989, Nechirvan Barzani (son of Edris Barzani), with backing from Iran became a member 
of the political bureau (Al-Khorsan, 2001). In the twelfth congress in 1999, Massror Barzani, 
son of Masoud Barzani, became the political bureau member who was the chief of the KDP 
intelligence service, called Parastin, and the chief of the Security Agency of the KRG (KDP, 
2013). Since the uprising and establishment the KRG, the majority of key posts inside the 
party, the government, the economy and charitable organisations have been managed by the 
Barzani family. 
In fact, in the period from 1946 until 1991, the majority of the KDP’s activities were guerrilla 
activities. The exception is some periods of the 1960s, which had a peaceful relationship 
with central government and involved the participation of ministers in the Iraqi government. 
Through the 1970s and the 1980s, the KDP was in military conflict against both the central 
government, the PUK and other political parties. In 1992, it participated in running the 
government. This means that for around half a century this party was far from civic activity 
and the mentality of armed conflict shaped the leaders’ thought who even now hold the key 
offices. Most changes occurred within the same generation of old cadres or their offspring5.  
Regarding the establishment of the KDP, some notice has to be taken of the following: 
Firstly, at the beginning of the establishment of the KDP, its approach depended on the 
Marxist-Leninist model, which meant that it could not accept any other rival ideology or 
                                                 
4 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
5 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader and with Saro Qadir. 
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point of view6. It is evident in the lack of agreement between the leaders of the party that 
finally led to the establishment of the PUK. At its tenth congress in December 1989 the KDP 
removed the concept of Marxist-Leninist ideology from its bylaws (Al-Khorsan, 2001). The 
ideology proved to be incompatible with the essence of the establishment of this party, which 
was based on nationalism on the one hand, and the religious framework of society on the 
other. Secondly, it was difficult to accept that the Marxist-Leninist ideology at the time could 
be applied to the Kurdish tribal-illiterate (or low-literacy) society in which land was 
manipulated by landlords (Agha, Mir, Sheikh) and mosque endowment known as Waqif still 
existed. The origins of the party were shaped by an ideology, which was alien to the 
conditions, which actually prevailed.  
Kurdistan was not a clear-cut peasant society, subject to exploitation by chieftain landlords. 
Loyalty to the chieftain, and especially religious chieftains, was part of accepted traditional 
structure or at least was not compulsory. Many rural workers have their own land. In some 
places, a group of villages does not compose a tribe and farmers run villages by electing a 
Mukhtar between themselves, and cultivate their crops together (see Chapter 8). 
Thirdly, due to the revolutionary approach and partisan activities, guerrilla conflict became 
a part of the identity of this party in mobilizing society. The failure of the central government 
to recognize Kurdish political rights galvanized this identity. Up to now the army has been 
controlled by the PUK and the KDP independently and even in their organizational structure, 
parties have Peshmerga and Martyr Offices7. These factors aided the centralization of power, 
which can still be seen in both parties’ leadership and their levels of government 
performance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 To better understand the functional type of the KDP at the time, which was later reflected in the political 
system and political activity in Kurdistan society, it is important to mention the Baku Declaration by Mustafa 
Barzani in 1948. The declaration, which was about the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (KFM), states that the 
KFM does not allow any other groups or organisations to be established apart from the KDP, and if necessary 
‘we will fight against them’ (Barzani, 1997:302-336; Berwari, 2013).  
7 After the uprising, in some parties such as the KDP this branch changed into the Election Office (Interview 
with Omer Nuraldini). 
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The KDP After the Uprising 
The eleventh congress in 1993 was the first to be held at a time when the KDP participated 
in indigenous government. Joining the congress were three other small parties. The congress 
was held in Erbil, in the Public Sports Centre which changed its name to the Holy Zerd, 
‘Yellow Hall’, to correspond to the KDP’s flag. This symbolic action can be interpreted as 
a sign of the homogenising of society by the KR’s political parties. Between the eleventh 
and twelfth congresses an internal war broke out. The result was a delay in holding the next 
congress and the deeper penetration of the KDP into the running of governmental affairs. In 
the twelfth congress in 1999, the party proposed a set of recommendations and proposals 
including: holding provincial elections, establishing an administrative justice court, the 
establishment of a Human Rights institution (controlled by the party’s leader) and the 
formation of a Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Al-Khorsan, 2001). All of these tasks 
can be considered as governmental functions, decided by the party in congress. In the 
congress, the leader of the party argued that it should to be more institutionalized, in other 
words more disciplined in party organization (Qhader, 2007).  
In the thirteenth congress in 2010, under the slogan of Renewal, Justice and Coexistence, 
the KDP reformed its organisational structure, adding local committees and creating a 
Council of the Governorate to make decisions with regard to the recruitment of new 
members and diversity of the party’s programme. One of the important tasks of the Council 
of the Governorate is to evaluate the quality of those nominated by branches for Iraqi and 
Kurdistan governmental offices and to report to the Political Bureau. Another task is 
considering the cultural diversity in its political activates (KDP, 2010). This change was an 
attempt to gain more influence on society because of the emergence of the Gorran Movement 
as a new rival party in both the Green Zone (dominated by the PUK) and then in the Badinan 
area (dominated by the KDP). The votes of this Movement increased between the Kurdistan 
parliamentary elections in 2009 and the Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2010 in the Badinan 
area. The KDP’s votes declined in this area which had been considered a KDP heartland.  
To extend its reach, the KDP expanded its Committees (Liq) from eight headquarters in 1991 
to 25 after the thirteenth congress in different areas inside and outside of the KR8. These 
branches again are divided into different sub-branches, with organisations for youth, 
                                                 
8 The number of the KDP’s Branches is 26. However, there are 25 actual Branches, in order to accommodate 
Kurdish reluctance to use the number 13, which people believe is an inauspicious number. For this reason, after 
the twelfth Branch the next Branch is the fourteenth.    
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teachers, sports, students and women and so on. After this congress the offices of the social 
activities of the party expanded. Many perform the duty of charitable organizations or 
exercise tasks such as giving direct grants to certain people, sending patients abroad, sending 
student to study abroad, solving tribal disputes and participating in funeral ceremonies. 
Funds are provided according to the social rank of the family. Sporting activities and cultural 
events are often held under the party leaders’ name. The party tries to influence every corner 
of social life. 
The extent of the party’s penetration of society and its control of funding resources shows 
clearly how this party can dominate society and intervene in the government’s decision 
making process. The diagram below illustrates the KDP’s structure and its various 
organisations. The central part of diagram is copied from the party Bylaw, and then 
additional information has been added by the author to show how the party operates via 
different organs nation-wide. The central part illustrates that the party has a hierarchical 
structure. Since, the establishment of the party in 1946, it has kept the same structure and in 
the thirteenth congress in 2010, the Council of Governorate Leadership added to its 
hierarchical structure.
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Source: The KDP’s constitution and Bylaw, 13th congress and the 
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Figure 7.1: KDP’s Organisational Structure 
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As the diagram shows, despite the congress and conference, the main body of the KDP, 
begins with the president and other main executive branches which are associated with it. At 
the operational level, the Committee (Liq) and its sub-units are the most important vehicles 
for mobilization. All social organizations for youth, women, syndicates and so on, operate 
under the supervision of the Committee and its sub-units in cities and villages. The diagram 
also illustrates how the party, through the Political Bureau, monitors its different branches 
inside the party as well as the Council of Governorate Leadership, at the level of each 
province (KDP, 2010). According to the bylaw of the KDP, the Political Bureau (executive 
body) members, select from the Council of Leadership to assist the president of the party. 
Hence, the Political Bureau comes above the Council of Leadership. In reality, the president 
is the highest power and the congress is a legislative body that regulates and evaluates the 
party’s performance between two congresses (Article 18). As Stansfield (2003:103) has 
pointed out, in relation to both the KDP and the PUK 
The analysis of power-groupings within the leadership apparatus illustrates that the 
parties are characterized by centralized leadership structures governing a politics of 
diffusion, ensuring that pluralistic demands are controlled within a hegemonic 
structure. 
At the local level, one task of the local organization committees, for example, is “to 
cooperate with the civil society organizations within its geographic working place” (The 
KDP’s constitution and Bylaw). The Organizing Bureau is another important mobilization 
organ which in its geographical area has the task of managing human resources such as 
women, students and the youth. More importantly the party has a stake in the mass media 
that consolidates its influence through broadcasting the policy of the party.  Nomination to 
be a KDP member starts from 16 years of age. 
According to the bylaws, each organ of the party has the authority to punish its members if 
they do not fulfil their responsibilities such as participating in periodical meetings on three 
occasions or paying their subscription for three months without good reason. The 
punishment system ranges from issuing a reminder, a warning, suspension, lowering one’s 
party rank, removal and finally, dismissal. Such punishments can be considered typical 
procedures for any organization. However, a problem arises when these kinds of punishment 
are linked with employment opportunities in the public offices controlled by the political 
party. As the party controls the economic sector, subscriptions are not the main source of 
funds. 
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Local branches or organs have a duty to report what occurs in their geographical area 
(political and social events), to higher branches, then the higher branches recommend lower 
branches. This hierarchy starts from the lower branches (base) to the higher branches. 
Furthermore, the higher branches have a duty to evaluate the lower branches’ performance. 
Consequently, the party horizontally and vertically monitors its members and penetrates into 
society. It is essentially a non-democratic system, especially as the majority of governmental 
officials are members of the party. As the table below shows, the roles are parallel. In 2014, 
the year of the ISIS attack on the KR, many Political Bureau members (from the KDP as 
well as the PUK) took on the role of military commander at the front with ISIS. 
Table 7.1: Parallel Roles in the Political Bureau and Government 
Members Party Role Governmental Role 
Masoud Barzani  President President of the KR 
Nechirvan Barzani Vice-President Prime Minister (the 4th,5th,7th and 8th 
cabinet) 
Masror Barzani Chief of the intelligence agency 
(Parastin), Political Bureau Member 
Chief of intelligence and security 
(Asaysh) 
Azad Berwari Political Bureau Member Deputy Prime Minister (6th cabinet) 
Izzadin Berwari Political Bureau Member ------- 
Zaeem Ali Political Bureau Member Previous Peshmerga Minister, 
Peshmerga Commander 
Salah Delo President representative in Kirkuk  ---------- 
Jafar Iminki Party speaker, Political Bureau Member Deputy speaker of the 4th parliament 
Fraydoon Jwanroyi Political Bureau Member ----------- 
Kamal Kirkuki Political Bureau Member Parliament president in the 6th cabinet 
Fazil Mirani  Secretary-General of the political 
bureau 
Internal Minister in the 4th cabinet 
Mahmoud Mohammad Political Bureau Member ------------ 
Kakamin Najar Responsible for the sixteen Committee 
(Liq), Political Bureau Member 
------------- 
Rosch Shaways Political Bureau Member Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister  
Karim Sinjari Political Bureau Member Internal Minister since 2001 
Rebwar Yelda Political Bureau Member Parliamentary member for the 4th term 
Hoshyar Zebari 
 
Political Bureau Member Iraqi Foreign Minister 2005-2014, 
Financial Minister 2014-2016  
Source: KDP (2014) ‘KDP Politburo Members’ http://www.kdp.info/p/p.aspx?p=2&l=12&s=010100&r=345. 
Some information has been added by the researcher himself. 
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At the top level of leadership, the figures from the revolutionary period continue to rule the 
party, which means that rotation of the leadership is difficult. In other words, although the 
party has become institutionalized, it has also become more centralized via the hierarchical 
organization of tasks amongst the various branches and organs of the party. This affects the 
democratic decision making process, especially given the influence of the leader’s relatives 
on the party. According to one interviewee  
Before the uprising, decisions were made by collective leadership. After the uprising 
the process of decision making became limited to a few figures such as the President 
of the party and his Deputy. The Council of Leadership which consists of 51 members 
has two or three hours to make decisions. This means that the decisions are dictated to 
them. Giving all this power to a leader creates corruption and there is common 
responsibility in the creation of corruption between leadership members9.  
The interviewees’ claims are different from those of Stansfield (2003:108) who observed 
that  
There is a consensus of opinion from KDP Political Bureau members that the majority of 
decisions are reached by democratic procedures, and on occasion go against the wishes 
of Masoud [the president of the party].  
According to interviewees the party leaders in Kurdish political parties have ultimate power. 
Excluding the interviewees from the Islamic Union, other interviewees from different 
political parties mentioned that the final decision was made by the leader of the party. More 
than one decade separates the author’s interviews and the Stansfield interviews, but still the 
same person is in power. This political behaviour leads to centralism and creates a kind of 
collective obedience which is in contrast to the open pathway of political development that 
builds on individualism and mobility between positions. 
According to the Bylaws of the KDP, the president has the duty to preside over both Political 
Bureau and Council of Leadership meetings, and he is considered as a guarantor of the unity 
of the party (my emphasis) (KDP, 2010). Many of the followers and supporters of the party 
believe that the president of the KDP is the symbol of Greater Kurdistan, unifying various 
social classes and ethnic groups to achieve national goals.  
                                                 
9 Interview with Mohammad Mulla Qader. The same claim was made by Saro Qader, that ‘before the uprising, 
decisions were made by the president and political bureau, but now, the strategic decisions are made by the 
president alone or in consultation with others’. Abdul Salam Berwari, claimed in an interview that often 
because of loyalty to the president, after discussion of a subject, ‘we respected the decision that he made’. 
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On the other hand, as the KR is a nascent region, taking early steps towards stability and 
development, the centralization of this party may actually favour a developmental process. 
However, centralism does not exclude the rotation of power in leadership. According to one 
interviewee,  
Regarding the KDP, the problem is if we consider the claim that the KDP is run by a 
family, family-owned parties are not confined to Kurdistan [the KR]. For example, in 
reality Saddam's sons were successors to their father, just like Bashar was to Hafiz 
Assad. Lebanon has several family-owned parties within the Muslim as well as the 
Christian traditions, like the Junbulat and the Amin families. Pakistan's Bhutto and 
India's Ghandi dynasties are other examples. These parties are not necessarily 
undemocratic or dysfunctional. The family-owned party system is acceptable in most 
cases, and it is known that it has provided stability in the party with all feuds and 
fissures stopping at the leadership doorstep. The problems arise when the family-
owned-party turns to family-owned-government, as is arguably the case in the KR’s 
political system10.  
Another contradiction, as discussed in the previous chapter, is the monopolization of the 
economic sector by political parties and the merging of party affairs with governmental ones. 
In describing the power of the KR Prime Minister and the Deputy President of the KDP, 
Stansfield (2003:110) concluded that 
Nechirvan has been actively creating a support base and has accumulated a vast amount 
of wealth through various business dealings. The extent of his power is unrivalled within 
the KDP region, in both terms of political inﬂuence and ﬁnancial control. 
To summarize this section, the KDP emerged as a revolutionary party to achieve national 
goals. In order to do so, it attempted to mobilise different strata of society. However, after 
more than two decades in power including participation in several political elections it still 
has not become a full civic party. It retains features of a tribal-militia party, with 
corresponding political rhetoric and continuity of political personnel. It means that the party 
has a limited ability to adapt to the changing environment. In the last election in 2013, this 
party promised to distribute oil revenues directly to its citizens, however, this has yet to be 
fulfilled11.  
In brief, it is difficult to consider the KDP’s emergence as being a result of the modernization 
of Iraq and Kurdistan society or even to consider it as a modern party or a tool for 
                                                 
10 Interview with Hishyar Abid. 
11 Some of the top leaders of the KDP, on TV and in meetings announced that if they vote for the KDP, citizens 
can have a direct share in the oil income. 
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modernizing society. On the contrary, the party has been a vehicle for the reproduction of 
non-modern values and a challenge for the political developmental process.   
The Formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
The PUK was established in Damascus in 1975 and its formation was the result of the 
breakdown of the Kurdish revolution, the struggle between the key KDP figures for 
leadership from the 1960s onward, the support for Maoist ideology among some of the 
political bureau members of the KDP, and the Algeria agreement (Stansfield, 2003). With 
the establishment of the PUK, the KFM transformed from a single leading party into two 
leading parties that later came to characterise the political system of the KR. The formation 
of the PUK pushed Turkey and Iran to reinforce the KDP as a rival to the PUK (Hassanpour, 
1994). 
In a meeting with Kurdish students in London in 1975, Talabani said of Mustafa Barzani, 
the leader of the KDP, that “he is not a traitor or a servant [to the central and other 
governments], but nobody can deny that he is a tribal man”. Talabani, who was a member 
of the KDP’s political Bureau and at the same time was one of the leaders of the Marxist-
Leninist Association of Kurdistan in the early 1970s proposed the formation of a new party. 
The PUK was founded by a combination of Wide Line (Héli Gşti), who were previous 
members of the KDP, the Marxist-Leninist Association of Kurdistan (Komala), and the 
Social Democratic Movement of Kurdistan (Bizotnewa). The new party was Marxist-
Leninist (PUK website, 2013).  
Marxist-Leninist ideology was clearly influential in the thinking of the Kurdistan political 
elites and was one of the reasons for disagreement between Brazani and Talabani. Barzani 
tried to gain the support of the USA by showing his willingness to extract Iraqi Kurdistan 
oil if the USA were to recognise the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan (Bruinessen, 1992; 
Masum, 2007). According to one interviewee, Talabani’s Marxist viewpoint was opposed to 
Barzani’s stance towards the USA. However, Barzani also had relationships with the USSR, 
the Iraqi communist party and Israel; and this is led to further conflict about who would run 
the party and society12.  
The leader of the PUK was, however, closer to the Chinese than the Soviet communist 
model; responding to the idea that the KR was an agricultural society, like China at the time. 
                                                 
12 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
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Al-Khorsan (2001) argues that the PUK did not gain broad acceptance at the outset, 
especially in the rural areas, because of the dominance of tribal and religious cultures. 
Stansfield (2003) pointed out that the moderate Bizotnewa wing gained strong middle class 
support throughout the KR, except among the Barzani and Bradwsti tribes, while the Komala 
as a Maoist (extremist) wing gained support among students. Both factions operated under 
the supervision of the Héli Gşti. Later, however, the PUK tried to include key tribal and 
social figures as a bridge to gain support from different strata and political views. Ideology 
played a less influential role than key personalities. The PUK (like the KDP) followed the 
hybrid system with tribal features incorporated into the modern type of party structure. 
According to a leader of the PUK, “generally, in the KR the political parties are not based 
on an ideology or a typical kind of political thinking”13.  
The General Secretary of this party pointed out that “one goal of our fighting is political, 
economic and cultural liberation from imperialism and from the Aflaqian [Michel Aflaq the 
founder of the Ba’ath ideology] colonial settlement policy” (PUK, 2014). However, Marxist-
Leninist ideology is more focused on the achievement of equality between classes rather 
than the rights of self-determination for a nation. It can be questioned whether the ideology 
held by the PUK was suitable for the reality of Kurdistan society at the time (see Chapter 8). 
Although the PUK’s leaders stated that ideology was a reason to split from the KDP; the 
KDP ideology was also Marxist-Leninist. The main factor in the division was which 
personality would become president of the KDP, Barzani or Talabani? As Nechirvan 
Barzani, the Deputy President of the KDP pointed out: 
Ideology was not the source of conﬂict between the KDP and PUK. The programmes 
of both parties are virtually identical, and the goals are the same. The problem is one 
of who has power, and this may be solved by either elections or violence . . . Believe 
me, there is no apparent external difference between the KDP and PUK, it is a personal 
matter (Stansfield, 2003:114). 
Nevertheless, adopting Marxism-Leninism and then Maoism from the 1950s onwards, is a 
sign that intellectuals and political elites were aware of mainstream ideologies and what was 
going on in the world. However, the PUK’s actual practices on the ground, as discussed in 
the following sections, are similar to those of the KDP. For example, both of them have a 
long-lived leader, both were based until the Kurdish uprising on Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
both are armed parties, have very similar structures and intervene in government affairs. In 
                                                 
13 Interview with Sa’adi Ahmad Pira. 
139 
 
1994, in the middle of the internal war to bring about reform to the administrative body of 
the KRG, some of the PUK’s cadres published a statement calling for an end to intervention 
in governmental affairs, monitoring the police and the army to be carried out by government 
(Aziz, 1994). 
After the uprising, the PUK ideology changed from Marxism-Leninism to social democracy. 
It stated that the tribal background of society had changed with the end of the economic 
feudal system of society and that the principles of capitalism were growing in the KR, 
enshrining individualism and the supremacy of law and that people would no longer need to 
rely on the tribe as their source of protection (PUK, 2014). However, this assumption that 
change has occurred in a war-torn country, and in such a short period of time is implausible, 
given their previous hostility towards capitalism and the West. 
The PUK’s Structure and Congresses 
From its establishment in 1975 up to now the PUK has held only three congresses. The three 
wings composing the PUK kept their own organizations. They merged into the PUK at the 
first congress in 1992 (PUK website, 2013). The congress coincided with the PUK taking 
power and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which compelled this party to change its 
ideology and follow social democratic principles.  
In the first congress, which was held in both Slemani and Erbil, elections were held to elect 
officials of the party except for the Secretary General and the first Prime Minister of the first 
cabinet and the Deputy Secretary General. They were recommended to stay in their positions 
via a Tazkiyah (party support letter), issued by the Secretary General himself. Between the 
first and the seconed congress internal war broke out and the PUK established a new 
administration in Slemani. In a Plenum in 1996, the party decided to establish the Minsitry 
of Human Rights in the Slemani administration and an office of human rights in all 
government ministries. At the same time the PUK decided to raise the salary of government 
employees in its domain (Al-Khorsan, 2001). These decisions refer to the dominance of the 
party in the public sector.  The second congress of the PUK in 2001 was again held with the 
previous Secretary General and nearly all the same leaders remaining in their positions. 
However, it was the period of the commencement of disagreement between the top leaders 
of the party on how to run the government and participate in the new Iraqi and KR 
government, which finally led to the resignation of the Deputy Secretary General. 
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After the resignation of the Deputy Secretary General in 2007 to establish the Gorran 
Movement, two other Deputies were appointed: one from Slemani and the other from Erbil. 
The appointments reflect the factionalism in the party which is also reflected in the region’s 
geography. The third Congress of the party took place in 2010 and the same three characters 
(The General Secretary and his Deputies) remained in their positions (PUK, 2014). However, 
after the absence of the Secretary General, instead of deputies, his wife who is a Leadership 
Council member, became the first figure of the party. After two decades of elections and 
governing, this party still has a military office. 
According to Article 26 of the PUK bylaw for the third congress “If there is one candidate 
for the General Secretary’s post, the person shall directly become the Secretary General”. 
Article 27 pointed out that the General Secretary shall “assign [appoint] his or her deputy 
from members of the Leadership Council (Committee) to which he or she can delegate some 
of his or her responsibilities” (PUK Bylaw, 2013).  
According to the Bylaw, the party must hold a congress every three years. The maximum 
number of members in the congress is 1,000, of which 120 are elected by the Secretary 
General and Leadership Committee (Council). The Supreme Preparatory Committee for 
congress has the duty of electing the congress members to represent the PUK in the Iraqi 
and Kurdistan parliaments, different ministries, embassies and other governmental 
organizations inside and outside the KR (PUK Bylaw, 2013). All of these authorities of the 
party reflect the level of the party’s control and centralisation.  
Article 18 of the PUK Bylaw states that “If the Conference [congress] is not held for 
whatever reason, a Plenum will be authorized to postpone the Conference [congress] for 
three to six months with a limit of one postponement. If the Conference is not held after that 
period, the Leadership shall lose its legitimacy”. However, after the absence of the General 
Secretary in 2012 due to ill health, the PUK held a Plenum in 2014 and up to now did not 
hold the congress. The deep factionalism inside the party, and concentration of absolute 
authority in the hands of the Secretary General eventually caused a split in the PUK in 2007 
(Mustafa, 2013), (see following section). 
The intense struggle between the factions of this party can be seen as a key problem. Many 
of its top leaders have their own newspapers, TV channels, magazines and websites. The 
struggle became most obvious in the extended absence of the General Secretary. Internal and 
international commentators agree on the multi-polarity of the PUK (Gunter, 1996; Anderson 
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and Stansfield, 2004; Babekr, 2006; Osman, 2008). The Kurdish term Fre Menberi, has been 
broadly used to refer to this multi-polarity. The feature that once kept the party 
underdeveloped has enabled it to adapt to environmental changes that came with a new 
generation. At the same time, the result was that the areas under the control of the party 
became more open compared with the KDP. This is reflected in the issue of freedom of 
speech and criticism of government and party officials in the Green Zone.  
The PUK, like the KDP, has various organizing offices to mobilize society including a 
Committee, Sub-committee (office) and District or Geographical Units in all rural and urban 
places, with different unions and syndicates. The base of both parties is heterogeneous and 
complex. All the above- mentioned features of the PUK add up to it being a closed, militia 
party more than a social democrat one, despite Talabani’s (2012) stated aim to establish a 
socialist democratic society, as declared in its bylaw. The following diagram illustrates the 
organisational structure of the PUK. 
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The diagram shows, that the hierarchical model of discipline is reflected in the organisation 
of the PUK, and especially in its sub-branches such as District and Geographical Units for 
mobilizing citizens. Like the Committees (Liq) of its rival the KDP, the Offices (Melbend) 
and the local sub-units of the PUK have responsibility for mobilizing people through 
different social and specialized unions for women, workers, doctors, youth, chemists, artists, 
and so on. The PUK also has a Human Rights Office. Employment in public offices is 
generally monitored by the party, especially in the Green Zone where a party Support Letter 
is required, particularly in the military and security services. The diagram refers to the 
Peshmerga Office, which is a military organ controlled by a political party. The Media Office 
which disseminates party ideology is another feature of the organisational structure. Hence, 
the structure of the party comes into deep contradiction with civic activities. Membership of 
the party starts from the age of 15 (it is 16 in the KDP). Like the KDP, this party disciplines 
its members by: warning notice, suspension, de-promotion and expulsion. According to the 
PUK bylaw one duty of its members is to oppose factionalism, tribalism and favouritism for 
a geographical area. However, as Chapter 8 will explain, in practice it participates in reviving 
tribes as a tool to stay in power. 
Comparing the structures of the KDP and PUK, the hierarchy of the distribution of power in 
the former is more centralized. However, on the ground, according to interviewees’ 
statements, the process of decision making and mobilization is very nearly the same. The 
main difference is because the PUK is a merger of three political groups in one party, hence, 
its political culture is more open to accepting various ideas. However, since the 
establishment of both parties, one family has ruled each party. The president of the KDP, 
and the Secretary General of the PUK have been in power for nearly four decades. This 
means, that the main point of development within a political party which is the issue of 
devolution of power and changing leadership is absent. The rule and function of the leader 
of the PUK can be seen in a statement made by Stansfield (2003:115): 
Within the PUK, the Political Bureau members acknowledge that Talabani is the 
overall decision-maker, and he appears to be more forceful in this position than does 
Massoud Barzani, as many PUK members consider Talabani a form of talismanic 
guide for the party. 
While, according to the PUK bylaw, the Leadership Committee has the highest power 
between two congresses. In the fieldwork period (March to July 2014), I visited the areas 
under the control of the PUK. All of the PUK’s buildings and the majority of the 
governmental entrance boards are coloured green as a symbol of the PUK’s flag. At the 
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entrance to the majority of cities under the domination of the PUK, a large photo of its 
Secretary General is displayed.  
The Leadership Issue in the PUK 
Understanding the role and the power of the leadership is a main factor in understanding the 
obstacles to political development in the KR. From the history of the establishment of this 
party in 1975 up to now, the party has not changed its Secretary General. According to the 
internal programme and procedures of the PUK, some of the Secretary General’s duties are: 
the responsibility to make decisions; elect his deputy from the Leadership Committee; 
suggest candidates for the Administrative Organs of the party; chair Leadership Committee 
meetings; be responsible for and monitor financial affairs and revenue sources; and form the 
Consultative Council, which consists of five people (PUK Bylaw, Article 28).  
As mentioned, since December 2012, the Secretary General has been absent for reasons of 
ill health. According to Articles 21 and 28:1 of the internal bylaw, in such situations an 
extraordinary congress must be held, but due to deep rivalry inside the party and the 
willingness of the Secretary General’s family to perform his duties, the congress has been 
postponed. As a cadre of the PUK pointed out,  
The institution of decision making is weak among the Kurdistan parties and persons have 
more authority than institutions. Decisions are made by an individual without consultation 
with the party, a factor which produces corruption. In the PUK the Secretary General’s 
wife has made decisions since his absence, although she is not the Deputy Secretary 
General 14. 
Another top cadre of this party explained in an interview that, the PUK has the problem of 
who will succeed the Secretary General. In his absence the Deputies are unable to act. The 
successor should exercise the same authority as the Secretary General15. According to Article 
28:2, the Deputy of the Secretary General shall perform all the duties of the Secretary 
General until the extraordinary congress is held. According to one interviewee, one reason 
for delaying the formation of the eighth cabinet in 2014, for nearly nine months, was the 
absence of the Secretary General and lack of agreement between other members on how to 
divide offices16. This claim refers to the power, dominant role and charismatic personality 
of the leader of the party and indicates the weak institutionalisation within it.  
                                                 
14 Interview with Haydar Esmial Abdulla. 
15 Inteview with Sa’adi Ahmad Pira. 
16 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
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In the parliamentary election in 2013, the number of votes for the PUK declined compared 
with previous elections.  
In a report prepared by the Central Council of the PUK, regarding the reasons for the 
decrease in the party’s votes and possible remedies, mention was made of the need to form 
a transparent fund for the PUK’s revenues coming from its properties inside and outside the 
KR, and especially from London, Istanbul, the Emirates, Jordan, Iran and the USA. A large 
proportion of the PUK’s assets belong to certain top cadres (Spee Media, 2013: No 7). Also, 
the leader of the PUK runs the Nocan Company that combines different businesses in the 
oil, food, construction, tobacco and other sectors (Ala'Aldeen, 2013). The interviewees in 
this study agreed that political parties in the KR have become a tool for trade and business.   
The most important posts inside the PUK and government have been held by the Secretary 
General’s family and his relatives. They include key posts in the Iraqi government, the 
PUK’s foreign relations office, the security (Zaniary) office, the Cabinet Functions Co-
ordinator Office in the seventh cabinet, the PUK’s Finance, Supervision Office and Finance 
Ministry in the seventh cabinet and Deputy Prime Minister in the eighth cabinet. The process 
of legislation is either positively influenced by the abovementioned officials, or they create 
obstacles to any laws that conflict with their interests.  
To sum up, the bureaucratic system is in paralysis because of the probability of the 
appointment of incompetent office-holders. More importantly, the national interest is 
interpreted corresponding to the family’s interest. The PUK, like the KDP, is a family-
owned-party which translates into family-owned-government and debilitation of the process 
of political development. 
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The Gorran Movement (GM) 
Disagreements and the lack of response to the demands for reform of the PUK, as well as 
the imbalance of power within the government between the PUK and the KDP, help to 
account for the formation of the GM which emerged from within the PUK (CEIP, 2009). 
The leader of the GM, Nwshirwan Mustafa, on leaving the PUK in 2007, founded the Wishe 
(Word) Media Company (TV, radio, newspaper, magazine and website) which mainly 
focused on government performance. The company performed as the opposition outside 
parliament to mobilize citizens through its broadcasting and as a base to establish a new 
political party. In 2009, the GM participated in the KR parliamentary elections and was 
formally established as a political organisation in 2010 (Gorran, 2013b). Mass media 
ownership is common to all political parties in the KR and it played a crucial role in the 
formation of the GM.  
The main reason for the success of the GM was the extent of corruption in governmental 
circles and the disclosure of illegal government expenditure by this Movement in election 
campaigns. The Movement brought about a national awakening as to what was happening 
behind closed doors, in terms of government performance, especially its fiscal aspects. More 
importantly, the GM introduced new concepts: individual freedom, civil society, a national 
budget, transparency, the type of political system and responsibility towards the next 
generation. These terms were unfamiliar or poorly defined for the majority of society. The 
Movement, via the mass media, planted the idea that income is the property of the nation 
and not of parties. As Bauer (2015:147) stated, instead of relying on the topics of ‘liberation’ 
and ‘historic experience’ that were used by the dominant parties, the GM injected the new 
topics to society. 
Certain characteristics distinguish this Movement from other parties in the KR. The 
Movement publishes monthly expenditure reports on its website. In a challenge to some of 
its parliamentary members who asked for facilities such as a car, a house or early retirement, 
the General Coordinator (leader) of the Movement asked them in an open letter to apologise 
publicly or if not to resign (Mustafa, 2012). 
The magic of the title ‘Gorran’ which means ‘Change’, can be considered a symbolically 
powerful factor in gaining new supporters. The slogan of the party not only challenges 
corruption but offers a new alternative to the prevailing ideology based on revolutionary 
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legitimacy. The majority of its supporters are the younger strata, the new mostly post-
uprising generation, who are more urban and better educated (Cordesman et al, 2010). 
In spite of these distinctive features, however, the process of mobilization and membership 
is similar to other parties of the KR. For instance, according to the constitution of the 
Movement, applicants for membership must be 18 years old, and pay a monthly subscription. 
Local offices hold very regular meetings with members and report to the next level. The 
Movement participates in Syndicate and Union elections and it has established large party 
headquarters in districts and sub-districts to control and mobilize citizens (GM constitution, 
2013).  
The image of the General Coordinator can be found on the walls of buildings belonging to 
the Movement. According to a top cadre and parliamentary member of this Movement, all 
political parties in the KR have the same type of political thinking. Despite some differences 
between their views about politics, their members often think and behave in the same 
manner17.  
Up till now the ideology and political perspective of this Movement has remained unclear. 
According to the interviewees: it is not a religious Movement; it is a civil party but does not 
believe in extreme secular concepts. It is a liberal party, and believes in the separation 
between state and religion. However, it does not believe in marginalizing religion. The party 
does not have a distinct ideology. For this reason, it has embraced people with different 
views18. As a cadre of this Movement explained its base is similar to that of the PUK and 
the KDP, because it contains a broad spectrum with different social and even political 
backgrounds. It promotes a political reform agenda that is compatible with many ideologies 
and political persuasions. That is why amongst its members, the wealthy are found next to 
the poor, the educated next to the illiterate, the urban dweller next to the farmer and the 
atheist next to the Islamist19. 
The party’s relationship to religion is illustrated by its role in legislation. Many of the cadres 
in Gorran’s mass media and social networks, including the first to be elected in the 
parliamentary elections in 2013 were members of Islamic parties. This may be the reason 
why the leaders of this party in an interview with the KNN Channel (2013) announced their 
intention to reject any law that would conflict with Islamic principles. Later, in enacting the 
                                                 
17 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
18 Interview with Adnan Osman and Mohamad Haji. 
19 Interview with Hishyar Abid. 
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law to allow loans from abroad, on 2 June 2015, the Islamic parties left the parliament hall 
in protest. In their view the law was against Islamic principles. However, the GM approved 
the law because the Minister of Finance belonged to the Movement.   
Concerning the leadership, three years after its formal establishment, in December 2013 the 
Movement held its first congress (26-27 December) without choosing its General 
Coordinator in congress. Instead, and in contrast to other political parties of the KR, the 
General Coordinator was elected by the Executive House for a two-year term, renewable for 
no more than three terms. The General Coordinator has no deputy and in his absence for any 
reason, the Executive House will elect the successor (GM constitution, 2013).  
Decision making, according to one interviewee, is similar to the other parties, with the 
important decisions being made by the General Coordinator20. All the GM’s ministers in the 
eighth cabinet were chosen by the General Coordinator alone21. According to an MP in the 
third term of parliament, the GM is even more committed to their party’s leadership 
directions than other parties22. However, despite these reservations, the Movement for the 
first time introduced the concept of political opposition to the political arena of the KR, 
which is a crucial element in the political development process.  
The Gorran Movement and Society 
Although the GM emerged to challenge corruption and demand reform in the political 
system, it had difficulty in broadening its rhetoric to appeal to the wider society. It mainly 
focused on the Green Zone and the challenge to the PUK; and it tried to show that Slemani 
province had lost influence as a cultural and political base on the KR compared to other 
provinces. Like the PUK, its leadership headquarters, top leaders and media channels were 
based in Slemani.  
Some of the top cadres disagree with the local emphasis of this Movement. Some other 
cadres have suggested creating a new party in the Badinan areas as an alternative to the 
Movement23. In fact, apart from the Islamic Union, all the other political parties exert most 
of their influence in a specific area. According to the interviewees, this fact derives from the 
                                                 
20 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
21 Interview with Abdilselam Berwari. 
22 Interview with Omer Nuradinin. 
23 The source of this idea was Adnan Osman, who I interviewed. He explained that the Gorran leadership was 
monopolised by certain persons with specific localities, who prevented others from other locations from 
entering the higher levels of leadership.  
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process of configuration of the leadership of each party. For instance, the top leader of the 
KDP is from the Badinan area; and the PUK’s and the GM from the Soranian area. The 
majority of the GM’s top leaders are from Slemani. The political culture reflects the tribal 
base which is influenced by traditional feelings of attachment more than rationality24.   
Another interviewee noted that, one aspect of the failure to penetrate all parts of the region 
is linked to the rivalry between the dominant political parties which has resulted in the 
demographic, geographic, administrative and political division of society. The history of the 
KFM shows that until 1975, or the rise of the PUK, commanders and officials from the 
South, for example, were employed in the Northern part of country. However, after that 
period this phenomenon declined and had nearly disappeared by the end of the civil war25. 
Hence, at the macro level, this division of supporters between specific areas is the legacy of 
the defeat of the process of nation building by the political parties which originated with the 
multi-party system in the KR. 
The GM inherited this political division which created a culture of distrust between the 
authorities and citizens on the one hand, and between the followers of the ruling party and 
the Movement on the other. It reignited the culture of violence and the use of violence to 
express alternative political views. The GM like other parties, aspires to a homogenous 
society based on an exclusive political view. For example, between the parliamentary 
elections in 2009 and 2013, the Movement’s political rhetoric was based on rejecting the top 
leaders of the PUK and the KDP, accusing the PUK and small parties of being obedient to 
the KDP, and rejecting all political institutions such as parliament, government, and 
presidential bodies (Cochburn, 2009; Hawrami, 2011). The distrust that exploded in the 
March 2011 demonstration led to the use of military force to end it (see Chapter 6).  
Instead of attempting to change society, the GM focused on the negative activities of the 
authorities in order to gain votes, it became the runner up in the elections. Its rhetoric after 
the 2013 elections changed dramatically and the Movement participated in the eighth cabinet 
which was again formed by the KDP and the same previous Prime Minister.  
Another important feature of the GM is that, the Movement was designed from the topdown 
and not from the bottom up. The Movement did not emerge with new leaders as a natural 
growth of public discontent against political authority. It grew as a result of dissent between 
                                                 
24  Interview with Mohamad Haji and Adnan Osman. 
25 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
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the leaders of the PUK. Considering its top leaders, political rhetoric and geographical 
performance, it is difficult to see GM as a social reformist movement which aims to appeal 
to the whole country. The legacy of the PUK and its type of political activities are reflected 
in the structure of the Movement as the figure below shows.
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Source: the GM’s constitution and 
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The diagram shows how the offices of the party extend into various geographical locations 
and occupations. The new Movement has branches for individual supporters and members 
that are related to the Circle’s branches at the party’s lowest level of mobilization. They 
operate in a similar way to other parties. Like the PUK and the KDP’s Academic Studies 
Organ, the Scientific Branch (Rooms) is included in the GM structure and is run by experts. 
The GM has local sub-branches to mobilize people. Like the PUK and the KDP, it has 
external branches for the Kurds in the diaspora.  Like the other parties, it formed General 
Council branches that consist of specialists and well-known people with experience in 
different fields such as the military, diplomacy, sport, the arts, law, engineering, and so on. 
This allows the Movement to penetrate into different corners of society. Besides, the General 
Congress that is held once every four years, each province holds their own congress every 
two years. 
However, the Movement has chosen new terms to differentiate its structure from the other 
parties. The terms used to describe members in various ranks are also different from those 
of other political parties in the region. This is a symbolic act to attract more supporters and 
members. In addition, unlike other parties in the KR, the GM has an organ to coordinate 
between its representatives in the Iraqi and the KR parliament and province council (The 
Fractions). The Movement does not have a military branch, although the General Council 
can mobilize armed groups. 
In a nutshell, while this Movement has a new perspective towards politics in the KR, its 
institutional form and its functions resemble those of other parties. It has not succeeded in 
breaking down the legacy of mass membership and mobilisation. The Movement has 
encouraged more people to engage in politics but the party-ization of society has become 
more entrenched.  
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The Islamic Parties and Society: Background 
Religion is a powerful contributor to the socio-political life of KR society, especially Islam 
as the religion of the majority of population. Societally, this contribution can be seen in 
religious events such as mass everyday participation in mosques for common prayer, 
especially on Fridays; having two religious ceremonies or Eid per year; two events 
commemorating the prophet (his birthday and his journey from Mecca into Medina, called 
the Hijrah); Imams and caliphs events, all of which are holidays. Religious concepts persist, 
such as Zikat and Sadaqhe in helping poor people, and many other religious events are held 
such as festivals for memorising the Quran or praying for rainfall in drought years. Other 
religions in the region have their own rituals and celebrations.  
Throughout the twentieth century, the majority of Kurdish political movements and 
revolutions were led by religious figures, but without religious goals. Mullahs and Sheikhs 
have also played a role in schooling people especially in the rural and remote areas (Sabir, 
2008). The Hojrah (a place, often in a mosque for religious studies) that is run by clerics 
undertakes the duty of schooling people (males) through instruction in religious issues. The 
Islamic groups have utilized this history and issue frequently reminders that more than 95% 
of the Kurdistan population is Muslim. There is no census to confirm the exact number of 
Muslims in the KR and there are many religious minorities, such as Jews, Armenians, 
Assyrians, Khaldeans, Ezidinian, Zarathustrans and Kakies who are non-Muslim. The 
Islamic factions frequently use the idea of the Muslim majority to resist the secularization of 
society and the constitution. 
In education, religion forms part of the curriculum in the early years of schooling and through 
to faculties of Islamic thought in the universities. In the economic sphere, Islamic Banks 
operate in the KR and mortgage interest is forbidden by pressure from the Islamic parties on 
the grounds that it is against Islamic principles and is Haram. Seven out of a total of 39 
banks in the KR in 2014, were Islamic banks (Kurdistan Review, 2014:70).  
Any economic law passed in parliament requires review by a committee of Islamic clergy to 
determine whether it is in accordance with Al-Sharia or not. The security services cannot 
arrest a Mullah without the permission of the Endowment and Religious Affairs minister. 
Politically, the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs supervises religious issues 
under a Minister from the Islamic Movement (in the fifth, sixth and seventh cabinets). 
Constitutionally, in a draft constitution Article (6), it is written that ‘Islam is a source of 
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making laws’ and laws approved by parliament cannot be in conflict with Al-Sharia. Islamic 
religion therefore plays a role in all aspects of society: in politics, the economy, law, 
education and security. 
The roots of Islamic parties in the KR can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
movement (Ala’akidy, 2011). In addition, both internal and external factors helped Islamic 
movements to strengthen their bases in the KR. Externally, the Islamic revolution in Iran in 
1979 was important. For example, the Kurdistan Islamic Movement was established in 1987 
in Iran and supported by it. Then, there was the capture of power by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan which shares the same creed with the Islamic Movement in the KR. Close ties 
between the Egyptian Islamic factions (especially the MB) and the Islamic Movement helped 
the rise of these parties. The Islamic Union stated that 1994 was the official year of 
inauguration of this party although it had engaged in clandestine activities before this date 
(Irevany, 2003; Ala’akidy, 2011).  
Internally, the main political conditions which helped to reinforce Islamic trends were the 
internal war between the KDP and the PUK and the destruction of the economic aspects of 
everyday life. The situation prompted the rise of various Islamic groups, especially the 
Islamic Union that was financially backed by Saudi Arabia, Iran and some other Gulf states. 
In the period of internal war this party provided some daily subsistence for poor people 
(Ala’akidy, 2011:100-101; Sharif, 2008; Akyol, 2010).  
The non-religious parties, the PUK and the KDP, responded to each other’s weakness by 
occasionally supporting one Islamic faction against the other party. In the period of two 
administrations, the Islamic groups had seats and a portfolio in cabinet and government, 
which gave them more room to grow. Another factor is Iraq’s position in the Arab world 
which meant that the KR as part of Iraq was affected by the Arabs’ religious-tribal culture 
and their view of Islam. These factors, in conjunction with the non-secular educational 
system, highlight influential Islamic audio-visual mass media and huge print-runs of Islamic 
books, which were conducive to the growth of Islamic groups in the region.  
Regarding the Islamic factions’ perspective on society and development, top cadres of 
Islamic parties often speak of their desire to return to the Al-caliphate period which is 
recognized only by the Sunni creed. It reveals: their intellectual dogmatism, which means 
looking backward instead of forward; failure to adapt to changes in the environment and 
progress at the local and global scale; their rejection of the secular system; and their desire 
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to impose Al-Sharia according to their point of view on society. For instance, in an interview 
with Ali Bapir, the leader of the Islamic League (IL) that was published on this party’s 
website, he stated that in order for the secular tendency in the KR to be overcome, “our 
dream is to draft an Islamic constitution to represent society” (Komalnews, 2013). The IL 
states in its bylaw that one duty of this party is to preserve the morality of family and society 
by preventing the intrusion of western norms. The leader of this party, in an interview with 
Spee Media (2013, No:1), rejected the status quo in KR’s universities which allows the 
mixing of genders.  
In spite of these influences, political development it is not a one-way process and the KR is 
not isolated from the outside world. It is important to take into account the processes of 
internationalization, globalization and regional upheavals and their effects on the KR. 
Upheavals such as the Arab Spring and the defeat in applying Al-Sharia in countries such as 
Egypt and Tunisia exist alongside ISIS and its claim to apply Al-Sharia. Within the KR, the 
rise of the GM has coincided with a reduction in the number of advocates of Islamic parties. 
For this reason, some cadres of the Islamic Union and Islamic League even suggested 
removing the title Islamic from their parties, although the suggestion was not accepted.  
At the moment three Islamic parties are active in the KR, the Islamic Union, the Islamic 
League and the Islamic Movement. The following paragraphs focus on the Islamic Union as 
the main Islamic party in the political arena of the KR.   
The Islamic Union (IU) 
The IU is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the KR (Mahmoud, 2011). In the 
events of Egypt between the MB and Egypt’s military services in 2013, the mass media of 
the IU focused strongly on the events and supported the MB. A top cadre of the IU, in an 
interview with Rudaw (January 2014) stated that the party “is an extension of the school of 
the Muslim Brotherhood…. The Muslim Brotherhood is the mother of most of the ideas on 
which the Islamic Union builds itself.”  According to the same report, the former party leader 
Salahdin Bahaddin announced that “The Muslim Brotherhood is the best school in which 
one can be educated. We are proud to be graduates of the Muslim Brotherhood school”. 
However, after the recognition of the MB as a terrorist group by the Egyptian government, 
and the rise of ISIS as an extremist Islamic faction, the IU and other Islamic parties faced 
fundamental challenges from voices in Kurdistan society which accused them of being a 
base for religious radicalisation. 
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 The constitution of this party states that the principles of the IU are fraternity, liberty and 
justice. It also states that Islamic principles are the basis for its political activities and it is a 
“national reformist party that tries to solve the political, social, economic and cultural 
problems of society from an Islamic standpoint”; it respects the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a human achievement. In an interview a cadre of this party stated that “in 
our [the IU] view of point, politics is a part of the great Islamic project…. We have an office 
called the Announcement (proselytization) Office, Maktab Al-Da’awa, which invites people 
to Islam and religiosity”26. Another cadre pointed out that “Islamism is a main motivation 
for loyalty to this party and its members believe that, through the IU, they can serve Islam”27.  
When it was formed, the party created a variety of charitable organizations throughout the 
country, especially among widows of the internal war, poor people and students through the 
distribution of goods, money, free student accommodation, arranging sporting events and 
offering sportswear for the youth, and building mosques mainly in the rural areas. Youth 
meetings were often held in mosques as an easy way to encourage them to pray, making 
Sallat. The party tried to influence citizens by exciting their religious feeling in response to 
the hard economic conditions.  
The socio-political activities of the IU are different: building mosques, opening small civil 
projects such as training barbers, textile and craft workers, opening health centres and direct 
monetary assistance to poor families. Most of the finance to run these projects comes from 
the Islamic Kurdish League, which is funded by certain Islamic states and wealthy 
individuals. The head of this centre is a Kurd who is the head of the Islamic Countries 
Conference28 (Amin, 2012).  
In the parliamentary elections in 2013, the total number of Islamic parties’ seats in 
parliament increased. However, the total number of their votes compared with the Iraqi 
parliamentary elections in 2010 decreased. Nearly half of all the IU votes were gained by 
two candidates. Both were missionaries, one from the Soranian area and another from the 
Badinan area (Siwkani, 2013). Compared with other parties, the IU is the only party that has 
nearly the same level of support in both the Soranian and Badinan areas.  
                                                 
26 Interview with Bayan Barwary. 
27 Interview with Salahaddin Babaker. 
28 In asking the IU’s cadres about the relationship between this party and the Islamic Kurdish League, responses 
differed. One of participants did not deny the link between the IU and the League, while another denied any 
link. 
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At its sixth congress in 2012 the IU, for the first time in the history of the KR’s political 
parties, chose a new leader. The selection was not based on the constitution of the party, 
rather, the leader decided to step down from his post after eighteen years29. However, in 
2016, in eighth congress he again elected as the general Secretary of the party. 
Regarding its political activity and structure, the process of decision making in the IU is 
collective as the important decisions are made by the Leadership Council. The Presidential 
Council is recognized as the highest authority inside the party that creates the framework for 
party policy30. The IU is similar to other parties in having various offices in different districts 
and sub-districts. It has established its own unions for students, women and sport as well as 
different kinds of mass media that spread the party’s ideology. Some of the union’s titles are 
adapted to religious priorities. For example, the women’s union is called the “Sisters Union”. 
The party created organs such as the Family Unit, or Osrah, to attract families and apply 
Islamic principles to them. As the Deputy General Secretary of this party explained “the IU 
represent all classes and strata of society and different ages. Through our various organs and 
units, we try to attract people. For every strata, the IU has established a specific organ”31.  
In terms of finance, the IU has a different structure. Apart from external support, the fund 
comes from the government’s allocated budget, trade activities such as construction projects, 
and donations. According to interviewees, another source is its ordinary members’ 
subscription which consists of 2.5% of the total monthly income of the member. As there is 
no banking system in the KR, trust between members and the party is the basis for knowing 
the rate of each person’s income. Thus, the subscription varies from member to member. 
High ranking officials pay more: The Iraqi ministers and MPs pay 50% of their monthly 
salary; the KR’s ministers and MPs pay 40%; the members of the provincial council, retired 
ministers and MPs pay 30% of their pension to the party32. The corresponding officials of 
the KDP, and the PUK, do not pay any portion of their salary or pension to their political 
parties33. The figure below illustrates the organisational structure of the IU.
                                                 
29 Interview with Bayan Barwary. 
30 Unlike participants of the other political parties, the participants of the IU asserted that the leader cannot 
make decisions alone nor do they have the authority on final decisions.   
31 Interview with Salahaddin Babaker. 
32 Interview with Salahaddin Babaker and Bayan Barwary. 
33 Interview with Omer Nuraldini. 
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As diagram shows, all organs of the party have a responsibility to act according to and to 
spread Islamic principles, especially via the Public Announcement (proselytization) Office 
(Da’awe), the Al-Sharia Experts Office and Family (Osra) Offices. It could be said that the 
party has a structure that may come into conflict with modern party duties. For example, the 
IU teaches its members to hold meetings about how to memorize or read the Quran, which 
is not the duty of a modern party. The party uses the Al-Sharia Office to interpret Islamic 
principles and apply them to various political and non-political activities.  In a similar way 
to the other parties in the KR, each organ and office has a periodic meeting to discuss new 
events and to give recommendations and suggestions to higher organs which are then 
implemented in a hierarchical way. Similar to the GM, the rate of women’s participation in 
the various IU organs is 25% of the total membership.  
In general, it is difficult to see how political development can occur under the umbrella of 
the Islamic parties in the KR. The basic reason is that many features of modern society 
cannot co-exist with Islamic principles. Examples include individual human rights, banking 
interest charges, equality between males and females in inheritance, or as witnesses in court. 
They have long term negative consequences on the political development process through 
their negative impact on the status of women in society and the failure to secularize the 
economic, educational, constitutional and state institutions. Society will become more closed 
through the application of Al-Sharia and will lose the ability to compete economically with 
the outside world. It is doubtful if the Islamic politics of the Islamic Union can resolve the 
problems of economic and fiscal deficit, the weakness of the military, weak 
institutionalisation of government or fraud in elections. 
Conclusion  
As this chapter has shown, the obstacles to political development that arise from the political 
parties are many and varied. Some of the obstacles derive from the top-down hierarchical 
structure of political parties and the type of leadership, which has created centralized party 
control which is reflected in the centralism of government performance. These obstacles are 
rooted in their histories especially those of the PUK and the KDP, their military origins and 
the legacy of Leninist-Marxist-Maoist ideology; as well as Muslim Brotherhood ideology. 
To mobilize support, political parties’ branches exist in all parts of society (streets, 
neighbourhoods, sub-districts, unions, syndicates, villages and even abroad). In structural 
perspective, political parties have succeeded in covering most of society through their 
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interconnected branches, creating a highly politicized society. While the political parties 
have been able to institutionalize their procedures and organization to mobilize citizens, it is 
doubtful whether this institutionalisation is in accordance with the political development 
process, especially when the parties’ influence on the economy, bureaucracy and 
employment is considered. The political parties remain unable to move beyond their 
traditional structures or relinquish their armed forces, which increases the threat of potential 
armed conflict. After two decades of governing the struggle between the political parties is 
deeply embedded within society. The attempt by the Islamic parties to apply Al-sharia to all 
sectors of government and society is a further obstacle.  To sum up, the KR’s political system 
is open enough to allow a degree of division, conflict, tension, competition and innovation, 
so the obstacles to development are not insurmountable. However, the competition is not 
constructive.  
Having explored the influence of political parties in government and parliament in the 
previous chapter, this chapter has reviewed the internal structures and functions of the 
political parties. To complement this picture, the next chapter will focus on the tribal fabric 
of society, its relationship to the political parties and government, and how this relationship 
also represents an obstacle to political development. 
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Chapter Eight: Social Fabric, Tribe and Politics 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the social composition of the KR and to explain how 
it retains some features of traditional society. The chapter explores the linkage between tribes 
and political parties to show how they reinforce each other and their impacts on government. 
It makes a connection between politics as an institution and as a process involving ordinary 
social lives to gain an insight into how tribes have operated politically in different periods. 
To do this, it is necessary to investigate the history of the tribe before the emergence of the 
KR as a socio-political entity; and explain how tribes became a strong political unit and 
gained economic benefits.  
The starting point is that the tribe is both relevant to and produces the dominant type of 
political culture in the KR. As Almond (1956:396) pointed out “Every political system is 
embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political actions” (cited in Pye, 1969:7), 
namely political culture, which is a part of general culture within a society. Political culture  
Suggests that the traditions of a society, the spirit of its public institutions, the passions 
and the collective reasoning of its citizenry, and the style and the operating codes of its 
leaders are not just random products of historical experience but fit together as a part 
of a meaningful whole and constitute intelligible web of relations (Pye, 1969:7). 
As this chapter shows, tribal values are implicated in government and politics through the 
political parties.  
Anderson and Stansfield (2004:160) define a tribe as “a socio-political unit with territorial 
limits based upon kinship and descent”. In the KR, besides this type of tribe, there are also 
groups of villages which are based on land ownership more than blood or kinship 
(McDowall, 2007). Some villages have a head or Mukhtar without having a tribal chieftain. 
They identify themselves with their village or use the name of a geographical unit that refers 
to the set of villages. Identifying a tribe only by kinship can be useful for studying the clan-
village and migratory tribes that are based on kinship. However, the tribe as a bigger 
community and especially sedentary tribes, are actually based on a combination of 
relationships such as kinship, land ties and religious creeds or even political ties. The map 
below illustrates the distribution of the major tribes within the Iraqi state, including the 
Kurdistan Region.  
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Figure 8.1: Iraqi Ethno-Religious Groups and Major Iraqi Tribes Map 
Source: "Iraq: Country Profile" Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) map cited in "Iraq: Distribution of Religious 
Groups and Ethnic Groups", http://usiraq.procon.org/view.additional-resource.php?resourceID=002425 , June 
2003.  
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Background to Tribalism in Iraq  
Studying the tribal fabric in the KR is difficult, because its meaning and power has changed 
from place to place and time to time, along with feelings about territorial identity 
(McDowell, 2007). Sedentary tribes have stronger territorial identity than nomadic tribes. 
However, tribalism or a tribal base is the dominant socio-political structure in the KR 
society1 (Fuller, 1993; Malanczuk, 1991), although some ordinary farmers (in Kurdish 
Jutyar), and city dwellers exist who do not belong to tribes. Before the Chaldaran War 
between the Safavid state and the Ottoman Empire in 1514, Kurdistan was a part of Iran. As 
a result of this war, Iran lost the major parts of Kurdistan. Then the principality emerged in 
both countries (Edmonds, 1957). Many Kurdish emirates such as Baban, Badinan and Soran 
emerged, which had their own soldiers, to defend their lands. The centralization of power 
was called Eskane Ashaiyer in Iran and the Tanzimat process in the Ottoman Empire, which 
led to the eradication of the Kurdish emirates (Vali, 2006; Saria’a-Al-Qhalam, 1998).  
However, tribal domination through the power of the chieftain continued. The appointment 
of some governors by the central government in the Kurdish emirates and the lack of 
legitimacy of the latter among tribes, led to an increase in the role of chieftains and tribes; 
tribes became the focal socio-political unit. This does not mean that the society only 
consisted of tribes: the expansion of government power and bureaucracy, oil exploration, 
land reforms from the Ottoman Empire to the Iraqi state in 1932, 1938 and 1963; the use of 
machinery in agriculture that led to migration from villages to cities especially in the 1950s, 
all led to the rise of independent farmers and the growth of commerce, which enhanced the 
economic power of individuals. Even in the era of the monarchy, the Iraqi communist party 
played a great role in provoking and supporting farmers against the Sheikhs and Aghas who 
                                                 
1 In my field work, the participants agreed that the KR’s society is mainly a tribal based society. Even in urban 
areas similar values of tribal structure can be seen.    
 Instead of using the term “peasant”, I have used the term “farmer” to describe those who work on the land, 
whether shared, rented or owned land. According to one definition, “peasants are a class characterized by 
small-scale agricultural production, economic self-sufficiency, low division of labour and relative political 
isolation from urban working classes” (Abercrombie et al, 2006:288). In Kurdistan society there is a low 
division of labour, and in some cases, small land owners have an economic self-sufficiency economy, but 
politically, there is no clear division between farmers and the urban working class. The majority of Kurdish 
political activities have been conducted in villages, and sometimes urban political elites moved to villages, so 
that farmers were automatically engaged in politics. When central government buys tribal loyalty, again 
farmers are engaged in politics. When villages were destroyed by central government, farmers were re-located 
in new settlements or in cities. Hence, farmers have engaged actively in politics, even if they have not 
constituted a distinctive social class.    
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were landlords. In addition, before the uprising in the Kurdish areas controlled by the KDP 
and the PUK, the parties limited the chieftains’ power. In the third congress of the KDP in 
1953, when the leftists ruled the party, they called for agricultural reform and farmers and 
workers’ rights (Bruinessen, 1992 and 2002; Stansfield, 2003:66; McDowell, 2007). 
The establishment of the Kurdistan political parties after the First World War, by both urban 
and rural leaders, is a sign that Kurdistan society adopted some of the political features of 
modern politics. The growth of the mass media, transport between villages and cities, and 
the diaspora of Kurds also helped to open up the tribal society and reduce its influence. 
With the emergence of the republican system, first with the Ba’ath regime and then the 
establishment of KRG, tribalism was once again strengthened in the service of authority. 
Geography is another factor in tribalism in the KR: features of tribalism remain stronger in 
the mountainous areas than the plain areas. One reason is the type of political activity of the 
political parties. Chieftains on the plain held large tracts of land, and, the majority of political 
activities against landlords, especially by the Iraqi communist party before it was made 
illegal by the Ba’ath regime, occurred in these areas. This does not mean that the 
mountainous areas were free of landlord exploitation, only that land ownership was on a 
smaller scale. The semi-nomadic mountain tribes depended mainly on husbandry. After the 
Kurdish parties became illegal, they retreated from the cities and returned to clandestine and 
armed activity in the mountain areas. Thus the type of coalition between Kurdish parties (the 
PUK and the KDP) and chieftains in a given territory, has shaped the forms of tribalism and 
the relationship between farmer-tribesmen and chieftains.  
There are alternative interpretations of the rise or continuation of tribal power in Iraq of 
which the KR is a part. The change from a monarchy to a republic in 1958, and return of 
Barzani from exile, led to the strengthening of the KDP control in the north (Kurdistan part) 
of Iraq. This event pushed the government to encourage tribes such as the Harki, Surchi and 
Bradwsti, which were traditionally hostile to Barzani to revolt against him and his party 
(Stansfield, 2003). As he was the key intermediary between the Barzani tribe and other tribes 
as well as the leader of the KDP, a complex intra-tribe and tribe-party conflict ensued. When 
the Ba’ath regime emerged, it followed the policy of demolishing religious sectarianism and 
tribalism. Its manifesto referred to the rejection of sectarianism, racism and tribalism as 
negative concepts that were remnants from the times of colonial power (Baram, 1997:1). 
                                                 
 The interviewees hold similar views on this issue. 
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However, as it became embroiled in internal and external wars, the regime again drew on 
the tribes to gain support and recruit soldiers. The successive wars against Kurds in both the 
monarchical and republican periods can be considered as one factor that shifted the attitude 
of authority towards the tribes (Yehya, 2013). For example, in the monarchical period, the 
government utilized tribes against the Kurdish rebellion and then with the establishment of 
the republican system in 1958, the government tried to abolish the tribal structure. However, 
the war against the Kurds impelled the government to return to tribes and form the army 
from both Kurd and Arab tribes 2. 
To prevent Kurds from supporting the Kurdish movement, the central government offered a 
socio-economic opportunity to those Kurdish tribal chieftains who joined the fight against 
the Kurdish movement (Malanczuk, 1991). This policy encouraged many chieftains to create 
their own militia, Jash, to fight and earn money, acquire positions and settle old antagonisms 
between themselves and some of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (KFM) leaders. 
According to one chieftain  
My tribe was divided in such a way that some were fighting as Peshmerga at the 
Kurdish Revolution Front and some were fighting for the Ba'athist Regime as Jash3. 
After 1975 and the failure of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, the majority of tribes 
became Jash. We were among them and I established a Jash brigade composed of 700 
members. This was the way we chose to save ourselves, since otherwise we would 
have been dispatched to fight in the Iran-Iraq war4.  
Bozarslan (2006:137) argued that “the survival of tribes depends narrowly on the existence 
of a conflictual environment”. In the war against Iran and Kuwait, support for tribes reached 
its peak and the government created titles such as ‘The General Sheikh of the Tribe’, ‘Tribe 
Sheikh’s Deputy’, ‘Tribe’s Flag Carrier’ and ‘The Tribe’s Poet’ (Yehya, 2013). In addition, 
in order to weaken political Islam, the Ba’ath regime relied on tribal figures (Hassan, 2007). 
This process can be described as co-optation whereby the regime supports traditional and 
tribal organizations in favour of the ruling party. After the collapse of the Ba’ath regime, the 
new Iraqi government again restored power to the tribes to combat Al-Qaida and other 
terrorist groups. It formed the Al-Sahwa forces from various tribes, held congresses for tribes 
and armed them. Finally, in response to the ISIS invasion in 2014, the Iraqi government 
                                                 
2 Interview with Sarbest Dewali on 30 March 2014, the chieftain of Dosky tribe, which consists of 124 villages. 
3 Jash is the Kurdish term which literally means 'donkey foal' and is used to refer to Kurds siding with the Iraqi 
government, organised in special regiments and used to counter the Kurdish revolts. 
4 Interview with Sarbest Dewali. 
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again formed a militia from tribes, where it plays a major role in the disputed and the Sunni 
areas. 
Bruinessen (2002) has argued that the continuation of tribalism is a reaction of Kurdish 
society to the types of deal made by other states with the Kurdish community, which works 
as a political coalition to defend itself. With the growing influence of the Iraqi state in the 
tribal territories, the tribes become larger through their coalitions. On the other hand, this 
means a tendency to reject non-Kurdish authority. The history of tribes in the KR shows that 
the rivalry between tribes, supported by state power, has been a dominant feature. Central 
government has succeeded in utilizing this rivalry against the Kurds themselves and their 
freedom movements.  
For instance, in the fighting between the Ba’ath regime and the KFM in 1974, a Kurdish 
force of around 20,000 men called Forsan Al-Kurd, supported the regime (Al-Khorsan, 
2001:219). This army was under the command of each tribe and the government dealt with 
their chieftains. The soldiers even received their salary through the chieftains. This action 
strengthened the chieftains’ power and position, but on the other hand, deepened the rivalry 
within Kurdish society to gain more privileges and power. The government entitled these 
chieftains Mostashar which means counsellor to be in command of the tribes’ militia 
(Bruinessen, 2002). In addition, this support by the central government to chieftains helped 
them to invest in the economic sector and they became the major investors in the urban areas 
(Gunter, 2004; Stansfield, 2006; Leezenberg, 2005). As mentioned in Chapter One, the 
chieftains’ economic power continued during the period of the KRG with the Oil For Food 
Programme, smuggling and economic privileges given as rewards for supporting a certain 
political party (Natali, 2010).  
Concerning the current roles of the chieftains, one MP pointed out that  
Tribal chieftains today are no longer restricted by the geographical boundary of their 
villages. They have become super-rich oligarchs of the region. Kurdistan society is the 
loser, as loyalty shifts from the nation to specific tribes5.     
                                                 
 After the ISIS invasion, the KRG also established some army for minorities (Christian, Yezidi, Kakai etc.) 
under the control of the Peshmerga Ministry to protect their own territory in cooperation with the Peshmerga. 
This refers to the fragmentation of the national army between minorities, tribes and political parties. 
5 Interview with Adnan Osman.  
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However, it is important to notice at that time there was a sense of Kurdishness in Kurdish 
society (urban and tribes). This sense could be invested by Kurdish political parties in favour 
of building a national sentiment. Especially by considering the fact that political parties are 
a modern tool for development and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the key political 
parties in the KR (especially the PUK) were against tribalism. However, these political 
parties, in order to gain support, reinforced the tribal sentiment and sometimes a chieftain 
became a commander either of Peshmerga or of Forsan Al-Kurd. In addition, the rivalry 
among various tribes itself was another factor in strengthening the tribalism. The 
combination of all these factors was the continuation of the tribal fabric. Even Bengio (2012) 
refers to the period of the KFM and the role of chieftains in that period in supporting either 
the Movement or the state. 
The chieftain’s position is supported from within by the tribe and from the outside by the 
government. Consequently, the chieftain operated as a link between the members of tribe 
and the outside world. The dominant political parties continued to fund tribal members via 
their chieftain after the uprising. A top official of the PUK stated that  
If political parties did not reinforce tribes, they could not be reinforced. Tribes and the 
tribal norms are revived and reinforced by the political parties. Tribes will perish if the 
political parties do not distribute money or other types of financial and political favours 
through the tribal chieftains. Such measures reinforce the belief for tribesmen that 
without the tribe and its chieftain their life, security and prosperity would be 
jeopardised6.  
The same statement was reiterated by a top official of the KDP, who pointed out that the 
political parties of the KR have themselves created some tribes7. What is noteworthy is that, 
despite the tribe originally being based on the male line, some tribes in Kurdish society have 
been headed by a female, such as the Badinan Surchi tribe which is one of the biggest tribes 
in the KR8. 
                                                 
6 Interview with Sa’adi Ahmad Pira. 
7 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
8 It is important to note that, although Kurdistan society is patriarchal, it has some specific characteristics which 
relate to the position of women in society. For example, even in previous eras, Kurds have had female poets 
and an army commander or occasionally a married man can be known via the name of his wife as an appendix 
to his name. Statues of famous Kurdish women can be seen in public places or some of their palaces remained 
as national heritage sites. Even more significantly, in contrast to the Islamic religious principle, which forbids 
men and women to dance together, they are found together in Kurdish traditional dances.  
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Broadly, the Iraqi central government policy towards Kurds can be counted as one factor in 
forming the common sense of nationality among the Kurdish tribes. The central government 
has always thought that the Kurds make problems for the government. Hence, the paradox 
that even those Kurdish tribes that joined the central government have been considered as a 
part of Kurdistan society. With the passage of time, and before the uprising in 1991, the 
strengthening of a central deprivation policy towards Kurds and the growth of a community 
of urban educated elites, Kurdish tribal society gained to some extent a sense of nation, even 
if it was not complete.  
As Fuller (1993,109) stated “Even if the Kurds possess a strong sense of their own identity 
in relation to the surrounding nationalities, their sense of ethnic unity is still poorly 
developed”. However, after two decades of self-rule, and regime change in Baghdad which 
brought about the participation of Kurds in the Iraqi government, the Kurdish sense of 
ethnicity (Kurdaiety) has grown. In Iraqi parliamentary elections it is very rare that a Kurd 
in the KR votes for a non-Kurdish list. The various Kurdish parties in the Iraqi parliament 
form the Kurdistani Coalition. Even when the ruling parties in the KR faced strong 
opposition in the Kurdistan parliament, they combined with the opposition to form a Kurdish 
united policy in the Iraqi parliament.  
However, the enhanced sense of Kurdaiety did not diminish the sense of tribalism or locality. 
In fact, the political parties reinforced tribal power by using them as a kind of mechanism 
for and object of political influence. Political identities within the KR are an amalgam of 
ethnicity (Kurdaiety) and locality. Ethnicity is more important in relation to the ‘other’ (non-
Kurds), while locality is important for internal political competition.  
Returning to our argument, in the period from 1960s, to end of 1980s, the urban population 
increased by 35%, following the destruction of villages, the relocation of the Kurdish 
inhabitants, and the Arabization process. These factors led to the growth of a sense of 
insecurity, which forced people to rely on the security provided by their tribe. Furthermore, 
they impacted negatively on the rationalization and bureaucratization processes of society, 
due to the persistence of powerful traditional attitudes in cities (Stansﬁeld, 2003; Natali, 
2010:23). The tribes retained some of their collective, rural norms. For example, people often 
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use their village, city or tribal nickname9; or they still keep their livestock in the cities. Even 
the majority of top political leaders have a tribal base, support or nickname. 
Althgou, in the urban areas tribal ties declined and the geographical link between the tribal 
members disappeared but the blood ties still exist. When a member of a tribe faces a problem, 
especially with those outside his tribe, members of the tribe often consider the problem to 
be a shared one and defend each other10. As McDowell (2007:13) claims, Kurdish society is 
still “based upon kinship ideology”.  This is because the purpose of the urbanization process 
was not to modernise society, it did not result in the creation of a middle class as a social 
stratum independent from the governmental economic sector. Instead, as Stansﬁeld (2003) 
pointed out, in the 1980s, the Iraqi government spent large petrodollar sums in the KR to 
create urbanization via forced settlement, and promote a culture of dependency on central 
government. 
In brief, the tribes had a role in politics either through their support for the Iraqi central 
government against the KFM or vice versa. The balance of tribal power was modified 
following the uprising, when the financial power of the political parties increased and was 
used to gain tribes’ support. After the uprising, tribal militias were brought under the 
command of the political parties, but often with a commander from the same tribe. In the 
Yellow Zone, the majority of the militias became a part of the KDP Peshmerga and in the 
Green Zone they became a part of the PUK Peshmerga11.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Interview with Ihsan Abdullah. 
10 In an informal conversation with a taxi driver, I asked about his tribe and why they (the tribe members) 
need a chieftain when they live in the city? He replied that “everybody needs a master or a Big Brother to 
solve their problems or protect themselves”. It means that the tribe to some extent still has a security and 
justice role. 
11 Interview with Ibrahim Ali Haji Malo, the chieftain of the Mizori tribe, which consists of 111 villages.  
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Social Fabric in the Kurdistan Region 
Kurdish society in the broadest sense can be divided into semi-nomadic tribes, rural and 
urban society. Kalhor (2006:102-104), referring to the wider context combines the nomadic 
and rural categories and states that traditionally nomadic tribal life predominated, although 
rural life and its economic role are important. In contrast, Bruinessen (1992), believes that 
the Kurds mainly inhabit urban and rural areas, while nomadic tribes are secondary. In the 
Kurdish language, the terms Kucher or Rewend are used to describe the nomadic tribes. In 
the KR, the tribe as a community that migrates from one place to another is less common as 
tribes have often settled in villages or been forcibly relocated to cities either by the 
government or by ongoing bombardment by Turkey and Iran since 1992 in the boundaries 
area, which is the main place for nomadic-and semi-nomadic tribes.  In addition, after 1996, 
a combination of the OFFP with the recruitment of farmers and members of semi-nomadic 
tribes, encouraged them to be settled tribes. For this reason, the majority of Kurdish rural 
areas consist of small villages, which are either a part of a tribe or are independent, keeping 
their own characteristics such as having a Mukhtar and a Rish Spee Assembly. In terms of 
bureaucratic procedures, a Mukhtar is more powerful than the Rish Spee Assembly. 
However, the power of the Assembly within a village, to which the Mukhtar belongs, is 
greater than the Mukhtar’s. 
Not all villages consist of tribes or consist of tribesmen (Edmonds, 1957). Bruinessen 
(1992:133) mentioned that “the structure of Kurdish tribes has various degrees of 
complexity”. Even within the villages of a single tribe, different social customs can be found. 
Economic relationships between farmers and chieftains and among community members can 
vary from place to place. Communities, customs and the relationship between land and 
community are not always based on tribal arrangements. For example, sometimes people 
from other tribes or villages will rent or cultivate in the village or on tribal land, and may 
share crops or not.  Often community ties continue even when a member does not live within 
the community. These ties can extend beyond the relationship between farmers and land or 
between farmers and their landlord. For instance, a person who lives in an urban area often 
continues to use their tribal or village title. Annually, on one day in spring, the tribe or village 
members hold a ceremony together. Often the ceremony is supported by a political party, 
such as the ‘Jaf Culture’ ceremony that is usually supported financially by the PUK. 
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Religion is another factor that plays an important role in the power of a tribe and its 
chieftain12 (Asasard, 2009). The head of the tribe may be either a non-religious figure (the 
feudal Agha and Mir), a religious-feudal figure or a purely religious figure (Sheikh). The 
eldest son usually inherits but, in the absence of a son, a female can be the successor. 
Moreover, a chieftain can be chosen by agreement between heads of villages of a tribe or by 
the government (Bois, 1966); or even by a political party. In the absence of a chieftain, his 
or her close relatives exercise the power of the chieftain and solve problems. However, if the 
chieftain does not have a successor, or his successor is not old enough, the closest relative 
takes this position13.  
At the present time these figures have a role in political, economic and military affairs. The 
role of the Sheikh is the most important. Originally, the Sheikh’s authority derived from 
religion, but in the middle of the nineteenth century this combined with nationalist motives, 
illustrated by the Sheikhs of the Barzani and Talabani tribes. Sheikhs were able to cut across 
geographical and tribal boundaries and build an extensive power base (Benjamin, 2007). 
Bruinessen (1992) also pointed out that in the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire 
launched the policy of centralizing power by destroying the Kurdish principality and its 
authority to solve disputes, it allowed the influence of the Sheikh to grow. The authority of 
the Sheikh was not limited to the boundaries of the tribes. As a man of God, he could mediate 
to solve disputes between different tribes. Given this increase in authority, it is not surprising 
that the leaders of the majority of Kurdish rebel and national movements were religious 
figures.  
The combination of villages into larger tribal communities, or the splitting of tribes, show 
that ties to land and not only blood ties are decisive for solidarity. Certain sects had a role in 
the expansion of the tribe, when a number of villages combined to follow the founder of the 
sect. Groups of villages may conform to natural geographical features and have control of 
check points (governmental, tribal or both)- as can be seen, for example, at the boundary 
between the Surchi and Barzani, or at the boundary between the latter and the Mzori tribe, 
which is a both a river and a check point. The borders of tribes are not fixed, especially in 
the vicinity of cities or in tourist areas. Near to cities, the extension of the public 
infrastructure transforms the character of tribal land. In the villages that attract tourists, the 
                                                 
12 Interview with Saro Qadir. 
13 Interview with Ibrahim Ali Haji Malo and Sarbest Dewali. 
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selling of land to outsiders has become a normal business, while in other rural districts it is 
forbidden to sell land to foreign (non-village) people, or it is very rare.  
Often the tribes have control of their own land and the land expropriated by the government 
needs agreement from both sides14. In non-urban areas, the government’s ability to influence 
certain issues such as the management of land disputes and social matters (including female 
rights, honour, polygamy and elopement issues) is reduced. Both the chieftain and 
government or a political party may became involved in solving such problems and the 
relevant documents will be kept in both governmental and party archives15. Thus a tribe (a 
traditional body) can play the role of a court in conjunction with the government and political 
parties (modern bodies). 
To add to these two factors (religious and economic), external threats either from other tribes 
or from central government, have played a role in the formation, growth and division of 
tribes (Back, 1996). When a tribe increases in size, its political power also increases. 
According to one MP,  
It is normal to have a tribe member representative of the tribe in the parliament, as 
tribes constitute a segment of the society and they can play their part in deciding which 
candidate should get more votes. Nevertheless, this results in the election to parliament 
of candidates with tribal affiliations and prone to tribal norms16.  
Geographical position is another factor that impacts strongly on the maintenance of tribal 
power in the KR. It is surrounded by neighbouring states: the boundary area with Turkey is 
under the influence of Turkish culture and power, the southern part of the region is under 
Arab influence (Iraq and Syria) and the Iranian part is influenced by Persian culture. 
Chieftains have often been supported by one of these countries against another tribe or 
against the KFM (Bruinessen, 1992). The heterogeneity of Kurdish communities, which 
impacts on cultural exchange and trade (Fuller, 1993) is increased by the mountainous 
terrain. The existence of various religions and sects has also created a heterogeneous society. 
The emergence of the Marxist and socialist parties after WWII, did not eliminate cronyism 
and traditional features. In the 1980s and 1990s, the socio-political elites who had experience 
                                                 
14 At present if a chieftain has more than 300 dunums (four dunums is equal to one hectare), the government 
takes the rest and redistributes it among the tribe. This policy was the result of land reform law in the early 
republican era in the 1960s (Interview with Sarbest Dewali). 
15 Interview with Sarbest Dewali and Ibrahim Ali Haji Malo. 
16 Interview with Amina Zikri. 
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in western countries and were influenced by modernisation studies, tried to inject this new 
culture into the region’s tribal body without prior preparation (Al-Khorsan, 2001). Not only 
did they fail to achieve their goal to make up for the cultural deficit, they actually reinforced 
tribal culture as a reaction to these alien ideas and paved the way for the emergence of 
extremist Islamic beliefs and factions. Other urban elites either returned to their tribal base 
to gain their support or to establish the military wings of their parties. It transformed tribal 
conflicts into party struggles.  
According to one interviewee,  
One reason for the shift among educated political elites towards tribal support is that, 
political parties in the KR are either traditionally formed from tribal Diwexans17 or have 
been compelled to resort back to these Diwexans since their foundation as parties. The 
power and influence of Diwexan appears invincible; throughout the history of both 
liberation movements and tranquillity, political parties have always resorted to tribal 
support. Conversely, the political parties have always needed these tribes to guarantee 
their votes and constituency support. Thus, the tribal mentality infiltrates the centres of 
decision making. This explains why, although political parties are established by the 
elitist educated intelligentsia, they gradually end up being run by tribal figures18.  
What is also important, is the internal financial structure of each clan-village. Some villages 
have a Fund Box or “Sindoq”. A group of families or Binemale(s) volunteer to collect a sum 
of money for the Box. Under social pressure most families participate. The sum is different 
from one family to another according to their financial means. The Box will be kept by a 
person who is considered to be reliable. The money collected is administered by the Village 
Assembly that often is run by the Rish Spee, and is spent on various objects such as funeral 
events, helping a poor family in the village, helping a family with wedding expenses, helping 
orphans or the treatment of an acute disease.  
The Fund Box operates as a local credit bank in supporting its members when they face 
tough economic situations. Even non-participating families can access the benefits of the 
Box, by virtue of their membership of the Binemale. This financial support is, on the one 
hand, democratic in the sense that each person’s participation is based on his or her economic 
                                                 
17 The Diwexans that I visited were large palaces, often divided into three or more parts. One part is for the 
chieftain’s family, one part for guests and one part for servants and guards. The latest models of cars can be 
seen in the Diwexan yard that belongs to the chieftain. The number of cars, guards and the size of the Diwexan 
corresponds to the power of the chieftain. Sometimes beside the Diwexan, the chieftain has another house to 
stay in. 
18 Interview with Mohamad Haji. 
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resources, while on the other, it can reinforce the kinship ties and encourage loyalty and 
develop feeling between the members of a community. This is particularly important if the 
government is unable or unwilling to offer such financial services. The custom generates a 
sense that everybody has a responsibility to contribute, to help and to share when the 
government lacks the capacity to provide public services. In villages or among relatives that 
do not have a Box, they usually help each other in events such as weddings, funerals and 
medical expenses. 
All of these factors (war, agricultural economy, geographical position, the type of Kurdish 
Freedom Movement, the religious background of its key figures and the relationship between 
parties and tribes) have shaped the tribal social fabric of society in the KR. The tribe as a 
local, traditional and kinship base, intersects with the larger scale fabric of religious 
authority, political power and economic exchange. The pyramids below show the structure 
of a tribe by its level of formation and its hierarchy of power embodied in leadership. 
Figure 8.2: The Structure of a Tribe 
A: Tribal social structure                                B: Tribal structure through influential figures 
 
Within a tribe, the Sheikh, Mir or Agha is the supreme authority who owns extensive tracts 
of fertile land and livestock. He often has the power to divide the tribe or village’s land 
between the members of the tribe or even persons outside the tribe (Ahmad, 2008). However, 
the influence of political parties does not end with the chieftain. It penetrates into other parts 
of the pyramid. Each figure of the pyramid has their own specific role. The chieftain has the 
highest rank and the power to influence all the members of the tribe. The Mukhtar, because 
of his role as an informal administrator has an impact on the clan or village. Sometimes the 
Tribe (a group of villages)
Clan/village (a group of 
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Binemale (a group 
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Family
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Mukhtar is a low rank military commander of a political party (often the PUK or the KDP). 
The chieftain’s position is inherited, while the Mukhtar is elected by male farmers, but gains 
a salary from the dominant political party or from government and is administratively 
connected to the district or subdistrict19. (In city districts a political party has influence in 
electing Mukhtar by supporting a candidate or electing them unopposed).  
If a Rish Spee or head of the Binemale20 supports a powerful nominated Mukhtar, he often 
gains economic benefits from the dominant political party such as a retirement salary or 
employment for a member or members of his family in the party, government or military 
organs. This co-optation system creates parallels between the political system and tribal 
organizations. In fact, the method for electing Mukhtars is a kind of limited democracy 
where elders (Rish Spees) who represent a number of families will choose the Mukhtar. 
However, it is sort of being democratic in that the number of participants in the election 
process is restricted and mainly males participate in the elections.  
To complete this overview of the tribal base of Kurdistan society, it is important to consider 
the legal definition of family. According to Law No.8 (2011) under the title of ‘An Act 
Against Domestic Violence’, the family is defined as “a group of natural persons who have 
a married relationship and relative relationship which continues to the fourth generation, and 
which has been adopted by law”. The definition shows that the base of the family in Kurdish 
society is very broad, and includes nearly all relatives. This mirrors the reality of Kurdistan 
society, where the meaning of the family extends well beyond parents and siblings.  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
19 Interview with Sarbest Dewali. 
20 In Kurdistan society the world of Binemale is used to refer to a family whose members consist of a father, 
sons and male grandsons, which means that if a girl marries a person who is not related to them by blood, she 
is not included the Binemale and blood transfer just by male members. Often the females do not receive an 
inheritance. The system clearly favours the role of males.  
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Connection Between Tribes and Political Parties 
Before the uprising, some of the chieftains and Mostashars with their militia forces (Jash) 
co-operated with the Peshmerga to fight against the Ba’ath regime. The Kurdistan Front 
announced an amnesty to those chieftains who fought against the Kurdish Movement (Hiro, 
2001; Bruinessen, 2002; Malanczuk, 1991). In the uprising in 1991, a number of chieftains 
and Jash commanders who were hostile to the KDP joined the PUK and vice versa. In the 
confused period of the uprising, several chieftains formed the “Society of Kurdish Tribes” 
to protect their tribal identity. Some chieftains established their own parties, such as the 
Conservative party, whose members are from the Surchi tribe (McDowell, 2007:380).  
As a response, and because of a vacuum of power and disorder, and because the tribes were 
powerful, the political parties’ formed the Rekxrawe Komelayetyiekan (Societal 
Organizations), the majority of whose members were representatives of tribes. These 
organizations still survive under different titles and under the authority of the dominant 
parties. For example, the PUK has a formal unit in its organisational structure called the 
“Social Office” and the KDP has the “Solving Tribes Disputes Office”, which are 
responsible for solving social problems and disputes between local communities, villages, 
clans and tribes, either alone or in co-operation with chieftains. The rivalry between the PUK 
and the KDP reinforced the tribes’ political power by strengthening their economic power. 
With the outbreak of the uprising, the participation of the Mostashars, helped them and other 
tribal figures to enhance their socio-political position and achieve office government (Yehya, 
2013). In addition, this rivalary enabled chieftains, local strong men and Mostashars to 
engage in the misappropriation of public resources without facing criminal prosecution. In 
1992, for instance, out of 700 public vehicles in the Erbil municipality, just 92 remained and 
the rest were sold to Iran. The political parties chose silence in order to not lose their support 
(McDowell, 2007:383).  
The PUK and KDP calculated that by gaining the chieftains support, the tribesmen would 
continue to support them. For this reason, both parties have continued to fund the Diwexans 
of the Aghas and Sheikhs. The linkage between tribes and political parties is again reinforced 
to the extent that a party can benefit this or that tribe more than another party. Tribes have 
regularly switched their backing from one party to another. Consequently, the political 
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support of the tribe is conditioned by economic and political interests21. Sometimes, 
chieftains have bodyguards who are paid either by the PUK or the KDP. This reflects the 
fact that the army is controlled by parties and tribal leaders influence them in turn22. 
After the parliamentary elections and the formation of a cabinet in 1992, apart from some 
conflicts between the KDP and the Surchi tribe during the internal war, the tribes accepted 
the authority of government (Stansfield, 2006). However, the internal war strengthened the 
position of chieftains, because tribes became a source of military supply to political parties 
on the one hand, and could challenge the power of a particular party in its dominant area by 
supporting a rival party on the other. Socially, the collapse of the KRG’s security agencies 
led to individuals finding themselves in a security vacuum, with the result that tribes became 
a safe haven for the tribe’s members. This led to the strengthening of tribal affiliations and 
the reinforcement of the position of chieftains. 
Belonging to a tribe allowed its members to gain economic benefits, power, social position 
and security. However, in the absence of an effective government, any disagreement between 
tribes could lead to armed conflict or tension (Özcan, 2004). This conflict and tension often 
occurred among Kurdish tribes on issues such as division of land, power or matters of honour 
related to women. This phenomenon constituted one of the main obstacles to the 
development process. When political parties and chieftains solve disputes between tribes, it 
strengthens the parties’ social role and weakens the power of the law and courts.  
Concerning the relationship between the tribe and political parties after the uprising, 
McDowell (2007:385-386) observes that  
Following the demise of traditional tribalism as the prime form of socio-political 
organization during the 1970s, the 1990s saw the emergence of neo-tribalism as two 
major 'confederations' competed for hegemony in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the centre of 
each party, as with traditional confederations, lay a core of those loyal to the 
paramount. Beyond this core lay a widening group of people who supported one 
                                                 
21 Interview with Mohamad Haji, Saro Qadir and Bayan Ahmad. When asked the question: Do parties fund 
Diwexan?, the participant chieftains denied this and explained that the party/government pays the salary of 
bodyguards and guards of the Diwexan. When the same question was put to cadres of different political parties, 
they agreed that the PUK and the KDP do fund chieftains’ Diwexans. One reason why chieftains reject this 
claim could be that before the uprising, chieftains had more independent space, economically, politically and 
militarily. However, after the uprising, the political parties/government became more powerful, especially in 
terms of their capacity to fund chieftains, but the chieftains want to show society that they are independent. 
22 Bodyguards who are paid by political parties, wear official army uniforms, but it is easy to identify to which 
party they belong: the KDP if they wear a red cap or the PUK if they wear a green cap.   
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confederation or the other less directly. Thus, the system of patronage and power still 
reached down to the street through intermediaries who themselves acquired followings 
through local patronage. These new 'Aghas' are the Peshmerga or Jash commanders 
who commanded their own following.  
However, as mentioned the Ba’ath regime through the 1970s and 1980s reinforced the 
tribalism to gain support against the KFM and Iran. McDowell uses the concept of neo-
tribalism for Kurdistan society. In this view, the relationship between tribes and the non-
indigenous (central Iraqi government) power shifted after the uprising to one between tribes 
and an indigenous power. The interviews confirm this interpretation. The new situation also 
brought the tribes’ direct military power under the control of the political parties23. With the 
consolidation of indigenous power, the horizontal power of tribes shifted to a vertical axis. 
Each federation or political party uses the tribes as part of its base to stay in power, a situation 
which can create a potentially unstable society; because the government needs stable 
institutions and a degree of democratic participation. 
The political support by tribes for parties in return for economic benefits was reinforced by 
the Oil for Food Programme which followed the internal war. New ties resulted in the leaders 
of political parties as well as chieftains becoming wealthy in the process of trade with the 
UN agencies (Natali, 2010). After 2003, most of the chieftains engaged in reconstruction 
projects or the property business24. Previously, in the period when the KR was under the 
double sanction of the UN and the Iraqi government, the chieftain, Mukhtar and Agha had 
the duty to distribute daily subsistence. In fact, the country’s budget was spent in various 
ways to reproduce tribal values. This was done for example, by holding tribal ceremonies, 
village festivals, funding the chieftain’s palace and by nominating and employing tribal 
figures in government departments. The duties of the Diwexan would include informal 
meetings to solve financial problems and disputes, collecting votes in elections for a 
particular party, and assembling troops for the party’s militia25.  
Often the head of the tribe, clan or village plays a role in the employment of community 
members. There are mutual advantages to these figures and the political parties in these 
arrangements. Each village (and sub-districts) has its Mukhtar (meaning both a person who 
has been selected and who has a kind of plenipotentiary role). Each Mukhtar has their own 
                                                 
23 Interview with Sarbest Dewali. 
24 Interview with Ibrahim Ali Haji Malo and Sarbest Dewali.  
25 Chieftains and cadres of various political parties mentioned these roles of tribes in their interviews. 
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document stamp (seal) that signifies legal power in administrative affairs. Consequently, this 
informal body becomes a part of the bureaucratic system. In choosing a Mukhtar, parties 
intervene in their zones and often the one elected is the one who shows the greatest party 
loyalty. The Mukhtar is a representative who conveys the village’s demands to the official 
authority and vice versa.  
The same policy in appointing the Mukhtar was followed by the Ba’ath regime in order to 
mediate between the rural community and government for economic benefit (Baram, 1997). 
Since this time in the KR, the bureaucratic system has originated with the Mukhtar of a sub-
district or a village. Without his Support Letters it is difficult for a person to advance his or 
her case. In the Yellow Zone the majority of Mukhtars are appointed by the KDP, while in 
the Green Zone the PUK chooses them via a panel which is called a District Assembly 
(Anjomany Garak). This cooperation between the Mukhtar and a political party is not 
explicit in the political party’s structure. However, there is more than one channel of 
connection between them, for example, via the Organization Office or through various 
party’s local branches.    
According to a report on the Hawlati website in 2013, the Interior Ministry responsible for 
keeping national security proposed a number of conditions in the appointment of Mukhtars 
in sub-districts. According to the proposal, the Mukhtar is required to have at least 
elementary schooling, be a married person between 30 to 50 years old, and should be a 
candidate for four years, but renewable. Among the duties of the Mukhtar is the requirement 
to record data in areas under his authority secretly and to report any suspicious movements 
(Mohammad, 2013). In this way the authorities have attempted to impose some rational 
criteria to counter the purely traditional; by increasing his security and bureaucratic role.  
At the same time, members of the KR parliament submitted a proposal concerning Mukhtars. 
It specified that they should be elected, have a purely representative role, be awarded a 
monthly salary (actually a grant rather than a salary), have the same security duties (reporting 
any suspicious movements by residents or foreigners in their sub-districts) and a 
responsibility to report the district or village’s problems to the authorities (Parliament, 
Submitted legislation No:1515, 2013). The proposal has not yet been passed into law and 
still the Mukhtar security role is ambiguous; especially regarding the villages. Although, the 
role of the Mukhtar is debated, it is crucial in both the administrative and security sectors of 
the KR. This phenomenon can come into conflict with administrative norms or at least create 
barriers to modernizing the state bureaucracy. 
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The outcome of this party and clan-tribal domination is a segmented society, a corrupted 
economic sector, a negatively polarized society and a non-nationalized army. One 
interviewee spoke at length of the connection between parties and tribes. 
The KDP, with tribalism nesting in the heart of its organisation, is strongest in the rural 
mountainous districts where tribalism is prevalent. Whereas the PUK, which is 
ideologically opposed to tribalism (at least at the early period of its existence), is 
strongest in the urbanised districts and the lowland-rural areas. The KDP is more suited 
to that social structure and therefore more able to exploit it to its advantage than other 
parties. There are reasons why competing Kurdish parties are so keen to forge tribal 
allegiances. The social system is based upon the collective loyalty of the tribe. The 
system works on the basis that a political party will bestow the chief certain financial 
rewards and indulge them with privileges in return for them securing the loyalties of 
their entourage. The financial awards come in various forms, such as the allocation of 
a number of salaries for their personal bodyguards, or/and a monthly allowance for 
their divan maintenance. The privileges come in the form of gifts of cars, land 
allocations, the appointment of relatives to government posts and the award of 
government contracts26.  
The same point was repeated by another interviewee who explained that in the KDP area, 
tribal loyalties are more powerful, and their armed forces and administrative officials 
have to be from these tribes27. 
At present, the official authorities (parties and government) command the army, which 
limits the direct military influence of tribes. However, their influence is articulated by a 
modern tool, which is elections. Tribes play the crucial role in the success of political 
parties in winning public elections28. According to two different reports from the Hawlati 
(2013) about the candidates in the fourth term of the parliamentary elections in the 
Badinan area in 2013, 90 candidates from fourteen different political lists were nominated 
from various tribes. The KDP list, nominated 34 out of its 100 candidates from the whole 
of the KR, 26 of whom were from the Badinan area and 12 of whom represented various 
tribes and entered parliament. The IU and the PUK nominated 17 candidates each (Anwar, 
                                                 
26 Interview with Hishyar Abid. 
27 Interview with Mohamad Haji. 
28 My fieldwork in the KR to study this subject coincided with the Iraqi parliament and KR’s provincial 
elections. Each list contained tribal candidates. I asked the question concerning the tribal background of 
nominated candidates and ‘was the candidate qualified for such a post?’ Many answered negatively, however 
still they voted for them because the nominated candidate is from their tribe. The quality, rationality and 
policies of the candidates are less relevant than their tribe. Even a picture calendar contains the slogan of a 
tribe, for example “Dosky is our Identity”. Furthermore, in some areas when people ask ‘who are you?’, they 
refer to tribal identity and not personal identity.  
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2013). Hence, the tribes are one of linkages between the party, parliament and 
government.  
The 2013 and 2014 elections in the KR, unlike those held previously, were run by semi-open 
list and political parties nominated a wider range of figures. Voters were free to choose their 
nominated candidate from the list. The majority of those who gained votes had either a tribal 
or an Islamic background. One interviewee stated that the semi-open list had negative 
consequences in comparison with the closed list. In the closed list, the parties put the names 
of qualified members at the beginning of the election list. In the semi-open list voters have 
more freedom in choosing their members, with the result that the majority of those who 
entered parliament were elected for reasons of their background identity29. 
However, not all political parties have exploited tribal networks to an equal extent. For 
example, according to one interviewee the GM through its General Co-ordinator has 
relationships with the tribal chieftains, which go back to the period before the uprising30. 
The IU interviewee explained that his party has a relationship with tribes and chieftains. But 
because the PUK and the KDP fund the Diwexan, the chieftains have closer relationships 
with these two parties31. The IU’s failure to gain tribal support is linked to the fact that the 
tribes make resource demands. However, because the national budget is under the control of 
the PUK and the KDP, the IU has not succeeded in gaining tribal support32.  Some political 
parties instead of putting a traditional tribal figure on its ballot list, try to find a well-educated 
member of the tribe with higher level qualifications to represent the tribe. Sometimes, 
political parties use religious figures, both as candidates and campaigners to collect votes 
among more conservative and tribal populations33. One interviewee observed that, while 
those from tribal backgrounds are necessary for attracting votes, others who have more 
ability and knowledge are needed to perform duties in the Parliamentary Committees34. 
After the rise of the Islamic parties, clergy and Islamic missionary names were added to the 
electoral lists by the various political parties. Interviewees explained that this was in order 
                                                 
29 All participants that I interviewed agreed that in the elections for the Kurdistan parliament and provincial 
government of both 2013 and 2014, the majority who gained votes were from tribal backgrounds and the semi-
open list had a negative role in allowing unqualified candidates to enter into parliament without any major 
change in the number of votes that political parties had gained via the closed list. 
30 Interview with Adnan Osman. 
31 Interview with Bayan Ahmad 
32 Interview with Salahaddin Babaker 
33 Interview with Omer Nuraldini. 
34 Interview with Haydar Esmail Abdullah. 
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to gain votes and not a positive change. “To win in elections a party will adopt any means, 
even if they conflict with its ideology and goals”35. This may eventually lead to these social 
forces becoming powerful in guiding the political parties and not vice versa, so political 
parties become the followers of society and not leaders of it36.  
This evidence from elections warrants the conclusion that: the tribal base is still powerful in 
the region; political parties recruit from this base to gain the tribes’ votes; the important 
resolutions and politics drawn up in the political bureaus must serve firstly parties’ interests 
and then they need to gain a majority of votes to become law. Resorting to tribal and religious 
networks is one of the best options to guarantee this. It is obvious how the domination of 
parties and the reproduction of tribalism as a characteristic of traditional society parallel each 
other. The significance of tribal identity in the socio-political mosaic also invites the leaders 
of the parties to be charismatic figures. For this reason, leadership changes are very rare in 
the socio-political system of the KR.  
Employment is another influential factor in the relationship between parties and tribes. The 
KDP and the PUK have monopolized the main opportunities for employment including high 
administrative positions. Many people join the party and vote for it to gain economic and 
employment benefits. This kind of relationship can be defined as both patronage and 
clientelism. Fukuyama (2013:16) defines patronage and clientelism as  
A reciprocal exchange of favors between two individuals of different status and power, 
usually involving favors given by the patron to the client in exchange for the client’s 
loyalty and political power. Clientelism is distinguished from patronage primarily by its 
scale, and by the use of a hierarchy of organized intermediaries in the distribution of 
favors. As such, clientelism is a phenomenon associated with electoral democracies. 
The connection between parties and tribes shows how the tribes’ participation in power 
impacts negatively on the democratic institutionalisation process and distribution of wealth 
and power. One aspect of the contest between different political parties is the level of support 
provided by the tribes, which is based on the level of privileges that this or that party can 
offer to the chieftain. The outcome is “incongruence between formal rule-making processes 
and de facto power holders” (Levitsky and Murillo, 2013:96). Having modern institutions 
does not mean that they perform on the basis of modern values or that their functions are 
modernized. This is one of the main problems facing political development in the KR. In a 
                                                 
35 Interview with Zana Rostai.    
36 Interview with Omer Nuraldini. 
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USA investigation of Kurdish tribes in 2006, in an interview with Sheikh Mazhar Surchi, 
the Surchi tribal leader reported that  
Tribes were forced to cooperate with the KDP and the PUK because the parties 
controlled all employment and education opportunities…. If you are not a member of 
either the KDP or the PUK, you cannot prosper in the KRG - the parties will insult or 
impose on you until you join (Wilgenburg, 2011). 
This response indicates that the tribal power has limits but still they see themselves as 
counterparts to the government, and that political parties instead of government control the 
key sectors. 
Tensions often occur between a tribe, a village or clan community and a political party. If 
the tension is not resolved, the community may be inclined to support another powerful party 
which can provide better funding, better socio-political opportunities or economic benefits. 
The best example is the armed conflict between the KDP and the Surchi tribe, which split 
the tribe’s support between the PUK and the KDP, and the migration of a part of the tribe to 
the PUK zone and electing a new chieftain as a counterpart to another chieftan of the same 
tribe. This led to new competition and the emergence of new tribal and political figures 
within the tribe itself to the detriment of the political development process.   
To sum up, the current relationship between tribes and between them and the parties is not 
based on a common enemy as it was previously. Nevertheless, it has not been replaced by 
the creation of a socio-economic class to facilitate economic and political development; or 
the emergence of a new identity and values within the parties to encourage society towards 
development. On the contrary, in order to remain in power, political parties have tried to 
centralize power, procedures and administrative units while relying on the support of the 
tribal network. As Lipset (1960) argued, social divisions which have a historical background 
and inequality in the distribution of wealth will have an impact on political stability if they 
remain unresolved. For political parties, keeping the status quo has a higher priority than 
planning for development.  
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Conclusion 
The KR is not totally based on tribal society and tribal culture. Forces that have an impact 
on tribalism work in different directions; sometimes they strengthen it and sometimes they 
weaken it according to the play of political interests. Nonetheless, there is a powerful 
connection between political parties and tribes. After the establishment of governmental 
institutions, the deep rivalry between political parties caused tribal figures to remain 
influential in the political process. Often, in the various government and party offices, the 
top circle of officials or secretaries is filled by a tribal figure and his or her family and 
relatives. These relationships impact negatively on the development of rational bureaucratic 
administration.  
With the establishment of the government institutions in 1992, the power of the tribes and 
chieftains was reduced, however, the tribes’ power did not disappear entirely. It 
demonstrates that the tribal fabric is not fixed, but decision makers can shape it in favour of 
their economic and political ends. Hence, after the uprising, connections were transformed 
into a patron-client relationship, in which tribes often act as a broker between society and 
government or political parties (Leezenberg, 2006).  
Political parties are compelled to follow two types of policy at the same time. On the one 
hand, they need to maintain their tribal affiliations to preserve their tribal support; and on 
the other, they need to control the power of the tribes to prevent threats to the party’s power. 
The main factor in a party’s strength and cohesion is not only its tribal backing, but also the 
intensity of party discipline within the tribe and among its elected representatives who 
simultaneously serve their own personal interests, the interests of the party and the tribe’s 
interests. This diffusion of power has enabled parties to bridge cross-cutting cleavages in 
society. Therefore, political parties which were considered to be a modern tool for the 
transformation of tribal society into a modern one, have actually deepened the social 
cleavages in the KR.  
In brief, the KR has adopted modern formal political structures, however, the orientation of 
the ordinary person towards politics is based more on traditional incentives. Locality, 
religious orientations and tribal loyalties are the criteria for political participation and the 
formation of political culture. These orientations are produced by traditional structures 
(tribes and religion), modern structures (political parties) and the interaction between the 
two. 
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Chapter Nine: Fragile Entity, the Impact of Regional Intervention on Political 
Development 
Introduction 
Greater Kurdistan extends to several countries. This means that any change or development 
in the KR cannot simply be considered a domestic issue, it is also related to the politics of 
the regional powers. From the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921 up to now, the 
neighbouring governments either alone or with the support of international powers have 
maintained a presence in the KR. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Kurdish internal war in the 
1990s provided a context for direct intervention by neighbouring governments. The KDP 
allied with Iraq and Turkey and the PUK with Iran, Turkey and Syria or both parties together 
with one of the states.  
After 2003, due to deepening sectarianism throughout the Middle East, as well as the 
discovery of natural resources in the KR, the world’s eyes focused more on this entity 
(Kirmanj, 2013). However, external relationships, whether involving the KRG or the 
dominant parties (the PUK and the KDP), have been confused and interlocked. On becoming 
a federal entity, the KRG broadened its external relations. By 2016, thirty-five countries had 
established their consulates or economic commercial offices in the KR. The region has a 
department of foreign relations and can enter into political and economic relationships with 
other countries via fourteen offices across the world (KRG, 2016a). 
The Arab states with a Kurdish population such as Syria have an impact on the KR. The role 
of Syria, however, has been ambiguous since the uprising in Syria in 2011 and ongoing 
events (Bryza, 2012). The voice of other Arab states on the Kurdish question often comes 
through either the Arab League or the Islamic Conference, which are both against an 
independent Kurdistan and in support of a united Iraq (Alarabiya, 2014; Stansfield, 2014). 
However, this rhetoric is open to change. 
 Undoubtedly, the US1 and the EU have an influential role in the political and economic 
development of the KR. The role of Western society in supplying a safe haven was discussed 
                                                 
1 The US played an important role in both the creation of the KR and preserving its stability. As is well known, 
in 1991 it participated with Turkey and some European states in the creation of a safe haven, which led to the 
establishment of the KR. They then provided the Non Fly Zone for the KR which prevented attacks from the 
Baghdad authority on the KR. In 1998, the US brokered the peace agreement between the PUK and the KDP 
which resulted in an end to the internal conflict. In 2003, it attacked Ansar Al-Islam, an extremist Islamic group 
in the KR. In 2005, the US and its European allies supported the Kurds’ demand for federalism and in 2014, 
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in the second chapter. However, the present chapter concentrates mainly on Turkey and Iran 
as neighbouring gateways and as the most powerful adjoining countries.  
The chapter reviews the events that have occurred in the regional context to understand their 
impact on the KR and its developmental pathway. It presents a chronology and analysis of 
events focused on the obstacles to political development. It is important to remember that 
this thesis covers the period since the establishment of the KRG in 1992 up to its seventh 
cabinet in 2014. Important events occurred in mid-2014, when ISIS attacked the KR shortly 
after the end of the seventh cabinet. It is difficult to predict the consequences in terms of 
political development in the KR. However, where necessary, the chapter will refer to key 
impacts of the ISIS invasion.  
The main aim of this chapter is to explore how neighbouring governments play an important 
role in the process of political development either by creating stability that results in 
economic collaboration and trade, or by creating instability through treating the KR as an 
object of military and security strategy. 
Turkey: 1992-2003, Conflict and Cooperation   
The Iraqi Kurdistan was a part of the Ottoman Empire known as the Mosul Villayet 
(province). This Villayet consisted of Kirkuk, Mosul and the current KR. At the time of the 
events in Iraq in the 1990’s, the Turkish president suggested to the international community 
that the Iraqi state be divided into three federal entities. The plan was called Ozal’s Map or 
Ozal’s Federalism. According to the plan, the Kurdish entity would consist of Erbil, Dohuk 
and Slemani. The Turkmen entity was Mosul and Kirkuk and the Arab entity would form 
the other parts of Iraq. The Turkish government then suggested that the Kurd and Turkmen 
parts be attached to Turkey (Alshameri and Hamid, 2012:277-278). The next president of 
Turkey, Demirel, reiterated the same request in 1995 to redraw the boundary between Iraq 
and Turkey with the Mosul Villayet being incorporated into Turkey (Khadir, 2009; Ahmad, 
2007). 
                                                 
when ISIS approached borders of the KR, the US and some other European states’ airstrikes supported the 
Kurdish forces. Hence, the relationship between the KR and western society expanded to include military co-
operation between both sides. However, US policy towards the Kurds is still ambiguous and remains in the 
framework of maintaining a united Iraq. In the disputed areas, the US follows a compromise solution which 
means attempting to satisfy all ethnic groups in the area. The strategy has not succeeded yet. 
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However, on the ground, after the Ba’ath regime withdrew its administrative apparatuses 
from the KR in 1991, a vacuum of power resulted in a flow of refugees into Turkey and the 
Turkish government with western allies was obliged to create a safe place inside the northern 
part of Iraq for Kurds. Turkey’s purpose was to achieve certain specific goals which were: 
to prevent the KR from becoming a military base for the PKK; to prevent an uprising in 
Turkey’s Kurdistan, as a way of gaining EU support for accession; to support the US policy 
of removing the Ba’ath regime; to support the Turkmen as a bargaining chip for Turkish 
policy in the KR; and to reduce the pressure of Kurdish immigrants on Turkey (Ala’alaf, 
2006; Alshameri and Hamid, 2012). Contrary to Turkey’s expectation, the Ba’ath regime 
did not change nor did Turkey achieve its goals. The safe haven shifted into a self-
administering entity ready to hold presidential and parliamentary elections.  
Both Turkey and Iran explicitly announced that they were against any kind of parliamentary 
elections in the north of Iraq. However, the self-administering entity became a reality and 
subsequently pushed Turkey to follow a dual policy. Firstly, they set out to establish secure 
ties with the Kurds’ leaderships. To achieve this purpose both Talabani and Barzani gained 
Turkish diplomatic passports and as part of this deal, both leaders had to fight against the 
PKK (Cagaptay, 2012). In order for the action to be legal, the Kurdistan parliament 
promulgated a law to prohibit the PKK’s activities in the KR. The Turkish government 
subsequently donated US$13.5 million to the KRG and the Turkish Red Crescent opened its 
offices in the region. Secondly, Turkey created obstacles to the KRG in its attempt to 
establish relationships with western countries, or at least closely monitored these 
relationships. This goal was achieved by the outbreak of internal war and the fragmentation 
of the KRG into two local administrations (Saifaldin, 2008:172; Saifaldin, 2009:105; 
McDowell, 2007:384).  
Turkey, in fact, tried to control the actions of the KRG by military, economic and political 
means. The situation caused instability in the region and minimized trade ties which were 
essential for development. Any trade and humanitarian aid was monitored by the Turkish 
authorities since Turkey controls the main border crossing with the KR. A portion of this 
trade was petroleum smuggled via tankers from the KR to Turkey at a price cheaper than the 
market rate (Natali, 2010).   
As discussed in the previous chapters, the conflict between the PUK and the KDP divided 
the KR geographically and politically. Foreign military invention commenced in 1996 when 
the PUK invited Iran to attack the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran that had headquarters 
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in the KR and then attacked on the headquarters of the KDP in Erbil. In response, the KDP, 
invited the Iraqi army to return to Erbil, which had been under the control of the PUK (Khalil, 
2009; Ala'Aldeen, 2013). Thus, the safe haven became a place for the settlement of old 
scores between various political parties and even neighbouring governments.  
The crucial result of the internal war was that the neighbouring countries successfully 
overcame, if only temporarily, the sense of united nationalism among Kurds. The collapse 
of a united government because of the internal war meant that external powers did not deal 
with the government, but with local administrations or the PUK and the KDP (Charountaki, 
2012). On the other hand, with international sanctions on Iraq, economically, the only 
gateway to supply domestic goods was through Turkey and then Iran. Any hostilities with 
either state would lead to a tough economic situation.  
Turkey as a member of NATO and partner in the international coalition against Iraq in 1991, 
and as a gateway to Europe, has always been the most important neighbour for the KR. For 
this reason, the Kurdish leaders tried to cultivate a friendly relationship with Turkey as the 
most powerful state in the region, which could be an outlet for Kurds to connect at least 
economically with the outside world; Iran being considered a pariah state from the Western 
viewpoint (McDowell, 2007; Valdani, 1996). This type of thinking (relationship with the 
West) originated from Kurdistan’s geographical and regional political system. Its landlocked 
geography and regional antagonism pushed Kurds to seek friends beyond the neighbouring 
countries.  
As the KR was established by an international resolution in 1991, so its survival has 
depended mainly on international support. For example, when the KRG was established, and 
after a series of military interventions into the KR by Turkish troops, the Western countries 
(Netherlands, Norway and Germany) suspended their military trade with it and the European 
parliament and Russia requested Turkey to withdraw its troops from the KR (Valdani, 1996).  
Internally, this protection turned the KR into the focal point for different groups from other 
parts of Greater Kurdistan which doubled the neighbouring countries’ concerns about the 
future of this entity (Hafezi Nya, 2006; Natali, 2004). This protection can be considered as 
a tool for the KRG to use as counter-pressure against Iran and Turkey. Through the 1990s, 
in order to avoid any undesirable outcomes and to protect its own national security, Turkey 
had developed a policy that basically relied on military action (Özcan, 2011) to make the 
KR unstable and provide a justification to enter the KR with international backing.  
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The main result of this policy was non-investment by domestic and foreign companies in the 
KR. The majority of investment or aid which arrived was humanitarian aid, a situation that 
is typical of war-torn countries or those suffering from natural disasters. Consequently, in 
the absence of the private sector, the government-party became the main source of 
employment, especially in the military sector.   
The establishment of a safe place inside Iraq, supported by Turkey, evolved into a political 
entity. It allowed Turkey to exploit the old hostility between the KDP and the PUK. 
Beginning with the tension between these parties, Turkey played a role in continuing the war 
between them and then played the role of broker to end it. This rivalry between the PUK and 
the KDP, and the attacks of the PKK on the KDP, created an opportunity for the Turkish 
government to establish military bases in the region in the name of peacekeeping, which 
resulted in the Ankara Agreement in 1996 between the KDP and the PUK (Saifaldin, 2009; 
Elik, 2014).  
Up to now, these bases have remained in the areas that are under the control of the KDP. It 
means that any kind of stability in the region has been based on the policy of Turkey (also 
Iran) towards the KR which can easily be broken. In other words, in the KR the stability 
required as a main factor to political development depends on the relationship between these 
two sides. It is true that even temporary stability can give an opportunity for political 
institutions to establish themselves, but it is difficult to imagine in such a short period a 
country being able to consolidate its democratic institutions. The KRG’s history during this 
time shows that the neighbouring countries’ will to destabilize governmental institutions was 
greater than their desire to bring stability.  
The strengthening of ties between Turkey and the Erbil administration (the KDP) after 1996, 
and visits by officials of the KDP to Turkey in 2000, came as a warning from Turkey to the 
PUK. Because of their closeness to the PKK and Iran, the PUK officials were persuaded to 
visit Turkey to improve their economic and political situation. This move was parallel to the 
PUK efforts to combat the PKK in the same year (Bengio, 2012).  
In 2002, by spreading the rumour of a changing regime in Iraq, the Turkish government 
accepted assistance from the USA in the war against Iraq. However, unlike the 1990s, 
military cooperation between the KR and Turkey, the Kurdistan parliament and Iraqi 
opposition groups opposed the intervention of Turkish troops in the KR and public 
demonstrations were held in the region which pressed the USA not to allow the involvement 
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or interference of Turkey in the KR during the war. Even after the war, the KRG and Iraqi 
government refused any military assistance from the regional powers (Khadir, 2009; 
Ala’alaf, 2006). This uncertainty and tension in the relationship between the two caused 
more military pressure on the KR from Turkey which led to the bombing of many of the 
Kurdish border villages and the destruction of infrastructure, schools and bridges.   
Generally, the Turkish policy towards the KR from 1992 to 2003 was based on fuelling 
conflict between the PUK, the KDP and the PKK to create conditions of instability in the 
KR. Support for the Turkmen to develop ethnocentric tendencies also led to regressive 
outcomes for the developmental process. The various relationships with the KR political 
parties established during this period were based on the dual policy of keeping the KR entity 
so weak that it would be unable to declare itself to be an independent state and yet strong 
enough to act against the PKK.  
The Turkish policy of supervising political parties in the KR and trying to fill the vacuum of 
power continued until 2003, when the international community tried to topple the Ba’ath 
regime. This brought about a new opportunity for the KR. However, the result of all these 
events was that divisions within government and society deepened, which reflected 
negatively on the process of political development; because the Turkish government did not 
participate to strengthen the official (or national) political institutions, but in contrast tried 
to weaken them. The relationships were not with national institutions but with sub-national 
organizations (with political parties). 
Turkey: 2004-2014: From Conflict to Economic and Political Cooperation 
For a period after 2003, the Turkish position towards the KR became severely strained. 
Turkey lost its influence, due to its having been excluded from participating in the war on 
Iraq and its political relationships with the KDP deteriorated. Meanwhile, Iran was engaged 
in the issue of how to run the Iraqi government with a Shia majority and it had the PUK as 
a strong ally in the north of Iraq. 
To cooperate with the USA in the war on Iraq, the Turkish government made a number of 
conditions: a Kurdish independent state in the north of Iraq would be unacceptable; any kind 
of federalism in Iraq based on ethnic lines would be rejected; Turkey should have the right 
to enter easily into the KR under the justification of protecting the Turkmen peoples; 
disarmament of the Peshmerga; giving broader rights to the Turkmen population; and finally 
keeping its troops within the northern border of Iraq or with the KR. The above mentioned 
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points worried the Kurds, the Arab opposition parties and even the EU and resulted in Turkey 
being prevented from intervening in the war on Iraq (Qader and Salih, 2010; Ala’alaf, 
2006:8; Ahmad, 2007:59; Alshameri and Hamid, 2012:287).  
In the period from 2003 to 2008, the relationship between the KRG and Turkey reached a 
nadir and speeches on both sides contained threats against the other. Large scale 
demonstrations against Turkey were held by people in all the cities of the KR and by various 
political parties. With the announcement of the war on Iraq, Turkey stated that if the Kurds 
entered Kirkuk or established a Kurdistan state, the Turkish government would attack it 
(Stansfield, 2014).   
In that period, the main problem that faced Turkey was the Kirkuk issue. It realized that 
federalism was becoming inevitable. It therefore tried to exclude the Kirkuk province from 
the federal map and was successful in its attempt to make Kirkuk not just a domestic issue 
within Iraq, but a regional issue with a future that could impact negatively on the regional 
context (Ala’alaf, 2006). In the Iraqi parliament elections of 2005, the Kurds gained 27% of 
votes, a result which Turkey felt to be a threat, because it presaged possible independence 
for the Kurds. At the same time, Sunni Arab allies of Turkey who boycotted the elections 
gained only 6% of total Iraqi parliamentary seats, while the Arab Shias who were allied to 
Iran gained the overwhelming majority (Alshameri and Hamid, 2012; Oktav, 2011:65). 
These results were not in Turkey’s favour and they led to an increase in tension between the 
KRG and the Turkish government. As a result, the KRG and its key political parties, which 
before 2003 were allies of Turkey against the PKK, turned to support the PKK as a pressure 
card against Turkey (Cagaptay, 2012). 
Turkey threatened to enter the KR to pursue the PKK guerrillas. However, this was strongly 
opposed by the USA, Kurdistan political parties and society in general. In spite of the 
growing tensions, once Kurdish federalism was enshrined within the Iraqi constitution in 
2005, and Shias dominated the Baghdad government (synonymous with domination by Iran) 
Turkey was compelled to accept the status quo and tried to establish a closer relationship 
with the KRG to keep the balance of power in Iraq (Oktav, 2011). One way was to strengthen 
economic ties. In 2006, the Kurdistan parliament passed the Investment Law which stated 
that the KRG would deal with foreign investors in the same way as local investors. Then, in 
2007, the Oil and Gas Law was passed, allowing the KRG to export oil. Both laws attracted 
foreign and local investors and the economic relationship between Turkey and the KR 
improved. To understand the reasons for the improvement, the above-mentioned political 
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upheavals within Iraq, the KR and inside Turkey have to be considered. For instance, it is 
important to note that shortly before the end of the Ba’ath regime in Bagdad in 2003, the 
AKP had gained power in Turkey in 2002, following the policy of “zero problems with 
neighbours” or minimizing external tensions. One aspect of this policy was the search for 
new markets in neighbouring countries (Özel and Özkan, 2015:90). Later, in 2009, with the 
appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign minister, this policy included the KR as well.  
The Turkish government had to confront the fact that the KR had officially become a federal 
unit within Iraq. With the change of regime in Iraq, the Kurds became more united than the 
Shia and Sunni Arabs. The Baghdad government engaged in sectarian conflicts which 
reduced the capacity of the government to govern. Therefore, the Sunni Turkish government, 
which had a more secular than Islamic view of politics, realized that having close ties with 
the KRG could bring more benefits than disadvantages. As a federal entity the KRG became 
an important internal and external player in the political arena. 
In terms of geography, the KR is the pathway between Turkey and other parts of Iraq. The 
Iraqi oil pipeline of Kirkuk passes through the KR which is a source of income for the 
Turkish government. This economic relationship also helped the Turkish government to 
improve the worsening economic situation in the Kurdish part of Turkey that may in turn 
have led to a reduction in support for the PKK. The PKK previously utilized the economic 
situation in these areas against the Turkish government. This relationship tied the KRG more 
closely to Turkey (Gunter, 2008:42).  
The period of 2009 also coincided with the AKP retaining power for a second term and 
gaining 29% of the Kurdish votes inside Turkey. The party promised to grant political rights 
to the Kurds in Turkey. In this year, the Turkish government announced the “Openness 
Democratic Plan” that focused on the economic relationship and direct investment in the 
KR, while at the same time emphasizing the unity of Iraqi territory (Alshameri and Hamid, 
2012:284).   
At the regional level, the biggest opportunity for the KR to establish friendly relations with 
Turkey was the Arab Spring in Syria in 2011. It corresponded with the Turkish “zero 
problem with neighbours” policy and a change in the PKK political rhetoric (Özcan, 2011; 
Cagaptay, 2013). In the aftermath of this event and the control of some parts of Syria by 
Syrian Kurdish parties in 2012 (mainly offshoots of the PKK), the political view of Turkey 
towards the KRG shifted in favour of a strategic partnership in the Middle East, to prevent 
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both Kurdish sides, the Iraqi and the Syrian, from converging to have negative effects on 
Turkey. In security terms, the better the relationship with the KRG, the better the Turkish 
government could resist the PKK’s threat because most of their bases are in the KR. In this 
way, Turkey realized that it could keep the balance in Iraq against Iran as well. According 
to the Finnish Swiss report, 75%-80% of construction projects in the KR are undertaken by 
Turkish companies. The relationship between Turkey and the KR reached a level of 
“unthinkable decade ago” (Fidan, 2016:120-122). Politically, all these factors could 
contribute to stability inside Turkey itself. 
At the same time, it is important to note the changes in the PKK perspective on the Kurdish 
question, which contributed to the change in Turkish policy towards the KRG. In 2009, the 
year which saw an improvement in the relationship between the KRG and Turkey, the 
Turkish national intelligence organisation and the PKK negotiated on how to solve the 
Kurdish question in Turkey: the so-called “Kurdish Initiative” policy (Charountaki, 
2012:190). In the following year, this party changed its rhetoric about the establishment of 
Greater Kurdistan as a nation-state, in favour of the creation of democratic self-rule for 
different ethnic groups in the Middle East. The establishment of the three Cantons in Syrian 
Kurdistan in 2012 (which shifted to a federal entity in 2016), with the participation of other 
ethnic minorities in sharing power, was the first step by the PKK towards this new policy.  
In Newroz (spring) 2015, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan condemned 
the nation-state as a western imperialist ideology against the people of the Middle East (in a 
message broadcast via various Kurdish TV channels). This new ideology reduced the anxiety 
of Turkey towards the perceived threat to its territorial integrity and the threat of a possible 
independent KR to its security. On the other hand, this change in rhetoric enhanced the 
ability of the KRG to assert its claim to an independent Kurdistan in North Iraq. The rhetoric, 
possibly promoted the declaration of a Peace Process in early 2013 between the PKK and 
Turkey in which the KRG, (the KDP) played an important role via mediation. However, this 
new ideology towards the nation-state, has implications for the Kurds’ efforts to establish an 
independent state, because of the heavy influence of the PKK on the KR. The PUK and the 
GM are closer to the PKK than the KDP, which holds on to the rhetoric of building a 
Kurdistan state in the north of Iraq. 
Another factor internal to Turkey was the candidature in 1999 of Turkey to become a 
member of the Europe Union. This is reflected step by step in Turkish policy (Özcan, 2011; 
Cagaptay, 2013). In the period when the AKP was in power after 2002, the military policy 
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of the previous governments was modified to pursue soft economic and political solutions 
and to decrease the level of military involvement (Elik, 2014). This change within Turkey 
helped to stabilize the economic and political situation in the KR as well. However, after the 
breakdown of relationships with many neighbouring states and the AKP’s failure in the June 
elections in 2015 to establish a new cabinet alone or by coalition, early elections were held 
in November 2015 and the AKP returned to the military policy and ended the Peace Process. 
Beyond the Turkish border, the period of close relationships between Turkey and the KRG 
overlapped with increasing tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, which reached a peak in 
2011 and thereafter. Simultaneously, the relationship between Baghdad and Turkey 
worsened (Park, 2014).  
Beside the political factors, the energy economy is a major factor in consolidating 
relationships between the two sides. The discovery of a huge amount of oil by powerful 
international oil companies pushed the KR onto the international oil market map and 
reinforced its political and economic identity. This factor became a dilemma for Turkish 
policy. On the one hand, these companies extract and sell oil in a zone which threatens 
Turkish security. On the other, according to reports, Turkey’s oil and gas consumption is 
expected to double in a few years. The KR can supply this demand at a cheaper price than 
buying it from other suppliers namely Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and Iraq (Sharif, 2015).  
Factors of regional rivalry between Iran and Turkey, international sanctions on Iran, which 
damaged its hydrocarbon infrastructures, Turkey’s demand for energy, the invasion of some 
parts of Iraq by ISIS, and russia’s use of hydrocarbons as political leverage especially after 
relationships between them deteriorated in the aftermath of Turkey’s downing a Russian jet 
in Syria in December 2015, all led to an increase in instability in the regional context. The 
combination of these Turkish internal, regional, as well as, Kurdish question pushed Turkey 
to choose the KR as one of its oil suppliers to increase its energy security (Borroz, 2014; 
Sharif, 2015).  
The energy relationship can improve political relationships between the KR and Turkey. The 
relationship is not without challenge for both sides and especially for the KR after having its 
budget cut off by the Bagdad government. How this affects the KR economy will depend 
significantly on the oil revenue which “relies upon accessing consumers via Turkish 
territory” (Borroz, 2014:109). This shift in Turkish policy contrasts sharply with the time 
before 2008, when the exporting of the KR’s oil independently by the KRG was an 
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“anathema for Ankara” (Bryza, 2012:55). However, this economic dependency became a 
political interrelationship as argued in this chapter.   
In late 2013, as the tension between the KRG and Baghdad authority on oil exportation 
deepened, the Turkish government suggested that the revenue from the oil sector from both 
sides could be saved in a Turkish government bank, and then 83% be allocated to the Iraqi 
government and 17% to the KRG as its portion in the total budget of Iraq. The idea was 
supported by the USA and some Kurdish political parties nonetheless, it was rejected by the 
Iraqi government. However, the revenue from selling Kurdistan’s oil is kept in a Turkish 
bank (Halk Bank), which means that the KRG economic and financial sectors mainly depend 
on Turkey (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014; Sobhi, 2013). Moreover, on the 
international level, the influence of Turkey as a main route for transporting energy will 
increase. 
Another economic factor is that the KR has become one of the largest markets for Turkish 
products. The KR’s streets are witness to the scale and ubiquity of Turkish products, Turkish 
restaurants and companies, Turkish banks, schools and universities which all operate in the 
KR. The relationships have reached the point where Kurdistan citizens can easily gain a 
Turkish visa. According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the KR, the trade between 
the two sides in 2009, 2012 and 2013 was US$ 4.0 billion, 8.4 billion and 12.0 billion 
respectively. In addition, Turkey has tried to change its trade relationship with the KR to one 
of investment; 80% of the KR’s imports come from Turkey and its companies account for 
65% of foreign business in the KR. (Kurdistan View, 2014:74). In 2007, the KR was the 
nineteenth largest market for Turkey; in 2011 it became the sixth biggest market for Turkey’s 
goods and then in 2013, after Germany and the UK (see figure 9.1 below), the KR became 
the third largest market for exporting Turkish goods (Cagaptay et al, 2015). In fact, the 
majority of technological and infrastructure development in the KR has been designed and 
executed by Turkey (Logan, 2009:180).  
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Figure 9.1: Country Rankings for Turkey’s Exports 
2007 2011 2013 
1. Germany 1. Germany 1.Germany 
2. UK 2.UK 2.UK 
3. Italy 3. Italy 3.KRG 
4. France 4. France 4. Russia 
5. Russia 5. Russia 5. Italy 
6. Spain 6. KRG 6. France 
….. ….. …. 
19. KRG 11. Iraq 11. Iraq 
19. Iraq   
Source: ‘Turkey and the KRG: Signs of Booming Economic Ties’, The Washington Institution (2015), based 
on the Turkish Ministry of the Economy, Turkish Statistical Institute: Iraq and KRG data 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krg-signs-of-booming-economic-
ties-infographic  
All the above-mentioned factors helped to stabilize relationships to the degree that Turkey 
and the KR signed a bilateral contract in 2014, to export KR oil for fifty years through Turkey 
to the outside world. However, relying on Turkey alone may harm the KR’s interests in the 
long term.  
In 2013, the KRG and Turkish government’s relationship took a step forward with the formal 
invitation of the president of the KR to participate in a wedding ceremony in Diyarbakir 
(Turkey), known as the capital city of the Kurds in Turkey. The invitation included a request 
to the KR president to support the Peace Process2. The meeting was widely broadcast by the 
mass media and for the first time the Kurdistan flag was shown to audiences (KRP, 2013). 
This means that the KR had become an important actor playing a role in relation to other 
parts of Greater Kurdistan. The leaders of the KRG came to recognize that, while other 
countries play a role in the stability or instability of the KR, it can be a player too.  
The closer relationship between Turkey and the KR was complemented by increased 
pressure from the Iraqi government on the KR. The Iraqi government accused Turkey of 
intervening in Iraq’s internal issues and sovereignty (Elik, 2014). At the same time, it 
                                                 
2 It is necessary to take into account that just one week before this event, the powerful Kurdish party in Syria 
(Kurdish Democratic Union Party/PYD), which is supported by the PKK announced self-rule in some Kurdish 
areas of Syria. This step was strongly rejected by the Turkish government, followed by an official rejection by 
the president of the KR (KRP, 2013). 
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accused the KR of behaving like an independent state. On the ground, any contract with 
Turkey on an oil issue met with the response of a reduction in the KR’s annual share of the 
total Iraqi budget3. In 2014, the policy of Turkey towards the KR became more positive. 
With the control of Sunni areas by the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) in June 2014, 
the KRG and Peshmerga controlled the Kirkuk province and its oil fields. It then announced 
the right to independence of the Kurdistan state via referendum, without explicit opposition 
from the Turkish government. To achieve this purpose, the Law of the Higher Independent 
Commission for Election and a Referendum was passed by the KR parliament (Law No 4, 
2014). In reaction to this resolution, Huseyin Celik, spokesman for Turkey’s ruling party 
(AKP), in an interview for the Financial Times, announced that  
In the past an independent Kurdish state was a reason for war [for Turkey] but no one 
has the right to say this now…. In Turkey, even the word ‘Kurdistan’ makes people 
nervous, but their name is Kurdistan…. If Iraq is divided and it is inevitable, they are 
our brothers (cited in Dombey, 2014). 
Furthermore, In October 2014, with the attack by ISIS on Kobani (a Kurdish province in 
Syria), the Turkish government allowed the Peshmerga safe passage through its territory to 
help Kurdish fighters confront ISIS. 
This means that the relationship between Turkey and the KR turned from hostility into 
political, security and economic cooperation. There are three main reasons for this change: 
to allow the KR to be a buffer zone for Turkey against ISIS; to keep a Turkish balance in 
Iraq in relation to Iran; and to reduce the danger from Syrian Kurds and their relationship 
with Kurds in Turkey. This shift reverses the previous stance, when Turkish officials called 
Kurdish leaders ‘tribal chieftains’ or refused to meet the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, who 
was a Kurd (Charountaki, 2012:191).  
On the international level, it is important to mention that, the closer engagement of Turkey 
in the KR is Turkey’s response to the engagement of the USA in the Kurdish issue since 
1992. The fear of a USA monopoly and the Kurds becoming the main allies of the USA in 
Iraq, pushed Turkey to engage more in the KR, in favour of its own interests. Even before 
the Washington Agreement in 1998, Turkey tried to make peace between the PUK and the 
KDP through the Ankara Process in 1996 (Charountaki, 2012). The withdrawal of USA 
                                                 
3 In 2014, the Iraqi government cut off the entire budget of the KR. At the beginning of 2015, it sent a portion 
of 17% of the KR budget as money for the sale of the KR’s oil. However, by the summer of 2015, the KR was 
selling its oil independently without payments to the Baghdad government. 
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troops from Iraq in 2011, provided an opportunity to strengthen the ties between the KRG 
and the Turkish government. 
Through the ups and downs of the relationship between Turkey and the KR, Turkey’s role 
has eventually been to strengthen the KR. As Bengio (2012) says، Turkey has been a 
“reluctant builder’’. Unlike the previous role of the KDP-PUK/KRG in its alliance with 
Turkey to fight against the PKK, now the role has shifted to help the Peace Process between 
the PKK and Turkey.  
However, with all of this, there is a belief in the KR that the relationship between both sides 
is essentially a relationship between the key figures of the KDP on one hand, and the AKP 
government on the other, which has its origins in regional rivalry more than mutual 
understanding. For this reason a top cadre of the KDP stated that “if any change occurs in 
international policy, Turkey will break its agreements with the KRG”4.  
Overall, after 2009, Turkey’s soft policy achieved desirable goals for both sides. The 
relationship between Turkey and the KR passed from: dealing with political parties instead 
of government (1992-2003); to freezing relationships (2004-2008); and to semi-
institutionalisation of relationships (2009 onwards). The question remaining, considering the 
critiques by Turkish nationalist parties of the AKP policy towards the KRG, is whether the 
shift in power from the AKP to other parties, and a coalition cabinet in Turkey, means that 
Turkish policy towards the KRG will remain the same or change? In view of the entrenched 
economic and energy relationships which have shaped a kind of long-term strategic 
relationship between both sides, it is difficult to anticipate radical change that will impact 
negatively on the KR in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Interview with Mohamad Mulla Qader. 
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Iran: 1992-2003: Making Problems for the Status Quo 
In the first decade of the establishment of the KR, the common ground in foreign policy in 
Iran and Turkey, with some differences in tactics was: how to deal with the Kurdish 
question? Turkey called the Kurds ‘Mountain Turks’, while Iran counts them as having 
Iranian roots. Both countries deny Kurds political rights. Following the Algeria Agreement 
between Iraq and Iran in 1975, Iran opened its boundaries to Kurdish refugees.  
The change of regime in Iran in 1979, increased the hostility between the new Islamic regime 
in Iran and the Ba’athist’s in Iraq. However, political relations between Iran and the Iraqi 
Kurdish parties improved. Up to 1992, Iran’s ties with Kurds in Iraq were closer than 
Turkey’s. They were used to exert pressure against Iraq and against the Iranian Kurdish 
opposition who had settled in Iraq. Initially, the ties were with the KDP. Later after the Anfal 
process, they also included the PUK, which supported the Kurdistan Democratic party of 
Iran (Al-Khorsan, 2001). In the war between Iran and Iraq, the Kurds backed Iran which 
resulted in the decline of Ba’ath authority in many parts of the KR and especially in the 
border areas with Iran (Sazmandeh et al, 2011). Before and after the 1991 uprising, various 
Kurdish political parties had offices in different cities in Iran.   
According to one assessment,  
Iran opposes any arrangement that might embolden the Iraqi Kurds to set up their own 
government or state. Iran has supported measures to reconcile the various Kurdish 
factions in Iraq (Byman et al, 2001:56). 
Iran’s viewpoint on the Kurdish issue shifted when the western states and especially the 
USA, in company with Turkey, provided a safe haven which was interpreted by Iran as a 
way for the USA to access Iranian territory and strengthen the Iranian opposition who had 
settled in the KR (Ihsan, 2001). For Iran, the safe haven meant greater influence for Turkey 
in the KR. Iran’s policy in contrast to Turkey’s was to prevent the Iraqi Kurds becoming so 
weak as to be overcome by the Iraqi government. However, like Turkey, it was afraid of the 
consequences of an uprising among its own Kurds (Olson, 1998).   
With attacks by Turkey on the KR in pursuit of the PKK in the 1990s, Iran feared the growing 
influence of Turkey on the KR, especially in view of its alliance with the USA and Israel. 
This threat encouraged Iran to support the PKK on the KR territory. In reaction, the Turkish 
government supported Iran’s Kurdish political party the KDP-I, also within the territory of 
the KR (Olson, 1998). Both sides agreed to prevent the establishment of any Kurdish entity 
in northern Iraq and prevent it becoming strong enough to threaten their territory. Both states 
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used the KR as a field of combat to pursue their own interests and to weaken the influence 
of the other. 
The KR parliamentary elections in 1992 had the effect of bringing both countries together. 
It led to the Ankara meeting between the neighbouring countries which concluded that “we 
as main regional powers, will not allow any entity to rise without our permission and against 
our will” (Jaf, 2005:133-134). From 1992 to 1995, the neighbouring countries met frequently 
on issues related to the KR (Hetuti, 2009). To mobilise regional public opinion against the 
KR, Iran represented the KR elections as an American conspiracy (Qhader, 2005). Persian 
language websites regularly pose the question: will the KR become the second Israel in the 
Middle East, or not?  
Iran officially rejected the establishment of any political entity in northern Iraq, but 
simultaneously maintained its relations with the political parties and established Nasr 
Command, an army unit which managed relationships with the political parties in the KR 
(Kalji, 2010). In this way it tried to control the political situation in the KR in the interests 
of security inside Iran.  
During the internal conflicts in the 1990s, Iran supported the PUK and the PKK. Iran was 
the main partner in this proxy war and had a role greater than the Turkish one. It received 
many Iraqi Kurd refugees who were mainly supporters of the KDP. Some occasionally faced 
problems (such as imprisonment or pressure to return to the KR in hard economic 
circumstances) which were designed to put pressure on the KDP. In the middle of the war, 
when Turkey began to be a broker for peace, Iran was drawn in to play the same role, 
reflecting the rivalry between the two countries. However, when its attempts failed due to 
the rapprochement of the Kurdish parties to US policy, Iran reinforced its ties with the PKK 
and the Islamic groups in the KR (Bengio, 2012). Hence, Islamic groups succeeded in 
gaining control of some areas of the Garmin administration which was under the 
management of the PUK (Natali, 2010), while the PKK controlled some of the border areas. 
The contest between the PUK and the KDP altered to become a multi-sided conflict. Thus, 
for a period between 1996 and 2003, the KR was divided into four zones5. Each was run by 
a different party and they applied their own resolutions and tariffs on trade (see Chapter 
                                                 
5 These zones were controlled by the KDP, the PUK, the PKK and the Islamic extremist group called Ansar 
Al-Islam from 1996 onwards. In 2003, the USA attacked Ansar Al-Islam and removed them. During my field 
work, I visited the PKK areas. The PKK controls some border areas without intervention from the government. 
These areas contain many villages and farming lands that are still used by farmers.  
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five). In such circumstances, the purpose of each party was not to rebuild the country, but to 
stop their areas from being penetrated by other parties. To achieve this, Kurdish political 
parties were prepared to be allies with different regional governments that were against any 
kind of political rights for Kurds. Such a response begs serious questions. Were the parties 
trying to serve national goals? Was there any prospect for institution building?  
Besides the KDP and the PUK, many small parties had a relationship with a neighbouring 
state, mainly at the borders between Iran and the KR. They established checkpoints and 
imposed non-governmental tax and Bexşiş (the payment that a trader has to make to the 
Peshmerga at the checkpoints, which amounts to a kind of bribery). The effect of these 
actions was to reduce the amount of trade, the number of traders, and increase the price of 
items. It led to a monopoly of trade by dominant political party figures and military 
commanders. The top party cadres became leading merchants due to their intermediary role, 
called Waste in Kurdish, and evasion of informal tax or Bexşiş. This behaviour among senior 
officials can be considered as one of the sources of the current corruption in the region. 
In terms of economy and trade, the KR became a big market for Iran’s products, which 
helped to improve the quality of life of Iranian border cities (Kar-online, 2014). Between 
1992 and 2003, Iran also opened bilateral gateways to benefit from trade with the KR 
(Sazmandeh et al, 2011;). At the same time many unofficial crossings for smuggling opened 
between the KR and Iran, for which Iranian traders paid lower tax. As the result of the vast 
amount of unofficial trade, as Natali (2010:55) describes, the KR became a “free zone” for 
Iranian traders and smuggling6. 
To summarize Kalji’s (2010:54) viewpoint, after the establishment of the KRG in 1992, 
Iran’s policy had five aims. First, it was designed to prevent the disintegration of Iraq and 
the formation of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Second, it was to deal with the 
KRG(s) to strengthen the opposition to Iraq and prevent the Iraqi government from re-
gaining control of the KR. The third aim was to maintain a certain level of relationship with 
the KRG(s), to give it responsibility for keeping stability in the border areas and prevent any 
armed action by the Iranian opposition groups. Fourthly, it was to prevent the KR becoming 
                                                 
6 Apart from the domestic factors which contributed to this phenomenon of smuggling via border crossings, 
the UN Resolution 661 in 1990 compelled the international community to avoid any kind of trade (import and 
export) with Iraq. Later, UN Resolution 986 (Oil For Food Programme, 1995) allowed for the provision of 
“medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs” (Article 8(a)). 
According to this resolution, the only export item allowed was oil and any imports were on a limited scale and 
monitored by the UN (Natali, 2010). The situation facilitated the growth of smuggling and corruption. 
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an arena for activities against Iran’s interest by other countries, and finally, to prevent the 
impact of nationalism among Kurds in Iraq on Kurds in Iran. In short, Iran was a powerful 
country in the region that played a crucial role in the political process of the KR. 
Iran: 2004-2014: A Factor of Continuous Instability 
Iran continues to be the main actor in shaping Iraqi government policy and its interests are 
often opposed to the USA policy in Iraq as a whole. In 2003, the Kurds aligned themselves 
with the USA front which Iran called ‘The Great Satan’. If the first period in the history of 
the KR (1992-2003) led to the bonding of the KR and Iran, thanks to a common enemy in 
the Ba’ath regime, this common enemy ceased to exist after 2003. With the KR becoming a 
federal entity, electing a Kurd as president of Iraq, and coordinating politics between the 
KR’s political parties, the KR shifted to a “soft threat” for Iran (Mehrani and Por- Eslami, 
2012:90).  
Politically, the KR became a centre for the reinforcement of Kurdish national identity, or 
Kurdaiety, throughout Greater Kurdistan. Economically, the export of oil by the KRG 
strengthened the KR’s position. Legally, the KR has authority guaranteed by the constitution. 
All of these factors mutually strengthen each other and mean that Iran cannot threaten to end 
the KRG. If Iran were to try this, the KRG could mobilise the Kurdish oppositions in Iran. 
It has therefore dealt more cautiously with the KRG and tried to use its influence since 2005 
via the Shia-led Iraqi government. The new de facto situation forced Iran to minimize threats 
by bringing together Shias and Kurds in the new Iraq. Iran utilized its historical relationship 
with them and historical relations between Kurds and Shias, as well7 (Zibakalam and 
A’abdollahpor, 2008).  
This policy of Iran was opposed to USA interests in Iraq. In 2007 and 2008 the American 
army arrested Iranian diplomats, businessmen and an army commander in the KR, which led 
to a reduction in the ties between Iran and the KRG. In response, Iran closed its border 
                                                 
7 The relationship between the Kurds and Shia is not based on creed, as the majority of the KR’s Muslim Kurds 
are Sunni. However, in the Ba’ath period, both Kurds and Shias were marginalized and they were in conflict 
with the Ba’ath regime. Further, because Iranian authority is Shia and was against the Ba’ath regime, all of 
them had common political interests. In 2005, both Shias and Kurds voted for the Iraqi constitution which 
guaranteed federalism for Kurds. While, the Arab Sunni sect boycotted the voting. After 2009 the authority in 
Baghdad became more Shia, and both Sunni and Kurds were marginalized. As a result, the common ground 
between Kurds and Sunni increased. However, the rise of ISIS in the Sunni part of Iraq and its invasion of the 
KR complicated the relationship between Kurds, Shia and Sunni. As a result, the Kurds’ relations with Shias 
and Sunnis is not clear-cut and is in continuous flux.   
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crossings with the KR, attacked border villages and reinforced its ties with the residue of 
Ansar Al-Islam to put pressure on the KRG to follow Iran’s policy (Logan, 2009). The re-
opening of the border in 2009 following mediation by the Baghdad government was linked 
to the KRG closing Iranian Kurdish party, PEJAK, (a branch of the PKK) headquarters in 
the KR (Rafaat, 2007).  
In the years between 2009 and 2013, which overlapped with the rise of a strong opposition 
in the KR on the one hand, and deep tension between the KRG and Baghdad on the other, 
Iran’s relationship with the KRG became normalized and there was minimum tension8. 
Again, this improvement in relationship occurred at the same time as Turkey-KRG 
relationships improved. Before the ISIS invasion, any claim by the KRG to include the 
disputed areas was sharply rejected by Turkey, which benefited Iran’s interests without any 
direct engagement. On the other hand, Iran influenced the Iraqi government that also rejected 
the extension of the KR’s border in the disputed area. 
In August 2013, in reaction to Turkey’s increasing infiltration, the Prime Minister of the KR, 
Nechirvan Barzani, was officially invited to participate in the swearing in ceremony of the 
new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani. This signified Iran’s concern about the growth of 
Turkey’s influence in the KR. However, the share of the PUK’s9 votes in the parliamentary 
                                                 
8 Iran exerts cultural influence on the KR which goes well beyond formal political structure and relationships. 
Many western works of philosophy, politics and social science are translated from the Persian language into 
Kurdish. Further, although Iran has a closer relationship with the PUK, it is important to note that thousands 
of Kurdish refugees who fled to Iran after 1975, mostly pro-KDP, returned to the KR and settled in areas under 
the influence of the KDP. In many districts and sub-districts such as Soran, Pirmam, Tanahi, part of Binaslawa 
and other places, many Kurdish people speak to each other in Persian. The Newroz national festival, which is 
the first day of the Kurdish and Persian calendar (two different calendars) is an opportunity for visitors from 
Iran to visit the KR which is more open than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iranian singers from both inside and 
outside Iran are invited to the KR through the Cultural Ministry of the KRG or private companies. Both Kurds 
and Persians consider their ethnic roots as Arian. These informal social and cultural links are less visible than 
economic and political ties but reflect Iran’s strong cultural impact on the KR.   
9 External supervision of a political party is visible in the KR. However, the top leader of the PUK can often 
be seen to criticize the KDP for establishing a strong relationship with Turkey and neglecting Iran. The KDP 
in turn criticizes the PUK for its close relationship with Iran. Looking at the claims of both sides, it could be 
argued that foreign relations in the KR are still not on a governmental track. There is another question that 
ordinary people as well as scholars often ask: Is the relationship with Turkey more beneficial than the one with 
Iran or vice versa? The question itself refers to hidden rivalry between the PUK and the KDP on the one hand, 
and Turkey and Iran on the other. The answers tend to favour the Turkish side, since people think of Turkey 
as a member of NATO, as a gateway to Europe, as a secular Sunni state and as the channel for the KR’s oil to 
reach the international market. In contrast, Iran is a Shia Islamic culture, and a country which suffers from 
international sanctions. However, after the events of the Turkish army attack on the Kurdish cities in Turkey 
since the end of 2015, there has been some shifting in the citizens’ view. In addition, in some sense, the power 
of oil unites the PUK and the KDP.  
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elections in September 2013 declined, which led to the weakening of the influence of Iran 
on the KRG. In contrast, Turkey was able to increase its influence through its close 
relationship with the KDP (Cengiz, 2013). Iran continued by using its representative in the 
KR to help form the eighth cabinet, because of disagreement between the PUK and the GM 
on the Depucty Prime Minister position. Iran arranged meetings with political parties to keep 
the PUK more fully integrated (Rudaw, October 2013). In June 2015, a disagreement 
between political parties on the duration of the presidential term and its authorities occurred 
in the parliament. The KDP and some other parties and minority parties boycotted the 
session. The other parties (the PUK, the IU, the IL and the GM) invited diplomatic observers 
to attend that parliament session. Their justification was, that they felt threatened by the 
KDP, who had the capacity to use military power against the parliament. Iran alone sent a 
high ranking diplomatic consultant; others either did not participate or sent low ranking 
officials.  
When the president of the KR announced steps towards independence, following the ISIS 
events in May 2014, the Prime Minister of the KR was again invited to Iran. In a meeting 
with Iran’s military figures, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council 
pointed out that  
I intentionally met with Nechirvan Barzani in [military] uniform so that he would 
understand that for us the integrity of Iraq is important (Namazi, 2014).  
This means any further nation-state movement by the KR would be met with a military 
response. The problem in making relationships with Iran as Sadjadpour and Ben Talebluis 
explain (2015:39) is that  
Iran’s political-ideological army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its 
elite Quds Force unit are responsible for devising and implementing Iran’s regional 
policies, not diplomats in the Iranian foreign ministry.  
Hence, Iran looks at the KR through a military and security lens, which makes it difficult to 
establish official civil relationships. In late December 2014 the head of the Iran parliament 
visited the KR. This followed visits to the KR by many top western and Turkish officials. 
The Iranian Speaker visited the KR parliament which means that it was officially recognized 
as a political institution along with the KRG. After this visit, the official Iranian Diplomacy 
website stated that the Iranian government should engage more in the KR and reinforce its 
relationship with the KRG to counter the influence of Turkey. However, the visit started 
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from Slemani, in the PUK zone instead of Erbil, the capital city of the KR (Irandiplomacy, 
2015). 
According to the officer of political relationships of the GM, the KRG’s external 
relationships are not institutionalized, but rather administered by the two main political 
parties. Both the KDP and the PUK have representation offices abroad. Despite the fact that 
the KRG has opened official diplomatic missions in recent years, they are weak. The same 
interviewee pointed out 
The PUK and the KDP affiliated representation offices have diluted Kurdish diplomatic 
efforts. As each of the two parties represents a demarcated geographical area in the KR 
this has influenced their relations with the outside. While the PUK represents Slemani 
province, the KDP represents both Erbil and Dohuk provinces. It is quite normal to have 
party representations abroad to establish links and relations with political parties. 
However, this should be limited to party affairs; they should not present themselves as 
representatives acting on the authority of the official KRG10.  
The trade and economic sector activity increased in both directions, and various commercial 
and construction agreements were signed and a free trade zone was inaugurated on the 
Slemani border. The trade ties between Iran and Iraq reached US$13 billion in 2014 of which 
40% was with the KR (Bultannews, 2014). According to the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
the majority of trade consisted of food, domestic goods and medicine. In 2013 out of 2,300 
foreign companies in the KR, from 78 countries, around 1,500 were Turkish, and 280 were 
Iranian (Kurdistan Review, 2014:47-49).  As the amount of trade between the KR and Iran 
and Turkey shows, Turkey has more extensive economic relationships with the KR, which 
is related to its greater political influence. 
The majority of Iranian companies (around 80%) are in the Green Zone and nearly 60% of 
the needs of this zone are supplied via Iran (Natali, 2010:95; Logan, 2009). In contrast to 
agreements with Turkey, the majority of Iran-KR agreements were signed by Iranian 
provincial authorities rather than the central government. It highlights the poor or non-
existent infrastructure of the KR on the one hand, and Iran’s use of the KR as a market for 
the consumption of Iranian goods, not as an opportunity to rebuild the country or invest in 
it. However, in the mid to long-term, the hydrocarbon production of the KR and especially 
its cheap price for Turkey, may intensify competition with Iran’s production in this sector; 
which means that the KRG can challenge the Iranian policy towards the KR. Whether the 
                                                 
10 Interview with Mohamad Haji. 
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response will be in favour of the KR or not will depend on the future balance of the regional 
political equation.       
In summary, the clash of regional and international power interests in the KR has taken 
different forms: before 2003 the KR was an arena of active conflict around the regional 
powers’ interests; after this period, it had to consider the interests of the regional and 
international powers which both competed or co-operated with each other. It demonstrates 
how outside influences are significant for the political development of the KR. Even if the 
KR has capacity, its ability to develop remains limited because its stability depends on 
external political factors. It highlights the political dependency of the KR on outside external 
circumstances; a dependency which is reflected in its economic dependency because of the 
legacy of a weak infrastructure.   
Conclusion 
The common ground among the KR’s neighbouring countries is that, when the political 
relationships between these countries are weak, they use the Kurdish question as leverage 
against each other. When relationships improve, they use this improvement to limit Kurdish 
political rights. Consequently, the relationships between the KR and the neighbouring 
governments are shaped by mutual distrust. Political liaisons, especially during the first 
decade of self-governing, were based on political parties. Both Iran and Turkey followed 
different types of policies in the two periods, but the target was the same until 2003 onwards, 
when Iran’s influence over the Iraqi government increased, and the role of Turkey in the 
Iraqi government simultaneously decreased; this caused Turkey to shift its policy towards 
the KR (Barkey, 2010).  
Turkish foreign policy towards the KR was related to the strength of the KR’s impact on the 
national security of Turkey. However, after the KR constitutionally gained de jure status and 
then explored oil in its territory and engaged in the power struggle between the Sunni and 
Shia in Iraq (referring to the struggle between Iran-Shia and Turkey-Sunni), the economic 
aspects were added to the security aspect, which enhanced the relationship between both 
sides. Turkey agreed to export KR’s oil to the global market while ensuring an energy supply 
for Turkey’s domestic market. Iran continued to deal with the KR case via a security lens. 
However, considering the one-sidedness of the economic and trade relationships, it is 
difficult to imagine that either state will contribute to institutional capacity building or the 
strengthening of democratic procedures in the KR.  
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A leader of the IU sums it up as follows: 
The KRG’s interstate relations are based on two premises: first, there are some 
provisions in the constitution which envisage the authority to exercise diplomatic 
relations with the outside world. Second, irregular relations are based on 
considerations mostly driven by greed and risk taking. The aim of these types of 
relations is generally related to natural wealth (oil), trade business and markets. 
Currently, KRG relations are provisionally (until the outstanding issues with central 
government are resolved) administered based on these two premises. The reason for 
this mixture of behaviour is the fact that Iraq doesn’t enjoy full sovereignty over its 
territory and regional and international players are stronger than the will of Iraq. Kurds 
have found a quite comfortable place in this sovereignty gap to play their role11.  
However, this niche for the KR is not a stable one; it depends on external circumstances. 
This limited opportunity has not expanded the KRG’s capacity to make its own future 
policies. For this reason, there is an underlying instability in relationships with regional 
powers which makes the future of the KR unpredictable. This has an impact on political 
development because it can only flourish when there is some degree of certainty regarding 
the future.  
  
                                                 
11 Interview with Muhamad Ra’auf. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
This research project has identified obstacles to political development in the Kurdistan 
Region in the period 1992 to 2014. This final chapter aims to highlight the contribution to 
knowledge which has been made to the field of political development studies and the 
political sociology of the region. It reviews the main thesis findings and offers a critique of 
political development theory. First, it is appropriate to comment on certain challenges and 
limitations that were faced by the research. The first challenge was theoretical. Current 
theories of political development are mainly western oriented, which means that they are 
poorly adapted to understanding political development in the KR. The second was a 
methodological limitation. The lack of reliable data, even official data, on the oil economy 
for example, or on the process of making political decisions, because it is often behind the 
scenes; or the impossibility of doing a large scale survey among political party members and 
the difficulty of conducting interviews with officials from Turkey and Iran about their 
relationships with the KR. However, the research was primarily about the formal political 
institutions within the KR and their relationship to other parts of society. So the interviews 
with officials partially overcame this limitation. Another limitation was the barriers to 
mobility in the KR and the difficulty of access to the top elites. I have tried to overcome 
these challenges by following on-going debates in the mass media and social media, by 
conducting interviews and where possible by direct observation in the field; and as a resident 
of the KR, my interpretations draw on my personal experience of the political culture and 
communication.  
Critique of Political Development Theories  
This thesis has identified political development in the KR in terms of: political institutions, 
political elites, the social fabric and foreign relationships. The study of political development 
requires explanations, and analyses which then make connections between these aspects. 
The study has found it is necessary to adjust the unit of analysis from the usual nation-state 
category in political development theory to a non-state political entity1. Modernisation, 
                                                 
1 There is an extensive literature on the concept of the nation-state. Although the KR is not a state, the concept 
is unavoidable because the mainstream literature in modernization and political development theories adopts 
the nation-state as the main unit of analysis, and situates political development in terms of national borders. 
However, this ‘methodological nationalism’ has not withstood the growing tendency to recognise diversity in 
political formations, including non-state entities, quasi-states (Jackson 1990) or sub-state nations. States often 
include more than one nation or ethnic group and there are multinational states. The variety demonstrates that 
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development and dependency theories, all take the nation-state to be the unit of analysis. The 
KR is not an internationally recognized state, but is more similar to a nation-state than a 
federal or devolved region. It has the political apparatuses that are necessary for political 
development, namely: government, parliament, political parties and relationships with other 
countries. Although Article 1 of the Iraqi constitution states that “Iraq is a single federal 
state”. Despite the assumptions of political development theory, it is necessary to reduce the 
unit of analysis from the nation-state to the study of the performance of the de facto political 
authority in the region.  
Political development studies based on western experience prescribed pathways for the 
development of underdeveloped societies. Their prescriptions have frequently clashed 
with the culture and realities of the countries in development by focusing mainly on the 
formal requirements of development and considering development as stages on the way 
towards a liberal democratic system (Rush, 1992:220). Sometimes, their 
recommendations could be regressive rather than progressive. For this reason, Frank 
criticized their “theoretical adequacy, their empirical validity and their policy 
effectiveness” (Frank in Larrain, 1989:98).  
More recent contributions on socio-economic development have argued that alongside 
economic growth and the establishment of democratic political institutions, political 
development is difficult to achieve without changes in values (Hyden, 2003; Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). This trend complements previous ideas. 
However, it is more applicable to those societies that have experienced modernisation and 
industrialization. Many societies have not had this experience.  This is one of the reasons 
why Inglehart and Welzel (2005 and 2009) used the concept of human development, 
modernisation and political development interchangeably. For development to occur, the 
function and structure of institutions and the culture of society under the impact of 
external environment all have to be engaged.  
                                                 
states are not typically homogeneous in terms of their history, social composition, values, norms, culture and 
institutions. The thesis has not debated this issue or engaged directly with a related question: the past, present 
and future of Kurdish nationalism.  The purpose of using the nation-state category here is to highlight how the 
KR occupies a position between two types of status: an independent entity that has sovereignty within its own 
territory according to formal and international recognition, which give this entity the capacity to manage its 
own affairs (federal region within a state); and the non-state political entity that lacks this recognition but has 
some capacity to conduct its own affairs (de facto autonomous region).  
210 
 
The above academic debate, when juxtaposed with the reality of development in 
undeveloped societies, shows that in general, the growth of political development theories 
has outpaced the development of underdeveloped societies. These theories commenced 
with concepts of modernisation and subsequently evolved with concepts of development, 
globalisation, human development and sustainable development. The latest expression is 
the idea of ecological democracy (Rocheleau, 1999; Baber, 2004). In some cases, on the 
ground there have been reversals in development: in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen and 
Libya.  
Another aspect to the conceptual ‘disconnect’ as shown in Chapter 3, relates to the 
political development argument itself. For example, in the 1960s, theorists suggested that 
to develop the undeveloped societies, the military should hold power. The justification 
was to ensure stability; the army would embody bureaucratic efficiency and act in the 
national interest. This view ignored the fact that it would lead to more militarization of 
society at the cost of civic values, which are important for political development. The 
result was that many countries became more militarized and this weakened the civic 
political institutions. The Middle Eastern countries are the best example of who 
participates in political authority and how it is a neglected topic.  
Concerning the KR, two examples can be mentioned; firstly, when the formal political 
requirements for political development were put in place, the role of tribal culture and its 
power was not substituted, but as explained in Chapter 8, rather reinforced through these 
modern institutions. The possibility that formal democratic institutions can serve 
traditional powers has been neglected by political development theories.  
Secondly, in political development theories, political parties in a multi-party system are 
viewed as tools for development (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966). The question is: does 
this idea recognize that parties possess armed forces, control media and culture, or 
reinforce tribal fabric even though they are publicly elected? Theories of political 
development, from the 1950s and 1960s provided an important if over-simplified and 
over-generalized theoretical base. However, to have value for the analysis of 
contemporary societies, adjustments according to the range of types of society are 
necessary. As Thomas (2011 and 2014) argues, and as the findings of this thesis show, 
political development thought and especially the American literature, with its emphasis 
on institutions and institutionalization, neglects the purpose behind institutionalisation.    
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Another significant theme in studies of development is the priority given to economic 
growth. The linkage between economic growth and political development is complex and is 
mediated in various ways by the culture of social and political elites, media institutions and 
political parties. Economic growth may occur without progress in the political sphere. 
According to Sen (1996), the issue of development is more complicated than selecting some 
economically successful authoritarian states and comparing them with other non-
authoritarian states with low economic growth and deciding in favour of an authoritarian 
solution. Sen (1996) found a link between media freedom, parliamentary political opposition 
and economic growth. In other words, there is a connection between democratic political 
norms, civil rights and economic performance. Hence, sustainable policies drive the 
sustainability of economic growth and orderly change in the socio-political aspects of 
society. 
One important assumption of modernization and political development theories is that 
development progress is unilinear. To develop, underdeveloped nations have to pass 
through the same stages that the developed nations passed through. These theories 
highlight the internal obstacles to the development of undeveloped nations (Larrain, 
1989). They assert that these nations can develop by introducing the developed nations’ 
values and technology. At the same time, the dependency school targets external factors 
and pays less attention to internal factors, disregarding the internal impact of foreign trade 
and the values of developed societies. This means that both views minimise the 
contribution of social variables in development at the expense of economic and political 
variables. Consequently, political development becomes a top-down process shaped by 
external factors (as in development theories) or the result of an economic plan shaped by 
a government (the dependency school). Both views are vulnerable to a kind of rigid 
stereotype through their generalized assumptions.  
The political development concept therefore perpetuates some inherent problems of scope 
and definition. For this reason, the alternative definition made connections between 
politics, society and the individual in the political, economic and cultural spheres, as well 
as in international relationships. This approach has its own pros and cons. On the one 
hand, it encompasses various aspects that relate to political development, while on the 
other, it broadens the scope of research, and makes the enquiry more complex and 
difficult. However, in spite of these difficulties it is possible to give a relatively clear 
vision of what political development means.       
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According to the findings of this research, both internal and external factors form barriers 
to the political development process. Both factors complement each other. In the case of 
the KR, in specific periods and in contrast to the dependency school (see Chapter 3), 
external factors have helped to bring about stability and economic improvement. Also, in 
the case of the KR, the regional neighbourhood plays a critical role in supplementing the 
internal and external factors- a point that is neglected in political development theories.  
A country cannot be isolated from the degree of stability or instability, the type of culture 
and the level of development of its neighbours. Wallerstein (1999:24) argued that 
movements impact on other movements when they are culturally and geographically 
close. The same claim can be broadened to apply to the impact of a state upon its 
neighbours. The instability in Syria and Iraq and the tension between Turkey and the PPK, 
Turkey and Iran, all have a negative impact on the stability of the KR. Similarly, 
according to the Democratic Domino Theory, an increase or decrease in the level of 
democracy in one country will increase or decrease the level of democracy in its 
neighbours (Leeson and Dean, 2009).  
In some periods, the influence of the KR’s neighbours was in contrast to the contribution of 
wider external factors. For example, in the first decade of self-government, the neighbouring 
countries stood against it, while the western countries supported it. Sometimes, both 
neighbours and distant allies have co-operated to bring stability to the KR, as can be seen in 
the ISIS attack in 2014. As illustrated in Chapter 9, the stance of neighbouring countries 
towards the KR and the degree of co-operation between them is important.  
Information technology, transportation and the health system, which have reached the most 
rural parts of the KR, have reduced the gap between the rural and the urban areas. However, 
the mass media (TV, radio and newspapers) have developed under the control of the political 
parties. They actually contribute to a unified political culture; but this unification is not open 
enough to accept other ideas. Global media content is quickly adapted through the use of the 
Kurdish language. This culture is even mirrored in the social media. Political parties have 
numerous pages which typically contain hostile messages towards other parties. They 
generate public debate on political issues but, the debates are shaped by party lines. For this 
reason, the diversity of mass media has not contributed to the openness of society or the 
achievement of political development. 
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In addition, the KR as a federal entity and the weakness of the central government from 1992 
up to now, has provided more opportunity for the KRG to behave as a semi-independent 
state especially after 2005. The KR has its own army, large scale foreign relationships and 
its own political apparatus, controlling its own internal financial sources as well as an 
allocated budget from the Iraqi government; it is planning to achieve economic self-
independency. It is true that federalism status limited the ability of the KR to behave as an 
independent state, however, it provided a legal ground for being self-governing. This is the 
situation, which is entitled the “paradox of federalism” in the literature (Danilovich, 2014). 
This analysis of political development theories in relation to the experience of the Kurdistan 
region implies that the basic concepts of political development such as urbanisation, 
participation, political parties, and differentiation and so on, are still essential. However, they 
have to be used and criticized. What has changed is not the fundamental conceptualisation, 
but the circumstances in which they need to be applied and the interpretations which need to 
be made. Concerning the KR itself, this thesis has tried to see beyond the formal institutions 
that are linked to the process of political development. It has tried to show how society 
connects to politics and vice versa, to discover the relationships between the economy and 
politics, and how they are all tied together.  
Analysis and discussion 
This research defined political development (see Chapter 3) as a process, which is (1) 
dynamic, nonlinear but still coherent, interlocking and constructive; (2) leads to the 
strengthening of the political, economic, social and cultural components of civil society, 
together with (3) positive outcomes in terms of the contribution of both government and 
society to the political process, which (4) increase the government’s capacity through 
democratic institutionalization, (5) requires political will between different political groups, 
and (6) leads to greater integration with international processes. 
The elements of the definition suggest a number of criteria which can be used to assess 
progress in political development. Political development can be considered to have occurred 
if there is evidence of the following. First of all, close, constructive relationships between 
political institutions (legislature, parliament, parties etc.). The findings from the present 
research show that relationships are in fact based on geographically distinct spheres of 
influence, conflictual competition (which has led, for example, to the suspension of 
parliament) and the placing of party above national interests. Secondly, there is a civil 
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society which can flourish independently of the state and market. Thirdly, evidence of a 
contribution by both government and society to the political process (e.g. through the 
political will of the elites, a public sphere and open media). Fourthly, evidence that the 
government’s capacity is increasing through democratic institutionalization (not simply 
formal electoral processes). Fifthly, there is evidence that a variety of political groups have 
a legitimate voice and can exert political pressure. And finally, there is evidence that 
international relationships contribute to integration (through mutual recognition, the trade 
system, security etc). 
Certainly, the mechanisms and prerequisites to launch political development exist in the KR. 
They include political party organizations, mass mobilization, participation, public elections 
and institutionalization, which are the key themes in development theories (Huntington, 
2006; LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Rustow, 1970). However, as illustrated in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7, the type of relationship which exists between the parties is not effective for the 
purposes of political development. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have argued, political 
parties may use state resources to serve their own interests. This situation, which Eisenstadt 
(1973a:47) called “breakdowns of modernization and development” means that the tools of 
modernization exist, but they are not used properly by the government to achieve 
development.   
In the case of the KR then a change in the relationship between the political institutions is 
first required. This will only follow from a change in the elites’ behaviours toward 
democratic values. Chapter 7 explained that the rotation of power, for example, is absent 
within political parties, and this problem is replicated in the lack of rotation of power in the 
government. However, this change will not be enough on its own. According to Almond and 
Verba (1963), Pye et al (1965), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) fundamentally, secular values 
also need to take root among the people. The secularisation theme is an important issue, but 
the evidence is not available to draw up a full conclusion. This second feature, as explained 
in Chapters 1, 7 and 8 is weak in the socio-political context of the KR. Thirdly, Lipset (1959) 
argued that economic development would lead to a democratic system. Stable and diverse 
of economic growth is a further condition. However, as Chapter One showed, economic 
growth in the KR was the outcome of the petrodollar, a governmental device rather than a 
market economy. If it improved living conditions from 1996 to 2013, it also contributed to 
the strengthening of certain political elites and parties. This economic leverage helped 
political parties to generate a mosaic of religious-tribal-local connections and a Party-ized 
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culture. Without all three transformations, political development is likely to be an incomplete 
process. 
This research has approached the subject from the point view of politics and political 
development relations in the political sphere. However, there are two further issues which 
has been highlighted in this thesis, namely the international community’s desire for stability 
and the possibility of social economic changes from below which might produce new 
incentives for change. Finally, there is a sense of nationalism emerging from inside and 
within Kurds in diaspora, which challenges the behaviour of the political elites to follow 
more modern norms of ruling.  
Following on from the research findings, the main internal and external obstacles to political 
development in the KR can be summarized as follows. 
Internal Factors: The Problematic Nature of the Political Parties 
As revealed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, the functions of political parties, parliament and 
government interlock in such a way that often they encroach on each other’s domains. This 
feature produces a hierarchical relationship between them. According to the results of this 
study and the testimony of the interviewees in the KR, the political parties come first, then 
the government and finally the parliament. This arrangement has two negative 
consequences: firstly, it undermines the autonomy of the government and, secondly, there is 
a lack of checks and balances to see if the government or political parties exceed their 
authority. 
In terms of Binder et al’s (1971) development syndrome -differentiation, capacity and 
equality - the political organisations of the KR suffer from a fundamental malaise. The 
dominant power of the political parties challenges the differentiation between the legislative, 
judicial and executive authorities. The main problem in the KR is not how to separate these 
authorities, but how to reduce the power of political parties. Political bureaus control 
decision making, so that important decisions are made outside rather than within the elected 
bodies (legislative and executive). The best example is the debate in parliament in August 
2015 on the extension of the term of the president. MPs from the KDP and its allies, who 
called for an extension, boycotted the parliamentary sessions because the non-KDP members 
tried to reject the extension. Even when the Consultative Council, the highest judicial 
authority, made a decision to keep the president in office (the majority of its judges belong 
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to the KDP), the political parties from the non-KDP half of the MPs rejected their decision. 
Finally, the KDP banned the GM representative from parliament and government.  
One factor behind the lack of differentiation is that the political parties originated as, and 
continue to be, mass political parties. Since 1992 they have controlled the major economic 
sectors, and military and public recruitment. This control enables them to directly mobilize 
in favour of the party’s interests, without the support of civil society organisations. The civic 
organisations that have emerged, mostly belong to the political parties. These organisations, 
along with the mass media and public employees, are mobilized to participate in elections to 
convey the impression of a democratic political process and development in the KR.  
This kind of performance produces a ‘hybrid regime’. “Hybrid regime” is a term used by 
Fritz and Menocal (2006) to refer to the less developed countries in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa in which states have formal democratic institutions and the state intervene in the 
development process. They describe these regimes as 
Characterised by populist politics, ‘delegative’/strong-man leadership and decision-
making processes…. Moreover, in these regimes, the rule of law is at best uneven. 
Clientelistic structures and high levels of corruption often persist, especially when 
citizens have few means of holding elites to account (p:17-18). 
 
These features are very apparent in the political system of the KR. Political parties have 
succeeded in establishing a collective national feeling, but have failed to transfer this 
sentiment into a coherent national identity. Political mobilization and participation via 
political parties perpetuate the rhetoric of nationalism although on the ground they serve the 
parties’ sectional interests. One important reason for this failure is the weight of history in 
the second half of the twentieth century. It was the history of political parties more than the 
history of a whole nation. This type of thinking still exists in the KR. For example, when 
ISIS attacked the town of Shingal in 2014 and the Peshmarga failed to resist, part of society 
and other political parties accused the KDP of failing to protect these areas.  
According to Organski’s (1965) ‘linear’ perspective on development, in order to develop 
politically, nations pass through four stages: “the politics of primitive unification, the politics 
of industrialization, the politics of national welfare, and the politics of abundance” (Organski 
in Olton 1966:161). The first stage is the stage of nation building as the primitive and 
necessary stage towards political development. The other stages depend on the success of 
this stage. In the KR, however, as shown through this thesis, the political parties were the 
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main tool of mobilization and divided the KR according to party affiliations more than 
national loyalty.  
The hierarchy of party-government-parliament prevents political parties from being a two-
way channel of communication between people and the government and an agent to 
transform power and change political elites. The KR party system conflicts with David 
Easton’s (1957) model which had a great impact upon the structural-functional literature 
(Higgott, 1983). According to Easton, a political system consists of Inputs, Process and 
Outputs. Inputs refer to the demands and support that come through different strata of 
society, which are aggregated by various political parties and civil organisations into the 
government. The government then responds to demands according to its ability and 
resources. Independent socio-political organisations continue to accumulate demands. 
However, in the case of the KR, the government and civil organisations are dominated by 
political parties, which themselves have the role of processing demands, decision making 
and performing the role of feedback. The situation that comes into contrast with our 
definition of political development (points 2, 3 and 4) will subordinate the civil society 
organisations and undermine the institutionalisation capacity of government. 
Another challenge facing political development in the KR is that the key Kurdish political 
parties were not originally formed to participate in elections. They were movements in a 
struggle for freedom and still have military wings, their own mass media, intelligence 
agencies, and overseas representation. They were created before the establishment of the 
state-government organisations and filled up the institutional vacuum in 1992. 
Consequently, they embody state-government functions and structure. The state-government 
in the KR does not have a monopoly of force over its territory. 
As interviewees from the PUK, the KDP and the GM affirmed, the role of political parties 
needs to be reduced, if they are to develop genuine electoral or civil parties. The form of the 
main Kurdish political parties is consistent with LaPalombara and Weiner’s (1966:29) 
description of “mass externally created parties”, which are not incorporated perfectly in 
parliamentary values and have the potential to destabilize the political system. Even, where 
there is a degree of pluralism and competition, such parties reject peaceful transition of 
power. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 illustrated this problem in the KR. In the first decade of 
governing, the dominant features were internal war and dual administrations. In the second 
period, with the rise of opposition groups in 2009-2014 the protesters rejected the whole 
political system. The establishment of the eighth cabinet in 2014 led to suspension of the 
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parliament for seven months because the political parties could not agree on the division of 
posts. Even after they reached agreement on posts, the ongoing disagreement about the 
extension of the presidential term led in 2015 to the suspension of parliament. 
As a medium for political development, political parties therefore suffer from a lack of 
democratic institutionalisation. There is a wider literature on democratization which has 
many facets and dimensions. This thesis has focused mainly on the political process and 
structure; hence, the term ‘democratic’ has been used in a narrow sense and essentially to 
refer to the mechanism of elections, representation and voting procedures, and ‘non-
democratic’ has been used to refer to the ambiguity of a party’s programme (e.g. secular or 
not); the non-rotation of power inside the party; delays in holding congresses; lack of 
transparency in funding and political involvement of armed forces. As Eisenstadt (1973:30) 
pointed out, there is no necessary relationship between the multiplicity of political parties 
and their ability to introduce change and political modernization. LaPalombara (2007:141) 
echoes Eisenstadt (1973:143) in arguing that public “elections would not necessarily lead to 
democracy”. In the KR, political parties easily secure the votes in public elections by 
operating the levers of funding, recruitment and tribal influence. Participation is permitted 
but it serves party interests. Participants are passive objects rather than active subjects. 
Another problem facing political development in the KR is the lack of rotation of power. For 
political parties to contribute to development, their higher offices need to be occupied by 
modernized elites (Han, 1970). In the KR, the same elites and their families have ruled the 
country since the 1950s. The latest generation will play the same role. The findings of this 
thesis are consistent with Mirza (2007) on political discourse that the independence of 
political elites in the KR, gave them an opportunity to make decisions without any public or 
legal investigation. 
Transitions of power within government and political parties are rare. The level of criticism 
within each party does not target the first figures of each party and their families. Each party 
has an organisational structure that limits the capacity to change, even when some free 
discussions are permitted. The leadership may initiate ideas for discussion and members may 
bring ideas from below, however there is no mechanism to connect all of these ideas to 
promote creative change. According to the interviewees, in reality, the voice of the president 
is heard above the other voices and procedures of a party. 
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The results of this thesis also correspond with Fukuyama (2015) and Bromley (1997), who 
have argued that a country can build modern ‘democratic’ institutions which merely serve 
the ruling elites and not political development. In such societies, the political elites utilize 
state resources as private property  through a network of political backers such as merchants 
and urban-based intellectuals. Participation in politics does not serve the public interest, only 
individual self-enrichment. Such institutions are inefficient at supplying public goods fairly 
and properly.  
Every parliamentary election in the KR since 1992 has delivered either a fifty-fifty division 
of power or a broad based government. This has brought about stability, however it actually 
represents the defeat of the “peaceful transformation of power” between political parties 
through elections (Newton and Deth, 2010:281). There is an appetite for coalition between 
political parties, tribes and certain intelligentsia figures in order to serve the interests of 
political elites at the cost of political development.  
To what extent can the KR elites (party leadership) be said to be ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’? 
The majority of the party leaders were raised according to the traditional norms and structure 
of Kurdish society and keep their connections with the mainstream culture and social 
structure, especially via the chieftains. However, they have a good level of education and 
international experience, mostly in western societies. They understand the local society and 
the demands of the outside world and adapt themselves easily to both. They benefit from 
outside support and inside trust; at least each political party does in its area of influence. It 
has helped them to remain in power for a long period of time with the electoral support of 
the public. The modern and democratic tools of participation through elections have served 
to reinforce an old traditional socio-political system.  
Another challenge to political development is the membership of political parties. When a 
party attracts members, it plants the notion that both material and non-material existence will 
be difficult without belonging to the party. Membership appears to be voluntary but, in 
reality, it involves a form of coercion. Recruitment by political parties with the public 
services is a key factor in mass participation and electoral successes. By tying the recruitment 
of party members to both the civic and military sectors, political parties in the KR follow a 
policy of exclusion rather than inclusion, in which they exclude those who do not support 
their policy. Citizenship is limited to those who support the dominant party in its territory.    
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As a result, the whole employment process from the hiring of teachers in a primary school 
to the appointment of judges and the recruitment of soldiers becomes a political process 
which works systematically in favour of the power-holders. This type of recruitment, which 
Rush (1992:130) calls “agency-recruited”, refers to office-holding via the mediation of 
others and especially by political parties. The phenomenon underlines the fragmentation of 
the political system and the penetration by parties of the bureaucracy to become a ‘party-
ocracy’2. It narrows the opportunities for innovation and change, and restricts the space for 
other interpretations. Periodically, the activities of a particular party in a specific territory 
are forbidden by the dominant political party and in time a kind of ‘hate culture’ emerges. It 
prevents political parties from becoming nation-wide bodies. 
In short, the main political parties and elites have stayed in power with mass support and 
regional monopolies of economic organisations and recruitment. They represent traditional 
culture and structure more than the modern values of political development. In this respect, 
the function of political parties in the KR contrasts sharply with the tendency of political 
development theories to consider political parties as the main instrument of political 
development in new states (Jackson, 1966). For political development to occur it is necessary 
to transcend these normative and simplified abstractions and embrace a more pragmatic 
view. 
Internal Factors: The Tribal Base Obstacle 
As noted earlier McDowell (2007:14) has argued that the state and tribes are incompatible: 
States are static, intent on exercising a monopoly of power within a defined territory. 
They require an urban dimension, which embodies a bureaucracy and culture based 
upon the written word…. Tribes operate on kinship ideology and territoriality; the latter 
includes both established villages but also more fluid ideas that no state could entertain. 
                                                 
2 Calise (1994:442-443) in a study of whether the political system in Italy is presidential or parliamentary, 
argues that “Italy is neither a presidential nor a parliamentary regime: Italy is a particracy, a term that, much 
as it might appear self-evident, calls for some specification”. For him ‘particracy’ or party government “is a 
form of government where a party holds monopolistic control over the governmental process” (p:444). Calise 
used the term “partitocrazia” to describe the political situation of Italy at the time. There are some similarities 
between this type of party system in Italy and the KR: both are multiparty systems and parties participate in 
election competitions. However, what distinguishes the KR party system is that each of the two major parties 
dominates a specific geographical area and all the key political parties have their own armed forces, intelligence 
services and some public services. For further discussion of particracy, see Lorch (1994); Pious (1994); Pelloni 
and Savioli (2015).  
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McDowell represents a typical view by saying that the modern state is incompatible with 
tribal society. However, as has been illustrated in Chapter 8, the relationship is more complex 
than this standard view suggests. In the Iraqi state, due to the state’s inability to monopolise 
power, the state co-operates with, and shares power with tribes, and grants them economic 
privileges. In the KR, as the authority of the Iraqi government was replaced by the power of 
political parties the parties extended various privileges to the tribes to the extent that they 
would serve party interests but not threaten them. Tribes have become genuine partners in 
governance.  
Chieftains carry out certain legal duties in co-operation with the ruling parties. Thus, the 
bureaucratic system is divided between the political parties, government and tribes. For 
instance, instead of using the Personal Status Law, issues such as honour crimes, polygamy 
(which is forbidden by law) or tribal and land disputes, may be resolved by applying 
traditional justice in co-operation with official bodies. The government is therefore not the 
ultimate source of power (neither is the army or the bureaucracy); it has to co-operate with 
other rival sources (Diamond, 2004). The key feature is that this power sharing is mediated 
by a political party, which means that in the KR, politics is a hybrid type between tribal and 
party/government (Rowton, 1973). It allows a degree of autonomy to both the tribes and 
government, but on the condition that the dominant political parties maintain sovereignty 
over them (party-ocracy). The equation favours both the political parties and tribes, but does 
not favour institutionalisation as an aspect of political development.  
Geographically, the division of the KR in the mid-1990s, helped to reinforce the ties between 
the tribes and political parties. The level of political and economic advantages as well as the 
geographical location of a tribe, determine which alliances are made between tribes and 
parties.  
Public elections are another tool to strengthen ties. Political parties nominate a tribal figure 
as a political representative of both the tribe and the party on one hand, and use this to prevent 
coalitions between the tribe and the party’s rivals on the other. Tribalism has been revitalized 
as a source of social identity, mass mobilization and participation. The arrangements present 
a democratic appearance to the outside world.  
It is clear, however, that hybrid politics conflicts with the nation building process. As 
Romano (2006:27) pointed out, Kurdish political elites are “more tribal or sectarian than 
nationalist”. On the national level, socio-political identity is fluid between national, tribal, 
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local and party elements. This corresponds with Cole’s (1982) definition of tribes as 
“groupings of people who use the idiom of kinship to explain their solidarity, recognizing, 
however, that they are integrally part of a wider society and culture not based on kinship” 
(Cole in Alshawi and Gardner, 2013:50).   
This type of co-operation works through ascribed status, especially among incumbents to the 
government and parliamentary offices. The political parties nominate influential figures to 
stand in public elections, who come from backgrounds such as Mullah, chieftains or their 
relatives, or offspring of well-known cadres of a political party. Their ascriptive status 
appears to shift into achieved status through their electoral success. In fact, this shift is 
simply the replacement of an older generation with their offspring by using political parties 
and elections3. If the tribe is to be considered “as a mechanism for asserting social power” 
(Alshawi and Gardner, 2013: 46) this power is not formed in the framework of a modern 
civic organization that includes individuals from different backgrounds but is rather built on 
the shared power of individuals of the same community.  
Some social changes have weakened the socio-political power of tribes. They include 
urbanisation, forced settlements and the intrusion of non-native cultures either through the 
mass media, the Kurds in the diaspora, trade or (I)NGOs. However, tribes still are powerful 
socio-political units in the KR. One reason is that, if the state-government as an overarching 
authority fails, which happened in the KR both before and after the uprising, citizens will 
rely on the other smaller entities such as tribal communities. In such situations of state-
government weakness, the role of chieftains, Mukhtars and Rish Spee, will increase as  they 
coordinate between villages or the members of a tribe to protect themselves from external 
threats.  
When the social fabric is considered in relation to the physical geography and the type of 
economy of the KR, the consequences for political development became even clearer. As 
explained in Chapter One, the KR has both plains and mountains. In such a geography, if 
the political authority obstructs industrialisation, as happened in the Ba’ath regime, the main 
activity will be traditional farming (mainly in plain areas) and husbandry (mainly in 
mountainous areas). With a lack of advanced tools for planting and harvesting, the members 
                                                 
3 There are some similarities with western democratic systems. In the UK, for example, the expression ‘old 
boys club’ refers to a particular type of social and educational background. However, the problem for political 
development occurs when this phenomenon becomes a general mechanism to secure government and political 
offices without adequate scrutiny. 
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of a village work together to help each other. Until now, this kind of farming has remained 
a feature of the agricultural sector in the KR. It reinforces feelings of attachment to traditional 
structures (family, village and tribal ties). With the return of government influence in tribal 
areas especially via public services, the collective agricultural system has reduced somewhat 
in importance but the authority of the chieftain, Mukhtar and Rish Spee may still exist.  
In this context, political parties oscillate between democratic rhetoric and supporting tribal 
values to remain in power. Support for the tribal fabric and figures by the political parties 
themselves, leads to a preference for sub-loyalties rather than national loyalty. Sub-loyalties 
impact negatively on the government and parliamentary performance. More importantly, it 
means that other sub-identities have the space to flourish (such as local, tribal, Soranian, 
Badinian identities, various dialects, as well as political party identities) they compete with 
national identity and often in practise rank above it. 
To sum up, internally, the main problem facing political development is the type of mass 
participation, the kind of relationship between parties and political structures (government 
and parliament), and between them and the social fabric. They all have a negative impact on 
the structure of the political and bureaucratic system and keep the political elites in power. 
The structure and formation of both society and its political parties leads internally to less 
openness and stagnation, which reduces the capacity for mobility, adaptation and innovation. 
External Factors 
In his overview of the development process, Hyden (2003) states that external factors play 
an important role. The two most important in the KR are financial dependency (especially 
foreign aid) and influence of neighbouring countries. As Chapter One explained, the 
majority of the KR’s funds come from outside the region. Its financial dependency is the 
combined result of poor internal political performance, external aid programmes and the 
KR’s budget share from Baghdad. One negative consequence of this dependency has been 
the destruction of the agricultural sector and the need to import the main subsistence 
commodities from abroad.  
In the first period (1992-2003), the KR’s source of income was petro-dollars, donations from 
INGOs and foreign countries, UN organizations and in the middle of this period the OFFP. 
However, it was not ‘country-built aid’ to rebuild the region’s infrastructure. As Barakat 
(2005) and Brynen (2000) have argued, foreign aid can have both harmful and useful 
consequences. Outcomes depend on the types of plans that originate in the recipient societies 
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and the aims of the donor states. According to a report at the beginning of the establishment 
of the KR, approximately 70% of the population relied on foreign aid in the form of 
humanitarian assistance (Bauer, 2015). Bauer explains:  
The huge financial and humanitarian assistance had a problematic side effect. It created 
a new type of economy, providing those groups with power who had access to the aid 
supplies. The strengthening of these local groups - many of them deploying their own 
militias - had a negative impact on the Kurdish population’s cohesion (p:143).  
This foreign aid became part of an OFFP programme and inflated the size of the government, 
as more than 90% of Iraqi revenue (including the KR) is derived from oil. The Iraqi 
government still sells oil and buys foodstuffs. According to a report published in Middle 
East Politics about Iraq, the government currently supplies 99.7% of the food consumed by 
all families (Springborg, 2015:115). Other economic sectors have stagnated because of the 
oil industry.  
For political development to occur, the political authorities of the recipient state must be 
willing to invest the aid and encourage stability and development. However, the terminology, 
aims and forms of aid vary considerably, reflecting different strategies: recovery, 
development, humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, rebuilding and reconstruction. In some 
countries the purpose of aid is relief and prevention of poverty, in others the aim is 
development, establishment of democracy and the rule of law. In other cases, people receive 
aid through political parties (Barakat, 2005; Brynen, 2000; Natali: 2010; Carapico, 2002).  
In the case of the KR, the main aim of aid was to preserve regional stability and security 
among the neighbouring countries which had experienced a Kurdish influx in 1991. Aid was 
granted in the name of humanitarian assistance, causing the KR to become a market for 
foreign goods. People received aid via a network of political parties, chieftains, local 
agencies and sometimes in the form of agricultural tools and livestock. It can be concluded 
that the purpose of aid to the KR was not political development or the establishment of 
powerful and democratic political institutions or improving economic sector.  
Foreign aid in the framework of the OFFP, as Natali (2010) has argued, did not target the 
construction of infrastructures, either by the two Kurdish administrations or by international 
agencies. Instead, it fostered corruption and inequalities in the distribution of wealth. Foreign 
aid has long been considered a possible contributor to economic growth (Chenery and Strout, 
1966). However, it is questionable how far it can bring about democratic political and social 
change. Economic growth without change in the socio-political institutions increases 
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inequality and prepares the way for violence (Wurfel, 1959:456-457). These outcomes have 
been displayed frequently up to the formation of the sixth cabinet and have been met with 
the demand: ‘equality in the distribution of wealth’. 
In a study of foreign aid to different countries between 1975 to 2000, Knack (2004) found 
out that it impacts negatively on the accountability and responsibility of government towards 
citizens, spreads corruption and conflict over the source of aid, and weakens the bureaucratic 
system and the rule of law. There is an inverse relationship between the level of aid and the 
quality of government performance. Knack (2001) argues that, in aid recipient countries, the 
public sector workers became deskilled and bureaucracy increases as government 
responsibility towards its citizens is reduced. Skills are concentrated in foreign civil 
organizations. Carapico (2002:379) also argues that foreign aid received directly by NGOs, 
political parties and other social and educational organizations, which he calls “extra-
governmental channels”, undermines the authority of government by creating reliance on 
foreign agencies and states; even if the ostensible purpose of the aid is to democratize the 
political system.  
The evidence in this thesis shows that foreign aid and then oil revenue strengthened the hand 
of party rulers to the detriment of indigenous economic development. The establishment of 
the KRG, which coincided with the supply of food by INGOs, deepened the competition 
between the PUK and the KDP in their aim to benefit from the food suppliers (Natali, 2010). 
By controlling sources of revenue, the parties pursued the policy of recruiting from the rural 
population to their civic and military sectors and government organisations. 
When the previous opposition participated in the coalition government (the eighth cabinet) 
they released evidence of corruption in various sectors and ministries, but this did not lead 
to prosecutions. For example, documents released in 2014 showed that various political 
parties ‘employed’ more than 100,000 of their members in ministries without any duties. In 
February 2016, the fiscal deficit triggered by a decreasing oil price and cutting off the KR 
budget by Baghdad forced the KRG to reduce its employees’ salaries from 15% to 75% 
(KRG, 2016b).   
Recent data confirms the devastating effect of relying on outside sources of income and oil 
revenue. According to ministry sources, in 2003 approximately 35% of the KR’s total 
population relied on agriculture as their main source of income, while in 2014, it had dropped 
to 6.63%. The annual subvention by government to this sector is $US250 million (Kurdistan 
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Review, 2014:153-155; Ministry of Planning, 2014:39). This occurred during the period 
since 2003, when reconstruction of the entire Iraqi agricultural system, and diversification 
of the economy was a strategy of the coalition countries (Looney, 2003).  
In brief, the KR’s financial capacity and its lack of autonomy in the economic sphere have 
hindered its development. It is important to add that government policies, especially after 
2003, were ineffective. It was the period when doors opened for the KRG to participate in 
international trade and rebuild its domestic economic sectors, but this opportunity was 
ignored by relying on oil as a main industry. 
The other main external factor in political development is the influence of neighbouring 
countries. As Kagan (2015:21) says “politics follows geopolitics”. In the establishment of 
the relationships with other countries, the KRG suffers from two fundamental weaknesses. 
Firstly, being part of the Iraqi state limits the KRG’s ability to broaden its relationships 
independently. Foreign countries often prefer to establish relationships with the KR through 
the Baghdad government. The exception to this is the period after 2009, which coincided 
with the discovery of oil in the KR and the growing strength of the Shi’a in Baghdad, which 
strengthened the role of Iran. One reason for countries to avoid making a direct relationship 
is that it may encourage the religious and ethnic minorities of the neighbouring countries to 
seek their political rights. This would create instability in the wider region and impact 
negatively on trade and especially, energy security. This highlights the fact that the degree 
of development is related to the level of stability and development of the neighbouring states 
and the extent to which they intervene in each others’ internal issues.  
Secondly, even before the establishment of the KRG in 1992, the political parties had their 
own offices abroad for relations with governments and institutions. This undermines the 
government’s capacity to engage in international relations. Even the KRG’s official foreign 
representation offices, which were established in 2006, are divided between the PUK and 
the KDP. 
The relationship between the KR and Turkey reflects the change of regime in Iraq in 2003, 
which constitutionally strengthened the KR. Turkey responded to this by changing the 
emphasis from military-security to economic-political relationships. Turkey did not 
officially recognize the KR, but it recognized that the change of the regime in Iraq gave a 
better opportunity to Turkey to achieve its goals through improved relationships with the KR 
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(Larrabee, 2007). Future relationships between the two will be shaped by upheavals in the 
wider region and Turkey’s stance towards its own population of Kurds.  
It is important to note the factors that impelled Turkey to follow a peace policy within the 
its own borders. They include the Arab Spring, Shi’a domination in the regional context, 
especially in Iraq after the withdrawal of the USA troops from Iraq in 2011, the deterioration 
of the relationship between Ankara and Baghdad, and the PKK threat to Turkish security 
enhanced by backing from the Shi’a governments of Iran. For this policy to succeed, the 
Turkish government needs the support of the KRG as a mediator between Turkey and the 
PKK.  
Hydrocarbon resources in the KR are another factor in the approach of Turkey to the KRG 
(Cagaptay and Evans, 2012). In the above list of factors, only energy is within the territory 
of the KR; the others are out of the control of the KRG. However, even energy is a volatile 
factor. With the halt to the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in mid-summer 2015, 
the PKK blew up the oil pipeline that carries oil from the KR to the global market. The 
energy relationship depends on the stability or instability of relations between the Turkish 
government and the PKK, the PKK and the KRG. However, as an independent state and the 
gateway for the KR to the outside world, Turkey has the upper hand in dealing with the KR. 
Another point of weakness in the relationship between the KRG and Turkey is that political 
parties in the KR believe that the relationship between both sides is the relationship between 
the KDP and the AKP (Turkey ruling party), which has not been institutionalized. As 
illustrated in Chapter 9, this assumption encouraged the PUK to strengthen its relationships 
with Iran. This can be seen in the speech of Baram Majeed Khan, a PUK advisor on Iranian 
affairs: 
Iran is worried about the fact that the Kurdistan Region has strong economic and 
commercial ties with Turkey…. Iran feels that Turkey has crept into the Kurdistan Region 
more than it should (Idiz, 2013). 
It means that the future of the relationship between Turkey and the KRG-KDP may deepen 
the political rivalry between the political parties in the KR.   
Like Turkey, Iran sees the KR as an arena of challenges and opportunities. Since its 
establishment in 1992, the KR has become a market for Iranian goods. However, maintaining 
security is the main challenge for Iranian policy. Before 2003, Iran dealt with the KR directly 
without the mediation of the Iraqi government. Subsequently, with the Shi’a domination of 
the Iraqi government, Iran has tried to establish a strong central government in Iraq to 
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weaken the KR (Barzegar, 2008: 50-51; Barzegar, 2010). Iran now follows a dual policy 
towards the KR, which is based on the type of government in Baghdad on the one hand, and 
the forms of regional and supra-regional power relations in the KR, on the other.  
A similar analysis can be made of the relationships between Iran and the KRG as was made 
of the relationship between Turkey and the KRG. Instead of being a relationship between 
two governments, the relationship is more between the PUK and Iran. Hiwa Osman, an 
analyst of Iraqi and Kurdish affairs pointed out that  
It's their geopolitics [the PUK and the KDP] that dictates their decisions…. The difference 
is understandable: The KDP lives on the border with Syria, the Islamic State [IS] and 
Turkey. The PUK lives on the borders of Iran and [the rest of] Iraq and has no borders 
with Turkey (Salih, 2015). 
In fact, the non-state status of the KR has opened the hand of its political parties to establish 
international relationships independently and to pursue their own interests; and it allowed 
neighbouring countries to intervene in the KR’s domestic issues. The struggle between 
political parties and personalities often shapes these relationships. Connections with the 
neighbouring countries are party/personalised rather than state/government and 
institutionalised.  
Compared to Turkey, the relationship with Iran is more problematic. As explained in Chapter 
9, Iran deals with the KRG through a combination of diplomatic and military channels. Even 
in the internal war, Iran provided the PUK with weapons against the KDP. The majority of 
Iran’s construction projects in the KR are by the “Bonyad Foundation”, which belongs to 
the Islamic Revolution Guard, called Sepah (Eisenstadt et al, 2011:12). The oil trade between 
Iran and the KRG depends on road tankers. Iran thinks that setting up an oil pipeline between 
Iran and the KRG will weaken the federal government of Iraq. Politically, Iran prefers to 
maintain relationships via political parties rather than the KRG or keep it at the lowest level 
through low ranking officials. An exception was that after an ISIS attack, the Iranian 
parliament speaker visited the KR. Iran has Consulates in both Erbil and Slemani. Most visits 
and meetings occur with leaders of political parties (not only the PUK and the KDP), not the 
KRG. However, the main problem for political development is that Iran is one of the “Big 
Five” countries (China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) that acts “to halt or 
reverse the advance of democracy” in regional and international settings (Walker, 2015:20).   
Relationships with Iran and Turkey have been a double burden for the KRG in its attempts 
to reconcile economic requirements and political freedom. Further, it has to bear the 
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consequences of competition between regional and supra-regional powers in the KR, which 
impacts on its stability and instability (Gunter, 1998). 
To sum up, the future of political development in the KR is uncertain. The findings of this 
study show that the contributing factors are the political upheavals in the KR between 1992 
and 2014, the rise of ISIS, the cutting off of the KR budget by the Bagdad government, the 
drop in the oil price as the main source of revenue, and the influx of nearly two million 
refugees into the KR. In the political sphere, the underlying theme is the deep rivalry between 
political parties. The multiparty system and periodic general elections have not guaranteed 
effective government. While the period from 1992 to 2014 can be considered as a transitional 
period, the current signals are not in favour of actual political development. The changes that 
have occurred do not originate from the elite’s political will but from pressures from below 
or from external economic and political upheavals. 
The KR is living in a constitutional vacuum and the major laws passed by the parliament 
carry different interpretations according to which party is in power. Demands for reform 
often remain as political rhetoric. Each party displays features of mass mobilization, militia 
organisation and cadre discipline. Each party in power, whether alone or in coalition, 
employs its own members in government offices, which means that equal opportunity is 
absent. Collusion between political parties, chieftains and religious figures has weakened the 
performance of government and parliament. International relationships are mostly party-led; 
and because of the lack of institutionalisation (or nationalization) these relationships often 
deepen the struggle between political parties.  
All the findings confirm that, in the KR, to achieve political development it is necessary for 
a parliament to be established that has the power of surveillance over government. A type of 
government needs to be established that has the power to monitor and regulate the political, 
economic and military spheres and the ability to represent the KR. This aim cannot be 
achieved until the political parties are transformed into civic parties. Thus far, the political 
parties of the KR have not been open enough to respond to the requirements of political 
development. Economic diversity and a secular social context are other requirements. Some 
obstacles can overcome internally, such as the implementation of law and rotation of power 
if there is political will. However, some of them are less controllable by the KRG, and 
especially neighbouring countries’ policies. However, the fate of the political development 
of the KR is not totally subservient to its geopolitical circumstances, internal policy has a 
role to play in changing this fate. The problem of political development in the KR is that 
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endogenous government lacks the capacity for development and that powerful exogenous 
factors escape the control of this endogenous government.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix1: Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement 
January 21 2006 
The supreme interest of the people of the Kurdistan Region, today more than at any other 
time, requires that its citizens further unite their energies and capabilities. We face serious 
and delicate issues in the period ahead when the future of the Kurdistan Region will be 
decided as we move through the development of a democratic and federal Iraq.  
We must secure and guarantee the historic achievements of our people and the realization of 
our full and just rights by putting in place and implementing the permanent Constitution, 
establishing a genuine federal and democratic Iraq; restoring Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, 
Makhmour, and other Arabized areas to the embrace of the Kurdistan Region, and 
developing and growing the democratic experience in the Kurdistan Region with further 
strengthening of stability and liberty through the creation of a lasting unification of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government.  
For these reasons, The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), on the basis of partnership, consensus and equity, agreed to the following: 
1. A New post of Vice President of the Region will be established by amendment to the Law 
of the Presidency of the Region. The Vice President will be from the PUK and will also 
serve as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Region.  
2. The Prime Minister and his Deputy will be identified by the Kurdistan National Assembly 
(KNA) and will be charged by the President of the Kurdistan Region with forming a joint 
cabinet. The Prime Minister will submit the names of his cabinet to the KNA.  
3. The Speaker of the KNA will be from the PUK and the Prime Minister will be from the 
KDP until the next election of the KNA at the end of 2007. For the next election, the KDP 
and PUK will participate in a joint slate as equals, and at that time the post of the Speaker of 
the KNA will go to the KDP and the Prime Minister will be from the PUK. This will be for 
two years. After that, the KDP and PUK will rotate the posts of Speaker and Prime Minister. 
If by the end of 2007 elections are not conducted due to delay, the posts of Speaker and 
Prime Minster will rotate.  
4. If either of the ministerial blocs withdraws from the joint cabinet, the entire cabinet will 
be considered as resigned.  
5.The ministerial posts will be divided as follows:  
  a) The Ministers of Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Social Affairs, Religious Affairs, 
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Water Resources, Transportation, Reconstruction, Planning, and Human Rights will be from 
the PUK.  
  b) The Ministers of Finance, Peshmerga Affairs, Higher Education, Agriculture, Martyrs, 
Culture, Electricity, Natural Resources, Municipalities, Sports and Youth, and Minister of 
Region for the affairs of areas outside the Region will be from the KDP.  
  c) The remaining ministries will be assigned to other parties of the Kurdistan Region.  
  d) The Ministries of Finance, Peshmerga Affairs, Justice, and Interior should unite within 
one year. These four ministries, until they unite, will have both a cabinet minister and a 
minister of the region for the affairs of the concerned ministry. Each minister will have 
responsibility for the part of the ministry which is currently under their control.  
6. The budget of 2006 will be managed as it has been decided, but the share of the budget of 
the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, the KNA, the Council of Ministers, and the Judicial 
Council, and any other joint items from each side will be allocated equally. Afterwards, in 
the coming years, the Kurdistan regional budget will be prepared by the unified KRG and 
submitted to the KNA. After approval, the budget will be allocated to various areas 
according to population percentage and agreement within the unified KRG.  
7. Under the auspices of the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region there will be established a 
Supreme Commission to institutionalize the police and security agencies of the Kurdistan 
Region. These united agencies will be removed from political considerations. After the 
unified KRG takes office in the capital of the Kurdistan Region, Erbil, a special program 
will be instituted for university graduates with the aim of recruiting new candidates to the 
security services of the governorates for the sake of unification and re-establishment of these 
important agencies for our people.  
8. The KRG representations abroad, according to agreement of both the KDP and PUK, will 
be assigned by the Prime Minster and his Deputy.  
9. In all the Governorates of the Kurdistan Region a joint committee will be established 
between the KDP and PUK to resolve issues as they may arise.  
10. Both sides, KDP and PUK, will present Mr. Jalal Talabani as their candidate for the 
sovereign post in the Iraqi Federal Government.  
Masoud Barzani, President, KDP  
Jalal Talabani, Secretary General, PUK 
Source: KRG,http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?r=223&l=12&a=8891&s=02010100&s=010000 (accessed: 15 
July 2013). 
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Appendix 2: The Participant Information Form 
COLEG BUSNES, Y GYFRAITH, ADDYSG A GWYDDORAU 
CYMDEITHAS 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, LAW, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
The Participant Information Form 
 
Title of research:  The title of this research is “The obstacle to political development in the 
Kurdistan region: 1991-2014”. The researcher is Hiwa Majid Khalil, Department of Social 
Science. The research is a PhD project and it is supervised by prof. Howard Davis. 
 
Reason for the research: 
Kurdistan region, a de facto entity since 1991, has established a local government, a 
multiparty system and has held various elections. However, in term of political development, 
the region faces difficulties. The academic literature on this issue and regarding the 
Kurdistan region is scarce. This research attempts to study the n-dimensionality of obstacles 
to political development in the KR. The aim of the research is to spotlight how the modern 
body of politics (political party, parliament and government) together with traditional 
features of society (tribal society) and regional governments have prevented the process of 
political development in the Kurdistan region before 1991 and 2014, and to find out reasons 
behind that. 
  
Details of participation: 
Regarding the issue of political development in the KR, there is not enough research and 
sources on this topic, hence the need for new data collection. The main method of the 
fieldwork or interview is interview with parties and parliament officials or elite interviewing. 
Several questions have been drafted about familiar cases to participants and those questions 
are the general framework of the interviews. 
Participants will normally be identified by their names, positions, and institutions. However, 
Participants’ identification details may be fully or partly anonymized if they wish. The 
interview will be recorded if participants do not object. If they prefer, the researchers will 
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take notes. Participants’ information would be used just in this research and if they agreed 
for related publications. The researcher promises to keep what participant want to be hidden 
or uncovered and to transfer knowledge and understanding with responsibility and in an 
honest and cautious way to my research. 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
Researcher Name: Hiwa Majid Khalil 
Phone: 07504636861 
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Appendix 3: Declaration Consent 
 
COLEG BUSNES, Y GYFRAITH, ADDYSG A GWYDDORAU 
CYMDEITHAS 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, LAW, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 
 
 
 
Title of research:  The title of this project is “Obstacles to political development in the 
Kurdistan region: 1991-2014”. The research, by Hiwa Majid Khalil, is for a PhD in the 
School of Social Sciences, supervised by Professor Howard Davis. 
 
DECLARATION OF CONSENT  
1. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the research 
at any time, without giving any reason.   
2. After reading the participant information form and speaking to the researcher, I am fully 
aware of the framework for the research and my role as an informant.  
3. I understand that all individual information will be held securely and used only for the 
purpose of the PhD and related publications.  
4. All questions that I have about the research have been satisfactorily answered. 
5. I agree for this research interview to be recorded and for the recording to be used for the 
purposes that have been explained to me.  
6. I understand that all the information I provide will be treated as strictly confidential.   
I agree to participate.                                   Participant’s signature:   
Participant’s name:                                       Date:   
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Appendix 4: Interview Questions 
Political Parties 
Factual/ questions 
1. What were/are your posts inside the party and outside the party? 
2. What are the privileges of being a member of a party compared with an ordinary person 
who is not a member of a party?   
3. In employing your members in official posts, to what extent do you consider his/her 
personal qualities and social background?  
4. Who does your party represent? Is it a certain strata or class of society? 
5. Why is your party more powerful in the Badinan area than the Soranin area or vice versa? 
Even your party (Gorran and the PUK and the Islamic League) has not gained any 
parliamentary seats in the Badinan area. Does this mean the political parties of the region 
are to some extent more local rather than national? 
6. Is politics in the KR always a zero sum game? Which means if I win, you lose?  
7. How would you describe the party system in the KRG?  Is it a multi-party system? 
especially by looking at economic sector that mainly has been controlled by the KDP and 
PUK) 
The connection between army and political parties 
8. Who is the army for? 
9. Who is or what are the main obstacle(s) behind forming a national army? Or how should 
the Peshmerga military develop to become a national army? 
Questions about a relationship between political party and tribes 
10. Kurdistan society to some extent is a tribal one and by looking at your party’s 
parliamentary candidate list, there were names of tribal members that were nominated for 
parliament. What is your relationship with the tribes?  
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11. As you know, the tribal norms often come into conflict with developmental norms, which 
means that to a high extent the political parties’ have a responsibility to do something in this 
respect. Why don’t you try to take action towards reducing this impact? 
Internal Decision making process and leader issue 
12. What is the system of decision making inside the party? 
13. Why doesn’t the phenomenon of succession of leadership exist inside the political party 
at the level of leadership? Does this mean that the party will be more based on 
personalization or family links? 
14. Some people say that the concentration of personal power is conducive to corruption. Do 
you agree? 
Party and society 
15. Many citizens say that the parties are no more than a means to get money or do business. 
So, how should your political party engage with social and political development?  
16. By each party having such a huge mass media (TV, newspapers, radio, magazines, 
websites and …) in which they compete sharply, do you think that the media divides society 
more than they unifies it? 
Financial question 
17. Where does your party funding come from? 
Religion question 
18.  What is your connection with religion? Is your party a secular party or non-secular?  
Parliament questions 
Simple question 
19. What were/are your posts inside the party and outside the party? 
The process of decision making 
20. According to the internal system of parliament, all members have the right to nominate 
him/herself for the parliament assembly (the president, vice president and secretary) and who 
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gains the majority of votes can run these positions. However, in all previous terms, these 
positions were distributed according to the political agreements between political parties and 
outside of parliament. What is your opinion about this?    
21. Does the parliament make laws and resolutions by itself or primarily do the political 
parties’ bureaus discuss these issues between themselves? For example, the constitution and 
presidential issue discussed in bureaus and then in parliament. 
22. To what extent did the parliament members succeed to be independent in decision 
making or were they often under his/her party’s influence? Because often or in the majority 
of times, all members of a list vote against or for a resolution. 
23. What is your connection with your place and people?  
The connection between parliament and government 
24. Have you as an individual ever voted against your party’s policy? why? 
The budget issue 
25. Why has the parliament still not been successful in passing a law to regulate parties’ 
activities and especially their funding?  
26. Many believe that the government does not regulate the budgetary issue of political 
parties because this step might be an action towards reducing the social and political 
hegemony of some parties on the public sphere. To what extent do you agree?  
27. A lot of the national budget is allocated to the parliamentary members. They have many 
privileges, such as receiving vehicles, houses, body guards and high salaries and pensions. 
Do you consider this as a kind of corruption?  
Government Questions 
Factual Question  
28. What were/are your posts in the party and outside the party? 
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Relationship between government and parties 
29. As we know the cabinet since 2005 is a coalition cabinet between parties that are still 
struggling. To what extent did this struggle between political parties inside the government 
aid them to gain their own interests thus creating a barrier to the government’s performance? 
30. Many times ministers of each party are engaged in the affairs of their party’s dominant 
areas. This can be seen in their visits and meetings that the PUK’s ministers have focused 
more on the green zone and the KDP’s on the yellow zone. Can government succeed in 
removing the boundaries of the two administrations?  
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Appendix 7: The Interviewees Duties in the periods 1992-2014. 
Abdilselam Berwari 
Counsellor of Deputy Speaker in the fourth term of the parliament. MP of the third term, 
administrator of the KDP’s Committee (Liq) in Austria. Chief of the KDP’s media, 
administrator of the USA Committee (Liq). Chief of the Gollan and Xebat media 
organization. Chief of political files in the KDP’s president office, chief of the KDP’s 
Academic Studies (interview: 19 June 2014). 
Adnan Osman 
Manager of the Hawlati newspaper, Manager of the Rojname Newspaper, MP of the GM in 
the third term of the parliament (interview: 6 July 2014). 
Amina Zikri 
MP of the third and fourth term, member of KDP’s Committee (Liq) in Dohuk, member of 
the executive assembly in the KDP’s Womens’ Union, the chief of the Dohuk Institution for 
Political Issues (interview: 2 April 2014). 
Bayan Ahmad (Barwary) 
The IU’s Political Bureau member, chief of the IU’s womens’ office. MP of the third term 
of parliament (interview: 6 June 2014). 
Haydar Esmail Abdullah 
MP of the first term, Member of the Organising Office of the PUK, Deputy of the Erbil 
Committee (Melbend), member of the Democratic Organization Office (interview:13 May 
2014). 
Hishyar Abid 
The organiser of the Badinan Room, which is in charge of the Duhok and Mosul Provinces. 
Member of the National Assembly of the GM (interview: 30 June 2014). 
Ibrahim Ali Haji Malo 
The chieftain of the Mizori tribe, which consists of 111 villages (interview: 29 March 2014). 
Ihsan Abdullah (Amedi) 
Member of the KDP’s Committee (Liq) in Dohuk. Chief of Organization Office in Dohuk. 
MP of the second term (interview: 2 April 2014). 
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Karim Bahri Bradost 
Member of the Democratic Organization Office of the PUK. Chief of the Lawyers’ 
Syndicate. MP of the second term of parliament (interview: 12 May 2014). 
Kwestan Muhamad Abdulla 
MP of the second term in the PUK list. MP of the third term in the GM list (interview: 14 
July 2014). 
Layla Amir 
MP of the third term of the KDP. A member the Student Union Secretary (interview: 25 June 
2014). 
Mohamad Haji 
The chief of the GM’s political relationship. Member of the National Assembly (interview: 
13 May 2014). 
Mohamad Mulla Qader 
The previous member of the KDP’s Political Bureau. Member of the Central Committee in 
the Eylol and Gollan revolution. Chief of the KDP’s Dohuk Committee. Chief of the KDP’s 
Erbil Committee. Minister in the first cabinet. Chief of the KDP’s cabinet (1995-1996). MP 
of the first term of parliament (interview: 10 June 2014). 
Muhamad Ra’auf 
chief of Leadership Assembly of the IU. Member of the IU list in the Governing Council in 
Baghdad. The minister in the fifth cabinet. A businessman (interview: 6 June 2014). 
Na’amat Abdullah 
The MP of the second term of parliament in the KDP list. The head of the Parliamentarians 
Syndicate (12 May 2015). 
Nahla Mohammad Sa’adulah 
MP of the second term of parliament in the PUK list. Member of the Organising Office 
(interview: 12 May 2014). 
Omer Nuraldini 
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MP of the third term of parliament in the KDP list. The head of the KDP bloc in parliament. 
Lecturer at Salahaddin University, department of political science. Member of Organizing 
of the the Central Committee (interview: 6 April 2014). 
Sa’adi Ahmad Pira 
The head of the PUK bloc in the first parliamentary term. Minister of Agriculture. Minister 
of Health and Social Affairs. Minister of Relationships and Humanitarian Affairs. Political 
Bureau member. Chief of the PUK’s International Relationship (Interview on 14 May 2014). 
Salahaddin Babaker 
The IU’s Political Bureau member. The Leadership Committee member. Member of the 
Planning Board of the IU. Deputy General Secretary of the IU. Minister in the eighth cabinet 
(interview on 8 June 2014). 
Sarbest Dewali 
The chieftain of the Dosky tribe, which consists of 124 villages (30 March 2014). 
Saro Qadir 
Member of the Communist party before the uprising. Chief of the logistic relationship 
between Afghanistan and the USSR. Chief of the Gollan foundation. Chief of the Media 
office. Leadership Committee member. Counsellor of the KDP’s president. Head of the 
Institute for Research and Development- Kurdistan (Interview on 7 June 2014). 
Tariq Jambaz 
The head of the PUK bloc in the first term of parliament. MP in the second term of parliament 
(interview 12 May 2014). 
Zakia Sayd Salih 
Chief of the KDP’s Womens’ Union in Dohuk. Member of the Dohuk Municipal. 
Government and organisations coordinator with the WFO. The KSP’s MP of the second term 
(interview: 3 June 2014).  
Zana Rostai 
Leadership member of the IL. Chief of Training and Development Academy of the IL. Chief 
of the Balwez organization for human development. Member of the Parliamentarians 
Syndicate. MP of the third term of the KR parliament. MP of the third term in the Iraqi 
parliament (interview: 12 May 2014).  
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 ناونیشانی توژینەوە:
''. توێژەری ئەم بابەتە ٤١٠٢-١٩٩١ناونیشانی ئەم بابەتە بریتییە لە '' بەربەستەکانی گەشەسەندنی سیاسی لە هەرێمی کوردستان: 
'هیوا مەجید خەلیل'ە لە بەشی زانستە کۆمەڵایەتیەکانی زانکۆی بەنگۆر. تۆژینەوەکە نامەی دکتۆرایە بە سەرپەرشتی پرۆفیسۆر 
 'هاوارد دێڤیس'.
 دەربڕین: رەزامەندی
 .من بە خۆبەخشانە بەشدارم لەم چاوپێکەوتنەدا و هەرکاتێک کە ویستم دەتوانم کۆتایی بە چاوپێکەوتنەکە بێنم.١
. دوای خوێندنەوەی فۆرمی زانیاری بەشدار بووان و گفتوگۆ لەگەڵ توێژەردا، من ئاگاداری چوارچێوەی توێژینەوەکە و رۆڵی ٢
 خۆم وەک بەشداربووەک.
ارم کە زانیارییەکان بە ئەمانەتەوەو مامەڵیان لەگەڵ دەکرێت و تەنیا بۆ نامەی دکتۆرا و بڵاوکراوە پەیوەندیدارەکان . من ئاگاد٣
 بەکار دێت.
 . گشت پرسیارەکانم سەبارەت بەم توژینەوەیە بە باشی لە لایەن توێژەرەوە وەڵام دراونەتەوە.٤
 ئامانجانەی کە بۆم باس کراون. . من رازیم کە ئەم چاوپێکەوتنە تۆمار بکرێت بۆ ئەو٥
 . من ئاگادار کراومەتەوە کە گشت زانیارییەکان لەم چاوپێکەتنەدا زۆر بە ئەمانەتەوە دەپارێزرێن.٦
 رازیم بە بەشدار بوونم:                                           واژووی بەشدار بوو:
 رێککەوت:                 ناو:                                              
 
  ROGNAB LOGSYFIR
 ,NEWGO DDAUEN
  ,ROGNAB
  YTISREVINU ROGNAB
 ,GNIDLIUB  NEWGO
  ,ROGNAB
 NOSNIBOR .A ENIREHTAC ROSSEFORP/ORHTA RY
  LOOHCS FO DAEH/LOGSY RY HTEANNEP 
   GD2 75LL ,DDENYWG  GD2 75LL ,DDENYWG
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 5651411
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 UARODDYWG A GSYDDA ,HTIARFYG Y ,SENSUB GELOC
 SAHTIEDMYC
 LAICOS DNA NOITACUDE ,WAL ,SSENISUB FO EGELLOC
 SECNEICS
 
 فۆرمی زانیاری بەشداربووان
''. ٤١٠٢-١٩٩١گەشەسەندنی سیاسی لە هەرێمی کوردستان:ناونیشانی توژینەوە: ناونیشانی ئەم بابەتە بریتییە لە '' بەربەستەکانی 
توێژەری ئەم بابەتە 'هیوا مەجید خەلیل'ە لە بەشی زانستە کۆمەڵایەتیەکانی زانکۆی بەنگۆر. تۆژینەوەکە نامەی دکتۆرایە بە 
 سەرپەرشتی پرۆفیسۆر 'هاوارد دێڤیس'.
 ئامانجەکانی تۆژینەوە
ەوە، حکومەتێکی خۆجێی دامەزراندوە و خاوەنی سیستەمی فرەپارتیە و ١٩٩١هەرێمی کوردستان وەک هەرێمێکی دیفاکتۆ لە 
چەندین هەڵبژاردنی ئەنجام داوە. سەرەڕای ئەمەش، لە رووی گەشەسەندنی سیاسییەوە، هەرێم رووبەڕووی هەندێ گرفت 
تە کەمن. ئەم توژینەوەیە هەوڵ دەدات کە بەربەستە جۆراوجۆرەکان لەبەردەم بووەتەوە. تۆژینەوە ئاکادیمییەکان لەسەر ئەم بابە
گەشەسەندنی سیاسی لە هەرێمی کوردستاندا بخاتە ڕوو. ئەمانجی ئەم توژینەوەیە بریتییە لەوەی کە چۆن ستراکتۆرە مۆدێرنەکان 
(کۆمەڵگای خێڵەکی) و وڵاتانی هەرێمی  (پارتە سیاسییەکان، پەرلەمان و حکومەت) لەگەڵ خەسڵەتە تەقلیدییەکانی کۆمەڵگا
بەربەست لەبەردەم پرۆسەی گەشەسەندنی سیاسی لە هەرێمدا دروست دەکەن و هۆکارەکانی پشت ئەم بەربەست دروستکردنەش 
 دەخرێتە ڕوو. 
 زانیاری بەشدار بووان
پێویست لەبەر دەست نییە، بۆیە پێویستە سەبارەت بە بابەتی گەشەسەندنی سیاسی لە هەرێمی کوردستاندا، تۆژینەوە و سەرچاوەی 
داتای نوێ کۆ بکرێتەوە. لەم توێژینەوەیەدا میتودی چاوپێکەوتن لەگەڵ کادیرانی پارتە سیاسییەکان، پەرلەمانتاران و نوخبەی 
چەندین سیاسی و کەسایەتییە کۆمەڵایتیەکان گراوتەبەر. وەک چوارچێوەیەکی گشتی، کراون لەسەر بابەتە دەستنیشانکراوەکان 
پرسیار گەڵالە. بەشدار بووان لە رێگەی ناو، پلە و بەرپرسیارێتی لە دامەزراوەکاندا دەناسرێن. ئەگەر بەشداربووان خوازیار بن 
دەکرێت ئاماژە بە ناو و نیشانیان نەدرێت. بە پێی رەزامەندی بەشداربووان چاوپێکەوتنەکان تۆمار دەکرێن یا خود تەنیا تێبینیەکان 
ە. چاوپێکەوتنەکان لەم توژینەوەیەدا بەکار دێن و بە پێی رەزامەندی بەشداربووان دەکرێت بۆ بڵاوکراوەکانی داهاتوش دەنوسرێنەو
 بەکار بهێنرێن. توێژەر بەڵێن دەدات کە داتا و زانیارییەکان بە خواستی بەشدار بووان و بە ئەمانەتەوە مامەڵەیان لەگەڵدا بکرێت.
 ناو: هیوا مەجید خەلیل                                                                       واژوو: 
  moc.oohay@asayis_awih ئیمێل:                                                  ١٨٨٦٣٦٤٠٥٧٠تەلفۆن:
  ROGNAB LOGSYFIR
 ,NEWGO DDAUEN
  ,ROGNAB
  YTISREVINU ROGNAB
 ,GNIDLIUB  NEWGO
  ,ROGNAB
 NOSNIBOR .A ENIREHTAC ROSSEFORP/ORHTA RY
  LOOHCS FO DAEH/LOGSY RY HTEANNEP 
   GD2 75LL ,DDENYWG  GD2 75LL ,DDENYWG
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 hsidruK ni snoitseuQ weivretnI :01 xidneppA
 پارتە سیاسییەکان
 پرسیارە فاکتەکان
 .دەکرێت باس لە بەرپرسیارێتی یاخود پلەی خۆت لە ناوەوە و دەرەوەی پارتە سیاسییەکەتدا بکەیت؟١
 . ئەگەر کەسێک ببێت بە ئەندام پارت چ ئیمتیازاتێکی وەدەست دەکەوێت بە بەراورد لەگەڵ کەسێک کە ئەندام پارت نییە؟٢
حکومییەکان تا چەند لێهاتووی تاکەکەسی و بەکگراوەندی /. لە دامەزراندی ئەندامانی پارتەکەتان بۆ پۆستە فەرمییەکان٣
 کۆمەڵایەتی کەسەکە رەچاو دەکرێت؟
 . پارتەکەی ئێوە نوێنەرایەتی چ توێژەکی کۆمەڵگا دەکات؟ ئایا نوێنەرایەتی توێژ یان چینێکی دیارکراوی کۆمەڵایەتی دەکات؟٤
بادینان یان سۆران؟ تەنانەت هەندێ پارتی سیاسی وەک گۆڕان، یەکێتی . پارتەکەی ئێوە لە چ دەڤەرێک بە هێزترە؟ لە ناوچەی ٥
و کۆمەڵی ئیسلامی یەک کورسیشیان لە ناوچەی بادیان بە دەست نەهێناوە). ئایا ئەمە بەو مانایە ناێت کە پارتەکانی هەرێمی 
 کوردستان زۆرتر لۆکاڵین تا پارتی نیشتمانی؟
ێمی کوردستاندا گەمەیەکی سفڕییە؟ واتە ئەگەر من ببەمەوە تۆ بەتەوەاوەتی دەدۆڕێنێت . ئایا لەو بڕوایەدان کە سیاسەت لە هەر٦
 یاخود بە پێچەوانەوە؟
. بەڕای جەنابت سیستەمی پارتایەتی لە هەرێمی کوردستاندا چ جۆرە سیستەمێکە؟ ئایا سیستەمی فرە پارتایەتییە؟ ( بە تایبەتیش ٧
 ۆستە سەرکییەکان و داهات لە لایەن هەندێ پارتەوە قۆڕغکراون).ئەگەر رەچاوی ئەوە بکەین کە دەوترێت کە پ
 پەیوەندی نیوان سوپا و پارتی سیاسی 
 .سوپا سەر بە کێیە؟ ١
. چ کەسێک یا خود چ شتێک بەربەستی سەرکییە لە دامەزراندنی سوپایەکی نیشتمانی؟ یا خود چۆن دەکرێت هێزی پێشمەرگە ٢
 بکرێت بە هێزێکی نیشتمانی؟
 ی نێوان پارتی سیاسی و عەشیرەتپەیوەند
.هەرێمی کوردستان تا رادەیەک کۆمەڵگایەکی خێڵەکییە. بە سەیر کردن لە لیستی پارتەکەتان بۆ هەڵبژاردنەکانی پەرلەمانی ١
 ناوی هەندی کەسایەتی عەشایێری دەبینرێت. دەکرێت پێمان بڵێیت پەیوەندی ئێوە لەگەڵ عەشیرەتەکان چۆنە؟
زۆر جار لەنێوان بەها عەشایێرییەکان و بەهاکانی پێشکەوتن بەریەککەوتن دروست دەبێت. ئەمەش بەو . هەر وەک دەزانن ٢
مانایە دێت کە پارتە سیاسییەکان بەر پرسن لە چارەسەرکردنی ئەم کێشەیە. بۆچی پارتەکەی ئێوە هەنگاوی نەناوە یا خود رێ و 
 عەشایێرییەکان؟شوێنی پیویستی نەگرتووەبەر لە پێناو کەمکردنەوەی بەها 
 پرۆسەی دەرکردنی بڕیار لە ناو پارتە سیاسییەکان و پرسی سەرکردایەتی
 . پرۆسەی دروستکردنی بڕیار لە پارتەکەی ئێوەدا چۆنە؟١
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. بۆچی دیاردە جێگرتنەوەی سەرۆک لە ناو پارتەکەی ئێوەدا بوونی نییە؟ ئایا ئەوە بەو مانایە ناێت کە پارتەکە تاکەکەسییە ٢
 لەسەر بنەمای پەیوەندی خێزانی دامەزراوە؟یاخود 
. بە بڕوای هەندێ کەس کۆ بونەی هێز لە لایەن یەک کەسەوە دەبێتە هۆی بەرهەمهێنانی گەندەڵی. رای ئێوە لەم بارەیەوە ٣
 چییە؟
 پارتی سیاسی و کۆمەڵگا
پارە و بازرگانیکردن. ئەگەر وەها بێت  .زۆڕێک لە هاوڵاتیان دەڵێن کە پارتە سیاسییەکان تەنیا ئامرازێکن بۆ بەدەستهێنانی١
 چۆن پارتەکەتان گەشەسەندنی کۆمەڵایەتی و سیاسی بەرهەم بێنێت؟
. هەر پارتێکی سیاسی خاوەن هێزێکی میدیایی لەرادەبەدەرە (وەک تیڤی، رۆژنامە، رادیو، وێبسایت و گۆڤار) کە زۆڕ بە ١
 شەدا میدیا کار ناکات بۆ دابەشکردنی کۆمەڵگا لەبری یەکگرتنەوەی؟توندی ململانێی یەکتر دەکەن. بە رای ئێوە لەم جۆرە کە
 پرسیار لەبارەی دارایی پاری سیاسی
 .سەرچاوەی پارەدارکردنی پارتەکەتان چییە؟١
 پرسیارە لە بارەی ئایینەوە
 ئایینیە یان سێکولارە؟ پەیوەندی نێوان پارتەکەی ئێوە و ئایین چۆنە؟ ئایا پارتەکەی ئێوە پارتێکی
 سیارکانی پەرلەمانپر
 پرسیارە فاکتەکان
 .دەکرێت باس لە بەرپرسیارێتی یاخود پلەی خۆت لە ناوەوە و دەرەوەی پارتی سیاسی بکەیت؟١
 پڕۆسەی دروستکردنی بڕیار
.بەپێی پەیڕەوی ناوخۆی پەرلەمان، گشت ئەندامەکان مافی خۆپاڵاوتنیان بۆ دەستەی سەرۆکایەتی پەرلەمان هەیە (سەرۆک، ١
سەرۆک و سکرتێر). هەر کەسێک کە زۆڕترین دەنگ بەدەست بهێنێت دەتوانیت ئەم پۆستە بەڕێوە ببات. بەڵام لە گشت جێگر 
خولەکانی پەرلەماندا، ئەم پۆستانە بە پێی رێککەوتنی پێشوەختە لە نێوان پارتە سیاسییەکاندا  لە دەروەی پەرلەماندا دابەش کراون. 
 رای ئێوە لەم بارەوە چییە؟
ا خودێ پەرلەمان یاسا و بڕیارەکان دەردەکات یا خود پێشوەختە، مەکتەب سیاسی پارتە سیاسییەکان گفتوگۆی بابەتەکان لە . ئای٢
نێوان خۆیاندا دەکات؟ بۆ نمونە بابەتی دەستور و پرسی سەرۆکی هەرێم پێشوەختە لە نێوان پارتە سیاسییەکاندا گفتوگۆی لەسەر 
 کرابوو.
ڕیار تا چ رادەیەک ئەندام پەرلەمان توانیویەتی سەربەخۆ بێت؟ یا خود تا چ رادەیەک لە ژێر کۆنترۆلی . لە پرۆسەی دەرکردنی ب٣
پارتەکانیاندا بووە؟ چونکە زۆربەی کاتەکان، گشت ئەندامانی لیستێک پێکەوە یان پشتگیری لە بڕیار یان یاسایێک دەکەن یان 
 دژی دەوەستن.
 نەوە چییە و چۆنە؟. پەیوەندی ئێوە بە خەڵک و ناوچەکەتا٤
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 پەیوەنی نێوان پەلەمان و حکومەت
 .ئایا ئیوە وەک تاکێک هیچ کات لە دژی سیاسەتی پارتەکەتان دەنگتان داوە؟ ئەگەر بەڵێ بۆ؟ ئەگەر نا بۆ؟١
 پرسی بودجە
یەکان رێک بخات؟ .بۆچی تا هەنوکە پەرلەمان نەیتوانیوە سەرکەوتوو بێت لە دەرکردنی یاسایەک کە کار و چاڵاکی پارتە سیاسی١
 بە تایبەتیش پرسی بودجە.
. هەندێک لەو بڕوایەدان کە حکومەت/پەرلەمان پرسی بودجەی پارتە سیایسییەکان رێک ناخات، چونکە ئەمە دەبێتە هۆکارێک ٢
ەگەڵ بۆ کەمکردنەوەی هەژمونی سیاسی و کۆمەڵایەتی هەندێ پارتی سیاسی لەسەر فەزای گشتیدا. تا چ رادەیەک ئێوە هاوڕان ل
 ئەم بۆچونە؟
. بڕێکی زۆر لە بودجەی نەتەوەیی بۆ ئەندامانی پەرلەمان تەرخان کراوە، ئەوان ئێمتیازاتی فراوانیان هەیە وەک وەرگرتنی ٣
 ئۆتۆمۆبێل، خانو، حیمایە و موچە و پلە وپایەی باش. بەڕای ئیوە ئەمە جۆرێک لە گەندەڵی نییە؟
 پرسیارکانی حکومەت
 پرسیارە فاکتەکان
 .دەکرێت باس لە بەرپرسیارێتی یاخود پلەی خۆت لە ناوەوە و دەرەوەی پارتی سیاسی بکەیت؟١
 پەیوەندی نێوان حکومەت و پەرلەمان
ەوە کابینەی تەوافقییە لە نێوان ئەو پارتانەی کە ململانێی یەکتریان ٥٠٠٢.هەر وەک دەزانین کابینەی حکومەت هەر لە ساڵی ١
ملانێیە لە نیوان پارتە سیاسییەکاندا لە ناو حکومەت، پاڵنەر بووە بۆ بەدەستهێنانی بەرژەوەندی تایبەتی دەکرد. تا چ رادەیەک ئەم مل
 خۆیان کە دەکرێت ئەم بەرژەوەندیانە ببن بە بەربەست لە بەردەم کارایی حکومەت؟
ژێر دەستڕۆیی پارتەکەیاندان. . زۆرجار دەبینرێت وەزیرەکانی هەر پارتێک زۆرتر دەرگیری کێشەکانی ئەو دەڤەرانەن کە لە ٢
ئەمەش زۆر جار لە دیدار و چاو پیکەوتنەکاندا دەبینرێت کە وەزیرەکانی سەر بە 'پدک' زۆرتر تەرکیزیان لەسەر ناوچەی زەردە 
 جاران لە ناو ببات؟ ییو وەزیرەکانی 'ینک'یش لەسەر ناوچەی سەوز. بەم پێیەش ئایا حکومەت توانیویەتی سنوری دوو ئیدارە
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